Philippine Air Force Visiting Fellow Program

Doctrine Writing Handbook

Noel L. Patajo
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Air Power Studies Centre
RAAF Fairbairn
Canberra
1999
The Air Power Studies Centre

The Air Power Studies Centre was established by the Royal Australian Air Force at RAAF Base Fairbairn in August 1989, at the direction of the Chief of Air Force. Its function is to promote a greater understanding of the proper application of air power within the Australian Defence Force and in the wider community. This is being achieved through a variety of methods, including development and revision of indigenous doctrine, the incorporation of that doctrine into all levels of RAAF training, and increasing the level of air power awareness across the broadest possible spectrum. Comment on this publication or enquiry on any air power related topic is welcome and should be forwarded to:

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Major Patajo is happily married to Noemi Ecal Patajo of Fernando Air Base, Lipa City. The union is blessed with Maureen Kay, Kenneth Paul, and Melissa.

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Preface

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) began rewriting all military manuals during the 1970s. The General Headquarter (GHQ) through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations J-3 printed several AFP Manuals (AFPM) dealing with the different functional concerns like personnel management, intelligence, operations, supply and logistics, communication and electronics, engineering, medical services, and finance etc. These AFPMs served as guide for corresponding major services manuals.

The Philippine Air Force (PAF) through the Office of Special Studies (OSS) published voluminous PAF manuals (PAFM) corresponding to the AFPMs from the late 1970s to 1984. These PAFMs and AFPMs serve as official references in almost all aspects of the AFP and PAF business through the years. After a decade, the relevant functional AFP and PAF staffs did several revisions of different AFPMs and PAFMs. The revisions came in the form of Circulars, Memos and Letter Directives. No single office remained responsible for consolidating changes to the manuals.

The onset of modernization renewed the interest in updating AFPMs and military doctrine in the early 1990s. The Commanding General, PAF reactivated the OSS in May 1994 for doctrine development and strategic studies as the modernization program gathered steam in the Legislative chamber.

The OSS searched for the PAFM writers’ established procedures and systems that were used in the 1970s but none were on file. Hence, the PAF published Standard Operating Procedure No. 16: PAF Doctrine Process in 1995 as the basis of doctrine development in accordance with the PAF Modernization Program. The AFP, in turn, published the AFP Development Manual in 1997 incorporating the PAF SOP 16, which also included the Army’s and Navy’s Doctrine Processes.

The AFP Doctrine Development Manual presents broad phases of military doctrine development, workflows, and approval process. It does not have clear delineation between doctrine concept or proposals development and writing. The existing PAFMs need updating while new equipment, lessons learned from actual PAF operations and PAF US Combined exercises demand new doctrine.

Before the end of the 20th Century, the PAF should have started doctrine development so that theory and technology will match the tactics and strategy of the new PAF. Doctrine development is an immense task and the impact of doctrine will be pervasive at all levels of the PAF Command. As such, the PAF through the OSS may task all airmen of varying skills and expertise to write doctrines. This book, the PAF Doctrine Writing Handbook, intends to give appropriate guidance to the chosen doctrine writer. It is not intended to be a ‘cure all’ guide but as a ready reference for the doctrine writing task.

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1 The declaration of Martial in 1972 initially reinvigorated the AFP and one of the telltale signs was codifying the AFP operations thus removing US Manuals role as official AFP references.
2 The OSS was deactivated in 1984 and resumed functional supervision of doctrines in 1994.
Acknowledgments

My involvement in the realm of doctrine development began with my mentor, Lieutenant Colonel Nestor M. Deona PAF – former Director of OSS and presently with the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, J-5. Further interactions with other great minds like Colonel Vicente C. Bunuan III (GSC) PAF and Colonel Danilo Augusto B. Francia (GSC) PAF honed my appreciation of air power and doctrine. Both Colonels Bunuan and Francia were former Directors of the Office of Special Studies. Other OSS directors, Colonel Arcadio L. Seron (GSC) PAF, Colonel Roberto S Nuqui (GSC) PAF, and Colonel Gilbert S Llanto (GSC) PAF took turn in improving and expanding my understanding of PAF air operations and doctrinal concepts. Colonel Llanto paved the way for my attachment at the Air Power Studies Centre despite some minor glitches. Of course, the current Director, OSS, Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo S Oban Jr. PAF for giving me the opportunity to avail of the air power attachments to the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre despite the heavy workload of the OSS. I extend my thanks to these learned men, who in one way or another trained me for doctrine studies.

My appreciation to Lieutenant General Willie C. Florendo AFP, Commanding General, PAF for enlightening guidance before my departure and also to several HPAF Staffs.

My years at the Office of Special Studies had been both busy and rewarding. I had the opportunity to attend numerous meetings and interact with several bright officers like Lieutenant Colonel Villarette, Lieutenant Colonel Nemenzo, Major Ecks dela Cruz, and my classmates: Majors Jun Mison, Art Orticio, Onids Dino, Benjie Madarang and Joey Mirandilla. My appreciation to these men who gave direct and honest views on several issues that aided my perception and appreciation of various concepts.

My profound thanks to Wing Commander Colin Price, my sponsor, for editing my drafts and guiding me during the course of my attachment to the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre. He gave his precious time to scrutinise, improve, and evaluate my work. In addition to his normal tasks, he also served as our friendly guide and companion beyond the confines of the Air Power Studies Centre and RAAF Base Fairbairn.

My gratitude to Group Captain Garry Dunbar, Dr Alan Stephens, Dr John Mordike, Wing Commander Keith Brent, Squadron Leader Peter McCarry, Flight Lieutenant Sal Sidoti, Squadron Leader Pete ‘Kiwi’ Wooding, Corporal Jason Jones, Sandra Di Guglielmo and Ros Bourke for their advice and camaraderie.

I chart my own course and yet my wife and family serve as the ‘wind pushing my sail’ and the ‘winds beneath my wings’. Without the support of my wife, Noemi Ecal Patajo, who inspires me to excel and make the most of this attachment, this task would have been impossible. Noemi, my three children Maureen Kay, Kenneth Paul and Melissa are the unseen fires that kept me warm.
# Table of Contents

Preface ................................................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgment ................................................................................................................ iv
Contents ............................................................................................................................... v
Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................... vii
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... viii

**Chapter I  **  Doctrine
- Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
- Doctrine .............................................................................................................................. 1
- Categories of Military Doctrine ......................................................................................... 2
- Levels of Doctrine ............................................................................................................ 4
- The Principles of War ......................................................................................................... 5
- Doctrine Development Process ......................................................................................... 9
- Examples of Doctrine Process .......................................................................................... 10
- Summary ........................................................................................................................... 12

**Chapter II  **  Background of Doctrine Development in the PAF
- Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 13
- Doctrinal Perspective in the Past ....................................................................................... 14
- Doctrine Development System ......................................................................................... 16
- Development of Higher Level Doctrine .......................................................................... 19
- Summary ........................................................................................................................... 19

**Chapter III  **  The AFP Five-Step Model of Doctrine Development
- Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 21
- Five-Step Model of Doctrine Development ..................................................................... 21
- The First Step .................................................................................................................. 22
- The Second Step ............................................................................................................ 23
- The Third Step ................................................................................................................. 23
- The Fourth Step ............................................................................................................. 24
- The Fifth Step ................................................................................................................ 25
- Summary ........................................................................................................................... 25
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter IV</th>
<th>Development of Military Doctrine</th>
<th>27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine Loop</td>
<td>Analyse the Data</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop Data</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experiment-Test</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Produce Phase</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Validate Phase</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter V</th>
<th>Doctrine Writing Process</th>
<th>39</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining the Tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set-Up Working Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Timetable</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compile Information to Fill the Outline</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce and Review Draft</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse Draft</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print and Distribute</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission for Approval</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |                                  | 47 |
| Appendix       |                                  |    |
| Glossary       |                                  | 49 |
| Bibliography   |                                  | 53 |
Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSC</td>
<td>Air Command and Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC of AS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFH</td>
<td>Air Force Handbook</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Force of the Philippines</td>
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<td>AFPSTROP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines Strategic Objective Plan</td>
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<td>AFPWSSU</td>
<td>Armed Force of the Philippines Wide Service Support Unit</td>
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<td>APM</td>
<td>Air Power Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSC</td>
<td>Air Power Studies Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Before Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, PAF</td>
<td>Commanding General, Philippine Air Force</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>Critical Path Method</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dir.</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ex-O</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<td>HPAF</td>
<td>Headquarters Philippine Air Force</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajGen</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<td>O-1</td>
<td>Operation dash One</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Special Studies</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Philippine Army</td>
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<td>PAF</td>
<td>Philippine Air Force</td>
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<td>PAFM</td>
<td>Philippine Air Force Manual</td>
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<td>PDB</td>
<td>Philippine Air Force Doctrine Board</td>
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<td>PDSG</td>
<td>Philippine Air Force Doctrine Study Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Philippine Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ret.</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Republic of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFR</td>
<td>United States Air Force Reserved</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>WGCDDR</td>
<td>Wing Commander</td>
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Introduction

In all our daily activities we follow certain rules and procedures that will make doing things more smooth and systematic. Just think of a society without rules. It would be anarchy and chaos. Hence, to put everything in order certain ways of doing things must be in place.

The PAF, like any other organisation, has its own set of rules and procedures that guide all Air Force personnel in doing their tasks. This set of rules and procedures are what we call ‘doctrine’. A mere discussion of doctrine causes some people to shudder, looks of confusion from some, and looks approaching mockery from others. The varied reactions of PAF officers may have some underpinning reasons anchored to the history of the PAF and the military as a whole.

The intent of this book is to dispel the ‘academic aura’ associated with ‘doctrine’ and present clear steps in the formulation, validation, evaluation, and revision of doctrines. Doctrine is dynamic and as environment, organisation, people, and equipment change, doctrine should have parallel rational changes. Hence, every airman especially Commanders must be able to review, revise, validate, and if necessary formulate new doctrines. Change in doctrine is required but overall doctrine is usually stable and should require change when major factors such as government policy, weapons systems and enemy threat assessments change.

Chapter 1 is about doctrine definition, types, levels, sources and the nature of air power doctrine. In this chapter, the framework of doctrine process will be presented. The chapter discusses the phases of doctrine process and the doctrine writing process framework.

