PEACE OPERATIONS: THE AIR FORCE CONTRIBUTION

By

Wing Commander Ric Casagrande
About the Author

The ...
INTRODUCTION

Since 1989 there have been fundamental changes to the world order. While former US President Bush was heralding the emergence of a new world order, after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, many other nations were intent on establishing their independent status, free from Cold War restraints. The result has been a more fluid and less certain world structure in which both the United Nations (UN) and regional powers are able to play greater roles. Exactly how these roles will develop is as yet unclear, but Australia, as a regional power, should expect to play its part as international security relations evolve further.

During this period of global change and uncertainty, Australia faces a complex security dilemma. However, one enduring feature of Australia’s security policy will be the need to be engaged regionally and globally so that national interests can be pursued. These national interests largely depend on a secure regional and global environment. One of the ways Australia can assist in the establishment of such an environment is by supporting the international community when it acts in world trouble spots. This aspect of Australia’s security policy was enunciated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a policy statement on Regional Security as Australia contributing to global security by acting as a good international citizen.

The prime vehicle for action in this field is the activity of the UN. Since the impasse between US and Russian cooperation has been removed, there have been new opportunities for the UN to protect and promote international peace. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have been the traditional method of using military forces to promote international peace, but with the emergence of a new era of UN activity a range of innovative attempts to prevent and deal with armed conflict and humanitarian disasters have been attempted. These attempts have been far from universally successful but they can be expected to continue. As military forces are likely to be involved in these activities, security planners and defence forces should work to develop new means to contribute to this process, as well as improve the ways in which current activities are carried out.

This paper addresses the important issue of innovation and the development of new means by which the RAAF can contribute to peace operations. ‘Peace Operations’ is a term which has been introduced into ADF doctrine by way of a draft pamphlet titled ADF Peace Operations. This pamphlet will be promulgated by the ADF Warfare Centre, when it is approved by the Chief of the Defence Force, and will be Chapter 35 of Australian Defence Force Publication 1. The draft doctrine describes Peace Operations as an adjunct to diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. These types of operations incorporate all those different types of peacekeeping operations that have been carried out since the formation of the UN. In advocating the air force role in peace operations this paper recognises that the most

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3 ADF Peacekeeping Pamphlet No. 1 - Peace Operations (draft), ADF Warfare Centre, RAAF Williamtown, November 1994. The term peace operations was adopted to try to reach a uniform approach with the doctrine of US and UK forces.
common manner in which the UN and Australia have contributed in the past has been through the deployment of ground forces, but it suggests, that in addition to this important means, the ability of air forces to play a significant part should also be considered. It is this contribution which is the central theme of this paper.

Australia has made clear its commitment to the UN and it is up to the ADF to prepare its forces, and develop guidance and procedures so that a variety of options are available to government, which should include the use of the RAAF. After an examination of the manner in which PKOs have broadened to become ‘Peace Operations’, the capability of air forces to contribute to these missions will be discussed to determine how the RAAF should prepare to act in support of the UN and other international groups.

Definitions

To assist this discussion and ensure consistency, a number of definitions are proposed:

Peacemaking is the diplomatic process of seeking a solution to international disputes, generally it will not involve the use of military force.

Peacekeeping is the traditional activity of providing a pacific means of settling a dispute or preventing a dispute from escalating. It can involve the use of military forces who act with the consent of all parties and only use force in self defence.

Peace enforcement is a new activity, which can include military operations, in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerent parties who may or may not consent to intervention and may be engaged in combat.4

The term ‘Peacekeeping Operations’ (PKOs) is also an umbrella term which is still widely used to describe all UN field operations in which military or police forces are utilised to maintain peace and order.5

Peace Operations and the UN

To establish how the RAAF can support the UN more effectively it is necessary to understand the nature of UN operations and their unique problems. While the nature of some of the UN operations, which have occurred since 1989 are new, the use of military forces to act as a buffer or intervene to restore order in an armed conflict has many precedents. What is new is the role played by international organisations, particularly the UN but also other regional bodies, in institutionalising the process.6

History of UN Field Operations

The United Nations Charter came into force on 24 October 1945. The Charter clearly set out that the first and primary purpose of the UN is the maintenance of international

4 AAP 1003 - Operations Law for RAAF Commanders, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p 4-2. These definitions broadly follow the definitions in the UN Secretary-General’s Report - Agenda for Peace and in Senator Evans’ publication Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen & Unwin, Canberra, 1993.
5 While PKOs has been, and still is, used widely the preferred ADF term for such field operations is ‘peace operations’.
peace and security. As the framers of the Charter based its articles on the assumption that threats to security would come from inter-state rivalry, no provision was made for peacekeeping forces. These were later innovations, established to deal with new situations which threatened peace. Accordingly, no reference is made in the Charter to peacekeeping forces per se.

Peacekeepers have been described as the invention of the UN. They first appeared in 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis. Acting on a Canadian sponsored General Assembly Resolution, the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, established an armed buffer force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities and oversee the withdrawal of British and French forces. This differed from earlier UN field missions which consisted of unarmed observers who were tasked with monitoring truces and cease fire agreements.

The fact that the first four UN field missions are characterised as PKOs by the UN indicates that PKOs have been regarded as ad hoc arrangements tailored to suit the circumstances of a particular crisis. This trend has continued to the present day as the number, character and cost of UN PKOs has grown and changed in nature to meet the new challenges of an uncertain world order, a world order that has been complicated by the absence of superpower overlay.

