AIR POWER STUDIES CENTRE

PAPER 42

Month Year

AIR POWER AND POLITICAL CULTURE

By

Mr Charles M. Westenhoff
About the Author

The author ....
INTRODUCTION

Air power\(^1\) is the most responsive and in many ways the most useful form of military force yet developed. Increasingly, air power demonstrates the capacity to dominate warfare, yet variations in its effectiveness show that air forces rarely achieve their material potential. The great success with which liberal democracies have employed air forces as instruments of power is most easily attributed to asymmetrical wealth, but this understanding misses the role democratic institutions and value systems play in the development and employment of air power.

Western democracies have evolved a distinctive and dominant security institution, the national air force. Authoritarian regimes have only occasionally imitated such arms and then could not trust them.\(^2\) The interrelationship between democracy and effective air power has both current and future significance.

Air power effectiveness clearly depends on training, equipment, organisation, and strategy, but comparative studies of air power tend to focus on just technical and material factors.\(^3\) Social, political, and organisational factors can also determine air power’s value as an instrument of power, either amplifying or attenuating its material potential. Scholarly studies of the sensitivity of military power to political culture tend to focus on armies\(^4\) - the arms of conquest prized by authoritarian states - so there is much to learn in this field, far more than one brief article can disclose.

Authoritarian states have repeatedly found air power’s utility as an instrument of the state limited by their political institutions, often gaining only a small return for their air power investments. Some have even found their military treasure working against the interests of their regimes. Even technically adept authoritarian states demonstrate this tendency. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany devoted considerable resources to

---

1 In this article ‘air power’ follows John C. Cooper’s definition - ‘the total ability of a nation to fly, to act through the air space, to use controlled flight’. ‘The Fundamentals of Air Power’, address to the Library of Congress, 7 January 1948, in Emme, Eugene M. (ed.), *The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics*, D. Van Nostrand Company Inc, Princeton, 1959, pp 128-134. An ‘air force’ is an independent military aviation organisation established to develop and employ air power for national security; an ‘air service’ is a military aviation organisation designed to develop and employ air power for the benefit of a parent military service, such as the Japanese Naval Air Service of World War II. The general term encompassing air forces and air services is ‘air arm’.

2 Communist regimes have generally averted any challenge air forces might pose to the state or party by organising air arms subordinate to their armies. Thus the People’s Liberation Army has an air force, but the Peoples Republic of China does not. North Korea follows the same model. Francillon, René J., *The Naval Institute Guide to World Military Aviation*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995, pp 51, 125. On the air arms of the USSR and other former communist states during the Cold War see Taylor, Michael J. H., *Encyclopedia of the World’s Air Forces*, Facts on File Publications, New York, 1988. Among Second World War fascist regimes, Italy clearly operated an independent air force, Japan clearly did not (instead maintaining army and naval air arms) and Germany’s Luftwaffe was a mixed case, but not an independent air arm comparable to the US Army Air Forces of World War II.


4 Stephen Peter Rosen’s recent survey shows the scholarly literature of strategic culture largely confined to studies of armies. ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,’ *International Security*, Spring 1995, p 5. The article’s brief discussion of air forces indicates that ‘they will be less affected by the general norms and social structures’ of the state than armies. The recent history surveyed in this article indicates the reverse may be true.
develop air power (largely in collaboration) in the 1930s. While they developed advanced air arms for the time, these governments also impaired them with doctrines that improved their adherence to the exclusive party in power but curbed their service to the state.⁵ Recent wars provide further and clearer evidence of this trend. Evidence from recent wars indicates the sensitivity of air power to political culture persists. The 1991 Gulf War exhibited a stark contrast between authoritarian and democratic air effectiveness, but material factors alone might have determined the outcome in this case. Regardless, the might and exquisite military competence of the coalition air operation overshadowed the effects of political culture on Iraqi air operations. A more appropriate case for illuminating how modern air power operates in the hands of authoritarian leaders is the Iran-Iraq War, the longest conventional war of this century.⁶

**IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY REGIME**

When Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionary government came to power it quickly imposed political controls over the existing military elite. These controls particularly affected the Shah’s favoured military arm, the air force. Until 1979 the Imperial Iranian Air Force, largely modelled after the US Air Force, had been a major force in the Middle East. It atrophied quickly after it was reorganised as the Islamic Iranian Air Force. Iran’s western-trained airmen chafed under increasing restrictions and began defecting. Repression led to defection in a descending spiral; the most eminent defector was Iran’s President Bani-Sadr in June of 1981 in the company of a colonel of the Iranian Air Force. By 1982 over 180 pilots had defected, many with their aircraft. They reported that they were forced to fly without Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) equipment, which resulted in 55 Iranian aircraft being lost to fratricide.⁷ Aircraft maintenance was poor, but political security measures took an even greater toll on Iranian air operations. A committee of three religious authorities was appointed to oversee air operations. Aircrew members were searched before each mission, crews were given the minimum fuel thought necessary for the assigned mission, and aircrew

---

⁵ The air forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are more accurately categorised as air services of their respective armies. Neither air arm was designed using the context of its service to the state, a requirement that some have called definitive for air power. See for example, W. Barton Leach, ‘Obstacles to the Development of American Air Power’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1955, pp 67-75, excerpted in Emme, *The Value of Airpower*, pp 805-813. Soviet air activity before World War II was largely concerned with developing symbols of prestige; while this theme continued after World War II, postwar Soviet aviation was in many cases slavishly derivative of western air forces and their technologies. Mason, Air Vice-Marshal Tony, *Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal*, Brassey’s, London, 1994, p 162, points out that ‘Soviet advice may even have been counterproductive’ to Iraqi air power development.

⁶ The performance of the Iraqi Air Force in Desert Storm has been difficult to assess first because it flew so little and second because of the near vacuum of reliable information stemming from Baghdad. The effects of this limitation are detailed in Watts, Barry D. and Keaney, Dr Thomas E., *Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume II Part II: Effects and Effectiveness*, Eliot A. Cohen, Director, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1993, pp 16-17.

members, instead of being allowed to plan their missions, were issued flight plans just before take-off.\footnote{Cordesman, \textit{The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-1987}, pp 105, 112, 143; O’Ballance, \textit{The Gulf War}, pp 71, 87, points out how restricted flying proficiency due to groundings eroded Iranian air capabilities, much as Napoleon’s conservation of his fleet during the prolonged British blockade rendered the conserved fleet militarily frail.}

The measures Teheran imposed on its air forces continued to erode combat effectiveness throughout the war. Iranian air efforts peaked in the first few weeks of the war and declined steadily thereafter. The isolation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary regime and the difficulties it experienced in obtaining replacement parts and equipment was one factor in this decline, but not the only one. [Iraq also suffered from withdrawal of aid. The Soviet Union embargoed military shipments to Iraq soon after the war began (although it quietly resumed them in 1982).\footnote{The timing of Soviet resumption of arms shipments, shortly after Israel routed Soviet arms in the Bekaa Valley campaign, is interesting. O’Ballance, \textit{The Gulf War}, p 12; Lawrence Freedman and Karsh, Efraim, \textit{The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order}, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992, p 279.}]

The extreme hostility of the Khomeini regime to the most industrialised states - the major arms suppliers - isolated Iran and significantly complicated its war effort. But suspicion and tension between Iran’s political elite and its air force proved the most corrosive influence on Iranian air power. Teheran continued to impose restrictions on its available air power as the Iran-Iraq War progressed. In the final months of the war Baghdad reported daily sorties in the hundreds, while Teheran’s war bulletins reported only a handful (and magnified the media signature of the few daily sorties by broadcasting the times they had been over their targets.)\footnote{Neither Iraqi nor Iranian war reporting can be considered reliable, but Iran’s tacit admission that its forces flew only a few sorties a day is a good example of the ‘proportional truth’ of official reporting from this war.}


\section*{IRAQ’S BA’ATHIST REGIME}

Militarised states tend to design their armed forces not for war fighting but for coup prevention. The autonomous operating characteristics and concentration of lethal power inherent in air forces has been key to the outcomes of coups in Guatemala (1954), Chile (1972) and the Philippines (1989). Iraq’s Ba’athist regime had historical reasons to fear the military - and the air force in particular. The Iraqi Air Force had been instrumental in several regime changes, including the 1936 coup and the 1958 republican revolution. The Ba’ath party launched its first coup in February 1963 by capturing and executing the commander of the Iraqi Air Force.\(^\text{14}\) That government, which brought Saddam Hussein his first position of power, lasted eight months. In November 1963 the military revolted from the Ba’ath party, securing its coup with an air force attack on the Baghdad headquarters of the Ba’ath National Guard.\(^\text{15}\) The Ba’ath party returned to power in 1968 in yet another military coup led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and secured by a purge of the military, orchestrated by his chief of security, Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein pushed President Bakr aside in 1979. Within a week of assuming power he claimed to have discovered a ‘conspiracy’ among the military and then executed the accused before a month had passed.\(^\text{16}\) Saddam Hussein purged all of the armed services but devoted particular attention to the Air Force. Membership in the Ba’ath party became a prerequisite for attendance at the Iraqi Air Force Academy. Saddam Hussein further tightened his control by moving the academy to his home town of Tikrit.\(^\text{17}\)