Chapter 2 of this handbook relates the background of the PAF development as a major Armed Service, and the PAF’s quest for air power both as a doctrine and practice. Like any air force in the world, the PAF began as a component of the Army. It is therefore prudent to look back to the history of doctrine development of the Armed Forces. The formative years of an institution provide insights to the interpersonal values of its personnel. This Chapter includes several vignettes relating to the Philippine government preparations for World War II. By knowing the mindset of both military and civilian leaders in that tense era, doctrine writers are able to deduce the ‘best ways’ as adopted by those leaders. Doctrinal inclinations by leaders may be discernable from the decisions made prior to the war. The discussion on the development of PAF as a major service deals with the appreciation of the AFP to have an independent air force and events in the world that set the trends for having a separate air force. The PAF quests for air power appreciation deals with the not so distant efforts of the PAF to write its own doctrine and lately, the appreciation of air power as a part of doctrine development within the AFP Modernization Program.

Chapter 3 deals with the AFP Five-Step model of doctrine formulation. It is admitted that the article of late Brigadier General Isidro B. Agunod AFP heavily influenced this chapter. The process of doctrine formulation will include strategy and policy formulation process as guides for the formulation framework. It is the intent of this chapter to relate the only Research and Development in Doctrine Development written by an air force officer.

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Chapter 4 is about Development of Military Doctrine. This chapter shows the framework for consolidation/analysis, development-model-test, revision and validation. This is the ‘doctrine loop’ that distinguished the writing process from the development of the military doctrine.

Chapter 5 deal with the actual doctrine writing processes beginning with the identification of the tasks, set-up of working party, timetable, establishment of objectives, draft, compiling information to fill the outline, producing and endorsing the draft, printing, submission for approval and distribution.

The queries of several air force personnel to OSS about doctrine indicate that there are varying degrees of perception and depth of understanding. This handbook utilises the experience of OSS as it handles the doctrine development component of the PAF Modernization. Whenever possible, comments and suggestions of various officers during the countless meetings about doctrine are included and used to inspire and or justify certain key steps. This research utilizes the various materials for Survey and Research, Manuals for Continuous Improvement Process, Strategy and Policy formulations, AFP Doctrine Development Manual, PAF Regulations, SOPs and Circulars, history books like *The Philippine Army 1935-1942* by Ricardo Trota Jose, *Philippine Campaigns* by Uldarico Baclagon, *Academy Scribe*, and *By Sword and Fire* by Alfonso J. Aluit and the Proposed PAF Air Power Manual, various papers in the Royal Australian Air Force, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Air University Maxwell AFB, and other air power papers and journals. The paper used various foreign manuals as well as local manuals as references and a basis of comparison.

Doctrines can be dynamic and may change according to the type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, political directions about the employment of forces, and the doctrine of the threat force in particular. The importance in planning and day-to-day operation of military operations cannot be overemphasised. The role of doctrine in the life of an organisation is influenced by professionals who advocate the essence of documenting the day-to-day activities so that the best way of doing things will be continually improved.

Through all this, the users of this handbook, especially the doctrine officers, are reminded that steps enumerated are guidance only and not written in stone. Doubtless, there will be better ways for doctrine development and its documentation but as the immense task of developing and writing doctrine lies ahead, this handbook serves as the initial guide.
Chapter I

Doctrines

Successful air forces have without exception been characterised by high quality people, high quality training and advanced technology, all supported by sound doctrine.

Conclusions from Air Wars 1914-1994

Introduction

The PAF intends to be a successful air force. Hence this chapter defines doctrine and showed the importance of doctrinal change and the process essential in developing new PAF doctrine.

The Nature of Doctrine

Doctrine is a body of principles in any branch of knowledge. It is based on an accumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, and test.

Doctrine is dynamic. It varies from time to time, situation to situation. As such, it is considered to be the best way of doing things in the present period.

Military Doctrine

Military doctrine is officially believed and taught as the best way to conduct military affairs. It is an authoritative statement of principles for the employment of military resources designed for continuing applicability in war and peace. It is founded primarily on the result of accurate analysis and interpretation of experience. In areas where there is no real experience to draw on, doctrines are formulated from the extrapolations of experience based on sound judgment, logic, intuition, and sometimes "gut feeling".

Military doctrines can be very dynamic and should change accordingly with the type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, political directions about the employment of military forces, and the doctrine of the threat force in that particular conflict.

Role of Doctrine

The importance of doctrine in the planning and day-to-day operation of military forces cannot be overemphasised. Well-known and experienced military professionals express its role in the life of an organisation:

---

At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory... It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF

At the highest level of planning, doctrine shapes military strategy. Doctrine sets out the best way to do things and military strategy is formulated within the guidelines provided by doctrine, taking into account existing realities.

Air Power 3000, RAF

Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.

General George H. Decker, USA

Doctrine is every action that contributes to unity of purpose ... It is what warriors believe in and act on.

Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN

The intelligent application of experience – when combined with forethought – can be valuable in finding the best solutions to new challenges. That is where doctrine can play a key part. By drawing the relevant lessons from past experience, it allows us to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow with greater certainty and confidence.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding, RAF

AFP doctrines ought to help provide a clear view of the simplicity and complexities of the various campaigns being waged simultaneously by the AFP in our young nation as it struggles to provide all of its citizens the chances to at least survive and, hopefully, to provide them with better opportunities for improvement in the quality of life.

Brig General Isidro B. Agunod, AFP

Categories of Military Doctrine

Military doctrines are divided into three categories: Environmental, Joint and Combined.

**STRUCTURE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE**

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1.1: Structure of Military Doctrine
Environmental Doctrine. Environmental doctrine is a compilation of beliefs about the best employment of military forces within a particular operating medium. The Armed Forces operate in three different environments – land, sea, and air – each with distinct nature and characteristics. The uniqueness of each environment calls for separate and specific doctrine that embodies the beliefs on how to use land power, sea power, and air power in their respective environments. Environmental doctrine is also known as Single Service Doctrine.

Joint Doctrine. In relation to air power, joint doctrine provides guidance for employment of PAF forces engaged in joint operations with the other major services. It prescribes the best way to integrate and employ air forces with land and naval forces in joint military operations. Responsibility for the development of doctrines for certain types of joint operations is assigned to individual major services. The major service having primary responsibility for the development of doctrine for joint operations does so in consultation and coordination with the other services.

Combined Doctrine. Combined doctrine establishes the principles, organisation, and procedures agreed upon between the AFP and allied forces in combined operations. This type of doctrine is normally developed to support mutual defense treaties, agreements, or organisations and promotes compatible arrangements for employment of AFP forces in combined operations. In relation to air power, combined doctrines serves as a guide for the application of air power doctrine to combined operations, and describes the best way to integrate and deploy air forces with allied forces in coalition warfare.

Inter-relationship. In modern warfare, the key to victory is jointness in planning and operations. However, fundamental to joint operation is single-service expertise. Therefore, single service doctrine is the backbone of joint and combined doctrine. It is only when single service doctrine is strong that the synergy of land, air and sea power can result in optimum combat power.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Distinct objectives, force</td>
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<td>capabilities, broad mission</td>
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<td>and operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<th>TACTICAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Specific weapon systems,</td>
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<tr>
<td>execution of roles and task</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2: The Levels of Doctrine
Levels of Doctrine

Strategic Doctrine. Strategic doctrine states the fundamental principles for employment of air forces to attain national objectives in peace and war. It serves as a reference or authority for all other doctrines; information for instruction in military service schools; material for public and internal information programs; and positions to support budgetary procurement programs. It establishes the framework and foundation for the effective use of air power.

Operational Doctrine. Operational doctrine establishes principles and rules governing organisation, direction, and employment of air forces in the accomplishment of basic combat operational missions in conventional and unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency and special operations, and various military tasks consonant with military preparedness. It embodies the concepts and principles derived from the strategic doctrines, serving as a guide for the air force in the organisation and employment of its forces to perform its function in a particular type of conflict with authorised entitlements.

Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine establishes detailed tactics, techniques and procedures that guide the use of specific weapons to accomplish specific objectives. It represents guidance on how the air force should be employed in engagements and battles. It should address how to accomplish tactical objectives and how combat situations such as threat, weather, terrain, and available weapons, influence tactics.

Inter-relationship. The three levels of doctrine are interrelated. In air power doctrine, for example, they are neither mutually exclusive nor rigidly limited to precise boundaries. An example helps to illustrate this:

• Strategic Doctrine. The strategic air strike campaign uses air power to strike directly and with precision at the enemy centres of gravity. Selection of targets is fundamental to this campaign.

• Operational Doctrine. To prosecute the strategic air strike campaign, an air commander employs air forces in air strike operations by orchestrating a variety of roles. These may include fighter escort, combat air patrol, suppression of enemy air defenses, air-to-air refuelling, long range reconnaissance, command and control, airfield attack, etc.

• Tactical Doctrine. In the scenario, for example, where as part of the force-mix required for the strategic air strike campaign, F-5s are used to provide fighter escort to the strike aircraft. Tactical doctrine describes how the F-5s performs this role and how they would be integrated and coordinated with the actions of the other weapons systems of the force-mix.
The Principles of War

Introduction
The principles of war are the most fundamental form of doctrine and they represent the basic guiding elements of warfare. Although they help provide a better understanding of warfare, they are not checklist items that necessarily lead to success.

Although Sun Tzu presented principles of war about 500 BC and numerous authors wrote about them in the eighteenth and especially in the nineteenth centuries, modern codification was accomplished by Colonel J.F.C. Fuller in 1916. In addition to eight strategic principles, the United States added the principle of simplicity that the Philippines also adopted. Many different countries have made certain modifications and utilisation of these basic principles. The succeeding figure shows how some of these countries use the principle of war.

The Principles of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>GREAT BRITAIN</th>
<th>FORMER SOVIET UNION</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>'Principles of</td>
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<td>Liberty of Action</td>
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Figure 1.3: Principles of War

5
The following principles of war will provide useful guidance to the action of AFP forces in combat. The use of these principles may vary with the situation and the perceptions of the commander. However, the commander must use them skilfully to maintain the initiative and control in the battle area.

Objectives

Direct military operations toward a defined and attainable objective that contributes to strategic, operational, or tactical aims. The military objective of a nation at war must be to apply whatever degree of force is necessary to attain the political purpose for which the war is being fought. Strategic, operational and tactical objectives can be clearly identified and developed only when the political purpose has been determined and defined by the national command authorities.

Military objectives must be constantly analysed and reviewed to assure that they accurately reflect not only the ultimate political purpose but also the political constraints imposed on the application of military force. Selection of theatre objectives is based on the overall mission of the command. All commanders must understand the hierarchy of objectives.