Since 1948, there have been some 33 UN sponsored PKOs; 650,000 military personnel have participated for the loss of 1069 lives. In monetary terms, the total cost has been US$9.4 billion (as at 1 January 1994). At the time of writing there are 18 PKOs underway. Australia has participated in some 19 missions that could be broadly described as peacekeeping operations, an involvement which is expected to continue given current government guidance. It is the nature of these future operations which will affect how air forces prepare so that they are able to contribute effectively to this important national task.

Traditional peacekeeping has been based on a number of assumptions and has followed a common pattern. First, PKOs were normally deployed on the cessation of hostilities after a period of armed conflict. Second, UN interventions were based on mutual consent and cooperation from all parties. Finally, except for self defence, the methods employed were peaceful: the peacekeepers being characterised as a bridge between the will for peace and the achievement of peace. Peacekeeping was a useful

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9 These were the UN Observer groups in the Balkans, Indonesia, the Middle East (UNTSO) and Kashmir (UNMOGIP), see ‘UN Peacekeeping History’, in International Peacekeeping’, Vol. 1 No.1 January-February 1994, pp 8-9; and Urquhart B., ‘Beyond the Sheriff’s Posse’, Survival, May/June 1990, p 198.
10 As supplied by the UN Department of Public Information, PS/DPI/15/Rev6, March 1994.
11 This number is derived from the listing in Defence Update, No. 7, December 1993 with the inclusion of Operation MINURSO in the Western Sahara and the UNAMIR operation in Rwanda, pp. 5-6; James N.F in ‘A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 104, January/February 1994, p. 4, lists 19 UN missions and six other multi-national PKOs.
12 Strategic Review 1993, Departmental Publications, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1993, pp 46, 49.
UN peace management tool but, because of Cold War restraints, it was restricted to areas outside superpower confrontation.\textsuperscript{14} A further restriction was that USSR and US forces were generally not available to support the missions.

**UN Operations Since 1989**

Since 1989, the UN has been able to utilise a range of new options to deal with threats to international peace and security. The right choice of option is often critical to success in these endeavours. An attempt to address this issue was made by the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report: ‘An Agenda for Peace’.\textsuperscript{15} In this document the Secretary-General put forward a series of proposals aimed at strengthening the capacity of the UN to perform preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. These included steps to reform the Field Operations Division in UN Headquarters, establishing special funds to finance peacekeeping efforts, forming peace enforcement units, who would be on call to the UN, and a call for the Security Council to adopt a more vigorous approach across the range of action it was authorised to take under the Charter.\textsuperscript{16}

An example of this type of approach was the use of air power to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was not a UN mission but a NATO operation carried out under the authority of Security Council Resolution 816. In this operation Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were monitoring a no-fly zone with fighters patrolling this zone.\textsuperscript{17} This mission was later expanded to encompass reconnaissance and strike operations. This has been the clearest example to date of the applicability of air power in support of the UN. This example requires detailed analysis to determine the lessons that can be learnt regarding the use of air power in support of the UN.

Despite the attempted reforms, the UN’s efforts in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia have been far from successful. This has led to caution when other crises have emerged. The most graphic example of this was Rwanda. The UN mission in Rwanda was unable to halt the genocide and humanitarian disaster that followed a bloody civil war. It was only after a huge tide of refugees flooded into Zaire that the UN and the international community were spurred into a massive relief action aimed at alleviating the suffering of millions. These efforts were spearheaded by air power in the form of an air lift of food, essential medical supplies, relief personnel and critical equipment, such as water purifying units.\textsuperscript{18}

Humanitarian missions are only one form of this broader UN role. Others blend political and humanitarian objectives through activities such as: the supervision or

\textsuperscript{14}ibid., p 100.
\textsuperscript{16}ibid., pp 14-44.
\textsuperscript{17}Security Council Resolution 816 (1993) was passed on 12 April 1993, prior to this AWACS were monitoring the no-fly zone without fighter support from 16 October 1992.
\textsuperscript{18}One of the first ADF deployments to Rwanda was on 28 July 1994 when two C-130 Hercules from Air Lift Group carrying medical supplies and water purifying equipment, essential to stem the spread of disease particularly cholera, left from Richmond Air Base. Australian ABC TV News reports of 26 and 27 July 1994, also see RAAF News August 1994.
organisation of elections, monitoring of human rights practices, the protection and provision of human rights assistance, and even the establishment and running of specific essential government services. Of course such actions as the UN authorised coalition effort against Iraq in the Gulf cannot be discounted nor can more aggressive and intrusive peace enforcement operations. Others have suggested even more radical expansion of UN operations. Some examples of these include a brigade size force to act as a ready reaction unit to act immediately when a crisis arises, or for environmental peacekeeping and anti-crime operations. These types of operations call for innovative solutions to the new challenges which would be posed.

Current Australian policy is to support UN operations and while the current policy can be expected to evolve even further, it is reflected in Australia’s current commitment to humanitarian operations. In addition, a number of steps have been taken to strengthen the UN and Australia’s capacity to carry out UN operations. These include the establishment of the Peacekeeping Centre, as part of the ADF Warfare Centre, RAAF Base Williamtown; conducting training courses in peacekeeping; increasing defence representation in the Australian Mission to the UN; and posting ADF members to the staff of UN Headquarters in New York. While many of these initiatives are focused on ground operations, an air force contribution is invariably present. Therefore, the RAAF should develop options which allow air power to make the most effective contribution possible.