When Iraq began its war against Iran in September 1980 it copied Israel’s 1967 strategy - attacking all of the important Iranian air bases on the first day - even though Iran had followed the lead of NATO states by constructing hardened aircraft shelters in the 1970s.\(^\text{18}\) Iran responded with a similar one-pulse attack on Iraq’s air bases.\(^\text{19}\) Yet neither state persisted in its efforts to eliminate or even significantly contain the opposing air force after the opening days. Westerners might characterise this omission as risk avoidance or a strategic oversight, but it accorded with each regime’s priority on internal control. Saddam Hussein’s declaration that he would disregard western analysts’ criticisms of his use of air power corresponded to his strategic overconfidence.\(^\text{20}\)

Once the Iran-Iraq War began, Iraqi air commanders were punished for aircraft losses regardless of damage inflicted on the enemy. Optimistic reporting was rewarded and


Air Power and Political Culture

unfavourable yet accurate reporting punished.\textsuperscript{21} The regime acted against its own interests when it attempted to gain better results by committing the IZAF to battle piecemeal, which increased its losses and reduced its accomplishments.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite these impositions on its employment the IZAF, exposed for eight years to the pitiless realities of combat, became one of the most technically experienced combat forces in the world in the 1980s. It steadily acquired new equipment and its pilots accumulated combat practice in advanced techniques such as aerial refuelling and the use of precision-guided munitions.\textsuperscript{23} But with each advance in its capabilities the IZAF posed a greater threat to the Ba'athist regime.

The assessment that ‘this is a war Iraq can not win and Iran can not lose’ had become a cliche by 1988, when Iraq launched a series of offensives and the course of the war changed dramatically.\textsuperscript{24} Iraq successfully exploited three crucial differentials to stave off defeat for seven years and eventually exhaust the Khomeini regime. First, Iraq possessed a network of roads and railroads paralleling the border - what Jomini termed ‘interior lines’. These lines of communication allowed Saddam Hussein to move reinforcements to limit or reverse any Iranian attack.\textsuperscript{25} Second, Iraq expanded its air force and employed it to buy time while reinforcements moved when necessary.\textsuperscript{26} Third, and most important, Iraq benefitted from generous loans and terms of credit provided by Eastern as well as Western sources. This allowed Iraq to invest in modern military technology. Not surprisingly, the tools of modern air power were a top priority.\textsuperscript{27} However, Iraq’s repression of its air force and its concentration on ground defensive operations until 1988 had the effect of curbing the potential of its abundant military hardware.

Although Iraqi air power may not have been fully exploited to gain victory, it at least prevented defeat by playing an indispensable role in containing Iranian offensives and preventing breakouts from 1981 through 1988.\textsuperscript{28} Iraq’s air effort in this first Gulf War

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} ibid., pp 236, 242, 363, 473.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Reiterated in Rezun, \textit{Saddam Hussein’s Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East}, p 36.
\end{itemize}
dwarfed that of the Coalition in the 1991 Gulf War (400,000 sorties versus 110,000). By 1988 the IZAF probably had more resident combat experience than all of the remaining air forces in the world combined. But Iraq’s Ba’athist elite carefully controlled this most potent instrument of external power, unable to assume it would remain loyal. In summation, while the Iraqi Air Force was sufficiently well employed to stave off defeat at the hands of an impoverished Iranian army, the penalties imposed by the restrictions it suffered were made clear when it faced coalition air forces in 1991.

THE CONTEST BETWEEN SECURITY AND AIR POWER

The particular philosophies and goals of authoritarian states can be as different as North Korean juche and fascism, but states that are systemically opposed to liberal democracy often share many common features. Chief among these are concentration of power in a single ‘political party’, some form of national mobilisation, and security measures designed to eliminate opposition. Influenced largely by ‘fascism, Nazism and Stalinism’, Iraqi Ba’athism illustrates the contemporary ‘state of the art’ other authoritarian regimes and future successors can aspire to.