Offensive

Act rather than react, and dictate the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must be seized, retained and fully exploited. The principle of offensive suggests that offensive action, or maintaining the initiative, is the most effective and decisive way to pursue and to attain a clearly defined goal. Although it may be necessary to adopt a defensive posture, this posture should only be temporary until the necessary means are available to resume offensive operations. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations. Although there are effective passive defense measures, the defense must be active, not passive.

Offensive action, in whatever form it takes, is the means by which the nation or armed forces capture and hold the initiative, maintain freedom of action, and achieve results. It permits political leaders or military commanders to capitalise on the initiative, impose their will on the enemy, set the terms and select the place of confrontation or battle, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. No matter what the levels of war is, the side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the enemy to react rather than to act.

Offensive action also allows successful application of several principles of war to the advantage of the party taking the aggressive action.

Mass

Concentrate on combat power at the decisive time and place. At the strategic level, this principle suggests that the nation should commit, or be prepared to commit, a preponderance of national power to those regions or areas where the threat to vital security interests is greatest. At the operational level, this principle suggests that superior combat power must be concentrated at the decisive time and place to achieve decisive results.
Economy of Force

Create useable mass by using minimum combat power on secondary objectives. Make fullest use of all forces available. As a reciprocal of the principle of mass, economy of force at the strategic level of war suggests that, in the absence of unlimited resources, a nation may have to accept some risks in areas where vital national interests are not immediately at stake. Economy of force involves the risks, requires astute strategic planning and judgment by political and military leaders, and again places a premium on the need for flexibility of thought and action.

At the operational level, the principle of economy of force requires that minimum means be employed in those areas where the main effort is not to be made. It requires, as in the strategic level, the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority in the area where decision is sought. Thus, economy of force may require forces in a particular area to attack, defend, or delay or to conduct deception operations, depending on the importance of the area.

Manoeuvre

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. In the strategic sense, this principle has three interrelated dimensions: flexibility; mobility; and manoeuvrability. The first of these involves the need for flexibility in thought, plans and operations. Such flexibility enhances the ability to react rapidly to unforeseen circumstances. The second dimension involves strategic mobility, which is especially critical in reacting promptly to concentrate and project power against the primary objective. The final strategic dimension involves manoeuvrability within a theatre to focus maximum strength against enemy weakness and thereby gain strategic advantage.

In a theatre operation, manoeuvre is an essential element of combat power. It contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and to reducing vulnerability. The object of manoeuvre is to concentrate or to disperse forces in a manner designed to place the enemy at a disadvantage, thus achieving results that would otherwise be more costly in men and materiel.

At all levels of war, successful application of this principle requires not only fire and movement but also flexibility of thought, plans, and operations and the considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force.

Manoeuvre is the means by which the commander sets the terms for battle, declines battle, or acts to take advantage of tactical actions.

Unity of Command

Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander. This principle emphasises that all efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common goal. At the strategic level of war, this common goal equates to national political purpose and the broad strategic objectives that flow from them. The common goal at the strategic level determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. To develop full combat power, these forces must be coordinated through unity of effort. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all force employed in pursuit of a common goal.
Security

Protect friendly forces and their operations from enemy actions that could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action thereby reducing friendly forces vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security measures, however, should not be allowed to interfere with flexibility of thought and action, since rigidity and dogmatism increases vulnerability to enemy surprise. In this regard, detailed staff planning and thorough understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine can improve security and reduce vulnerability to surprise.

At the strategic level of war, security requires that active and passive measures be taken to protect the nation and its armed forces against espionage, subversion, and strategic intelligence collection. Campaigns depend on security of forces and security of plans for success. At the operational and tactical levels, security results from the measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, and harassment. Security may be achieved by establishing and maintaining protective measures against hostile acts or influences, or it may be assured by deception operations designed to confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the forces being secured.

Surprise

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. To a large degree, the principle of surprise is the reciprocal of the principle of security. Concealing one's capabilities and intentions creates the opportunity to strike the enemy when he is unaware or unprepared, but strategic surprise is difficult to achieve. Rapid advances in strategic technology make it increasingly difficult to mask or cloak large-scale marshalling or movement of personnel and equipment. Still, rapid deployment of combat forces into a crisis area can forestall or upset the plans and preparations of an enemy.

Surprise results from going against an enemy in a time, place, or manner for which he is unprepared. Factors contributing to surprise include speed and alacrity, employment of unexpected factors, effective intelligence, deception operations of all kinds, variations of tactics and methods of operation, and operations security.

Simplicity

Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting military operations. Guidance, plans and orders should be as simple and direct as attainment of the objective will allow. At the national level, the strategic importance of the principle of simplicity is the development and enhancement of public support. Political and military objectives and operations must, therefore, be presented in clear, concise, and understandable terms.

In its military application, this principle promotes strategic flexibility by encouraging broad guidance rather than detailed and involved instruction. Direct and simple plans and clear concise orders are essential in reducing misunderstanding and confusion.
Application of the Principles of War

The principles of war merely represent generally accepted truths that have been proven effective for commanders employing forces in combat. Theory is not a substitute for military genius or even professional judgment. The complex nature of war prohibits using the principles of war as a checklist to assure successful military operations. They cannot substitute for initiative and improvisation; rather, they offer a conceptual framework within which to evaluate possible actions. In a doctrinal sense, they are fundamental guiding principles.

Doctrine Development Process

The purpose of any doctrine development process is to effect review and modification of air power doctrine because changing factors demand the ongoing reshaping of doctrine.\(^2\) Doctrine as distinguished from dogma relies on continuing change. Change may be slowly happening as events unfold. Doctrine can, but should not, easily be left neglected over long time periods. A doctrine process allows changes to be managed in an orderly way so that while doctrine is responsive to minute changes, the guidance process is stable.\(^3\) Doctrine development process is continuous and involves a circular methodology or ‘doctrine loop’.

Phases of Doctrine Development Process

There are models of doctrine process in several countries that are suitable for the Philippines. Most of the models expand from a three-phase effort in developing doctrine. These phases are gathering information, formulation and dissemination.\(^4\)

Gathering Information. This phase involves the assembly of objective information required from a variety of sources. The basis for change due to influence of several factors on military doctrine must be through the gathering of objective information. There must be convincing probable effect of the new information on the existing doctrine or the new information requires an obvious formulation of new doctrine.

Formulation. This phase involves the distillation of ‘doctrinal concepts’ from the information. Formulation may also be called the doctrine development process in itself.

Dissemination. All the airmen must have knowledge of the output from formulation. Professional military education, journals, symposia, seminars are means to educate the air force in any doctrinal change from the existing documents or for new doctrines spawned by new information from new experience, theory or technology.

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\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.
Examples of Doctrine Processes

Royal Australian Air Force Doctrine Process

STAGES OF THE PROCESS

Produce written doctrine, manage changes and disseminate it through the AAP 1000, *The Air Power Manual*

Modify doctrine and disseminate this for refinement of understanding and education

Circulate the proposed changes to appropriate elements and agencies within RAAF for review, refinement and staffing

Review and Prepare Submissions for Air Power Doctrine Board Approval

Procedures for Review of Doctrine
a. Initiation
b. Preparation
c. Initial Staffing
d. Informal Proposal
e. Monitoring/Deadline
f. Completion of Staffing
g. Endorsement
h. Approval
i. Promulgation
Royal Air Force Doctrine Process

Doctrines

Royal New Zealand Air Force Doctrine Development Loop

START

Post Application Analysis

Research and Development

Information & Dissemination

Application

Training
United States Air Force (Colonel Drew Development Cycle)

Experience Theory Technology

Apply

Educate the Force

Consolidate and Analyse

Develop Concept (Thesis/antithesis)

Test/Evaluate/ Discuss/Argue/Debate

Write and Publish doctrine

Accept Reject Synthesis

Summary

This chapter lays the foundation for the succeeding discussions in the next chapters. So far, doctrine as defined in the proposed PAF Air Power Manual had presented not only the meaning but also the types and levels of doctrine.

Doctrine is a body of principles in any branch of knowledge. It is based on an accumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, and test. Military doctrines are divided into three categories: Environmental, Joint and Combined doctrines. The levels of doctrine are strategic, operational, and tactical.

This chapter also showed the principles of war as an integral part of military thinking. Lastly, the chapter showed the doctrine process, phases in the process, and examples of the doctrine development process.
Chapter II

Background of Doctrine Development
in the Philippine Air Force

It took a long, tough learning process before our air forces learned that command of the air could not be exercised until it was obtained, and it could not be obtained unless it was fought for.

Michael Howard

Introduction

The significant trend in defense capability build up in the South-East Asian region coupled with the irreversible decline of communist insurgency in the country dictated the need for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to gradually shift its internal security operations to external defense mode or national defense. With these developments the PAF is gearing up towards a modest modernization program. Along this line, the PAF undertakes a more aggressive doctrine development to include review, update and validation of these concepts as a major component of the modernization program.

The re-activation of the Office of Special Studies, considered to be the strategy and doctrine centre of the PAF, was the first step towards the gigantic task of developing, revising, and updating air power doctrine and PAF strategies. This effort of the PAF can help the AFP realise the vision of modern AFP beyond the Year 2000.

Air power is considered as the prime force component required to implement the defense-in-depth strategy embodied in the Philippines National Defense Strategy. It is the key element in projecting forces to desired areas of interest, be it land or at sea. As such, the PAF APM discusses both current roles of the PAF in a broad spectrum of conflicts and future capabilities. Such inputs provide the basis for planning and programming of later defense equipment acquisitions, future force structuring and development of human resources.

The development of an APM is envisioned to encapsulate the historical development of air power, the generally accepted concepts in the application of air power and the numerous roles of air power for defense, offence, and support to combat forces. The PAF APM will be a permanent document that will serve as the basic guide to understanding the vital importance of air power in the defense of the

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2 The shift in defense policies of the past tended to disregard external defence in favour of internal defence. There are recent events that reinforced the rationale of maintaining both external and internal defence development efforts.
3 Doctrine development began in the late 1970s resulting in several AFP/PAF Manuals. The updating effort has been neglected for several decades until modernisation revived the doctrinal efforts of the AFP.
4 The National Security Council formulate the National Defence Strategy (NDS) of the Philippines.
Philippines. Hence, the quest for air power appreciation serves as an impetus for PAF doctrines as a component of the modernization program.

