



Air Power Conference 2012
“Air Power’s Role in Coercive Diplomacy”
- Chief of Air Force: Air Marshal Geoff Brown AO -
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(Check with delivery)

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of the Royal Australian Air Force, I am very pleased to welcome you all to the 2012 Air Power Conference.

It gives me very great pleasure to welcome in particular the many visitors from overseas, both Chiefs and senior officers of Air Forces (*update based on attendee list*) but also the many speakers who have travelled a long distance to contribute to our Air Power Conference. Thank you for your attendance and contribution toward making this event a success.

I am also pleased to welcome the many members of the retired community to the conference. Finally, it is good to observe that many serving officers, airmen and air women, and civilians of the RAAF are with us today.

It hopefully won’t have escaped your attention that the theme for this conference, *Air Power and Coercive Diplomacy*, will focus on the air operations undertaken by NATO forces over Libya in 2011. Nearly 16,000 kilometres from Libya (that’s 8,600 nautical miles for our non-metric friends), in the generally sunny climes of Canberra might seem a somewhat curious venue for a discussion on the use of air power and coercive diplomacy.

Curious not only because the Middle East and the events that took place, during what is commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, are very far removed from the continental landmass of Australia deep in the Asia Pacific.

Curious also because the often expeditionary Australian Defence Force played no direct role in these operations, and perhaps even more curious if one is to try to articulate a clear link between the aspirations of a group of Libyan rebel militants and Australian national security strategic priorities.

Yet links and connections there are. Links and connections that echo back through the years to the earliest adventures of Australian airmen aloft in the Australian Flying Corps’ experiences over the Libyan deserts at the start of the last century.

History – WWI. In the June of 1916 air crews of No 1 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, were involved in keeping watch over the activities of pro-Ottoman Arab Senussi tribesmen who were pressing across the western desert from Libya. On 13 October Captain (later Air Marshal and first Chief of the Air Staff) Richard Williams and Lieutenants Murray Jones and Lawrence Wackett—names prominent in the later RAAF—took part in a particularly memorable mission to follow-up reports that the Senussi were withdrawing back into Libyan territory. While Jones and Williams took their aircraft over the nearer oases, Wackett went out as far west as Siwa, virtually on the Libyan border, and used his machine guns to add some ‘hurry up’ to the last of the retreating Senussi that he found.

History – WWII. During World War II, a number of RAAF squadrons took part in the battles for air supremacy that occurred in the skies over what is now the eastern half of Libya between 1940 and 1943. RAAF airmen who became almost household names—men such as Peter Jeffrey, Nicky Barr, Bobby Gibbes, including Clive Caldwell, the top-scoring fighter ace of the entire war —came to prominence during the fierce aerial contests which characterised the war in the desert. The strength of the RAAF presence is testified to by the 64 members of the Service that today remain buried in war cemeteries in Libya.

Our operations in the Mediterranean may not be recent, but past experiences have taught us that there are many valuable operational and geopolitical lessons we can draw on from the experiences our friends and allies gained during the recent activities over Libya.

Why are we having this conference? A unifying belief we share with our friends and allies is the importance of stability, peace and order in securing our national interests. Air power plays a large role in the maintenance of these interests. But the face of modern air power is changing, becoming more complex, and we bear the responsibility to question our understanding of air power in light of contemporary operations. This conference will provide you the opportunity to examine the underlying principles of our family business; Control of the Air, Strike, ISR, and Air Mobility, against the realities of the recent operations.

The intent of the program is twofold.

Firstly, to provide a considered perspective on the contemporary and evolving international security environment. We will do this through an examination of the 2011 events in the Middle East, especially those associated with what is generally called the 'Arab Spring';

Secondly, to investigate the use of air power in Libya within the context of the generally coercive strategy employed by NATO;

The program will meet this intent by focussing each day's activities around these themes;

Day one looks at the contemporary security environment and the theoretical basis of coercive diplomacy and the use of air power as a coercive instrument; and

Day two will investigate the actual conduct of operations over Libya. Our discussion for each day is directed to lead logically from a consideration of the global security environment to the operational implications of employing modern air power today.

By examining the setting and concepts, then comparing these against the actual experiences, we can learn much about the relationship between theory and practice, and importantly the complexity of elements that allow ideas to be turned into operations.

Why is it important to Air Force and Australia?