Air Power and the UN

To be able to carry out the range of military operations described above the UN must be able to perform a number of functions for which military forces generally possess the capabilities. These range from conducting strategic assessments of military situations to routine headquarters staff work, but the critical element will always be the actual conduct of the operation. In many cases success will also depend on a range of supporting functions and specialist applications. However, in all cases these other support or preliminary functions are essential to the successful completion of a military operation. These functions can only be performed if particular capabilities exist. A US study, conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, has identified a number of these necessary military capabilities:

a. Intelligence:
   i. Indications and Warnings,
   ii. Strategic Assessment, and
   iii. Tactical Intelligence.

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22 At the time of writing an air force SQNLDR is the assistant defence attache in the Australian Mission to UN HQ, New York; a SQNLDR is on the staff of the Peacekeeping Centre; and a number of officers and airmen are on secondment with the UN in New York. In addition, RAAF members attend peacekeeping training courses.
b. Integrated Military Command Control and Communications:
   i. Planning,
   ii. Operations,
   iii. Training and Simulation,
   iv. In-Place Regional Command Structure,
   v. Area Specialisation,
   vi. Global Communications, and
   vii. Precision Locating.

c. Aerospace Power:
   i. Aerospace Control,
   ii. Precision Munitions Delivery,
   iii. Survivable Deep Attack, and
   iv. Theatre Missile Defence.

d. Maritime Power/Sea Control:
   i. Countermine,
   ii. Countersmuggling,
   iii. Protection of escorts/Sea Lines of Communications, and
   iv. Refugee Control.

e. Forcible Entry.

f. Strategic Mobility:
   i. Airlift, and
   ii. Sea Lift.

g. Global Logistic Support.

h. Land Combat Power:
   i. Light Infantry Force,
   ii. Armoured Force, and
   iii. Heliborne Force.

i. Unconventional Warfare.

j. Nation Building:
   i. Engineering,
   ii. Civil Affairs, and
   iii. Psychological Operations.23

Relevance to the RAAF

Not all these capabilities are possessed by the ADF, nevertheless they are indicative of a range of options that could be considered by strategic planners. Yet a number of these capabilities lead to roles which could be undertaken by the RAAF as an

Australian contribution to peace operations. In many cases, the UN cannot replicate the capabilities and there are only a limited number of nations which can provide the advanced air capabilities described. The RAAF has a solid doctrine base, advanced aircraft, highly trained personnel and a sophisticated logistic support structure which should enable it to make an important contribution to Australia’s UN support operations.

**Air Power and the UN Charter**

The role of air power is recognised as one of the prime means of carrying out the UN mandate. The UN Charter itself is explicit in Chapter VII ‘Action with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches to Peace, and Acts of Aggression’, Article 42 which states that the UN may:

...take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of The UN.

By deliberately overturning the historical precedence of sea, land and air forces, the Charter recognises the ability of air forces to act decisively to deter or counter aggression. This was demonstrated by the speed with which the US and coalition air forces acted to protect Saudi Arabia in the prelude to the 1991 Gulf War.

This interpretation is further strengthened by the view of the British Chiefs of Staff who in 1948 considered that the:

‘initial show of military power’ by the UN would be made ‘principally by air forces, possibly in conjunction with sea forces. Should such measures prove ineffective the next step which could be most easily and rapidly achieved, would be air bombardment, accompanied where applicable by naval bombardment: thereafter land forces might be necessary for operations and to enforce any subsequent decisions made by the Security Council’.

According to the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, the main elements of any UN Force will be air and naval forces.24 Yet, since 1948 this has not eventuated, largely because the UN has been hampered in its actions by Cold War rivalry. This has meant that the emphasis has been on lightly armed neutral peacekeepers operating on land.

**The UN and the use of Ground Forces**

Despite the explicit recognition of the role of air power in UN operations, the evolution of peacekeeping, with its focus on ground forces, acting as observers and forming a buffer, has established a relatively narrow collective experience by the UN and its members. Indeed, between 1948 and 1989 the predominant use of air power in UN field operations was to support ground forces. This experience has produced a relatively narrow focus by the UN and, when confronted by a new situation, there has been a standard response of deploying ground forces. While in the majority of cases this was entirely appropriate, the UN’s collective experience did not equip it with the

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ability to utilise the range of air power options which could have been used in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Instead, the UN relied on NATO, a body with extensive knowledge and capability, to carry out such operations. The air power operations included enforcing the no-fly zone, close air support, reconnaissance and strike operations. Despite the conduct of these operations by NATO over Bosnia, the collective experience of the UN has received little benefit. Thus the UN planners who witness the effectiveness of NATO air power may tend to seek air power solutions without fully understanding a number of fundamental principles for its use.

Employment of Air Power by the UN

Certain principles have been developed by air forces which guide the way they use air power. RAAF air power doctrine for example sets out a number of these basic principles.\(^\text{25}\) It also describes air power’s positive attributes. These are flexibility, swiftness of application, ubiquity, range and shock effect. The secondary strengths of air power are its political responsiveness, its ability to complement the other forms of combat power, rapidly concentrate and minimise casualties. Its limitations are the dependency of air forces on secure air bases, cost, vulnerability, impermanent effect and the degree of political control it attracts.\(^\text{26}\) For UN operations it has probably been the impermanence, security and cost limitations which have been most evident and dictated the limited use of air power, particularly given traditional peacekeeping requirements.