Doctrinal Perspective in the Past

The concept of armed organisation in the Philippines existed long before the arrival of any western or eastern influences. The leaders known as DATUs maintained armed followers for security and peace of the community. The coming of the Americans after the Spaniards brought about the establishment of serious military organisations for internal purposes. The Constabulary School taught western military doctrines that were heavily influenced by the US Army.\(^5\)

**MacArthur’s Defense Plan and National Defense Act**

The Commonwealth years, 1901 – 1945, under the Americans was the period when the Philippines adopted its democratic form of government. Along with the bureaucratic change, the military was reorganised under the tutelage of General Douglas MacArthur.\(^6\) The period in review for doctrinal perspective begins with MacArthur’s Plan and the National Defense Act since it was the period where the Air Force, then part of the Philippine Army Air Corp, was considered an essential part of the national defense efforts.\(^7\) The Philippines, under the aegis of the Americans, and with an unstable international situation, seemed to have an uncertain future.

There are clouds, black, ominous clouds hanging over every part of the world. Everybody is talking peace; but everybody is preparing for war. We would be unworthy sons of our heroic forefathers if, because of the unsettled international situations we were hesitant even for a moment in answering the responsibilities defining the role of an independent national existence. But in order to forge ahead no one may refuse to take the place that may be assigned to him in time of need.

The preceding words of L. Siguoion Reyna, then technical adviser to the Secretary of the Interior in 1935, foretold the submitted preliminary plan on national defense and related problems.\(^8\) Reyna’s work was apparently a reflection of thoughts and opinions that originated from the primary problem of attaining maximum effectiveness at minimum cost. There was economic difficulty and yet there was a need for an organised army similar to the Belgian and Swiss models.\(^9\) The long coastline of the Philippines was noted as a significant factor in selecting the model.

The conclusion of Reyna’s work recommended a small regular army with coastal artillery and air corps. These corps could be developed to insure protection from threats at sea. The plan divided the Philippines into military districts based on

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\(^5\) The Constabulary School was founded on 5 February 1905 in Santa Lucia Barracks, Intramuros.

\(^6\) President M.L. Quezon initially relied upon General MacArthur for the planning of Philippine defence.

\(^7\) The PAF became a separate major service of the AFP on 1 July 1947 almost at the same time that the USAF became a separate service of the US in 1947.

\(^8\) The Philippine Commonwealth under the trying situation did the best preparations possible before the World War II.

\(^9\) The Swiss model relies upon a citizen-based army that a new nation like the RP can emulate.
population rather than area. Denial of any part of the Philippines to any possible foreign intruder was the key tactical concept of the defense plan.\textsuperscript{10} MacArthur wrote:

A cordon system of defense was practically forced upon the island due to impracticability of developing naval forces to preserve inter-island communication against any powerful attack by water.

The Early Air Power Perspective in the Philippines

MacArthur’s plan aimed to provide early warning and attempted to break up landing forces. The Air Corps and Offshore patrol would be at hand. The Air Corps, with 150 fast bombers as proposed, was supposed to attack the enemy fleet while still maintaining control of the air over the Philippines with pursuit planes. The threat of the planes, MacArthur thought, ‘will be sufficient to keep major portions of a hostile navy completely outside these territorial waters’. This was a tough job for any air force, let alone the fledging Philippine Army Air Corps.\textsuperscript{11}

Dominant Air Power Doctrines before World War II

The official American air power doctrine of the late 1930s was tied closely to that of the surface forces. As early as 1926, the War Department declared that the purpose of air units was to aid the ground forces by destroying enemy planes and attacking enemy ground forces.

Aircraft were also assigned the roles of aerial observations, adjusting artillery fire, and providing messenger service and transportation for special personnel. The fundamental principles for the employment of Air Service stated that Army Commanders who decided how aircraft would be employed also controlled those air elements.\textsuperscript{12} American aviators at the Air Tactical School and in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps were nurturing a divergent theory that aircraft could perform much broader and more independent missions. They envisioned an air arm equal, rather than subordinate, to the land and sea forces.\textsuperscript{13}

The records showed that both the US and Philippine leaders had no appreciation of air power capabilities then. Thus, Army officers-in-charge, who drew the defense plan, exacerbated the inadequacy of the attention to the air arm in the Philippines without advice from air force professionals on the capabilities of air power.

The Philippine Air Force as Independent Service

As host to the powerful American forces, the prevailing doctrine for the AFP was logically American. The American doctrine intends to employ air power centred on three tasks: control of the air, attack of the enemy heartland, and the attack of peripheral targets. These tasks were based on experiences during World War II. The magnitude of American air power doctrine did not suit the small PAF. Nevertheless, the Military Assistance Group concept at that time strongly influenced the PAF doctrinal perspective.

\textsuperscript{10} General MacArthur relied upon then Colonel Eisenhower for the development of Philippines defence plan.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
The internal strife in the 1950s, 1970s and up to the present resulted in the efforts of the PAF being directed to purely support roles to the ground forces. The PAF like the air arm of the Commonwealth remained the same at least in terms of doctrine through all these years. The departure of the USAF 13th Air Force in the early 1990s created a vacuum with regards to Air Defense that until now has remained a dangerous void.

Doctrine Development System

As the PAF rediscovers itself, new approaches to every facet of the air force function will be important and the development of air power doctrine over the next few years will be an excellent opportunity by the PAF to do just that. Doctrine is a means to rationalise the importance of an independent Air Force. The PAF Doctrine Development System sets the direction and procedures for developing and revising PAF doctrine to its final written form. Moreover, the system identifies the authorities and responsibilities in the development of doctrine in the PAF to ensure a smooth and systematic approach. The system integrates PAF air power concepts, strategies and doctrines using the PAF Doctrine Development process.

Organisational Structure

The doctrine organisational set-up establishes links between the various components of the PAF doctrine process. These components are the PAF Doctrines Board (PDB), PAF Doctrines Study Group (PDSG), and the PAF Chain of Command.

The inherent function of the Command carries with it higher levels of responsibilities in doctrine formulation and development. Hence, the doctrine body of the PAF is composed, at the highest level, by experienced members in the PAF Command.

PAF Doctrines Board

To provide impetus to the dynamic development of strategic, operational and tactical doctrines, the PAF Doctrines Board was created. The Board composition is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPOINTMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice Commander PAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir, Office of Special Studies</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
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Table 2.1: Composition of the PAF Doctrines Board
The PAF Doctrines Board has the following duties and responsibilities:

- To review the status of PAF doctrines for its validity, relevance, and consistency with laws and enunciated policies;
- Recommend to the CG, PAF formulated doctrines/doctrinal changes for endorsement to CS, AFP;
- Through the Vice Commander, refer rejected proposals back to the PAF Doctrines Study Group for further action; and
- Initiate the implementation of approved doctrines through the chain of command.

**PAF Doctrines Study Group**

To ensure orderly staffing and coordination of doctrinal views and proposals, the PAF Doctrines Study Group with the Office of Special Studies (OSS) as its Secretariat, was created. The group composition is shown on Table 2.

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<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Director, OSS</td>
<td>Member/Secretary</td>
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</table>

*Table 2.2: Composition of PAF Doctrines Study Group*

The PAF Doctrine Study Group has the following duties and responsibilities:

- To represent the different units, staffs and other agencies of the PAF in reviewing doctrinal changes at all levels;
- Review proposed doctrine changes referred to the Study Group for further disposition;
- Submit reviewed and evaluated doctrinal changes to the PDB;
- Recommend to the PDB the progression or termination of doctrinal proposals;
- Through the Director, OSS tasks project teams and appoints team heads for the review and evaluation of assigned doctrinal projects; and
- Act as consultative group on air doctrinal matters for the PAF and for other major Armed Services when requested.

The PAF Chain of Command provides the required links for initiating, processing, and staffing of doctrinal changes. The chain provides a two-way communication link in the processing of proposed doctrinal revisions from initiation to implementation. The built-in check and balance in the PAF Command chain provides the basis for the orderly control of doctrine development and review. The
PAF chain of command will therefore be fully harnessed to achieve the relevant and quality doctrinal output. Appendix 1 shows the synergy between PDB, PDSG, project teams and chain of command.

The PAF has three major projects to develop and integrate air power concepts and doctrines. These projects are: Air Power Manual writing; doctrine development; and the doctrine updating program.

**PAF Air Power Manual Project.** This project seeks to expand the existing PAFM Basic Doctrine O-1 series 1981. PAFMO-1 was the basis for the PAF modernization component programs. The PAF APM project began with the attachment of two Colonels to the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre in 1995. Subsequently, an Air Power Core Group was created to research and collate the first draft. After a year, the draft-interim went through the PAF Doctrine Process for deliberations, scrutiny, debate and revisions. Another year passed and the AFP Doctrine Development Component Committee reviewed and transmitted the PAF APM to the Chief of Staff, AFP and then to the Secretary of National Defense. The APM is the basic doctrine of the PAF.

**Doctrine Development Program.** This program precedes the acquisition schedules of new capabilities. The PAF’s additional priority for development is its operational doctrine which has significant bearing on the application of air power. Again, this will not only contain the traditional concepts and application of air power, but would ideally consider modernization triggered by technology, the requirement to support Government socio-economic programs, and the civil-military joint user concept. Development of joint doctrine will be in cooperation with the other major services.

**Doctrine Updating Program.** This is a continuing process, which will probably run through the AFP Modernization Plan period. The majority of existing doctrines of the PAF need updating to conform to the present developments in technology in terms of airframes, engines, avionics and weapons systems.

The OSS is the sole office in the PAF that handles the above programs for doctrine development. With the magnitude of the tasks, other PAF officers and units will be needed for drafting and/or formulating doctrines at all levels. The experience of OSS in delegating some of the doctrinal requirements especially in writing logically lead to the need to formulate this Doctrine Writing Handbook for the use of newly appointed officers and senior officers.

The Doctrine Writing Handbook may involve the technical format for research writings but should most importantly include the air power test and evaluation procedures not normally found in the usual writer manuals. Further, the guidebook seeks to improve the existing doctrine development and process by clarifying the specific steps in formulation, test, evaluation, and review.

**Recent AFP Doctrinal Development**

As a background, the basic concept for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the 1990s was laid out late in 1989 at the General Headquarters (GHQ). This modernization is a fifteen-year undertaking that aims to develop credible deterrence to external aggression and contribute to the peace and stability of the Asian region.

The AFP Modernization Program has five components namely: organisation development; training; infrastructure; acquisition of major assets; and doctrine
development. The program seeks to make the AFP a more effective instrument in nation building in such concerns as natural resource protection, disaster relief and rehabilitation, and as a base of support to other agencies of the Philippine government in the maintenance of peace and order.