Interests. All states identify interests they need to pursue outside their own borders in order to protect their people, expand their economies and, more generally, shape the world in which they want to live.

Engagement. Australia and Australians have been deeply engaged with the international community of states since European settlement. As a small population occupying a large, resource-rich continent distant from our traditional security partners and markets, our gaze as a nation has typically been outwards.

International influence. Australian governments have long recognised that our national security and prosperity are profoundly affected not just by domestic and regional issues, but by international events across the globe.

Concept of interests. As our country has matured so too have our perceptions of national interests and national security. We have moved beyond simple expressions of the need to ensure our physical security and the protection of our resources, to include the active advocacy of the rule of international law, the rights to life and dignity of all mankind and a range of normative precepts which have shaped and conditioned a stable and democratic world order.

Geopolitical realities. Australia's has a long and distinguished tradition of expeditionary military action. We also have a decade's long history of active diplomacy and aid engagement in Asia and the Pacific. Together with our strong commitment to multilateral trade liberalisation our commitment to the region and beyond reflects our enduring geopolitical realities.

Responsibility of government. Maintaining Australia's national security is of course a fundamental responsibility of government, and much of our diplomacy has been directed to that end. That diplomacy has over the years been backed by our credible and capable Defence Force, and Air Power has long been an integral element of the nation's security strategy.

Conference importance. As a flexible and responsive capability, Australian air power has proven effective in contributing to national security across a spectrum of operations, contingencies and crises. The nature of air power is such that it is possible to tailor a force response option appropriate to the context, the outcomes sought and the means available.

These response options can range from all forms of kinetic and non-kinetic support to diplomatic activity to the application of lethal combat force. Not only is air power readily scalable in the quantity and character of the force available but can be employed under a number of what we generally call air power strategies.

From deterrence, through denial and punishment to defeating an adversary, air power strategies allow air power to be tailored to the ends, ways and means of a wide variety of circumstances. The use of air power as a coercive force is one available option that has, at least since the use of force in Bosnia in 1995, proven to be a popular if not always entirely effective option.

In the UN sanctioned NATO use of force over Libya in 2011 we find ostensibly the latest manifestation of this air power option. In this conference we intend to thoroughly examine this proposition and in doing so gain a greater appreciation of the types and scale of air power options available to Governments today. This sort of examination is, I would suggest, of considerable importance to Air Forces and governments around the globe, and especially in the West where air power plays such a pivotal role in national defence structures.

What will the conference cover?

Strategic environment. Understanding the context of our discussions is essential in understanding why air power is such an enticing option to a government considering using a strategy based on coercive diplomacy. Dr Chris Clark, our Air Force Historian, will offer an insight into the origins of coercive diplomacy and some of its earlier forms. We will open the session after morning tea with a consideration of the strategic context within which we locate this episode air power.

The distinguished Professor Amin Saikal from the Australian National University will provide an insight into the events surrounding the Arab Spring that ignited much of the wave of change that

swept through the Middle East. His insights will I am sure will not only be highly informative and penetrating but will ably lay the foundation for further discussion.

His colleague, the also very distinguished Professor Ramesh Thakur, will bring into focus the objectives behind last year's military operations in Libya.

Professor Thakur was instrumental in the development of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle adopted by the UN and held up by some to be the justification for this intervention into Libya. We certainly look forward to his perspective.

Coercive diplomacy Our speakers this afternoon will step through the conceptual underpinnings of the use of force and diplomacy in Libya. First, Professor Jentleson a world leader in this field, will explore the concept of coercive diplomacy in the modern world. How do we conceive it? Is it a bridge between policy and strategy? Is it an appropriate mix of force and diplomacy?

Following this our very good friend, Dr Ben Lambeth, will discuss the many faces of air power since the end of the Cold War. How and when has air power been effective as an instrument of coercion?

Dr Eric Larson from RAND, who was a key author on the very influential 1999 RAND publication *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*, will then discuss in some detail the theoretical and practical considerations of using air power to these purposes.

Finally, Dr Christian Enemark will take a somewhat different approach and discuss the ethical considerations of using air power within a coercive strategy – considerations which I am sure will be reflected again in discussion tomorrow.

Libyan campaign. Tomorrow, as I have hinted, we will look at the Libyan campaign in greater detail. It is true that perception is everything, so I am grateful to have a broad range of presentations from our colleagues from the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, United Arab Emirates, France, and Italy to provide reflections from their experiences. Dr Sanu Kainkara will provide a small air force's perspective on the coercive use of air power.

