This account of the higher command of the Royal Australian Air Force during the Second World War has been written by a military professional primarily for his fellow professionals so that they might see some of the mistakes that were made by their predecessors from times past. Such mistakes have been revealed here, not to lay blame, but rather so that those who may be responsible for the control of Australia's Defence Forces now and in the future may learn from the mistakes of the past. Political figures with an interest in Defence might also care to take note of how their predecessors handled, and mishandled, the higher direction of one of Australia's fighting Services during the challenging times of the Second World War.
This account is based, in the main, on documents from the period held in various government archives. As these documents are not readily available to most readers, they have been reproduced, in full, in Volume Two. Volume One contains the narrative, which can be read, if so desired, without reference to Volume Two. However, if the reader should wish to go to the source documents he or she can do so with relative ease. Also, a reading of the source documents may give the dedicated reader a better feel for the various issues and for the times.
For anyone interested in the Royal Australian Air Force and its history, this account of the higher command of the Service during its period of greatest trial should fill a gap in the recorded history to this time. And, while the story itself may reflect rather poorl on many of those intimately involved in it, its telling is necessary so that others may learn how not to run an air force!