Consequently, the Philippine Army (PA), the Philippine Navy (PN), and the Philippine Air Force (PAF) developed their own modernization programs with the same five components stated in the AFP modernization program.

Development of Higher Level Doctrine

The PAF will continue to concentrate on the development of doctrines at the operational and tactical levels. PAF personnel who participate in national defense strategy workshops and members of the AFP Strategic Planning Committee give contributions to the formulation of higher level strategic doctrine. Moreover, the PAF has actively participated in setting strategic framework on the role of the AFP in support of non-traditional military roles such as socio-economic development and international commitment roles.

Campaign Planning

The experience of the PAF in campaign planning derives mainly from two sources. These are the Lambat Bitag Campaign and the AFP-US Balikatan Exercise.

The Lambat Bitag Campaign Plan is an AFP counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign plan that integrates and employs mainly assets of the Philippine Army and Air Force. Though limited in scope and scale, these campaign plans have provided the PAF valuable inputs to the formulation of doctrines on the local application of air power in joint operations.

The Balikatan Exercise is an AFP-US Armed Forces Joint/Combined Exercise being conducted in the Philippines every year. This exercise provides a venue for the PAF to participate in and learn about air campaign planning from the more experienced US counterparts. The exercise provides inputs and planning factors for pursuing a workable campaign involving the sophisticated and highly technical US system and the less sophisticated but smaller and more agile AFP forces.

Summary

The PAF doctrine development in the past has evolved at a very slow pace. As a result, events and rapid changes in technology overtook most if not all published PAF doctrines. In 1994, the organisation of the Office of Special Studies started an upswing in doctrine development and consciousness across the broad organisational structure of the PAF.

Focus on doctrine development is the Air Force's present thrust with a shift from internal security operations to the national defense concept, force modernization, civil-military joint-user concept, and support for the Government's socio-economic development program.

The tasks of writing doctrine for a small air force like the PAF is challenging and will require concerted effort for every Filipino airman. Alexander P. De Seversky aptly stated:

The task of each generation is to interpret accumulated experience and to adapt it to new conditions.
The OSS has supervision over the doctrine component of the PAF Modernization but every airman in the PAF should help in the huge task of updating, revising and formulating the PAF doctrine.

We in the Philippine Air Force intend to succeed in this endeavour, realising that the key to a successful doctrine development program is the collective and cooperative effort among the different levels of the PAF Command.
Chapter III

The AFP Five-Step Military Doctrine Formulation

Introduction

The AFP especially the Air Force is in the process of reviewing and revising doctrines as modernization picks up pace. Accordingly, initial investigation revealed that the PAF has been captive to foreign doctrines whose relevance to the Philippine condition is in great doubt. This revelation posed a challenge to every airman to seek reasons for everything the PAF does. The quest for proper reason seems to guide the formulation of right doctrine. Hence reason is akin to doctrine as doctrine like reason is the guiding principle and considers as the best way of doing things.

The first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. To the natural law belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally; and among these it is a special property of man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now reason proceeds from what is common, or general, to what is proper, or special. But there is a difference in this regard between the speculative reason and practical reason.¹

The choice between speculative reason and practical reason may not be easily discernible in formulating doctrine. Be that as it may, doctrine writers need to follow certain steps in doctrine formulation. While doctrine writers need freedom to extract academic output without the stress of policy guidance and overtures, doctrine formulation has to follow predetermined steps that will keep the doctrinal ideas within the bounds of military strategy and national policy. The following steps are recommended in the current AFP Doctrine Development Manual.² The explanation for the steps will be included as stated in the article: On Research and development of AFP Doctrine by General Isidro B. Agunod AFP (Ret).³

Five-Step Model of Doctrine Formulation

The AFP Doctrine Development Manual specified the Five-Step model of doctrine formulation. The said manual stated that should the Five-Step model proved inappropriate for a particular doctrine, applicable models for the AFP under Philippine environment maybe adopted. This indicated that mere enumeration of the Five-Step Model in the manual were insufficient in doctrine development. The

² The AFP Doctrine Development Manual was published by consolidating existing major services doctrine processes.
³ Brigadier General Agunod was a Commandant of AFP General Staff College when he tasked the GSC classes to create doctrine steps.
following are the sequential steps enumerated in the AFP Doctrine Development Manual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1 - Identification of the conflict/war and its nature</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 2 - Consideration of the enemy's viewpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3 - Development of the National Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4 - Development of the Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5 - Development of the Military Doctrine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The First Step

**Identifying the particular conflict/war, its nature, and its basic characteristics** is the first and crucial step in formulation of doctrine. The unique natures/characteristics of each type of war/conflict have profound effects on the national strategy and on the 'correct' restatement of military missions, objectives, policies, and/or desired military force characteristics for each particular type of conflict/war.

Caution should be exercised in determining the true nature/characteristics of conflict/war. Any error in this first step will start a chain of errors that will result in an irrelevant and/or ineffective military organisation in response to the conflict/war. The possible errors are enumerated below.

The error of describing the characteristics and requirements of a military force even before identifying the particular war/conflict in which that military force is, or will be, engaged. The outcome of this error is a 'weapons strategy' rather than a national or military strategy.

The error of 'threat evaluation' and what the threat can/cannot do and stopping the analysis right there, with no in-depth analysis of the nature, characteristics, and dynamics of the war/conflicts and what damage they can inflict upon our country. The thinking process is limited to threat evaluation, insights are not provided on what the Philippines can do to deter, defeat, or even turn the tables on the 'enemy's intention. When insights stop, national/military strategies stop and weapons strategies begin.

The error of setting national/military objectives as the first steps, without identifying and analysing the particular conflict and without first looking at the conflict from the 'enemy's view point'. This error often results in objectives that are irrelevant to the characteristics of the war being fought or about to be fought.
The Second Step

The consideration of the ‘enemy’s viewpoint’. To be able to do this you must be able ‘to think like the enemy’, to have his ‘mind-set’ as you view the environmental-political, psychological, techno-scientific, economic, geographic and ecological aspects of the enemy’s situation. This must be considered alongside a comprehensive knowledge of one’s own forces and political directives regarding the use of such military forces. If you cannot bring yourself to ‘think like the enemy’, to develop a ‘mind-set’ like his, and to wargame the conflict from his viewpoint, then the following errors can easily develop.

- The error of thinking that the enemy ‘sees’ the same vital factors from your viewpoint which can be far from reality and can result in irrelevant ineffective doctrine. As an example, our enemies in counter-insurgencies do not consider economic and military strength alone as vital power factors. They consider political/military leadership, ideology, and cadre/organisations as extremely powerful factors which can overcome any initial political, economic, techno-scientific, geographic, and/or military weakness on their side since these extremely powerful factors, in ‘their view’, will bring about people support, international support, sanctuaries, and strategic/tactical intelligence, and perhaps even government troops to their side as is the case in China and Vietnam.

- The error of planning and implementing defenses/attacks without taking into consideration the enemy’s style of fighting and ‘mind-set’ which could greatly affect the characteristics, dynamics, results, and even the aftermath of the conflict/war. This step follows Sun Tzu’s aphorism on the art of war 2500 years ago which is often not heeded by planners.

*If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.*

The Third Step

The structuring of the alternative national strategies for conflict/war so that the nation’s relevant instrument of power can develop the desired national force characteristics and then be brought to bear against the enemy. This will ensure the strength of all the nation’s resources can be directed in a coordinated manner against the enemy.

What is national strategy? Here, we use other models that show the factors applied in the moulding of our national and military strategies for conflict/war. National Strategy consists of the set of policies, plans, doctrines, programs and budgets that will enable the present and/or future forces to struggle and attain the predetermined objectives. Many AFP authors present strategy as if it is similar to, or different from, the elements - the ‘means’ the ‘ways’ and the ‘ends’ - that should altogether make up a strategy.

Those at the strategic level determine how the national instrument of power can develop desired characteristics and can be brought to bear on the ‘enemy’. They must bear in mind the factors that will spell suitability, acceptability and feasibility to
the political executive/legislative authorities and military leaders regarding any proposed national or military strategy. Unless all these factors are borne in mind, the following errors can happen.

- The error of believing that strategy development is amenable to rational and unemotional logic. Our AFP Strategic Objective Plan (AFPSTROP) is one example. The AFPSTROP tends to be disregarded in the annual programs and fund priorities among the Major Services /AFP Wide Support and Separate units (AFPWSSUS’s). The ‘factors of the moment’ dictate the priorities, and strategic demands tend to be forgotten. What seems to exist is ‘crisis management’. There seem to be little or no ‘unity of views’ on the objectives for particular conflicts/war the AFP is or may be engaged in, little or no ‘unity of views’ on command/mass manoeuvres of combined forces and or economy of forces, nor a ‘unity of views’ on the quantity and quality of forces, weapons systems/quality of leadership and organizations to prevent, or fight and win, such conflicts/wars. These are what the ‘factors of the moment’ do to the AFPSTROP.

- The error of overlooking vital national factors in the total struggle against the ‘enemy’ in war and in peace. The AFPSTROP does not but should describe the vital interactions and interfacing that the AFP should have with the civil and/or diplomatic services of government and with the political, economic, psychosocial, techno-scientific, and geographical/ecological aspects of the country in each particular type of conflict/war. This oversight can end up with only one type of strategy – a ‘weapon strategy’.

The Fourth Step

The development of AFP military strategy for the particular conflict/war. Military strategy must have the following elements:

- A restatement of the AFP mission, to clearly indicate why the armed forces exists in the particular conflict/war. It must be a statement from which every member of the AFP can draw motivational inspiration and strength to struggle, suffer, and perhaps even die so that the AFP mission gets done.
- A set of co-related and interfaced AFP policies and doctrines that will clearly lead to the structuring of an AFP that will have required characteristics to prevent or fight, and win, a particular conflict/war. AFP policies/doctrines directly affect existing and/or future through plans, programs, and budgets.
- A set of co-related plans, programs, and budgets, derived from the AFP mission, objectives, and policies/doctrines that will be definite guidelines in the organisation, training, maintenance, operations, directions, control and coordination for all the seemingly diverse AFP efforts, and thereby, attain AFP’s objectives most efficiently and effectively.

The military strategy model should be viewed as a subsystem within the total system of national strategy; thereafter, the military strategy model could then be considered as a total system in which objectives, political policies/doctrines, plans, programs, budget and forces are the subsystems. This ‘system view’ of military strategy would help prevent irrational organisations/reorganisations, and/or
The Fifth Step

The development of military doctrine emerges during the search for grand military strategy. Actually, by going through Steps 1 to 4, one can develop the basic doctrine. Such basic doctrine if well researched and developed would then guide the construction of formal grand and military strategies for a particular conflict or threat.