'Why is a conference on air power discussing the spectrum of diplomacy'?

The answer, which I hope will become more evident as the conference progresses, is that the path from diplomacy to war is in fact a continuum of sorts. It's not an especially obvious or clearly distinguishable path for sure, but as Clausewitz would remind us, the relationship between policy and war is a close and enduring one. Of particular concern for us here are those areas and those circumstances when force and diplomacy, the power of the pen and the power of the sword, overlap.

Libya as a case study. When diplomatic suasion is stiffened with the sharp edge of steel, the relationship between politics and war is most critical and perhaps most obvious. The events over Libya last year offer us, I would suggest, a very useful case study of this delicate dance. But why is this particularly relevant to air power? The answer perhaps lies in the proposition that air power is a scalable entity that can be applied across the continuum of diplomacy and force.

There is no doubt for example, that airlift support in response to a humanitarian crisis or a natural disaster is a useful adjunct to diplomatic engagement. Or that using air delivered munitions to help convince President Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate in Kosovo in 1999 is an example of air power acting to coerce and persuade. In these examples air power is seen as a form of force that can bridge the gap between diplomacy and force, it can have utility beyond simple kinetic effect. Understanding that utility, as it was demonstrated in Libya, is the objective of this conference.

What is the role for air power?

Military response. Air power, as I am sure this conference will reiterate, is a flexible and useful form of force, within the coordinated total military response available to governments. Ordinarily and certainly in the Australian context, air, land and maritime forces are only ever considered as part of an integrated joint package.

However, circumstances can, and have in the past, dictated that the nature of the military force possible within the coordinated strategy are tightly constrained by diplomatic, political, economic or some other critical factor. Surely this was largely the case in Libya. It is clear that regardless of our strategic circumstances and strategic priorities, conflicts can and do arise that demand military responses.

But perhaps less clear is the fact that more often than not, in contexts short of total war, the nature and character of the force options possible are, as I have suggested, substantially determined by other than operational considerations. A reflection on the history of 'limited conflicts' in the past twenty years, would highlight the fact that often the only acceptable, or possible, or expedient, force options seriously considered have been air power ones.

Again I might suggest this was the case in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1999, and perhaps in Libya in 2011.

Generating response. In some respects air power is a victim of its own apparent success. The ability to generate agile and responsive force options, when the use of ground forces is explicitly 'off the table', has led some to suggest that air power has become, and indeed sees itself as, a "weapon of first choice".

This is certainly a contested notion, and one that has led to some overstatement of air power's ability to shape and influence on the one hand, and a misrepresentation of the limits of air power to influence on the other. It's perhaps worth taking just a few moments to lay out in very simple terms the dimensions of this argument, as it tends to distort accurate and reasonable understanding of the role and place of air power in modern conflicts.

Weapon of first choice. Air power has, as I have suggested, come to be seen by some as a weapon of first choice. Primarily, I would suggest this view is based on a few key assumptions.

First, that there are times and circumstances when air power is seen as the only viable and palatable military option open to governments.

Second, it has proven to be very successful, within certain bounds, at delivering effective and lethal force.

Third, it is generally perceived, because of the outstanding quality of much of Western air power, as a low risk, low casualty option. The spectre of incurring significant battlefield casualties in the prosecution of limited wars of limited consequence or strategic significance is a daunting possibility for any government.

If however, force can be applied, successfully, responsively and most importantly with limited risk of friendly casualty, then that form of force becomes especially, perhaps irresistibly, attractive. This I would suggest has been the lot of modern Western air power probably since the early 1990s.

There are however, some contended propositions in this whole matter. It is not entirely evident for example how truly decisive air power has been on its own in such instances. This is not to suggest that air power has failed or not delivered what has been asked of it, for clearly air power has delivered in spectacular fashion.

Measured decisiveness. Rather, how do we measure decisiveness? Or perhaps even more pertinent, how do we measure air power's ability or capacity to coerce? How do we know that our air power actions produce the kinds of coercive effects we intend? We might plan to shape and influence an adversary through our application of scalable, precise and proportionate air power effects, but how do we measure their real coercive impact?

It is a quandary that I think echoes the classic work of Professor Robert Jervis on *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. It's probably not a puzzle we will solve in the next few days, but an examination of the use of air power in Libya can certainly inform our thinking on the matter.

