Chief of Air Force’s Reading List 2017

Air Marshal Leo Davies, AO, CSC
January 2017
Preface

Books, in all their variety, offer the human intellect the means whereby civilisation may be carried triumphantly forward.

Sir Winston Churchill

As Director of the Air Power Development Centre (APDC) I am fortunate to regularly interact with and receive feedback from Air Force members who undertake the various air power education programs the APDC provides. Be they residential courses, such as the Air Power Trainers Course, one of the suite of online Air Power Courses – Basic, Intermediate or Advanced, or attendance at one of the regular Air Power seminars, I am invariably impressed by the enthusiastic pursuit of air power knowledge by Air Force’s men and women. We are privileged to be serving in an era of almost total force renewal. To ensure Government and the nation receives the ‘best bang for its buck’, we must all strive to achieve the best outcomes with the tools with which we are equipped. We are trained in a broad range of professional specialisations, be it logistician, engineer, technician, analyst, or any one of a range of others. However, we all share the common attribute of being professional airmen.

The Chief of Air Force’s Reading List 2017 is released two years into the transformation of Air Force, guided by Plan Jericho, and following Government’s articulation of defence policy in the Defence White Paper 2016. Taken together, these programs acknowledge the challenges of developing an integrated force, capable of operations in an increasingly complex and uncertain world. Titles for this Reading List have been selected for their relevance to the environment in which Air Force finds itself and will have to continue to develop strategies for success. I particularly commend Ghost Fleet to the reader. Although set in a fictional near future, the extrapolation of current technology makes this a plausible, and disturbing, future war-fighting environment. Those who attended the 2016 Air Power Conference will remember one of the co-authors, Mr August Cole, spoke on this topic to great effect.

As the Chief of Air Force states in his Foreword, tailored reading is a critical tool in equipping ourselves for the journey of developing and delivering air power. Nineteen titles form the recommended reading in the 2017 List, covering: air power concepts, strategy and doctrine; air power issues; command, leadership, management and ethics; air power history; biographies and memoirs; and a brief selection of fiction. The second section of the booklet contains a list of enduring

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1 Retrieved 31 August, 2016, from Churchill Central website: https://www.churchillcentral.com/quote
works that form a solid foundation for a professional library for every Air Force member and air power enthusiast. The final section contains the titles reviewed in the 2014 and 2015 lists, with a link to the APDC web site where lists back to 2010 can be found.

The *Chief of Air Force’s Reading List* 2017 is neither an exhaustive nor definitive list of titles of relevance to air power practitioners. The APDC welcomes suggestions, and reviews, by readers for inclusion in future Lists.

**Mark Green**  
Group Captain  
Director, Air Power Development Centre  
January 2017
A rock pile ceases to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates it, bearing within him the image of a cathedral.
Antoine de St-Exupery

Air Force is currently embarked upon an intense period of transformation. Enviably, the Air Force of 2025 will operate one of the youngest, most capable inventories in the world, with our oldest platform being the venerable C-130J. By 2025, we will have introduced to service the P-8A Poseidon, EA-18G Growler, F-35 Lightning II, MQ-4C Triton and PC-21 training aircraft. These cutting edge systems will join F/A-18F Super Hornets, E-7A Wedgetails, KC-30 MRTTs, C-17 Globemaster IIIIs and C-27 Spartans, equipping Air Force with a potent and capable array of aircraft. These platforms will be ably supported and enabled by a technologically advanced ground environment. We will be a balanced force, capable in our own right and an indispensable part of the information-enabled Joint Force. Airmen know, however, that platforms and systems alone do not constitute capability. Technical mastery, the ability to skilfully operate and sustain capabilities to extract optimal performance from them, is a hallmark of all competent air forces. As important to effectively delivering air power, and a discriminator of the very best air forces, is professional mastery.

Professional mastery develops by building on technical mastery with the inquisitiveness of an informed mind. Professional mastery includes the ability to continually improve, to innovate and to evolve capability through the perpetual development of operating concepts, techniques and procedures. It builds on past experience while remaining open to new, sometimes radical, ideas. For Air Force to hone its professional mastery requires a workforce of thinking practitioners. Tailored reading is a critical tool in equipping ourselves with the basis upon which to apply our own experience and technical skills to innovate Air Force into the future. US President Harry S. Truman stated, ‘Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers’. Each of us has a role to play in leading the Air Force forward, and we will be better prepared to do so having taken the time to read, absorb and integrate the knowledge acquired, into our professional lives.

The Chief of Air Force’s Reading List 2017 includes titles specific not only to air power, but also offers a spectrum of titles covering historical, technological and organisational themes with applicability to the air power practitioner. I encourage you to draw from this List in your reading. The time taken is an investment in your professional development. 

personal development, and a contribution to the betterment of Air Force in the service of the nation, its people and your fellow airmen.