Few if any states have erected information control mechanisms to rival those installed following Iraq’s Ba’athist revolution of 1968. Under Ba’ath party leadership the military and the interior ministry developed as many as eight separate but interlocking security services to monitor the population as a whole and report on the others. The single sanction for disloyalty and, by some accounts, accusations of disloyalty, was (and presumably remains) death. A central aim of all of these efforts was to increase the security of the regime by politicising Iraq’s armed forces.

As the rest of the world was entering the ‘information age’ Iraq developed pervasive measures to control information (which eventually had debilitating effects on the Iraqi military in the 1991 Gulf War). Telephones, radio receivers, copiers, computers, and typewriters had to be registered with the state. Cameras could be purchased but photography was prohibited without written permission from the interior ministry. Foreign publications were prohibited; Baghdad’s five newspapers were all government organs, as were its broadcasting stations. Weather forecasts were state secrets; even current weather reports were forbidden to be published or broadcast.

---

31 al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, p 36. Saddam Hussein sought expert assistance in reorganising the State Internal Security organisation from KGB chief Andropov and East German training. ibid., pp 12, 66.
throughout the course of the Iran-Iraq War because of their possible value to Iranian military planners.33

Iraqi officials echoed Iranian practices in the Iran-Iraq War by providing aircrews with their flight plans at the last minute and forbidding mission debriefings.34 The regime also deemed it better to forgo the potential synergy available from coordinating air and land operations rather than risk collaboration, so the Iraqi army and air force were prohibited from coordinating their efforts.35 This prohibition dangerously slowed the collective reaction to Iran’s summer 1986 Karbala offensive which penetrated so far into Iraq that it temporarily closed the Baghdad-Basrah highway.36

Iraqi air power contributed anemically to the battlefield, but achieved eye-catching strategic successes against Iran. Long-range attacks on pinpoint targets such as the Neka power plant on the Caspian Sea coast, Larak Island in the Straits of Hormuz, the Bushehr nuclear plant, and satellite communications stations near Hamadan demonstrated the increasing skill and technical sophistication of the Iraqi Air Force from 1986 on.37 Yet Iraqi air operations continued to follow the same impractical pattern that plagued Iraq’s original air effort of September 1980. Iraq certainly had the military potential to gain the advantages it accrued by August 1988 at a faster rate. The tempo of effort may have been slowed by limiting the role of airmen in air planning; it most certainly was affected by basing the most effective aircraft far from the militarily optimum site - Iraq’s geographic and technical centre of Baghdad.38 While this impaired internal air force communications and technical interchanges, locating Iraq’s most potent combat aircraft at outlying bases reduced the risks of their use against the regime. Iraqi air forces also rarely flew in large formations (and when large formations flew together they were unarmed) to eliminate the risk of a large force contributing to a coup. This spilled over into the Gulf War of 1991, eliminating Iraq’s most worrisome offensive option.39 All these factors confirm the appraisal offered by Anthony Cordesman that the IZAF was ‘organised and deployed to prevent

33 al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. For a noncritical survey of Iraqi information restrictions see for example The Baghdad Writer’s Group, Baghdad and Beyond, Middle East Editorial Associates, Washington DC, 1985, pp 21, 27, 60, 76-79.
35 Waters, Gary, Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons for Australia, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992, pp 36, 123 explains the resulting reduction in military capability.
38 Watts and Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume II Part II: Effects and Effectiveness, Figure 14, Selected Iraqi Air Bases, p 150.
39 The practice of forbidding large formations of aircraft from flying together prevented Iraq from mounting a spoiling attack on the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Coalition. Such an attack, using an immense formation to saturate and ‘strip off’ the Coalition’s defensive air patrols, was considered the one type of raid with the slim chance of upsetting the coalition’s plans. ibid., pp 129, 157. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, p 194.
its use in a coup’.\textsuperscript{40} That is, it was fragmented and enmeshed in security procedures that limited its contributions to the war effort.

**AIR POWER AND VALUES**

Elaborate security measures like those imposed by Iran and Iraq have clear costs, yet these two ideologically opposed ruling elites each deemed them necessary to the regime’s safety. Shifting military priorities from warfighting effectiveness to internal stability can have debilitating effects.

As these recent examples demonstrate, state value systems may bound modern military capabilities. Rigid command and direction tends to marginalise air forces as instruments of war; each advance in capability that might compensate for inefficient organisation makes a repressive state’s air force more threatening to the regime it was intended to serve. The values and doctrines required to fully develop and harness the potential of modern air power clash with those values and mechanisms of state control favoured by unpopular or repressive regimes, as the remainder of this article will explain.