Whether or not air power is a weapon of first choice, or whether some governments see it that way or not, is I think an important issue. As practitioners of modern air power, which many of us here today are, we owe a duty of responsibility to our governments to offer the very best and most intelligent advice concerning the employment of air power we can.

In order to do this we need to understand air power in all its manifestations, its powerful effects, its limitations, and its use of both hard and soft power. It is my hope that conferences like this one will further our ability to do this.

Air diplomacy

Many faces of diplomacy. Before we launch into what happens when persuasion fails, I want to discuss another option air power offers other than the use as a tool in coercive operations; its soft power utility. Air diplomacy is not a term that is commonly bantered about when we think of the Air Force, but in fact it has been a role we have played for much of our history. Air diplomacy is a concept broadly understood to encompass the use of airpower for diplomatic purposes. Now for many people when we hear the word diplomacy we automatically picture embassies, foreign affairs officers and cocktail parties. But in essence diplomacy means so much more and has many faces.

Types of diplomacy. Dr. Adam Lowther of the US Air Force Research Institute suggests there are at least thirteen different types of diplomacy, each differentiated by the means employed and ends sought. Each type varies to a significant degree but has overlap with other forms. Some of these include elements of traditional, commercial, public, humanitarian, protective, deterrence, military, and of course coercive diplomacy. In each of these types air power's speed, range, and flexibility offers government with scalable options to achieve the ends sought.

With our focus over the previous decade on operations, it is easy to forget that there are many other tasks the military can undertake to achieve the degree of influence the government seeks in the international arena. However, air power in particular is a tool surreptitiously employed to contribute to many of the diplomatic tasks.

Humanitarian air diplomacy. The most visible of these missions is the *humanitarian aid tasks* we have engaged in; from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami assistance, earthquake relief tasks in Pakistan and Iran, floods and cyclone relief across eastern Australia, through to the support to Japan in the aftermath of the last year's tragic tsunami.

Traditional diplomacy however, is the conduct of activities performed by government officials in the course of normal international relationships. Air Force has been active in its support to events such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government, APEC meetings, and support for visiting heads of state. From VIP transport to the security of surrounding airspace, Air Force has played a significant part in the conduct of these proceedings.

Military air diplomacy. Diplomacy does not end when war begins. And, in many instances, foreign governments and their citizens interact with the military far more regularly than do members of the Foreign Service. For the Air Force this means every airman that serves abroad or interacts with foreign military on our shores is a diplomat of sort.

Normalised interaction. This rationale elevates engagement to a higher level of importance; and the RAAF has a long history of engagement. The more we engage with other militaries the more normalised our interactions. This approach has a two major advantages.

Firstly, each military gains a greater appreciation of their modus operandi so if we engage in a coalition action our forces are best placed to work as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Secondly, and arguably of most importance, if our militaries were to find each other in the same airspace during a period of rising tension, we understand how to respond to each other in manner that does not escalate the situation into conflict.

We have all heard the stories of encounters between US and Soviet aircraft during the Cold War that escalated tensions beyond where either party intended. Arguably, much of the source of these tensions was the result of decisions-makers not fully understanding why the other was acting in a particular manner. Regular engagement between militaries can mitigate the potential for a spiralling of tension.

Expanded engagement. The RAAF has in the past, and will continue into the future, undertake regular exercises with other regional Air Forces. With the commencement of regular deployments of US Marine Expeditionary Units in the Northern Territory, we envision that not only our level of engagement will expand but also the amount of engagement by other regional Air Forces with our US allies.

US engagement. Large US activity in the North is not new. We have regularly hosted US forces on exercises that involved not only our Air Force but also those of our regional partners. Many of those present today would recall during the 1980s and 90s, the regular sight of US B-52 bombers in Darwin after conducting training on Delamere and our northern ranges. Many of these aircraft originated from Guam or even CONUS. We knew how to operate with and around these forces due to our regular interaction.

I see only a greater normalisation of contact between our respective Air Forces.

Cost effectiveness? Air diplomacy works best before a crisis emerges, but, as in many cases with diplomacy, the results largely are intangible. How do we prove that the diplomatic actions we undertook contributed to reduce the potential for a crisis? How do we justify in a fiscally challenged environment that our actions are cost effective. How do we present a business case for something that cannot be proved?