Military doctrine development is analogous to biochemistry where biochemists can design and re-design an organism to adapt to, and be effective in a particular environment. The AFP basic doctrine can be likened to the environment of an organism, including its probable enemies and the demands of the total environment upon that organism, the redesign or the organism to enable it to adapt to the environment at once and succeed in its purpose of existing here; and the roles, functions, and relationships of the various parts of the organism. Service basic doctrines would be like detailed descriptions of each part of the organism as well as the roles, functions, and relationships of the sub-parts. Joint doctrines would be like descriptions of the brain and nerve networks to direct, control and coordinate parts of the organism. If basic, operations, and/or unified doctrines fail to provide sufficient descriptions of and/or relationships among parts and sub-parts of the organism you can be sure that the organism would succumb to its environment, or fail to achieve the purpose of its existence, or both.

Summary

Brigadier General Isidro B. Agunod Jr AFP recommended the Five-Step Model of Doctrine formulation to the Armed Forces of the Philippines General and Command Staff College (AFPGCSC) and later used by TDCS for Education (J-8) in the doctrine formulation aspect of the AFP Doctrine Development Manual. Brigadier General Agunod Jr was the Commandant of the AFPGCSC in 1979 when he wrote this article about the Research and Development on Doctrine Development.

The five-step model is an abridged version of the article and is an expanded list enumerated in the AFP Doctrine Development Manual. The short explanations for each step are included in this guidebook to help the doctrine writers connect their doctrinal concepts to the over-all scheme of the AFP/DND. The ideas were written has many years ago but the essence and lessons learned and the wisdom of each step remained valid through the years for the AFP and continue to be valid and applicable.

The five-step model sets the proper direction and guide for subsequent phases of the military doctrine development. A framework links the five-step model to the ‘doctrinal loop’ and is the basis of the next chapter on Step Five of the Five-Step Model.
Framework for Military Doctrine Development

Step 1: IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT/WAR

↓

Step 2: CONSIDERATION OF THE ENEMY’S VIEWPOINT

↓

Step 3: DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

↓

Step 4: DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY STRATEGY

OUTPUTS

Basic

Functional

Operational

Tactical

 INPUTS

Experience

Theory

Technology

Step 5: Development of Military Doctrine

Analyse

Review

Develop

Validate

Produce

Model

Test

26
Chapter IV

Development of Military Doctrine

Nothing is permanent but change
Heraclitus (circa 500 BC)

Introduction

The permanence of change covers all facets of life. Even the military changes, despite its strict reverence to traditions and customs of the service. The military’s change in the way it does things usually starts with doctrine. The AFP Doctrine Development Manual as stated in the preceding chapter recommended the five-step doctrine formulation. The last step of the five-step doctrine formulation is the Development of Military Doctrine. The AFP Doctrine Development Manual after enumerating the steps for formulation then details the different doctrine development processes for Army, Navy, and Air Force. This doctrine development process has consolidation/analysis, development, revision and validation in the doctrine framework.1 The questions that may arise when major services adhere to the framework are – what are the steps in consolidation/analysis? What are the steps in the revision guides/validation? These questions are understandable and this Chapter aims to resolve these aspects.

For example, in the course of doctrine development OSS once requested the different HPAF Staff offices for the functional doctrine as part of the PAF Doctrine Development Program. The immediate consequence was that OSS was asked those same questions in the preceding paragraph. There is definitely a need to enumerate the steps in the actual development of military doctrine. The key areas of SOP 16: PAF Doctrine Process namely validation, revision, formulation and publication need further elaboration.

Major General Holley Jr USAFR Ret asked “What does it require to introduce significant new doctrine?”2 Subsequently he suggested the following steps, which are intended to be more than mere publication of the manual:

- There must be an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change, to draw up parameters for change and to describe clearly what is to be done and how that differs from what has been done before.
- The educational background of the principal staff and command officers responsible for change must be sufficiently rigorous, demanding and relevant to bring a common cultural bias to the solution of problems.

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1 The AFP Doctrine Development Manual is a consolidation of the different doctrine development processes of the major services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
2 Major General Holley, professor emeritus of history at Duke University and visiting professor at the National Defence University, asked the question in an article entitled Fifty Questions for Doctrine Writers, Means are as important as Ends, Air University, Maxwe ll Air Force Base, Alabama, 1995.
• There must be a spokesman for change. The spokesman can be a person, one of the mavericks; an institution such as a staff college; or a staff agency.
• Whoever or whatever it may be, the spokesman must build a consensus that will give the new ideas, and the need to adopt them, a wider audience of converts and believers.
• There must be continuity among architects of change so that consistency of effort is brought to bear on the process.
• Someone at or near the top of the institution must be willing to hear out arguments for change, agree to the need, embrace the new operational concepts and become at least a supporter, if not a champion, of the cause for change.

Some of the above recommendations have been happening in the PAF through the OSS, ACSC, and the PAF Modernization Board. Major General Holley's preceding list are broad requirements but are not steps in doctrinal development. It is the intent of this chapter to spell out the steps in the actual development of military doctrine.

The following are never meant to be prescriptive steps in the development of military doctrine. The intent is to separate the doctrine development in itself from the approval process and writing steps.

**Doctrine Inputs**

From Step 4: Development of Military Strategy we move on to Step 5: Development of Military Doctrines which is fed by Step 4 outputs and begins with factors such as experience, theory, and technology change. These inputs are identified or influenced by the developed military strategy in Step 4.

**Technology Inputs**

The PAF, like other major services, and all air forces, is dependent upon high technology. Dr Richard P. Hallion said that ‘the air force, however, as a service is wedded to technology, there is always the danger that technology will make one’s doctrine obsolete, will replace doctrine as the determinant of the future course of the Air Force’. Significantly, the possession of obsolete equipment translated to dormant doctrinal concepts compared to doctrine commensurate to technology available off the shelf. What then is the relationship of technology to air force doctrine?

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3 The inputs such as experience, theory and technology were first forwarded by Colonel Dennis M. Drew USAF Ret. In an article inventing a Doctrine Process.

The British expound on the mitigation of technology to air power in the book *Dynamics of Air Power*.\(^5\)

Technology conferred on man the ability to fly and exploit the third dimension. Technology created Air Power, and Air Power has now changed the dynamics of war. But Air Power and technology are symbiotic: Air Power exploits a technological edge that can be further improved by increases in technology. The effect of technology on Air Power has been like that of a lens, progressively minimising its limitations, whilst successively magnifying its attributes.

The Air Force modernization will definitely involve new equipment. Whenever we get new equipment, the degree of technology differs to what we possess and has direct bearing to our doctrine. Throughout the history of air power, technology has sometimes driven doctrine and doctrine has sometimes driven the technology.\(^6\)

According to Wing Commander Sutherland in his paper *The Influence of Technology on the Development of Air Power Doctrine*, technology has the following certain common characteristics.\(^7\)

First, a technology by itself is not always sufficient to produce a radical change in the way an air force operates. Technology must be used in conjunction with organisational, strategic and tactical changes.

Second, a technology may have been available for some time but has gone unrecognised. Poor recognition may be due to adherence to cultures that cling to present doctrine, technology, old traditions, and due to age old ‘resistance to change’ that may affect status, influence and careers.

Third, a technology succeeds not just on its merits but the way it is operated, supported and integrated with other technologies. The air force has been using computers for decades but never went beyond perfunctory computer tasks. For example, the Internet as a research tool and network is crawling ahead at snails pace in the Headquarters Philippine Air Force (HPAF).

Finally, the advantages that come from a new technology can be fleeting and must be sufficiently analysed for its applicability and value. The limited time of advantage makes it imperative to introduce and to exploit new technologies as soon as possible.

Technology as an input to the development of military doctrine should remind the writer of the errors of early air power visionaries, that is, allowing the concepts to race ahead of technology. There must be a link to reality.

Since technology and doctrine are inherently dynamic, the rapid expansion of technology should trigger an anticipatory, proactive impulse within the doctrine community so that doctrine can be established to guide the application of high technology suitable to the Air Force missions.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Hallion, *Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare - A Late Twentieth Century Perspective*, p. 7.
Experience Inputs

Experience forms the foundation of doctrine, which is another way of saying that history forms the primary source material for writers of doctrine.9 There is a problem for the PAF if experience will be the sole source of input to doctrine. As regards Close Air Support as part of Air Support to Surface Forces, the PAF has practical experiences to draw from. These experiences, however, were not recorded properly and as time goes on, the narratives of experiences cast doubts to the veracity and clarity, especially if stored through individual memories.

In other areas, the PAF must rely on normal library research. To build experiences data, after exercises, manoeuvres and actual operations must be recorded. Sadly, the method of recording past operations needs enormous and significant overhauling. The OSS experienced this inadequacy of post-operation reports by tactical and other units of the Air Force when the office had to write the air operations experience of the PAF in Mindanao.

The recording was perfunctorily done and included limited data such that the only contents of the records/reports on file with the PAF historian were aircraft numbers, number of munitions expended, and locations as. Even the names of aircrats were not mentioned. Significant lessons learned or problems encountered peculiar to the missions were conspicuously missing. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) Combat Research Divisions used to have a good file for AFP post-operation reports. Unfortunately the records of this office were lost.10 This is entirely opposite to the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Air Force that have memoirs, biographies, popular works and technical histories as sources of experiences.11

A ‘history focused doctrine’ is important for three main reasons. First, it is legitimate to presume that the lessons of history hold value for the challenges of tomorrow. Second, it is certainly safer to extrapolate data from a historical analysis than it is to speculate freely about the future. Finally, there is an overwhelming belief that historical material provides a more accurate basis for doctrine than creative judgments.12

Experience especially when it is reliant upon history must be treated with caution. Doctrinal outputs relying solely on historical analysis is dangerous since it may result in the most fundamental of errors which is the fighting of tomorrow’s war in the same way as we fought the wars of yesterday.13

Theory as Inputs

The Macquarie dictionary defines theory as ‘a coherent group of general propositions used as principles of explanation for a class of phenomena’.14 Additionally, it is a proposed explanation whose status is still conjectural, in contrast to well-established propositions that are regarded as reporting matters of fact.