Leo Davies, AO, CSC
Air Marshal
Chief of Air Force
January 2017
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In *Airpower Reborn*, Norwegian Air Force Colonel and prolific air power scholar, John Andreas Olsen has assembled five essays from five leading air power and strategy scholars for the purpose of re-caging the discussion on air power. Olsen’s introduction clearly and succinctly lays out the issues that the book seeks to address. Since World War I, air power professionals and theorists have had to overcome an ‘entrenched force-on-force and battlefield-oriented war-fighting paradigm,’ and ‘have had to justify accomplishments against unrealistic expectations rather than against actual results.’ These obstacles have detracted from creating a viable and influential theory to guide and inform strategy and operations. The aim of the book is to break with air power’s conceptual past and establish a new basis for air power theory, one divorced from the land-centric obsession with the *battle* and built instead upon the concept of *strategic paralysis*. Establishing a new concept of air power, however, cannot be achieved simply by writing a book, a fact that is tacitly acknowledged in Olsen’s introductory chapter. Instead, it requires air power professionals to think, understand, explain, and advocate for a new paradigm.

Well structured and well argued, the five core chapters of *Airpower Reborn* guide the reader skilfully through the book’s central argument. Each chapter builds on the previous to provide a logical development of the case for a shift in the way air power is understood, explained, developed and employed. As a result, the book hits its mark.

Although well written, *Airpower Reborn* is challenging, as should be expected from a book that seeks to spark a paradigm-shift in military thought. Accordingly, it is not a book that can simply be read, absorbed and quoted; rather, it requires the reader to engage with the ideas, question their own assumptions and those of the authors, and debate the concepts that the authors advocate. For this reason, this book is a must read for any Air Force Officer attending Command and Staff College as it will provide a strong foundation from which to understand, debate, and further develop a working knowledge of air power theory and strategy. It also has much to offer a broader readership wishing to deepen their understanding of air power’s history and future. Although some readers may not be swayed by the case the book presents, the quality of the chapters will challenge the engaged reader to think deeply about the points that are raised.
The book provides the genesis of how the USAF became the largest user of armed unmanned aircraft systems in the world, and how that has affected the way in which they have subsequently conducted warfare.

The story is told from two parallel but equally enthralling points of view. First, that of the brilliant Israeli Air Force aeronautical engineer asked to build sacrificial unmanned target aircraft to ‘absorb’ enemy fire. Second, the point of view of two entrepreneurial American brothers who came up with the idea of coupling the fledging GPS navigation systems to an aircraft autopilot to allow it to fly itself. The story provides an insight into the resistance of senior Air Force officials (and not just the USAF) to the introduction of unmanned aircraft, and contrasts that with the insight of the few individuals who refused to let the new capability die an early death.

The story has a great breadth of characters, from the Israeli engineer and millionaire entrepreneurs to rogue fighter pilots, the CIA and cunning Pentagon capability development officers. Whilst it is largely what the USAF Big Safari program is known for, the book highlights what can be achieved if red tape can be removed and the smart operators and engineers are permitted to get on with the job of developing the capability. The story of how the USAF finally arrived at the current technical arrangement for operating the aircraft from continental United States (so called remote split operations) is particularly instructive.

Whilst the USAF is no longer the sole user (or developer) of armed unmanned aircraft, the MQ-1 Predator is first to be considered a production asset that started the paradigm of ‘drone’ warfare across the globe. This book passes no moral or legal judgments on the technology or the employment of the capability. It is simply a factual recollection of the development of the MQ-1 Predator and is highly recommended.
Although ‘strategic’ has long been part of the air power professional’s vocabulary, it is normally used as an adjective to emphasise air power’s speed and reach; strategic strike and strategic airlift being the most notable examples. Understanding the concept of strategy itself and how it relates to the acquisition, development, and employment of air power is, however, a requirement for members of the Royal Australian Air Force if it is to realise its goal of becoming a 5th-Generation force. *Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower* is a book that will shape the minds of Air Force’s present and future strategists and leaders.

This book is a collection of essays on a complex subject, written by past and present faculty of the United States Air Force (USAF) School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). SAASS is a selective graduate school within the USAF’s Air University, aimed at educating a small cadre of strategists and leaders whose role it will be to shape the strategy, policy, capabilities and operational employment of the USAF now and into the future. The book captures the essence of the SAASS program and will challenge many readers.

Challenging though it may be, *Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower* is a necessary addition to the library of anyone serious about understanding the relationship and relevance of strategy to air power. It is not a book to be read once and then left on the shelf as a symbol of the owner’s intellect, but one that should be the subject of regular re-engagement. This is the book’s key strength. Air Force’s strategists and leaders will find chapters in this book that they will continually refer to and regularly re-read. By so doing, their appreciation and understanding of strategy as a concept will grow.