The answer is we don't. We acknowledge the efficacy of diplomacy as a process that contributes to national security and undertake a range of activities that fulfil operational requirements while cultivating air diplomacy endeavours.

Air power operations

But the question we seek to answer in at least some measure over the next two days is what role does air power play when other types of diplomacy fail and the government turns to a coercion diplomatic approach?

Options. Our speakers will describe how coercion is not a binary, on or off, framework. The type and scale of response will be dependent on the situation and the objective. Air power's innate characteristics of speed, reach and flexibility provides the government with a broad range of operational options.

Air power can be reactive or proactive, dependent upon the situation the government faces. It can provide options that can be as proportionate and discriminatory as required to achieve the desired objective. And be in no doubt, strategic decision-makers expect to be provided with a range of response options to choose from. Options that allow greater political scope.

Ratcheting. As you will hear, a central characteristic of coercion is the ratcheting of measures intended to force a targeted audience to change the current status quo to a new state desired by us. An unwillingness to shift to the altered status quo results in a new level of coercion. It is within this space where air power is so effective.

Scalable response. Our speed, reach, precision and agility allows a scalable response across a large area of operations, and as we saw in the Libyan operations, can turn the tide in favour of whichever side is able to employ air power most effectively.

The scalability of air power can be seen through the transition from a no-fly zone into operations against Libyan loyalist ground forces. Initial coalition air power was focused on protecting the Libyan civilians from air attacks. The establishment of an non-fly zone successfully halted Qaddafi using air power to persecute any opposition to his forces. When his ground forces did not stop targeting civilians, air power impeded much of his ground force's mobility. This action not only reduced the amount of civilian casualties, but also enabled rebel forces to gain an upper hand. Air power shifted the asymmetrical advantage across to the rebel forces.

Above all, we must not lose sight of the fact that our top end war fighting functions and capabilities matter and we should not lose sight of that, even in low-ish level conflict like Libya, the speed, reach and precision of combat air power was the key.

Air power's flexibility. Air power's flexibility as an instrument of national policy, be it coercive, humanitarian or whatever, is the single greatest capability the RAAF can bring to the Government. And for our strategic decision-makers, there must be a clear understanding of what air power can and cannot achieve when a coercive diplomatic approach is considered.

Precision. We will observe over the next few days some of the important insights to come out of the Libyan conflict. One of the most important to note is that precision relies not just on the delivery platform, but the systemic capabilities that underpin the weapon system. Intelligence and persistent ISR are critical to achieving the level of precision that our governments have come to expect.

PED. We cannot attain the level of precision expected unless we can achieve a degree of fidelity in the analysis of our ISR. And while some our process can be automated, the real driver behind this fidelity is people. The greater the level of precision the more specialised people we will need.

Persistent ISR. The Air Force is fortunate to be bringing into service, capabilities of the quality of Wedgetail, P-8 and long-endurance unmanned systems that will provide persistent ISR into the future.

Electronic warfare. However, for me the other major lesson from Libya was the critically of electronic warfare to the ability of NATO to employ air power to the desired level. Even in a relatively low threat environment, aircraft can be vulnerable to the capabilities of an adversary's air and land defence systems. Electronic warfare reduces that risk and substantially increases the chances of mission success.

Operation Odyssey Dawn saw the E/A-18G Growler making its combat debut. The growler was instrumental in shutting down the majority of the Libyan surface to air missile systems, opening the door for other aircraft to operate unimpeded across the Libyan airspace.

Airborne EW has been widely used in the suppression of enemy air defences, but in a first, the Growler conducted operations against tanks. Whether the Growler directly targeted the tanks electronics, or jammed their communications opening them up to attacks from other platforms is open to discussion, but the capability to do both is resident in the aircraft.

The next generation jammer system, which will be hosted on the growler, is capable of more than jamming radars, it has the potential to disable remotely detonated IEDs, and conduct air-launched cyber attacks. Anything that works in the electromagnetic spectrum will be fair game.

As the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughhead described – Growlers were kept busy '*banging trons over Tripoli*'. The Growler is truly a game-changer and a capability that the Air Force will look to exploit to the maximum.

Growler. This is why I am so passionate about the force-multiplier effects we will gain from the potential conversion of 12 of our Super Hornets into E/A-18G Growlers. Success in the current and future battlespace rides on the ability to use reactive and pre-emptive electronic jamming of airborne and land-based radar and communication systems, in concert with specialised weapons designed to suppress an enemy's air defences. The Growler will provide our force with a combat advantage that will could be the decisive effect in any conflict.