On the scientific character of military theory, the inquiry into military affairs and its findings have been described as ‘theory’. Theory should be a systematised

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9 Drew, Dennis M., Inventing a Doctrine Process, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, p. 2.
10 The JOC Combat Research Division was burned when GFQ was torched during the Coup d'Etat in 1989.
13 Ibid., p. 1.
collection of interrelated and warranted assertions about military affairs, focusing on
the application of military force.\(^\text{15}\)

By studying military affairs, one is able to determine the nature of military
force as a social institution, and of war as its traditional main activity. One is able to
establish principles in the successful use of military force and of an effective
preparation for it. One is able to predict at least some actions undertaken by military
force and some results of these actions.\(^\text{16}\)

To explain further, the theory of deterrence is presented as an example. The
dictionary defines deterrence as ‘the act or process of turning aside, discouraging, or
preventing action through fear, doubt, etc’.\(^\text{17}\) Below is a chart showing the types of
deterrence.\(^\text{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target of Attack</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defender</td>
<td>Direct-Immediate Deterrence (France-Germany 1940)</td>
<td>Direct-General Deterrence (USSR-China 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protege of Defender</td>
<td>Extended-Immediate Deterrence (Operation Vigilant Warrior)</td>
<td>Extended-General Deterrence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Typically, the calculus of deterrence is presented in a binary form – the target
state and its defender either respond or do not. If the probability of response times the
costs (pR x C) to the attacker is greater than probability of no response times the
expected benefits (pNoR x Bexpected), the attacker is deterred. Deterrence is a
process based on assumptions, knowledge, and decisions. It is a reactive enterprise
that takes shape based on the actions, values, capabilities, and perceptions of two
parties. The point here is that doctrine should be supported by established theory and
the theory should be validated by experience.\(^\text{19}\)

After briefly discussing technology, experience, and theory inputs, the next
step in the ‘doctrinal loop’ is to analyse, develop, produce, validate, and review. The
next paragraphs will discuss each part of this loop in relation to the inputs. The
doctrine loop is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment rather than a set of
rules to be followed mechanically.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 393.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) The Macquarie Dictionary.

\(^{18}\) W. Eric Herr, Operation Vigilant Warrior: Conventional Deterrence Theory, Doctrine, and Practice,
School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, June 1996.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., pp. 42-45.

\(^{20}\) Captain Daniel J. Monahan, USAF, Creating Air Refuelling Doctrine: Preserving Experience in
Writing, Graduate School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Training Command, p. 9.
Figure 4.1: Doctrine Development Loop

Analyse the Data

Gathering the historical, theoretical, and technological data is the first task. If this task is not performed correctly, the purpose of the process can be defeated. A common occurrence is predisposition, i.e. 'gathering only the evidence that supports preconceived concepts about the subject at hand'.

At this part of the doctrine loop, inputs are examined in order to determine either their impact on current doctrine, or the requirement to develop new doctrine. The possible outcome among others at this phase is the identification of capability issues, concept papers, and working papers that provide guidance for further development.

The PAF lack of experience in certain areas of air power application logically lead to the use of foreign doctrines as 'benchmarks' of analysis. Major General Holley USAF Ret. in his Fifty Questions for Doctrines Writers posits several queries regarding the use of foreign doctrines for analysis. The questions are: has the doctrine team comprehensively studied the experience of foreign air forces? Has it guarded against the bias that arises from relying only on those reports of foreign experience and practice which have been translated, while ignoring contrary evidence which happens not to have been translated? Has appropriate account been taken of cultural or material differences underlying foreign experience and practice when weighing the utility of foreign doctrinal ideas? What can we learn from the ways and means employed by foreign air forces in formulating doctrine? Has our doctrine team ever undertaken any systematic effort along this line? Do foreign air forces have procedural manuals or regulations on the formulation of doctrine that might offer us insights on their methods, if not their doctrines?

Develop Data

The development phase of the doctrine loop involves the examination of the concept paper or working paper produced as an outcome of the analysis phase, in order to determine how to achieve a doctrinal solution.\(^{23}\)

The current PAF approach to the examination of concept or working papers involves the meetings of the PAF Doctrine Study Group (PDSG). PDSG is internal to the PAF and is composed of representatives from the different HPAF Staff. Brainstorming and debates characterise such meetings.

The search for a doctrinal solution may go beyond the PDSG method through options such as the conduct of symposia, seminars, and utilisation of professional journals and papers as forums for increasing debate and expanding the source of ideas beyond the walls of the HPAF building.\(^{24}\)

The Development phase is incomplete without the model-experiment-test process being applied. The explanation of model-experiment-test are as follows:

Model

The dictionary defines 'model' as 'a representation, generally in miniature, to show construction or serve as copy of something'.\(^{25}\) A review of literature in modelling air operations prescribed that models should possess three fundamental characteristics. These fundamental characteristics are: models should be an abstraction of something or an object, models should have a particular purpose, and models should be more cost-effective means of achieving their purposes than by using the object itself.\(^{26}\)

There are important criteria for selecting models. These criteria are framed as questions to be asked of any model framer and the doctrine writers.\(^{27}\)

- **Is the model comprehensive?** For the different output per level of doctrines, the model must at least encompass the operators, plans, and objectives at the target level of doctrine.
- **Are responsibilities clearly identified, and are champions designated for each step of the way from envisioning to implementation?** The doctrinal solution should be advocated clearly by a responsible Unit or individual (champion) and should result in action plans which optimise the generated ideas and analysis.
- **Is organisational turbulence minimised?** The change in the organisation must not affect the model. An incremental transition to the model is desired.

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\(^{23}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{24}\) *Drew, Inventing a Doctrine Process*, p. 3.

\(^{25}\) *The Macquarie Dictionary.*


Experiment–Test

In searching for the doctrinal solution using the model, experimenting and testing are necessary. These approaches need not be ‘formal’ analysis. Testing and experimenting may be done by categorising the model into the following: historical model; engineering model; and commonsense model.28

The historical approach is usually the first approach decision makers turn to when confronted with the problem of criteria development and measures of effectiveness. This approach suggests that the lessons of history can serve as a basis for viewing the future and can provide a model of assessment. Recourse to historical comparison, is useful in conditions where technological breakthroughs were not critical. In viewing what worked before, one must be wary of the assumptions used in recounting the history itself. History does not seek to predict; it intends to recount facts and explain why an event occurred as a function of hindsight.29

There are aspects that doctrine writers should be aware of when using this model for testing. The ‘right’ historical model should match the ‘right’ situations. Further, the danger of ‘lessons-learned syndrome’ is that it focuses attention on the events of the past as a function of hindsight, not on the possibilities of the future as a function of foresight. While ‘lessons learned’ are valuable, they have a tendency to be forgotten.30

The engineering approach is characterised by the attempt to measure precisely what can be measured.31 The approach is influenced by scientific methodology and technological innovation. Evaluation criteria and operational suitability are commonly used in this approach. Evaluation criteria is a standard by which required technical and operational effectiveness and suitability characteristics or the resolution of technical or operational issues may be addressed. Operational effectiveness and suitability are the over-all degree of mission accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of the system.32

Another method of testing and experimentation of a model is the commonsense approach. The doctrine writers are cautioned because commonsense is neither ‘common’, nor does it necessarily represent ‘sense’. Although it will always be an important method, test of the model in this realm suffers ambiguities and errors in logic. First, the commonsense approach suggests a central frame of reference that is assumed to be universally understood and applicable. Second, it fails to account for perceptual differences and assumes that there is only one credible paradigm with which to view the world.33

29 Ibid., p. 55.
30 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
31 Ibid., p. 59.
32 Ibid., p. 60.
33 Ibid., p. 65.
Produce Phase

After the doctrinal solution is modelled and tested, the Produce phase is a process involving drafting, writing, and publishing as the next phase of the doctrinal loop. The draft may be provided in a number of forms, including paper and electronic. The complete steps of this phase will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter.

Validate Phase

The doctrine process does not end with the production of the doctrinal output. Validation is used to determine if the doctrinal solution has met the original requirement. Validation may be formal or informal.

The PAF units are tasked to validate the proposed tactical doctrines relevant to their organisations. The functional and operational doctrines are validated by the HPAF Staff and the ACSC through simulation and wargaming. As such, there are three levels of validation in the PAF. The first level involves the validation by unit/staff to which the doctrine is applicable. Second level of validation is the PDSG and finally at the level of the PAF Doctrine Board (PDB).

Validation, assessment, test and evaluation in the AFP Doctrine Development Manual, relies on the training institutions and schools. Field exercises and wargaming are the PAF tools for the validation.

Wargaming can be defined as a simulated military contest, conducted according to rules, with participants in direct opposition to each other (or to the umpires or game control systems), without using actual combat forces. Wargaming can either be for analytical applications or training and education applications.

Analytical applications of wargaming include the development of operational support tools (decision aids) and research and evaluation tools. Analytical gaming assists in the formulation of doctrine, strategy and policy.

Training and education wargaming has broader treatment of issues and leans towards processes and human factor analysis. This includes team and individual skills development.

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34 LWD-1, Fundamentals of Land Warfare, The Australian Army Model, produce phase uses the CD as output.
35 Ibid., p. 3.
37 Squadron Leader Peter J. McCary, This is Not a Game, Wargaming for the RAAF, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1991, p. 18.
38 Ibid., p. 20
39 Ibid.
Summary

Step 5 of Doctrine Formulation embodied in the AFP Doctrine Development Manual is the Development of Military Doctrine. To accomplish this step there is a need to enumerate and identify the phases of developing military doctrine. The existing phases of doctrine process both in the AFP Doctrine Development Manual and PAF SOP 16 needs further elaboration. Some of Major General Holley's recommended steps are intended to satisfy the requirements in introducing new doctrines. Some of the recommended steps are already happening in the PAF that still necessitate the 'doctrinal loop' guide in developing the military doctrine.

The 'doctrinal loop' is a systematic process beginning with the inputs of technology, experiences and theory. These inputs are identified or influenced by the developed military strategy of Step 4 of Chapter 3.

The inputs are followed by the analysis phase, which is the gathering of historical, theoretical and technological data as the first task. At this phase, inputs are examined in order to determine their impact on current doctrine or the requirement to develop new doctrine.

The next phase is the development phase. This involves the examination of the output of analyse phase, that is concept or working papers. The output of the development phase is an interim doctrinal solution. At this phase, doctrine writers should make and test a model of the doctrinal solution.
After the model of the doctrinal solution has been tested and completed there will be the production phase which involves drafting and writing. The next chapter details the drafting and writing phase. The initial output of this phase may be draft interims and limited copies in paper or electronic for the purpose of validation requirements.