The book is strongly recommended for anyone wishing to deepen their understanding of the concept of strategy and its relationship to air power. It is a must read for those planning to attend Command and Staff College or the School of Defence and Strategic Studies.
Strategy: A History
details a largely Western-centric view of the evolution of strategy. It charts the historical experience of how strategic thought has developed and how it has influenced the military and government strategy as well as revolutions and business enterprises. The author, Sir Lawrence Freedman, is the Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College, London and is well credentialed to write such a broad exposé, almost unlimited by time or context when considering its subject matter.

The chronological sequence of case studies used by Freedman progressively inducts the reader into his view of what strategy is, what its limitations are and some of the counter-theories which have endeavoured to challenge the effeteness and relevance of strategic practice in national conflicts. It is the very diversity of case studies that Freedman has used to highlight his points that both sets this book apart from the many other books on the subject and provides the reader a multifaceted series of contexts from which to draw salient lessons. Nor does Freedman limit his case studies to mainstream historical examples. Animal behavioural science, the Old Testament, Milton's Paradise Lost and Tolstoy's War and Peace are liberally exploited by Freedman as mechanisms to get his point across. The author has explored the core theorists, practitioners and critical observers, who have influenced the development of strategic thought. Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Napoleon are all examined as are more recent theorists such as von Moltke, Liddell Hart, Lenin and Mao Zedong.

Freedman's work does not however remain in the past, and it is in his examination of more contemporary case studies that the diversity of strategic application becomes apparent. The influence of business investment into economic research, the rise of institutes such as RAND, the work of theorists such as William Riker and Thomas Schelling are all studied and used as examples by Freedman in expounding his own theories of strategic practice.

There are many positives to Freedman's book—the diversity of content, the engaging and very readable text, inductive style and, at times, surprising choice of case study material, to name a few. They combine to make Freedman's Strategy: A History an ideal primer on the subject.
The employment of air power in support of UN operations is little researched and poorly understood. This is a logical, though unfortunate, reflection of the primacy of land forces in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. However, as Air Power in UN Operations highlights, air power has a long history in support of the full spectrum of UN military missions. From the Congo in 1960 through to Haiti in 2010, it is a history full of lessons that hint at the potentialities to be exploited and challenges to be overcome if the UN and its member states are to reap the benefits air power offers. However, although Air Power in UN Operations provides a useful introduction to the subject matter, it does not provide the ‘conceptual base to examine joint [UN] air ground operations’ called for by Lieutenant General Roméo A. Dallaire (Retd) in the book’s foreword.

The division of the book into six parts is logical. Part I introduces the challenges of UN air power through examination of operations in the Congo between 1960 and 1964. Parts II to V address the four core air power roles: air mobility, ISR, control of the air (no-fly zones) and strike. The book concludes by looking to the future of UN air power. Although well structured, the book appears to suffer from an absence of clear direction to the various authors on the editor’s principal intent, the result being that within each part the individual chapters are at times not well connected.

Viewed individually, some of the chapters provide unique and interesting insights into UN air operations. For example, the chapter on air power in Sarajevo provides an excellent ground-up perspective of UN air power in support of complex operations. More relevant to the ADF, ‘Humanitarian Relief in Haiti, 2010’ examines how the US Air Force and the UN refined their relationship during the humanitarian response to the Haitian earthquakes. These lessons and the recommendations provided by the author to overcome them would be useful for anyone involved in the planning and execution of expeditionary humanitarian operations.

Air Power in UN Operations lays the foundation for what is an increasingly relevant area of research. Various chapters deal with a range of novel yet important aspects of UN air power, such as command of multinational forces; the control, coordination and integration of different national air and ground elements; and the potential of remotely piloted aircraft systems as a key feature of future UN missions.

This book highlights that air power plays an important role in the effectiveness and efficiency of UN military missions. Air Power in UN Operations is recommended for those with an interest in air power history, air power in non-traditional operations or UN operations more generally.
The book provides an easily digestible synopsis of key lessons from hybrid wars spanning the Roman campaigns in Germania, the American Revolution, Napoleonic Wars and finally the French and US hybrid wars in Indochina in the 20th century. The historical case studies are instructive and provide the reader with an intellectual basis to assimilate relevance and meaning to contemporary ADF operations. Hybrid warfare is not new; however, the alignment of key lessons over thousands of years of conflict may challenge some readers to ask how history will ultimately judge contemporary ADF campaigns within which they may have personal equity.

A modern maxim is the phrase ‘winning the peace is as important as winning the war’. This point was as pertinent in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71 as it is today. In strategising how to manage a defeated regime and its army, the reader may draw some parallels to the dismantling of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq in 2003.

The authors leave the reader with some wise counsel derived from historical analysis. Firstly, in almost all cases, ‘will’ is the overriding factor in the ultimate victory as the conflict extends in time and space. Secondly, do not fight a hybrid war unless the most fundamental interests of the state are at stake. In addition to retrospectively reconciling these questions against recent Western campaigns in the Middle East, the reader may also choose to question why conventional land forces in the latest Iraq/Syria campaign are largely in absentia. Does a heavier emphasis of air and special operations forces in support of hybrid indigenous forces in these campaigns represent a strategic paradigm shift and if so, why?