The security measures imposed on the Iraqi and Iranian air forces by their respective governments attenuated the potential of these forces to a degree that would be viewed as intolerable by the people and the military professionals sworn to protect the people in contemporary western states. The luxury of concord in public discourse enjoyed by authoritarian regimes comes at an immense price in accurate knowledge and the feedback necessary to tune government operations. Politicised armed forces, compelled to filter and misreport information, lose effectiveness as instruments of the state. The results of manipulation continue in operation, gaining layers of effects. Natural errors may be statistically distributed and self-cancelling in open systems, but imposed biases block such self-regulation. All the armed forces of authoritarian states are clearly affected as military instruments by information distortion, restriction of dialogue, and lack of access to objective sources of feedback\textsuperscript{41}. These factors impede air forces disproportionately.

The losses authoritarian regimes sustain by imposing excessive security measures on their armed forces are proportional to the military possibilities they curtail. Air forces can attack opposing navies, air forces or armies with great immediacy and effectiveness, can also attack national war-sustaining means, and may destroy or incapacitate specific strategic functions such as internal communications or transportation. The array of air power’s immediate possibilities magnifies the opportunity costs of misapplication and accentuates the importance of air strategy.

In both Iran and Iraq, air strategies appear to have been devised by ruling elites who forbade or dismissed the advice of experienced airmen. It is impossible to say if Iran’s

\textsuperscript{40} Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability*, p 746. Rezun, *Saddam Hussein’s Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East*, p 35, accurately pegs Iraqi priorities - protecting the Takritis, the Sunni Elite, the Revolutionary Command Council of the Ba’ath party, the Ba’ath party, and then Iraq.

\textsuperscript{41} For the effects on the Soviet air arms, see for example, Mason, *Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal*, pp 210-213.
religious authorities who oversaw air operations had any understanding of the potential of air power, but the measures they imposed indicate ignorance of, if not hostility to, the resources at their disposal. Flying then-irreplaceable aircraft without operating IFF equipment subjected Iranian airmen to continuous attack from both Iraqi and Iranian forces. Operating aircraft supplied with only a minimum of fuel - with no reserve for the vagaries of weather, manoeuvring, enemy action, or disorientation - guaranteed needless losses of irreplaceable assets. Likewise, Baghdad’s tenuous application of its air force may have stretched out the Iran-Iraq war needlessly. And the awkward locations of Iraq’s air bases and its restrictions on joint army-air force planning certainly cost soldiers lives and metered results. Professional airmen in both nations must have understood many of these errors but lacked avenues to communicate even basic professional advice to those in authority.

The understandings required to develop and effectively employ military aviation are technical more than political. However, professional airmen tend to be cosmopolitan, exposed to western education, and accustomed to thinking rigorously - at least about matters affecting their survival. Iranian airmen were trained in the United States until 1979, while Iraqi airmen traced their traditions to Britain’s Royal Air Force and trained in several European locations in the 1980s. Authoritarian or xenophobic governments may classify airmen as a potentially threatening group. As Richard Hallion observed:

While Saddam Hussein could rely on like-thinking unsophisticates from his home town of Tikrit to run his army, finding equally doctrinaire individuals who could also fly an airplane was a far more difficult task. (Hitler and Goering had the same problem with the Luftwaffe in the Second World War ...) Distorted information can be a death sentence on any sortie. An accurate and thorough preflight briefing arms airmen to minimise risks, affords them the ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and helps them to work together when flying in formation. But to an air force as a body, debriefings are even more important. Debriefings permit organisations to accumulate knowledge, to cease making errors when they are first discerned, to acquire vicarious knowledge that can benefit the whole force, and to hone military capabilities. Debriefings also begin the process of feedback to national decision-makers. Regimes that restrict constructive internal communications inadvertently sacrifice external military security.

The airman’s appetite for pertinent information is specific but voracious in those particular areas of professional need; the air planner’s needs are synoptic. Accurate reporting is important to any military branch; to airmen it is a personal priority. Information distribution is a predictable source of tension between the power elites and the airmen of centrist states. Societies ruled by tight control of information cannot tolerate individual access to information, free media, or free speech. This creates a natural tension with the survival values and information requirements of aviators.