The impermanent effect of air power means that it has limited use where the UN has attempted to establish effective barriers or a medium between potentially hostile parties. Furthermore, air base security could not be guaranteed, in many instances, without substantial ground force protection and, finally, the high operating cost of military air units meant that the UN often utilised the cheapest option rather than a preferred choice.\(^\text{27}\)

The broader UN operations which have been conducted in the past few years have provided more opportunities to exploit air power’s advantages, its limitations being of less consequence as the UN moves into peace enforcement operations. But in utilising air power certain fundamental maxims and imperatives should be borne in mind. Again RAAF doctrine draws from the lessons of history to prescribe broad guidance in the form of air power maxims. While these maxims have their genesis in the principles of war and the history of armed conflict, some have application for UN operations. The RAAF air power maxims are concurrent campaigns, unity, professional mastery and balance.\(^\text{28}\)


\(^\text{26}\) *AAP 1000 (2nd Ed)*, pp 37-41.

\(^\text{27}\) Interviews with Mr S. Taroor (Office of Peacekeeping Operations) and Colonel Purola (UNPROFOR Chief of Staff), New York, 10 June 1994.

\(^\text{28}\) *AAP 1000 (2nd Ed)*, pp 58-59.
While the maxim of concurrent campaigns directly relates to armed conflicts, unity is necessary to ensure that scarce and costly air assets are commanded at the appropriate level, so that air assets can be tasked to carry out the maximum number of missions possible. Professional mastery implies that air operations should be commanded, controlled and executed by professional airmen who understand the correct application of air power, so that its employment can be maximised. Balance involves having the correct mix of resources matched to the task. This mix includes weapons systems, experienced aircrew and effective support staff. Expertise in the use of air power is necessary so that basic principles, such as those set out above, are adhered to, not blindly but with a wisdom born of experience and an eye to the future. This expertise must exist at the strategic and operational planning level as well as the tactical level.

Possible RAAF Contributions

What then are the areas in which the RAAF can support the UN given the new types of operations in which the UN is becoming involved? The current Director of the Air Power Studies Centre has identified a range of activities which the RAAF could be called upon to carry out in support of the UN:

a. enforcement of no-fly zones;

b. surveillance for breaches of cease fire or other peace agreements;

c. airlift, reconnaissance and surveillance in disaster relief or humanitarian assistance operations;

d. strategic and tactical airlift support of peacekeeping forces;

e. surveillance and reconnaissance in support of peacekeeping forces;

f. precision strike against key targets;

g. airborne command post or liaison platform;

h. airlift and surveillance to combat border incursions or to quell civil disorder;

i. surveillance and reconnaissance in maritime observations (especially in enforcing economic embargoes);

j. survey (aerial photography);

k. search and rescue;

l. provision of specialist staff, such as experienced joint planners to man multinational planning staff, other examples include medical personnel, operations legal advisers, air traffic controllers, air defence controllers, military police and intelligence staff; and
m. operational logistics support, especially deployable base support units, telecommunications units, airfield defence guards and mobile air transport units.  

To this list I would add:

a. specialist observers, including personnel who could command specialist missions;

b. air-to-air refuelling;

c. aeromedical evacuation; and

d. close air support of UN forces engaged in peace enforcement missions.

The above is a comprehensive list of activities which the RAAF has the capabilities to perform. Significantly, they are those capabilities developed for normal RAAF operations in the defence of Australia, however, they are also directly relevant to wider security interests, in this case peacekeeping. To carry out these functions there would need to be changes in attitude which would be reflected in resource allocation to accommodate increased demands. Resources would be needed to fund the additional operational tasks and some additional training which may be required by forces who are to become involved in peace operations. Some operational and unit level procedures may also need to be developed for the new situations which air force elements may face in these types of operations.

AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENT TO UN OPERATIONS

Strategic Review 1993

Australia has made an unequivocal commitment to support the UN so that the UN can work towards a more secure global environment. Early Australian defence policy papers exhibited a degree of ambivalence towards the role of the ADF in PKOs. In contrast, the latest strategic review clearly recognises the importance of supporting global security and demonstrates this by devoting five pages to the subject. This latest policy paper identifies new opportunities to promote multi-lateral mechanisms for managing security, including a greater role for the UN. The importance of the Defence role is highlighted as the Review states: ‘we should ensure that we maintain a total participation that is reasonable for our size and standing in the international community’. The advantage of providing formed land units is also referred to in the

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32 Ibid., p 16.
review because they offer ‘high visibility, a more effective input and more training value for the participants’.\textsuperscript{33}

The review does not specifically address the contribution by air or naval units but it could be argued that the most visible type of support the ADF could provide would be aircraft. Transport aircraft, for example, could be used to support UN missions. These would be widely seen across the whole area of operations thus ensuring maximum visibility. In addition, the training value and effectiveness of these air components would be of no lesser value than that experienced by other ADF units. The training value is encompassed by the experience of personnel who would plan and execute the military operation. This would mean the exercise of a range of military/professional functions in an operational environment, its benefits building confidence and esprit de corps and these benefits would be translated into collective RAAF experience and eventually RAAF doctrine. As RAAF assets are currently being fully utilised on training or ADF support tasks additional resources or a readjustment of tasking may need to be examined so that the air force can take advantage of these benefits.