The historical case studies contained in this book are academically instructive in their own right. However, an astute reader can be challenged to take this to the next level, aggregate the lessons and extrapolate their strategic significance to contemporary and future conflict environments.
In its title, *On Flexibility*, Meir Finkel gives the answer to his book's analytic treatment of what he sees as a recurrent problem faced by militaries—how to deal with technological and doctrinal surprise.

‘Flexibility is the key to air power’ is an adage well understood and often quoted by airmen. The sceptic might then argue that in *On Flexibility*, Finkel is simply borrowing from Douhet’s earlier assertion. However, Finkel’s argument holds contemporary relevance for practitioners in all military domains; air, land, maritime and the more recently developed space and cyber domains.

His treatment of the topic is in two distinct parts. First, he puts the theoretical case for flexibility across the military spectrum, espousing flexibility in the conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organisational and technological elements of warfare. This discussion draws lightly on illustrative examples, including the seven case studies developed more fully in the second part of the book. These support his argument by providing examples both of military success due to exhibited flexibility and failure attributed to inflexible response to surprise.

Through the case studies presented, Finkel argues that surprise, be it technological or doctrinal, has resisted all attempts to be removed from the military landscape. He contends that intelligence, displacing earlier concepts such as the Clausewitzian belief in the supremacy of mass, currently holds sway as the preferred method of dealing with surprise, effectively trying to remove it, by knowing or predicting the battlespace. The intelligence proponent argues that if one can know how an adversary will fight, or what their order of battle will be, doctrine or equipment can be pre-emptively tailored and honed for success. Through the case studies, Finkel shows this enduringly and demonstrably to not be the case.

Written in 2007, the book does not address a counterinsurgency or ‘hybrid warfare’ scenario. Given the prevalence of this type of warfare in the 21st century, a second edition including a counterinsurgency case study subjected to Finkel’s thesis, would be an instructive addition.

Finkel’s work provides sound support to the proponent of a flexible approach to warfare. For all its deserved importance as an element of an effective military organisation, the intelligence function will never predict nor understand an adversary with certainty. An organisation with a culture that encourages and implements the ability to respond nimbly to the unexpected will fare better than one which dogmatically adheres to fighting the war it expects to eventuate, giving weight to that other adage ‘hope is not a strategy’.
Mathew Burrows worked 28 years for the CIA as an intelligence analyst. During the last ten years of his career, he was part of the US National Intelligence Council, in charge of writing the *Global Trends* reports. Written every four years to coincide with the presidential election cycle, it provides an outlook for 15 to 20 years. Used by the White House, the State and Defense departments, and Homeland Security, this futuristic guide employs the most advanced research and data at the US Government’s disposal to predict the future. After his retirement in 2013, Burrows wrote this (declassified) version of *Global Trends*.

In *The Future, Declassified*, Burrows ties the many emerging trends together in a magical yet logical way, to provide possible futures for the world we live in. Burrows builds his book by first grouping trends in four so-called ‘megatrends’. He then goes on with elaborating on four possible game changers based upon these megatrends. The book takes a turn when he takes us along four alternative worlds that are written in fictional form. The book ends with his view on the question, ‘Are we prepared for the future?’

*The Future, Declassified* is well written. Although the topic in itself is complex, because of the multi-dimensional connections among the trends, it remains a pleasant and compelling read. Throughout the book, Burrows shows great analytical skills in tying the obvious with the less obvious, to support his outlook. The outlook itself has often been classified by the press as ‘grim’. However, his message is not all doom, specifically if ‘we’ act now. Although aimed predominantly at the United States, his ‘we’ should be read as ‘humanity’.

Why should you read *The Future, Declassified*? First of all, Burrows has a story to tell that is of interest to everybody who wants to know what is happening in the world and Burrows tells that story well. Furthermore, it is of particular interest to those who play a role in the international security domain, be it civil government or military, as it helps understand trends and subsequent geopolitical shifts that will shape our future.
Friedberg’s useful book is a compact history of US policy towards China since World War II. It also presents a range of policy responses the US might take around China’s emerging position in the world, as well as the likely postures and outcomes China might want to, or be forced to, adopt. The book was published in 2011 and a lot has happened with China since then, but the foundations of the book are solid and allow the reader to consider contemporary international developments from them.

A Contest for Supremacy is written in sober and credible style that is also easy to read. Its strength lies in its historical and policy analyses and it is recommended for a military professional seeking to understand the broader sweep of China’s emergent posture. A serious student might also read A Contest for Supremacy in conjunction with Henry Kissinger’s book On China, also published in 2011. Kissinger’s book is a more idiosyncratic view than Friedberg’s and tries to make sense of China’s diplomacy and foreign policies across the last two and a half thousand years, in order to illuminate the present.
In his book *The Improbable War*, Christopher Coker, a Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, invites readers to consider the possibility of great power conflict between China and the United States (US). Published in 2015 and set against a backdrop of increasing tension over China's activities in the South China Sea, Coker's work is becoming increasingly relevant to all elements of government contemplating a national response strategy.