---

43 Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, p 129.
44 Dr. Frank Dully of the Naval Postgraduate School, lecture on survival values in combat aviation, Shaw AFB, SC, 14 Feb 86.
All types of forces benefit from societies that permit free speech, free competition, and free markets, but air forces exploit these freedoms in unique ways. Unlike soldiers and sailors, aircrews possess the potential to attack any target within an immense radius each time they fly. This power is concentrated in individuals and small crews. Army forces capable of significant action consist of hundreds or thousands of individuals, none of whom can radically depart from authoritative norms. Similarly, naval vessels are crewed by large numbers (and while a ‘Red October’ mutiny is theoretically possible, no ship (much less a fleet) is likely to be used to displace a government. Centrally controlled regimes typically compensate for this concentration of power in individual combatants by selecting and advancing airmen based on their political reliability rather than their military competence, but this further reduces the utility of the air forces they acquire (for example, if the primary criterion for entering an air arm was red hair, those with the reddest of hair would be the top candidates, and there would be a cutoff at some degree of redness - regardless of whether hair colour indicates skill or fitness to serve). Even with such selection practices, non-popular or insecure elites cannot afford to trust that their airmen are free of infection from Western ideas.

Western air forces gain advantages stemming from information sharing, the unbiased competition of ideas, scientific objectivity in systems development and testing, and individual initiative. These advantages are likely to remain unchallenged by states that depend for their security on information control and manipulation. The progressive expectation - that knowledge accumulates to the benefit of the many - is similarly unlikely to benefit repressive regimes. But perhaps the most effective value differential curbing hostile use of air power is that western forces are assumed to serve society, not the ruling elite.

INFLUENCES OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON AIR POWER

DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

Iran and Iraq used their air forces as terror weapons and aped Adolf Hitler in applying missiles to the same job. The use of air forces for terror was available from the first. It began with German Zeppelin attacks on London and other British cities early in the World War I. Britain’s strategy in response was penned by Winston Churchill in a series of memoranda of September 1914. In essence, he proposed gaining exclusive control of the air. After outlining an array of military measures to defend Britain from air attack, Churchill suggested a way of making lasting gains:

... after all, the great defence against aerial menace is to attack the enemy’s aircraft as near as possible to their point of departure ...

Politically, the priority of gaining control of the air accords with the value democratic governments assign to the population as their source of power and their responsibility to safeguard. Strategically, gaining control of the air has proven essential in every campaign of World War II and every interstate war since. The method of gaining lasting advantage in air operations - destroying the enemy air force, preferably on the ground - seems from the evidence of the 1991 Gulf War to be increasingly important. This lesson has not been missed in Russia, which began its suppression of the Chechen rebellion by destroying the 200 aircraft available to the rebels (who were led by the former bomber pilot Dudayev) in the first day of operations.

Such a promising strategy is unlikely to be ignored by repressive states, but the Iran-Iraq War experience reveals some institutional impediments authoritarian regimes face in attempting to gain an air advantage. Instead of attempting to gain air ascendancy, Iran and Iraq continued to attack politically symbolic targets throughout their war. The simplest explanation of this behaviour, proposed by a number of analysts, is that neither Baghdad nor Tehran was willing to risk its most flexible offensive tool merely to shield its people. Instead, these centrist regimes strove to maintain control of the offensive potential of air power, metering air operations to prevent coup attempts and preserving it in case it might be needed to repress internal foes.

One more political differential stems from the varied purposes states assign to their air forces. Instead of designing their air forces to protect their people and disarm aggressors, authoritarian regimes tend to see air power as an adjunct to their arm of conquest. In terms of military art, western states employ air forces as coequals to armies and navies in a ‘joint’ scheme, while air forces designed to serve armies fit a ‘combined arms’ scheme. Several commentators have noted how Iraq followed the combined arms model. In another interesting parallel, in World War II allied forces employing a joint operations model gained air superiority and then complete ascendancy over the Axis powers, who generally followed the combined arms model. This was true in every theatre save one - the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany both employed their forces under a combined arms model. These two ‘combined arms’ forces clashed in the eastern front of the European Theatre in World War II. It is no accident that this was by far the bloodiest front in the war.