**Australian Defence Peacekeeping Policy**

Australia’s Defence policy on peacekeeping is currently contained in a policy paper which pre-dates the 1993 Strategic Review. This policy is limited to traditional:

...UN (and other multinational) peacekeeping. It does not address enforcement activities such as the international response to the invasion of Kuwait; although activities like the recent deployment to Somalia have elements of both enforcement and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{34}

This policy document states that peacekeeping is a supplementary activity to the defence of Australia and promotion of Australia’s interests in the region. Nevertheless, where PKOs serve a significant or strategic interest there are strong grounds for increasing the ADF contribution.\textsuperscript{35}

Apart from the strategic and national interests served there are also other benefits of participating in peacekeeping. Some benefits and advantages of ADF participation in PKOs are listed in the Peacekeeping Policy paper. They include: strengthening Australia’s regional and wider international image and status, assisting any Australian claim to be involved in regional PKOs and increased standing with the UN should Australia want to call for a UN peacekeeping mission in the region. Direct benefits for the ADF are the valuable individual and collective training, and the quasi operational experience they offer.\textsuperscript{36} A limitation to participation is cost and this must be assessed in the light of the particular operation, specialisations sought by the UN and overall cost/benefit to the ADF.\textsuperscript{37} When assessing possible contributions to UN operations, Headquarters ADF, with the support of RAAF elements, should be able to conduct this type of cost/benefit analysis with respect to air force contributions to peacekeeping and the RAAF should prepare options to assist in this process.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{ibid.}, p 16.
\textsuperscript{34} Peacekeeping Policy, p 2.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{ibid.}, p 3.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{ibid.}, p 4.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{ibid.}, p 4.
Peacekeeping Doctrine

At this stage there is no approved ADF doctrine on peace operations, though the Peacekeeping Centre has made available a draft pamphlet on peacekeeping for working purposes. This will become a chapter in Australian Defence Publication Number 1 - Joint Operations Doctrine. The draft pamphlet on peacekeeping introduces peace doctrine to the ADF. It is extremely useful because it provides a set of definitions and categories for different types of operations, and sets out a number of key principles which should govern the conduct of peace operations. In the future, the Peacekeeping Centre should be in a position to develop further guidance, in the form of joint doctrine, for the units of all three Services which could be involved in peace operations.

According to the current draft doctrine, the use of air capabilities will be more important in what are described as the higher levels of PKOs. These involve the use of force for protection of humanitarian relief, assistance to an interim authority, guarantee and denial of movement, sanctions and peace enforcement. But, even at the lower levels of peace operations where the emphasis will be on predominantly ground forces acting as observers or providing an interposition presence, including preventive deployments, air support will be necessary. Apart from this draft ADF doctrine the RAAF has its own single-service doctrine. RAAF doctrine contributes to the joint doctrine development process and sets out air force functions, including contribution to furthering wider national interests such as peacekeeping.

The AAP 1000 - The Air Power Manual (2nd Ed), mentions peacekeeping on four occasions. First, when considering classes of war; second, when outlining a brief history of air power; third, as an option for government; and lastly, when discussing the need for logistic preparedness to cope with peacetime contingencies. The paucity of references to peacekeeping is highlighted by the fact that the Air Power Manual lists the international activities in which the RAAF participates but does not include contributions to peace operations in this list.

Comparing the first edition of the AAP 1000 with the second shows that the first edition does not mention peacekeeping at all, indicating that there has been some recognition of recent changes to the nature and prominence of UN peacekeeping. However, specific guidance on how the RAAF should prepare, organise and execute its involvement in peace operations is not the province of the AAP 1000. Such guidance should be drawn from joint doctrine, Air Headquarters Directives and unit level procedures which should be established to cater for tasks associated with peace operations. But such guidance is difficult to establish if there is an absence of practical experience. Therefore, intellectual effort should be made to prepare for peace operations.

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39 AAP 1000 (2nd Ed), p 27.
40 ibid., p 59.
41 ibid., p 10.
42 ibid., p 56.
43 ibid., p 59.
44 ibid., p 152.
45 ibid., pp 59-60.
operations and, where possible, the RAAF should become involved in these operations. Following this experience, the relevant RAAF elements should work to ensure they prepare properly for future peace operations by developing and promulgating guidance for the air units which may become involved in these types of operations.

Dr Steven Metz has made similar comments regarding USAF doctrine.\textsuperscript{46} RAF doctrine on the other hand has a section in its doctrine manual which discusses the ability of air power to contribute to a variety of critical situations, including support of peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{47} While this level of guidance is useful in describing the role of air power in these crises, specific guidance on how air power could be most effectively used in these situations appears to be lacking. The RAF has taken steps to address issues associated with the RAF and peacekeeping by having one of their Wing Commander’s conduct a study of the subject at the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre during 1995.

**The RAAF and Peace Operations**

The RAAF has been involved in a number of peace operations over a long period.\textsuperscript{48} This involvement dates from 1949 when a RAAF officer was part of a two man team in the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK).\textsuperscript{49} In 1962, Sioux helicopters, four army pilots and seven RAAF ground crew were attached to the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), established to supervise the transition of Netherlands West New Guinea to Indonesian control and to assist with the cholera eradication program.\textsuperscript{50} To date, the RAAF’s biggest contribution to a peace operation was as part of the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) to supervise the Camp David Accords. Between 1983-86, 109 personnel (99 RAAF) and eight Iroquois helicopters were based in the Sinai, supporting observers who conducted verification and reconnaissance missions in the treaty zones.\textsuperscript{51}

Apart from the unit level deployment, as part of the MFO, the RAAF has generally participated in peace operations by providing a small number of specialists to UN missions. In some cases, as in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), these specialists served as members of army units. In addition, the RAAF has provided airlift support for a number of Australian peace missions. Most recently this has been by airlifting the Australian United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) advance party to Kigali. In addition, RAAF medical staff have deployed as part of the Medical Support Force in Rwanda. While this form of involvement will continue the RAAF should not limit the horizons of its participation to these forms of contribution.