Coker is not attempting to be alarmist and does not purport to predict an impending conflict between China and the US. His purpose is to caution strategists not to dismiss the potential for conflict between two great powers, because he believes that ignoring the possibility of war increases the likelihood of it occurring. Coker draws an analogy with the period just prior to World War I where a common belief was held that the interconnectivity of the financial and governance systems within Europe made a great power war improbable, but suggests that conflict still occurred because nations are capable of acting irrationally.

The most convincing argument Coker puts forward is that the most likely source of conflict between China and the US will be the change in global power distribution. He suggests that great powers go to war when they assess that they have the national power necessary to create a desired change in the international status quo. The US, as the current dominant power, has a vested interest in maintaining the current international system. China as a rising great power will challenge that system in places where it believes it has the right and the need to do so.

The relevance for military strategists is to contemplate how the rising power of China can be incorporated into the international system. National strategies will need to consider the inevitable move towards a more familiar multi-polar global power distribution. Will the nations supporting the current international status quo be able to make the required adjustments in time to cater for the rising power in China? Can we avoid the Thucydidean trap of trying to contain China's increasing power? Coker suggests that if we rely too much on China acting rationally, and don't carefully consider the possibility that our actions could lead to great power conflict, we could stumble into a great power war through provocation and miscalculation.
Most contemporary historians credit the might of the Soviet Union with winning World War II in Europe and the US Navy, the war in the Pacific. This book directly challenges this oft-held belief. The author, Phillips O’Brien, a Scottish academic, presents a strong case that it was Allied air and sea power combined that held the keys to victory. He begins with the controversial statement that ‘there were no decisive battles in World War II,’ this despite Alamein, Kursk, Okinawa, Midway and Normandy. His point is that the war was not one of attrition like World War I, but rather about freedom of manoeuvre. Accordingly, ‘apart from killing every enemy combatant, the only way to “win” a war is to stop your enemy from moving.’

In many ways, the book follows eminent British military historian Sir Richard Overy’s Why the Allies Won published in 1995 and it makes for an interesting contrast. Overy covers more aspects of the war with a heavy concentration on the European theatre. To him, the battle for the seas, the Germans in Russia, the combined bomber offensive and the invasion of Normandy were the decisive armed struggles whereas the economy, technology and moral willpower were the real war winners. Overy’s thesis is that the war was won not so much by the Allied armed forces, but ‘because [the Allies] turned their economic strength into effective fighting power, and turned the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win.’ O’Brien would strongly disagree with this idea.

How the War was Won is not light reading. It is 488 pages of text with charts, tables and select photographs. A comprehensive set of notes, bibliography and index add another 138 pages. Phillips O’Brien is the Director of War Studies and a professor of history at the University of Glasgow. The book is extremely detailed and well researched. The arguments are supported by statistics and analysis where appropriate.

O’Brien has written this book to challenge the conventional wisdom and argues the war was more a contest in the air and on the sea, and it was air and sea power combined that really won the war. The book’s main purpose then is to discuss how the Allies destroyed the greater part of German and Japanese production through the application of air and sea power, thus preventing the enemy from moving. That, he claims, is what really won the war.
A broad description of Robert Lyman’s book *The Jail Busters* could be confused with a contemporary account of current operations against ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria. In essence, *The Jail Busters* is an account of a precision air strike on a dual-use civilian/military target, planned in part using intelligence supplied by local militia forces of uncertain political objectives and requested by a member of the same militia forces. It is however one of the finest analysis and studies of the Amiens Prison raid of 18 February 1944 available. This raid, initially referred to within the RAF as *Ramrod 564*, was later to become known colloquially as Operation *Jericho* and a byword for World War II precision strike.

The story of the Amiens Prison raid has been subject to several conspiracy theory–based accounts over recent years. Several factors, such as the raid’s genesis, gaps in contemporary records and wartime censorship have all combined to provide rich fodder for the dross populist ‘historians’ to dish up to the general public. This is not the case with Robert Lyman’s book. *The Jail Busters* is the product of serious and extensive research in primary source documents and eyewitness accounts, underpinned by sound analysis and well-reasoned conclusions.

The strength of *The Jail Busters* is that it first considers all the factors leading to the British decision to aid in a breakout from the jail before it moves to detail the conduct of the Amiens mission. Lyman examines the relationships between the rival French Resistance factions, de Gaulle’s Free French headquarters and the British intelligence services, as well as the successes the German counterinsurgency operations were having in 1943. With the context and rationale for the raid established, Lyman’s book then provides an excellent account of the raid itself and the aftermath from the British and French perspectives.