AIR POWER’S UTILITY

As observers in many nations have noted since the Gulf War, air power is increasingly likely to establish the outcome of interstate war. It is a more responsive, potent, and

---


48 See, for example, Erez, The Middle East Military Balance 1987-1988, p 179.


flexible form of military power than any that preceded it. This characterisation stems from the speed, manoeuvrability, and range of aircraft (giving them access to whatever an enemy holds most dear, or, as a corollary, everything an enemy values). The consequent capability of air forces to attack any of an enemy state’s instruments of national power provides decision makers a valued array of choices.\footnote{Cohen, Eliot, ‘The Mystique of U.S. Air Power’, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Jan-Feb 94, pp 109-124; Philip Gold, ‘What does a 21st century defense require?’, \textit{Inquiry} 1995/1 (occasional paper), Discovery Institute, 5 Apr 1995.}

Liberal democracies have taken extraordinary measures to minimise casualties in war yet retain military capability commensurate with their commitments. Air power has allowed the United States in particular to not only resolve this dilemma but to acquire a potential ‘military edge over conventional opponents comparable to that exercised in 1898 by the soldiers of Lord Kitchener over the sword-wielding dervishes of the Sudan.’\footnote{Cohen, ‘The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,’ \textit{Foreign Affairs}, p 111.} Other democracies share the same values if not identical wealth and technical achievements. As long as memory of the 1991 Gulf air campaign is widespread, citizens of democratic states will expect their governments in the event of war to use the full potential of their air forces to minimise costs and risks. Those citizens might also judge the wisdom of their governments based on the soundness and foresight of their defence decisions.

Air forces provide democracies with easily shared tools befitting their common values. The evidence indicates that democracies rarely fight democracies and, as the Gulf War demonstrated, can find common cause in opposing aggressive actors.\footnote{Waters, \textit{Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons for Australia}, pp 221, 253. This correlation is examined in ‘Democracies and War: The politics of peace’, \textit{The Economist}, 1 April 1995, pp 17-18. In reply Bruce Russitt, Chairman of Yale’s department of political science pointed out statistical evidence supporting the assertion that democracies rarely fight, and Harvard’s Andrew Moravcsik pointed out that ‘Democratic pacifism is the closest thing to an empirical law that scholarship on international relations has yet produced’, \textit{The Economist}, 29 Apr 95, p 8.} One of the least-noticed yet most important changes in warfare wrought by air power is its extraordinary streamlining of multinational operations. In the 1991 Gulf War air forces of a dozen nations following a common air tasking order operated seamlessly. The challenge coalitions have wrestled with since Wellington and Blucher, of concentrating different forces in time and space, dissolves for air forces since they can concentrate in purpose without needing to unite in location. The fluidity of coalition air operations adds to air power’s usefulness to democratic states.\footnote{The air war against Iraq turned out to be an enormous success. One of the reasons for this triumph was the integration of the various air forces into a solid fighting force. Was this so unusual?’ Rezun, \textit{Saddam Hussein’s Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East}, p 94. Unified efforts seamlessly incorporating air forces from several nations have included the defence of Australia in 1942 and 1943, the Mediterranean and Northwest European campaigns of World War II, the Berlin Airlift, and United Nations operations in Korea from 1950 to 1953.} Put simply, air power concurs with American ideas. It supports collective response and independent strength. It substitutes technology for human risk - and takes the initiative.\footnote{Perry, William J., ‘Defense Aerospace and the New World Order’ in \textit{The Future of Aerospace}, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1993, pp 7-14.} The full potential of air power can be realised by armed forces that systemically accept and apply the Western values of free expression, competing ideas, and individual liberty. No regime opposed to those values has met Western standards for exploiting the potential of air power to date. Indeed, the institutional dissonance...
between authoritarian regimes and effective doctrines for air employment indicate these impediments are unlikely to vanish. Authoritarian regimes are unlikely to choose more effective air power at the cost of less control. It is interesting to ponder the extent to which those who developed modern air power assumed it would serve democratic minds, thus unconsciously limiting its effectiveness at the hands of those hostile to Western values.

THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENTIAL

The priorities and methods of totalitarian states clearly tend to curb air forces so they exclusively serve the aims of ruling elites. In symmetrical conflict, states that hoard air power to preserve its potential for terror are likely to see that power wither, while air forces that are utilised to shield the citizenry are likely to gain advantage if they are reasonably well equipped and led. States that do not trust their air leaders are likely to employ air forces to suit the desires of their power elites with little understanding of capabilities, limitations, or opportunities that expert advice would disclose and consequently fail to harness the combination of responsiveness, initiative, and combat power that liberal states expect their air forces to provide.