**ADF Contributions to Peace Operations**

\textsuperscript{46} Metz, ‘The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping’, p 76.
\textsuperscript{47} RAF AP 3000, pp 17-26.
\textsuperscript{48} See generally Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 104, January/February 1994, an edition devoted to ADF Peacekeeping; details of the history of ADF peacekeeping operations is in James, ‘A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping’, from this edition.
\textsuperscript{49} Waters, ‘The Light Blue Line in the Thin Blue Wedge’, p 42.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{ibid.}, p 42.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{ibid.}, p 42.
Current Defence policy, as expressed in the Peacekeeping Policy statement, lists the following as contributions Australia can make to UN missions:

- an infantry battalion group,
- an APC squadron,
- a signals squadron,
- a field engineer squadron,
- a medical unit,
- a field supply squadron,
- a transport squadron,
- a field workshop,
- a light and medium helicopter flight,
- a military police platoon,
- a Force Commander and personal staff,
- military observers or individual specialist officers,
- a movement control unit, and
- a fixed wing SRT or MRT transport flight.\(^{52}\)

These are predominantly Army capabilities and, except for the fixed wing air transport flight there is minimal opportunity for air force units to be deployed as part of a peace operation. Yet, as outlined earlier in this paper, air forces are able to fulfil many other roles which are relevant to UN or regional peace operations. For the RAAF role to be recognised and its unique capabilities fully utilised, when called upon, changes need to be made to our peacekeeping policy which reflect the importance of these types of operations to the RAAF mission.

**Relevance of UN Operations to the RAAF**

Two fundamental issues need to be addressed at this point. First, are these operations relevant to the current RAAF mission? and, second, what are the benefits for Australia and the Air Force?

The RAAF mission is to:
- Prepare for, conduct and sustain effective air operations to promote Australia’s security.\(^{53}\)

\(^{52}\) Peacekeeping Policy, p 11.
The public document which describes the RAAF mission and plans for 1994, and beyond, places great stress on the need to prepare to defend Australia and enhance the ability to conduct air operations in Northern Australia.\textsuperscript{54} While this war fighting emphasis cannot be faulted, because it correctly identifies Australia’s security priority, there is little mention of contributions to wider security interests. While there is some discussion of fostering regional cooperation in Air Force 1994, which will enhance regional security,\textsuperscript{55} there is very little on the wider security objectives which are outlined in the Strategic Review 1993.\textsuperscript{56} Nevertheless, the RAAF mission is broad enough to include contributions to these wider objectives, including peace operations.

The issue of how such operations directly contribute to Australia’s security remains. While the importance of the security environment is described in the latest Strategic Review,\textsuperscript{57} there are direct benefits which flow to the ADF and Australia from participation in peace operations. The diplomatic advantages mainly relate to Australia’s standing in the community of nations and its ability to influence events so that they accord with national interests. This includes playing a vigorous and active role in the UN and the activities sponsored by the UN. An example of this is the announced desire for Australia to become a member of the Security Council in 1996. Playing an active role in UN affairs, including peacekeeping, will have a bearing on Australia’s international standing.

Of course peace operations contribute to wider and more noble objectives than furthering national interests. The lives saved, suffering diminished and conflict ameliorated through peacekeeping are worthy aims in their own right. The Australian public reaction to the horrors in Rwanda stand testament to this. Few will dispute the tragedy caused by war, and efforts to bring peace will be almost universally praised and supported by the Australian public. However, there are limits to the levels of support possible, which include budgetary considerations and political will.

**Costs and Benefits of Participation**

The ADF is given limited funds to provide for the security of Australia. Generally funding for peace operations must be found within this budget.\textsuperscript{58} On occasions supplementation will be provided, or the UN may meet some ADF costs, related to these operations. As discussed in the Peacekeeping Policy, the ADF, when considering contributions to PKOs, should look to the direct advantages provided by involvement in peace operations.

The most important of these relate to the training benefits which would flow to the RAAF from participation. As discussed above, the ‘quasi-operational experience’\textsuperscript{59} will lead to the development of skills which cannot be replicated by indigenous

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{ibid.}ibid., pp 6, 16 and 20.
\bibitem{ibid.}ibid., pp 9 and 16.
\bibitem{ibid.}ibid., pp 2-5.
\bibitem{ibid.}ibid., pp 15-32.
\bibitem{ibid.}ibid., pp 15-32.
\bibitem{ibid.}ibid., pp 2-5.
\end{thebibliography}
training and exercises. No amount, or level, of training can substitute for experience in actual operations carried out under difficult and hazardous conditions.\(^60\)

In addition, such experience enables the ADF to test their professional standards. As the CGS, LTGEN John Grey recently pointed out: ‘You need to be able to test them in a very realistic environment and I think that you can do that with the UN.’\(^61\) LTGEN Grey went on to say that members of the ADF must always be ready to utilise their military skills. But opportunities to do so are few, especially in actual operations. In this sense, the fact they do not have a chance to use these skills leads to morale problems, thus it could be postulated that:

UN and multi-national force deployments significantly improve morale.\(^62\)

Indeed LTGEN Grey’s advocacy of UN operations to develop the professional well-being of the ADF is difficult to dispute. Short of actual hostilities, such operations provide the environment in which military forces excel. While participation in dangerous missions should not be undertaken without careful consideration of the risks and the national objectives being pursued, duly authorised peace operations will generally satisfy this criterion, provided other possibly higher priority criteria are not sacrificed.