Of all the recent publications which claim to be a ‘true’ account of the Amiens Prison raid, Robert Lyman’s *The Jail Busters* is the one which actually delivers, providing a reliable and trustworthy study of the operation.
21st Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era
Benjamin F Armstrong (ed)
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MA, 2015
ISBN: 978-1-61251-810-7

21st Century Sims is a well written and easy to read review of the major works of Admiral William Sowden Sims, a US Navy officer and a Pulitzer Prize winner, who proved to be exceptionally innovative throughout his long and distinguished military career. He influenced ship design, ordnance material and most significantly, he revolutionised the way in which the Navy conducted battle at sea to the extent that he was affectionately called ‘The Gun Doctor’.

However, this is not a book about navy sea battles; it is a book about innovation. In reviewing Sims’ military career and his ability to influence, Armstrong, himself a naval aviator, highlights what it takes to innovate in a bureaucratic, rank-oriented environment where if you are not one of ‘the known’ or ‘inner circle’, you are not seen or heard.

Amongst the many lessons which Armstrong extracts from the life of Sims are:

- the dangers of a conservative military,
- how men and women in uniform must educate themselves,
- the importance of the study of history,
- the need for professional debate,
- the value in military character or values,
- the essential requirement to maintain a focus on the problem and not the people, and
- the need to not only point out faults but to provide detailed constructive solutions.

This book highlights the skills one must develop, the detail one must present and the outright (and sometimes insubordinate) tenacity one must maintain in order to be innovative in the military context. Further, it highlights the role that leaders, supervisors, peers, friends and staff officers must take to support, open doors and help fight the bureaucracy that will try to stifle innovation.

It is a must-read for anyone interested in being part of an innovative organisation.
Much has been written on the ‘correct’ relationship between the military and politicians. Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* typifies the traditional orthodoxy in which a military, after being given broad intent by its political masters, is left to execute operations as its commanders see fit. This view—understandably popular within military circles—serves as the focal point of Cohen’s criticism in this book.

By drawing on historical examples, Cohen seeks to sweep aside stereotypes of interfering politicians, replacing them with well-researched vignettes of effective wartime leadership at the grand strategic level. In the main, the case studies are well chosen, and effectively illuminate the broad thesis that active management of the military on the part of four national political leaders was a key ingredient in their wartime success.

Overall, the case studies are effective in supporting the author’s argument. Lincoln’s reserved personality is juxtaposed with the bombastic nature of Churchill and Clemenceau, with Cohen observing that these personality traits were less important to their success as leaders than their willingness to prod and question their senior military commanders. While a fourth case study of David Ben-Gurion rounds out the analysis, he sits uneasily against the monumental figures of Lincoln, Churchill and Clemenceau, thus forming the weakest section of the book.

Cohen brings the reader up to the present day in the final chapters by applying his perspective of civil-military relations to conflicts from Vietnam to the War in Iraq of 2003. These short vignettes are presented as proof of Cohen’s thesis, that success in armed conflict invariably results from *more* civilian involvement in military affairs, not less.

Overall, this book is an engaging entry point into the subject of civil-military relations, and is effective in contextualising the soldier/statesman dyad.
The term ‘red team’ has made the transition from its origins within military wargaming to the lexicon of both government and business. What is less well understood is what a red team is, what it does and does not do, and how and why ‘red teaming’ can be helpful to an organisation. In *Red Team*, Zenko takes a well known yet poorly understood concept and answers these questions in terms that can be easily grasped by the reader based on a central theme that, ‘you cannot grade your own homework’.

The book is broken into six chapters, each dealing with a facet of Zenko’s research into the three core red team techniques: simulation, vulnerability probes and alternative analyses. In the first, Zenko distils from his research six best practices in ‘red teaming’. The second chapter covers the origins and military use of red teams and emphasises the benefits and limitations of ‘red teaming’ to address issues such as groupthink within rigid hierarchies.

In the third chapter, Zenko turns to the US intelligence community to reveal subtle differences in approach and application while again reinforcing the six best practices. In these organisations, he discovered three barriers to optimised performance. Other government agency approaches to critical infrastructure vulnerability probes and simulations are considered in the next chapter. Aspects of the best practices are again reinforced through examples.

The fifth chapter looks at red team use in the private sector. The key distinction between this and the previous military/government usage is shown to be motivational. Zenko closes by describing the limitations of ‘red teaming’ and the problems that arise when it is planned and executed poorly. He proposes five worst practices to contrast with his six best.

*Red Team* is inherently interesting, easy to read and contains several concepts that make it an important addition to a professional reading list. It clearly demonstrates through multiple examples how an informed and empowered red team can help an organisation overcome cognitive and organisational biases that constrain not only their decision-making but also their ability to generate objective courses of action in the first place. Importantly, it also highlights the need for independent and critical thought regarding an organisation’s operations, culture, processes and the core assumptions on which they construct strategic planning.
The Last Warrior describes the extraordinary career of Pentagon legend, Andrew Marshall. At 93, Marshall recently retired as Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and is amongst a handful of thinkers honourably regarded in US defence strategy matters. Marshall’s most important contributions to American national security included forcing a much-needed debate about the CIA’s assessments of the Soviet economy and defence spending. His rational, intellectual approach was crucial in breaking down bureaucratic thinking and typical dogmatism associated with the intelligence community’s method of prognoses in the US Government at the time.