Asymmetric advantage. A key facet of coercive diplomacy is to convince an adversary that we hold an asymmetric advantage over their force that we can and will use if required. The introduction into service of the Joint Strike Fighter is the trump card in our asymmetric deck that will provide the government with an enhanced range of response options.

The future operational environment will become increasingly more difficult to access due to improving military technologies. The risk to our air, sea and land forces will only increase as more nations employ anti-access and area denial capabilities.

It is these types of environments that the 5th generation demonstrates its asymmetric worth and lesser generation aircraft will struggle to survive.

Why 5th Generation? Why is 5th generation so important?

Our approach to high-end war fighting capabilities is to ensure we can achieve a level of lethality and survivability that exceeds those of past, present, and future potential adversaries. Well while I cannot predict the future, one important lesson I take away from history is that the next conflict will not look like any of the previous ones. Fighting the last war is a fatal mistake for any nation. We need a

combat system that delivers on our prime responsibility, that of control of the air, across the entire spectrum of conflict. 5th generation aircraft provide this capability, and for Australia, the JSF is the weapon system that will meet our need for many decades.

Red Flag. It will be able to fight and win in the anti-access, area denial environment where most other fighters will struggle. It brings to the fight a degree of networking that is a force multiplier not only for airborne forces but its sensor data can be shared with other ground and maritime elements to enhance the battlespace picture in real-time. I have seen the asymmetrical advantages close up. During a recent Red Flag exercise I had the privilege of flying in a dual F-15 against a few F-22 Raptors. I learnt the hard way about being on the wrong side of a 5th generation fight.

Each time we crossed into the box to start hunting we would get a radio call that we had been killed. So we would turn around and try again. Let me tell you after this happened five times with not even a hint of seeing your opponent, it becomes very frustrating. The biggest revelation came in the debrief when we reviewed the tapes. The only thing we could see on our tapes was the aircraft in our package. But on the F-22 tapes it was like looking at a God's eye view. Every aircraft was there, clear as day.

The lesson was; second best still costs a lot and can deliver in some environments, but when put to the test may give you nothing.

JSF. The 5th generation JSF brings a new meaning to the term combat lethality. It will bring with it for the first time, our ability to hold at risk a range of regional targets across our maritime environment from extended stand-off range through the employment of JASSM.

This is a significant capability that alters the calculus of power projection in the region. Our operating environment is not becoming any less complex and we do not expect our preparedness requirements to reduce. The requirement to maintain persistent air coverage in most operational environments is a key element of our preparedness.

In high-end war fighting, capacity counts almost as much as capability. To give you an example, during Operational Iraqi Freedom, just to maintain three Combat Air Patrols 24/7 at 600nm from base required 155 fighters and 32 AWACs, Tankers, JSTARS and Prowlers. Our single squadron of F/A-18s, provided 12 aircraft for 8 hours per day. Consider what would be needed to project a CAP over an amphibious task force as well as a on-call close air support (CAS) CAP over a embarked combat team. Throw on the requirement to provide protection for other points of vital national interest, you can easily see that anything less than 100 JSF limits the options available to government and provides only a boutique capability.

Closing

In closing, over the following days I want you to reflect on what was achieved by the Libyan operation as well as what was not.

Air power helped to ensure that civil deaths by the hand of troops loyal to Qadhafi were reduced. And I would argue that air power directly contributed to the over throw of the Qadhafi regime through its support to the rebel alliance. But because Qadhafi did not capitulate to the United Nations or NATO, we have to question the effectiveness of a coercive strategy. So while I believe that there is little doubt as to the effectiveness of air power during this campaign, as we progress through this conference I challenge you to ask yourself the questions; what was the strategic coercive objective and what was the true effect of air power?

The face of modern air power is changing. Our approach to air power today will shape our ability to influence the events of tomorrow. In addition, while we did not play a role in this Libyan campaign, it is quite possible the type of conflict the Australian Government may call upon us to undertake in the future.

The Air Force needs to continue to understand the dynamics and politics of complex security circumstances like Libya, so we are best placed to offer expert intelligent advice to Government on the use of air power. As our Air Force has no recent first hand coercive diplomacy experience, we need to learn from others. I invite you to listen with interest to our speakers over the following days.

Thank you