Air forces should therefore consider and exploit opportunities to make important and effective contributions to peace missions. The direct advantages for airmen would be:

a. operational experience for all personnel involved,

b. significant involvement in a joint ADF operation,

c. experience in combined operations,

d. experience in supporting and sustaining overseas deployments in remote localities,

e. an opportunity to involve more enlisted personnel in operational circumstances,

f. provide benchmarks against which the RAAF can be measured against other air forces, and

g. promotion of an understanding of air power and the utility of air forces.

To gain these advantages large numbers of aircraft do not need to be involved. Two or three aircraft in a remote location supporting a UN operation would represent the likely numbers, although they would require their own ground support for sustained operations. The result, particularly after several rotations, will be greatly enhanced

\(^{60}\) Discussion with two officers serving in the UN Field Operations Division UN Headquarters New York, LTCOL W. Lange (a German Air Force transport pilot) and SQNLDR N. Bradford (a RAAF Supply officer), 10 June 1994.


\(^{62}\) ibid., p 62
aircrew experience levels in flying in unfamiliar and taxing situations, similarly the ground crew would learn to operate in a foreign environment. Such a commitment would have a high profile, bring great credit to the RAAF and Australia, and contribute to Australian influence in international affairs.

**The Need for a Changed Approach**

As indicated above, any decision to give more priority to RAAF involvement in peace operations will require some changes in RAAF attitudes as well as certain training and resource allocations. In terms of attitude, the RAAF should recognise the advantages and approach peace operations as a serious commitment. A commitment which will require additional resources. This means resources for special training, flying hours and additional personnel. This change can only be effected by the RAAF’s senior leaders and, if peace operations are to become an important air force role, the commitment simply must be made by those airmen. Dr Steven Metz has described this in a USAF context:

> Above all else the Air Force must take peacekeeping seriously by valuing the preservation of peace as much as victory in the traditional sense. The military services must give peacekeeping its fair share of resources in terms of intellectual energy, talent, and training time - something that can happen only when the attitudes of senior leaders change.\(^{63}\)

One of air power’s great strengths is flexibility. While the ability to fight and win during combat must continue to be a high priority for the RAAF, peace operations could be afforded more attention. This will not be easy because involvement in peacekeeping does require a markedly different ethos.\(^ {64}\) It also requires a different form of leadership from officers and non-commissioned officers. That said, these leaders will need to appreciate that there may be a time and place for war fighting, even in peace operations. However, peace operations generally require the exercise of great restraint and caution. Service culture and training need to be able to adapt to provide the skills necessary to deal with such an environment. This will require specialised training and may require the use of specialist personnel such as civil affairs officers. The use of legal officers to assist with the peacekeeping process may also be useful.\(^ {65}\)

The requisite skills can be developed through the RAAF Officer Education Training Scheme, incorporating training from junior to senior officer level, which would provide a solid foundation. This would then be augmented by specialist instruction, including that conducted by the ADF Peacekeeping Centre. While this type of training is an important starting point, practical exercises are also needed to reinforce classroom lessons and instil the sensitivities required of military personnel tasked to support the UN to bring peace to the world rather than victory for their nation.

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\(^{64}\) ibid., p 75.

\(^{65}\) This was the experience during Operation Solace when the civil affairs team and the legal officer played an important part in the nation building activities which were regarded as one of the most visible and noteworthy successes of the Operation. see Mellor W.J.A., ‘The Australian Experience in Somalia’, in Smith H. (Ed), *Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence University, Canberra, 1993, pp 63-66.
Apart from exercises, practical experience gained through involvement in peace operations and through exposure to the UN by way of posting or secondment are important to the RAAF so it can gain corporate knowledge of the UN’s organisation and procedures. This is necessary so that a core of personnel are available to act as planning staff and as instructors and staff at training institutions. This will enable their valuable expertise to be passed on to other RAAF and ADF members. At the moment the bulk of this expertise rests with the Army.

Risks

Military forces when preparing for and acting in support of peace missions must be mindful of the risks associated with these types of activities. If peace activities are allowed to become the focus of ADF operations there is a danger that force development will be skewed to tailor capabilities for peace operations rather than the requirements of the defence of Australia. Current policy statements have recognised this danger and have clearly stated that while roles, other than the defence of Australia, can have an influence on ADF force structure the ADF should not develop capabilities specifically for these other roles. To date the ADF force structure has proved sufficiently versatile to meet international commitments. Current guidance is that for some operations minor adjustments to equipment acquisition priorities may be justified but these should not place in jeopardy the capabilities required for the defence of Australia. The installation of self protection equipment into a number of RAAF C-130s is an example of this policy at work.

Another risk associated with involvement in peace operations is that the philosophical focus of military forces may be distracted from defending Australia, through fighting and winning an armed conflict, to more restrained objectives associated with peace missions. If the military services are to prepare to act as a credible combat force then they require a combat mentality which is quite different to the peaceful conflict resolution approaches adopted by the diplomats who will generally be controlling peace operations. Accordingly, when preparing for and conducting peace operations, the Air Force should not lose its combat edge by concentrating its focus too narrowly on these types of operations or operations other than war generally.

The dangers associated with some of the higher level peace operations cannot be ignored. The dangers of working in high risk and hazardous situations need to be carefully assessed against the national interests being pursued. These assessments must eventually come to government who will bear the political responsibility of putting Australian lives at risk. To enable government to make the most informed decision possible, military leaders must be in a position to provide the most accurate advice possible.