As former students of Marshall, Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts provide a unique insider’s perspective on the changes in strategy from the dawn of the Cold War to present day under Marshall’s influence. Krepinevich and Watts chronicle Marshall’s intellectual life from his early years developing US nuclear weapons strategy through working with the National Security Council staff in the Nixon White House to predicting the ‘pivot to Asia’ focus on China that began in George W Bush’s administration.

Marshall’s low public profile belied his enormous influence in crafting defence policy with high-quality intelligence. His eclectic intellectual style coupled with an ability to identify and draw together strategic thinkers across a variety of intelligence sources, within and beyond Department of Defense, were fundamental in the construction of the ONA framework. Marshall’s role in the Pentagon’s internal think-tank pioneered an analytical framework for understanding long-term political and military competition, helping formulate bedrock concepts that endure to this day. This book is a must-read for those wishing to develop their understanding of the importance of long-term strategic thinkers within Defence.
'Humanitarian, ecologist, politician’—three words that have rarely been applied to General Curtis LeMay by the media. ‘Brash, awkward, warmonger’ are words that today’s society more often associate with this man, so it is refreshing to get a new perspective as portrayed in this book by Warren Kozak, a journalist who could have stayed safe and continued the megalomaniac myth, but thankfully did not.

Kozak portrays a man fiercely proud of the military and honour bound to perform his duty to the absolute best of his ability, even if it means treading on the toes of those around him. To get the picture of the whole man, Wozak takes the reader back through the history of the LeMay family and Curtis’ upbringing in a far-from-stable environment which left him with a profound desire to protect those close to him—a desire he took with him into the US Army Air Corps.

Although trained as a fighter pilot and navigator, he had fallen under the spell of the maverick William ‘Billy’ Mitchell who had advocated the bomber as the premier deterrent and defence against attack on the US. He was to become one of the leading lights of what was known as ‘The Bomber Mafia’ and would always advocate for the first strike being the hardest strike, knocking the opponent out of the fight before it got out of hand.

This book is a must-read for any military scholar and joint warfare commander. It traverses topics from how to prepare a force in a climate of peacetime austerity, to making the types of decisions that could affect thousands, friend and foe alike. Warren Kozak shows his credentials as a journalist, bypassing the hype surrounding LeMay and using a mixture of sources for this book, including LeMay’s daughter, many of his friends and more than a few past commanders and detractors. The only downside to the book is the author’s less-than-authoritative knowledge of World War II outside the American sphere, but this should not detract from an otherwise excellent examination of the person who was General Curtis LeMay.
The book’s overarching plot is not in itself particularly surprising. Set in the near future following a range of global socio-economic crises, the People’s Republic of China is now ruled by a military-industrial consortium known as the Directorate. Facing petroleum resource pressure, Directorate geophysicists discover gas reserves in the Mariana Trench, within United States Exclusive Economic Zone protection. In coalition with Russia, the Directorate then mounts a surprise military attack on Hawaii and deployed United States Pacific forces, the rapid success of which leads to the collapse of NATO and redefinition of the world order.

This piece of fiction is a platform to stimulate readers’ thinking about a broad range of ideas and issues. Singer and Cole themselves have been at the forefront of highlighting this intent, emphasising in a range of forums how fiction offers the opportunity to explore military concepts without any of the constraints of physical and technical realities.

The argument in favour of fiction is that it doesn’t suffer the same tight controls as exercises and war games, in which availability of people, funding, time and technology still provide limits to what can be achieved, even within a live, virtual and constructive (LVC) environment. In writing Ghost Fleet, Singer and Cole were not constrained by a limited set of objectives defined and prioritised by a higher command and nor are their readers. They were free to raise ideas and concepts that some organisations may find unwelcome or confronting or from which some organisations might genuinely benefit; ideas and concepts that the reader can then choose to explore to attain a deeper level of understanding themselves, based on which of these interests appeals to them.

Singer and Cole have researched thoroughly the technologies described to show that the events they describe are at least possible in the future, even if we might find them implausible.

This theme, of open-minded and innovative thinking, is the key takeaway from Ghost Fleet for Air Force. Plan Jericho looks to leverage the technologies offered by the advanced platforms we will acquire over the next ten to fifteen years. Jericho demands that we ‘red team’ the way we do business so that we can innovate and improve. Ghost Fleet provides an example of how that ‘red teaming’ can be achieved through fiction.
Section Two: Enduring Works for Professional Mastery

Air Power Strategy

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat
Colonel John A. Warden III
The seminal work on the contemporary application of air power and air campaign planning, first published in 1988.

The Command of the Air
Giulio Douhet
The foundation book that explored the concepts of air warfare, in which concepts for the employment of air power were explored that are still valid today.