The modern manned aircraft embodies this value differential in miniature. Contemporary multirole aircraft can be armed with a selection of specialised weapons (each of which requires expert planning for optimum results), can range over hundreds of miles at speeds in hundreds of miles an hour, and can perform an array of tasks. Commands composed of many aircraft and crews with good leadership, intelligence, and communications accumulate higher level skills and military potential. It is the human element in aircrews and air organisations that repressive regimes can not afford to trust. The most prized military trait of air power, flexibility, stems from individual performance, trustworthiness, and initiative. The fact that Hitler, Khomeini and Saddam Hussein increasingly relied on unmanned weapons is striking.  

56 Air forces have proven most capable when employed by liberal democratic states. Liberal democracies have a distinct asymmetric advantage in maintaining air forces to serve their national security needs. Indeed, the opportunities air power can provide which suit democratic value systems are increasing. For example, stealth and precision weapons offer an extended form of deterrence that could forestall aggression by those who might not fear nuclear deterrence, as Paul Nitze has pointed out.  

57 Similarly, Tony Mason has pointed out the collective security opportunities available in an ‘era of differential air power’.  

However, while this potential advantage is inherent in democratic political culture, there is no guarantee that democratic states will exploit their leverage. They may marginalise or even discard this advantage unwittingly. Just as creating an air force

56 Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, p 228, and Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, p 129 point out the coincidence of Hitler, Khomeini and Saddam Hussein’s reliance on missiles.  
and investing in air power are military policy choices, the arrangements for obtaining expert air advice, planning, and direction are dictated by defence policy, which may or may not make the critical distinctions necessary to the optimum use of any specialised form of combat power.

As belts tighten in the world’s democracies, defence staffs tend to equalise dissatisfaction and seek compromise in the name of ‘jointness’ (or, as some allies term it, ‘jointery’) rather than pursue excellence in the specialised fields of air power, sea power, and land power. In this atmosphere, compromise can repress expertise and initiative, promoting a form of conformity. Uncritical devotion to harmony and compromise could impose the fetters of an imposed and excessive political reliability on any branch of armed forces. This is not to say that jointness is harmful to military capability (the reverse should be true, as we saw in World War II), but confused ideas of jointness could curb effectiveness. A clear conception of jointness has become a strategic necessity.

To the extent that defence staffs avoid the temptations to arrive at comfortable compromises and instead refine specific military capabilities (provided by elementally different forms of armed force), contemporary defence restructuring could actually lead to leaner, more modern, and more affordable armed forces. Yet as Eliot Cohen has so sagaciously pointed out, we need to think clearly about our real military strengths. Democratic strategists, policy-makers, and citizens should appreciate how their values and freedoms provide a favourable climate for air power, which in turn shields those who nurture it. Air power thrives in the salubrious air that liberal democracy provides. It is in the interest of democratic states to fully appreciate all of the benefits their societies provide, including unique defence advantages. Policy-makers can do even more, nurturing the contemporary synergy of culture and power that is in their trust.

Stifling effects that can result from excesses in the name of jointness were cynically characterised by Dr Edward N. Luttwak: ‘Jointness is the virus that gives you the acquired strategic deficiency syndrome’, quoted in Air Force, April 1995, p 65. Examples of the tendency to view air power contributions through the lens of its contribution to land battle (and resistance to its employment in pursuit of national goals) can be found in Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, pp 84, 97, 98, 200, 310-11.

Centrifugal reactions to the success of coalition air power in the Gulf War indicate the extent of tension post Cold War downsizing has caused, magnifying the pressures to mix and dilute the separate capacities that distinguish air forces, navies, and armies. For example, two letters by Frederick Kroesen - one in the Washington Post, 7 Nov 94, p 22, the other in the Washington Times, 26 Dec 94, p 18, claimed that air power failed to gain a single US or UN objective in the Gulf War, whereas four days of land combat gained all of them. A brief reference to the US war plan shows it had six objectives; three were attained by air power, one by land combat; of the two remaining one (destroy Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical capability) was governed by the state of intelligence and the other (destroy the Republican Guards) should have been a team effort.

American planners should look at what happened [in the Gulf War air campaign] and ask whether these improvisations do not point the way to greater effectiveness. After several decades of insisting that the word “service” means “parochial”, military reformers might ponder the individual merits of the services, each of which can pool a great deal of operational expertise along with a common world view and an esprit de corps difficult to find among a melange of officers’. Cohen, ‘The Mystique of U.S. Air Power’, Foreign Affairs, p 118. See also Cohen, ‘The Mystique of U.S. Air Power’, Foreign Affairs, pp 116-117, 120, 123-124.