Other risks are associated with the costs involved in conducting peace operations. These relate to costs in resources such as flying hours, maintenance and logistic expenses and manpower. These costs should therefore be offset by supplementation to the relevant program by the portfolio or other government agencies, if Defence is

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66 Strategic Review, p 46.
67 Ibid., p 46.
68 The author is grateful for comments provided by Dr Alan Gropman during discussions at the National Defense University, Washington DC, 17 June 1994.
serving broader national interests. However, some expenditure will have to be borne by the ADF in recognition of the benefits discussed above, but again, such expenditure should not prejudice high priority training and exercising for national defence.69 Moreover, the ADF could adopt other strategies for the more routine tasks, such as scheduled air services or other similar air transport tasks, because of commitments to peace operations.70

Cost Recovery from the UN

The difference between the cost of personnel provided by the ADF to the UN is currently absorbed which means that the Australian Government is in effect subsidising UN operations. Even though the UN provides some payments for personnel, the payments do not cover the actual cost of the ADF members employed on the mission. The UN pays a set rate of $988 per month71 in contrast, according to the Defence Ready Reckoner for cost recovery, the full cost of an Army Private from Townsville is approximately $5 000 per month.72 While these figures are indicative only and do not cover the additional allowances paid to ADF members when they deploy on UN operations, nor reimbursement provided by the UN for field equipment used, there is a clear discrepancy between the figures. Accordingly, when predominantly army units are committed to UN operations the Australian Government, through the Defence portfolio, provides a subsidy to the UN. This form of subsidy is recognised as being offset by the wider benefits to the ADF and Australian interests.

A different situation occurs when RAAF transport aircraft are used to support UN missions. Normally, such aircraft are provided at full cost recovery to the UN which, for Hercules aircraft amounts to about $12 000 per flying hour. The UN generally rejects this rate as they are able to contract air transport at a substantially less cost. In some circumstances, usually following government direction, the ADF recovery rate is lowered to ensure ADF air assets are used. In these cases the costs recovered from the UN are equal to the lowest rate available which could perform the task at the time.73 While the training benefits derived from long range point-to-point air transport sorties may be similar to those derived from routine long range tasks in Australia, the benefits of providing a detachment of aircraft in-theatre would be much greater and would approximate the quasi-operational experience which the Chief of the General Staff has recognised as one of the benefits of peacekeeping for the ADF.74

To gain the benefits of such experience the RAAF should recognise that in some circumstances cost recovery for flying hours should be lowered to enable it to have detachments employed on peace operations. This would then approximate the approach taken by Army with its contributions to such operations. This is just one

69 Peacekeeping Policy, p. 6.
70 One alternative may be to contract out these tasks, retain the flying hours and devote them to peace operations. The author is grateful for the suggestion of the Director of the Air Power Studies Centre, GPCAPT G. Waters on this point.
72 Ready Reckoner of Personnel Costs and Related Overheads (3rd Ed), Department of Defence, Canberra, April 1994, Army Personnel Costing Table - Full Recovery Costs.
73 Discussion with ADF Command Centre staff, particularly WGCDDR R. Lewis on 7 & 8 Sep 94.
example of how the RAAF could encourage greater involvement in peace operations. As new situations develop there may well be other opportunities.

**Conclusion**

Australia’s direct security and broader national interests are strengthened through ADF involvement in peace operations. The ADF through its three Services has been a consistent supporter of UN efforts in this field. Over the past five years the UN has been exploring new ways to bring global peace and security. This has been possible because the members of the Security Council have found means to cooperate and agree on activities which accord with the UN Charter. One of these means is through a new understanding of the possibilities offered by peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping has evolved from being an invention of the UN, not specifically referred to in the UN Charter, to encompass the more robust measures originally envisaged by the framers of the Charter, as expressed in Chapter VII. Before 1989, peacekeeping was restrained by a number of limitations associated with superpower rivalry. As a result, ground forces were and remain the focus of UN peacekeeping efforts. The new activities which the UN has sanctioned in areas such as Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda indicate that new solutions to conflict situations are being explored and that air forces may be able to play a greater part. While ground forces will always be needed to carry out the more traditional peacekeeping operations, as well as some of the new initiatives, air forces should prepare to present useful alternatives which can be considered during deliberations on national involvement in peacekeeping operations.

The formulation and presentation of such options will require new attitudes about peace operations and a willingness to change some of the more conventional approaches to UN contributions. Changes will need to be made to joint doctrine, and probably RAAF doctrine, specific training will need to be introduced and an innovative approach to participation in opportunities will need to be explored and tested. The benefits that this would encompass include the chance to contribute to an important national mission, the acquisition of training experience, the development of operational expertise and the morale-building benefit of being a significant part of the ADF team which participates in peace operations. While these benefits are obvious, participation must not be at the expense of the prime ADF task which is to ensure a secure Australia. This may necessitate fighting and defeating an enemy and therefore forces should still be structured and trained for this. The ADF war fighting edge should not be dulled by an undue focus on peace operations.

There have been steps taken towards the changes discussed above. RAAF officers are involved with the UN and a number have been part of peace operations. The ADF Peacekeeping Centre conducts joint training on peace operations, including lectures to the single Service staff colleges. One of the Centre’s staff members is a RAAF officer with peacekeeping experience. However, the trend to form ADF peacekeeping contingents predominantly of ground forces is continuing and if the RAAF is to be more involved than it currently is, then there is a need to ensure that personnel gain the requisite experience by offering innovative options to CDF and ultimately Government. By doing this, Australian national interests will be furthered and the
RAAF will be contributing in a manner appropriate to its size, standing and capability as part of the ADF.