The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory
Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (ed.)
A detailed study consisting of a number of essays that together provides a clear understanding of the development of air power theories through analysis of the wars and conflicts of the past century.

Alan Stephens
A comprehensive overview of the evolution of Australian air power thinking. It provides an understanding of our background to inform our future.

The Art of Air Power: Sun Tzu Revisited
Sanu Kainikara
A detailed study of the great Master’s paradigms and their application to air power at the strategic and operational level in the twenty first century.
Military Strategy

Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
Peter Paret (ed.)
Over 20 essays on war, covering leaders and thinkers like Clausewitz and Mao, conflicts, strategy and politics.

On War
Carl Von Clausewitz
Written in German in 1832, multiple versions and translations abound, but volumes one to three of his 10 volumes of work are known in English as ‘On War’.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm

The Art of War
Sun Tzu
The Chinese classic compiled over 2000 years ago. There are several translations available of the book that inspired Clausewitz and Jomini (among others).

Strategy: The Indirect Approach
B.H. Liddell Hart
Originally published in 1929 and extensively updated since, a British World War I Army Captain analyses historical battles to develop an alternative to attrition warfare. Hart provided a ‘new’ guerrilla warfare chapter in his 1967 edition.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1785
Alfred T. Mahan
Written in 1890, this was required reading by American, German and Japanese Navy members pre-World War I.
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13529

Leadership

The Mask of Command: Alexander the Great, Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler, and the Nature of Leadership
John Keegan
Keegan’s 1987 classic that considers the nature of military leadership and reviews the careers of four significant military leaders; Alexander, Wellington, Grant and Hitler, to identify what makes a great leader in the unique field of military conflict.
Air Power History

A History of Air Warfare
John Andreas Olsen (ed.)
A 2009 collection of essays by eminent scholars that traces the history of the development of air power from the very beginning, to the Lebanon War of 2006. It also includes three very thought provoking essays on the future of air power.

Global Air Power
John Andreas Olsen (ed.)
This 2011 work examines, in several essays by world renowned air power theorists, the historical developments that have brought the major air forces of the world to their current position.

Royal Australian Air Force History

The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918:
Volume VIII - The Australian Flying Corps
F.M. Cutlack
Still the most detailed, informative and interesting history of the earliest Australian military flying service during WWI before the formation of the RAAF.

The Australian Centenary History of Defence—Volume II—
The Royal Australian Air Force
Alan Stephens
A comprehensive overview of RAAF History from its beginnings until 2000.
Section Three: Past Chief of Air Force’s Reading Lists

The 2015 List

European Air Power: Challenges and Opportunities
Edited by John Andreas Olsen

War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness
Williamson Murray

The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons
Anthony H. Cordesman

Fire on the Water: China, America and the Future of the Pacific
Robert Haddick

The Age of Airpower
Martin van Creveld

Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla
David Kilcullen

Red Air: Politics in Russian Air Power
Dr Sanu Kainikara

Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life
William Deresiewicz

Going Pro: The Deliberate Practice of Professionalism
Tony Kern

Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
Michael Walzer

The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War Volume 1: Australia and the War in the Air
Michael Molkentin

An Interesting Point: A History of Military Aviation at Point Cook 1914-2014
Steve Campbell-Wright
The Influence of Airpower upon History: Statesmanship, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Since 1903
Edited by Robin Higham and Mark Parillo

The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945
Richard Overy

Churchill and His Airmen: Relationships, Intrigue and Policy Making 1914-1945
Vincent Orange

Australia’s Few and the Battle of Britain
Kristen Alexander

Bomber
Len Deighton

Winged Victory
Victor Yeates

The 2014 List

The Bolt from the Blue: Air Power in the Cycle of Strategies
Sanu Kainikara

Airpower for Strategic Effect
Colin S. Gray

Strategy in the Contemporary World, 4th edition
John Baylis, James J. Writz, Colin S. Gray

The Unseen War
Benjamin S. Lambeth

NATO’s Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998-1999
Dag Henriksen

The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945
Peter Gray

It Worked For Me: In Life and Leadership
Colin Powell with Tony Koltz

The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War 1914-1918
F.M. Cutlack
Air Force: Inside the New Era of Australian Air Power  
Ian McPhedran

Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II  
Thomas Alexander Hughes

Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1910-1945  
Richard Hallion

Flyers Far Away – Australian Air Crew over Europe in World War II  
Michael Enright

Storm over Kokoda  
Peter Ewer

From Fledgling to Eagle: The South African Air Force during the Border War  
Brigadier-General Dick Lord

Bomber Commander: A Biography of Wing Commander Donald Teale Saville  
Francis Roy Chappell

Nicky Barr: An Australian Air Ace  
Peter Dornan

The Larks  
Jem Shaw

Wings Over Summer  
Ron Powell

Previous lists can be found at the Air Power Development Centre’s website:  
www.airforce.gov.au/airpower