The last phase of the ‘doctrinal loop’ is the validate phase. If validation is satisfactory, the output i.e. the draft – interim (tactical, operational, functional or basic doctrine) will be going out of the loop and begin the approval workflow at the different levels of the approval chain.
Chapter V

Doctrine Writing Process

In a certain sense, war through the ages has been a battle of doctrines. The really decisive successes have come to those who adopted a new doctrinal concept to which their enemies were unable to respond.

Colonel John A Warden III USAF

Introduction

Adopting a new doctrinal concept begins with developing and writing one that is relevant. Without a formal written doctrine, the organisation depends upon informal doctrines. Informal doctrines, according to General Sir Edward Hamley, may often be ‘nothing more than the opinion of the senior officer present’.¹

The major implication of continuous doctrine development, is the simultaneous dual output of the evaluation and formulation process, i.e., published (formal) doctrine, and unpublished (informal) doctrine (informal doctrine can be thought of as a ‘chop suey’ of untested theory, personal experience, ad hoc solutions, etc.). Formal doctrine will always be ‘wrong’ to some extent because it will always lag in contextual change; ‘informal doctrine’ can compensate for this problem by helping to ‘fine-tune’ the guidance provided in formal doctrine.²

The emphasis of doctrine process is keeping the doctrine as an authoritative guidance.³ To do this, written doctrine as a part of the process begins with other activities such as evaluation, education, and application.

As regards writing and development of doctrine, there is a possibility that the development process, ‘doctrine loop’, may be mixed up with the actual writing of the doctrinal solution. The ‘doctrine loop’ showed the different phases of military doctrine development while this chapter presents suggestive steps in the doctrine writing process only.

The OSS observation in the past years revealed that it is implied that doctrine writers or any Air Force officers knew how to write either a research paper or technical reports. As such, the existing AFP Doctrine Development Manual and PAF SOP 16: Doctrine Process are broad references for doctrine development. Specific steps are not required with the given premise; Air Force officers knew how to write.

This book does not intend to prove that premise wrong but does aim to give the doctrine writers supplementary guides in addition to the existing doctrine development manuals.

² Ibid., p. 13.
This chapter intends to define the tasks of the doctrine writer, set-up of working parties, developing a timetable, drafting an outline, compiling information to fill the outline, produce, review draft, and endorse draft for publication and distribution.

Defining the Tasks

All air force writing falls under one or a combination of three general purposes: to direct, to inform, or to persuade.\(^4\) The doctrine writing process is a combination of directing and informing process for the doctrine writers.

The tasks of the doctrine writer are to gather ideas (theory, experience, and technology) and then shape and work them into doctrinal concepts or working papers intended either to inform or direct actions. Part of the task to support the concept paper is to gather research materials. The following are the research stages: \(^5\)

- Analyse the inputs (theory, experience, and technology). Normally, inputs are triggered by events that clearly show their relationship to the existing doctrine.
- Draw up a research plan from the analysis of the issue. A research plan is a set of headings under which various pieces of researched information will be filed.
- Allocate a folder to each heading in the research plan and put all notes and photocopies of data appropriate to the heading into the folders.
- When you decide you have done enough research, take a holistic view of the overall list of headings in the research plan and the contents of the folder to ensure it encompasses the desired doctrinal aims.

Set-Up Working Party

Doctrine inputs although broadly categorised as theory, experience, and technology require air force personnel with varying skills to correlate developments of inputs to the existing or non-existing doctrines. The PAF uses the Special Working Committees for specific doctrine. The members of the PDSG represent the skills and knowledge mix to ensure proper treatment of the doctrinal concepts.

Developing a Timetable

The 'doctrine loop' is a systematic continuous cycle but each phase must conform to specific events and time to accomplish the doctrine cycle in a reasonable time. There are methods available to chart the time element of the doctrine cycle. Among these methods are the milestone chart, Ghant Charts, simple Critical Path Method (CPM), etc.

\(^4\) The Tongue and Quill Communicating, AFH 37-137, August 1994, p. 10.
Drafting

Once you have prepared a work plan, a draft is necessary for three reasons.\(^6\)

- Provides a total picture of the task and this allows the writers to balance time and resources more efficiently as the work progresses;
- A broad view reduces the chance of inadvertently omitting important section/s of the concept paper; and
- Provides signposts for the investigation and initial set of categories to file research materials gathered.

A preliminary plan usually contains three major divisions and a number of subdivisions, such as:\(^7\)

**Introductory Material**
- Necessary background information
- Reason for the investigation
- Present condition
- Reasons for considering changes

**Investigative Material**
- Findings of previous investigations
- Methodology and work done in present investigation
- Results obtained from present investigation

**Analytical Material**
- Discussion of significance of investigative material
- Relation to present practices
- Recommendations based on the above

Compile Information to Fill the Outline

There is a variety of techniques that have been developed by other researchers and there is nothing wrong in benefiting from any or all of these techniques. The following are recommended means to compile information:

**Thesis Statement**

The thesis is usually considered the most important part of your paper because it outlines the central purpose (doctrinal concept) of the essay. A good thesis will link the subject of an essay with a controlling idea. Consider, for example, the following thesis:\(^8\)

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\(^6\) *Ibid.*, p. 239.

\(^7\) *Ibid.*

\(^8\) *WC The Writing Process*, The Writing Centre, p. 1.
The Air Force in the past spent a great deal of effort protecting the Air Bases from Bombers.

Subject: Air Force and Bombers
Controlling Idea: Air Force spends a great deal of effort protecting Air Bases

A thesis should be narrow in focus in order to allow the fullest possible exploitation of its issues, and should reflect the type of paper that follows. Narrowing the focus of the thesis may require posing questions about it before committing to a final version.

Organising Your Material
The OSS adopts the use of file folders (Manila Envelope), each labelled with one of the subheadings from the preliminary plan. As information is gathered, file it in the appropriate folder. If a big or lengthy report come along the way, such as a book or a lengthy report, photocopy the relevant sections and put the photocopies in its right folder. If information can be placed in two different folders, make a copy and place the original in one folder and the copy in the other. When research is complete, the headings of the folders should comprise the headings and subheadings under which the final report will be written.

Categorising Sources
It is useful when thinking about sources of information to divide them into primary sources and secondary sources.

Primary Sources
Primary Sources are taken from first-hand experience with the subject or event in question. They can be personal observations by witnesses to an event, post mission reports, photographs, autobiographical data and contemporary publications containing direct first-hand observations. Two other forms of primary sources are findings from interviews and questionnaires.

Secondary Sources
These are sources that interpret events, which make observations or comment upon them at a later time. These sources includes books, articles published in journals, documentary films and anything else that analyses the first-hand information after the event.

The following are some of the most important sources of information:

- Organisation Records, Files and Archives
- Personal Experience
- Written Submissions
- Library Research
- Literature Reviews
- Statistical Bulletins

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9 Ibid., p. 241.
10 Ibid., p. 243.
Produce and Review Draft

Producing a draft begins with the organisation of thoughts about the compiled information, interpreting the data, and creating paragraphs. When writers talk about organisation, it is about arranging thoughts systematically in an orderly and functional way to create a harmonious or united action.

A Basic Framework

Most effective writing has an introduction, a body, and a conclusion. This is deemed to be the most logical framework. The following is a brief description of the framework.

- The introduction must capture the audience’s attention, establish rapport, and announce the purpose.
- The body must be an effective sequence of ideas.
- And finally, the conclusion must summarise the main points stated in the body and close smoothly. Recommendations can also be included either within the conclusion or separately.

The Main Point

The main point emanates from the thesis and is the source of the controlling idea. The main ideas and facts represent major divisions or points expected in the paper. When weighed against other facts and ideas, the main point stood out. Supporting ideas give descriptive elements that expand the main idea.

Paragraphs Pattern

After the main point, drafting means selecting a pattern as the guide for systematically and logically moving through the paper. The following patterns may be use singly or in combination depending on the purpose of the paper.

Topical pattern is commonly used to present a general statement followed by numbered listings of subtopics to support, explain, or expand the statements. Some materials flows more logically if arranged from the simple to the complex, the known to the unknown, the general to the specific, the specific to the general, etc.

Time or Chronological Pattern is used to discuss events, problems, or processes in the sequence of time in which they take place or should take place (past to present, present to past, or present to future). In most cases, this pattern is used in writing histories, tracing the evolution of processes, recording problem conditions and solutions, and dealing with other situations that develop over extended periods.

Reason Pattern is used if the writer wants to state an opinion or point of view and then develop support by discussing reasons.

Problem-Solution Pattern is used to identify and describe a problem or issue and then discuss possible solutions to the problem or technique for resolving an issue.

11 The Tongue and Quill Communicating, AFH 37-137, p. 25.
12 Ibid., p. 25.
Spatial or Geographical Pattern starts at some point in space and proceed in sequence to other points. The pattern is based on a directional strategy - north to south, east to west, clockwise or counterclockwise, bottom to top, above and below, etc.

Cause-and-Effect Pattern shows how one or more ideas, actions, or conditions lead to other ideas, actions, or conditions. Two variations of this pattern are possible: cause to effect, and effect to cause. Whichever is selected avoid false and single causes. False causes occur when assuming that one event or circumstances cause a second event or circumstance merely because it precedes the second event or circumstance. Single cause is when one condition is deemed responsible for a series of conditions.

Crafting Paragraphs

A paragraph is a group of sentences that are related to each other because they all refer to a controlling idea. This idea is often expressed in a topic sentence which is a sentence that functions in a paragraph much like the thesis statement functions in a paper. Paragraphs work together to develop the controlling idea established by the thesis.

The paragraph is a unit of organisation and development. This structure is used fully to explore the set of sub-topics that a thesis statement suggests. Each paragraph develops a specific idea that supports the thesis statement; it also connects that idea to the other ideas presented in the paper.¹³

The normal plan for a paragraph will follow either the inductive or deductive model. In the inductive model, you put down each piece of information that goes to make up your point. Then, in the last sentence of the paragraph, you draw from these points the conclusion. In the deductive model, you begin the paragraph by asserting your main point. You use the rest of the paragraph to write down the evidence that goes to support this first sentence.

Endorse Draft

After the completion of the draft, doctrine writers should submit the initial draft to the Office of Special Studies. The OSS will convene the PDSG for the initial review of the proposed doctrine.

Print and Distribute

Simultaneous with the endorsement of the draft, initial copies shall be made for distribution to the Air Command and Staff College and/or using units. These copies will be use in the validation phase of the 'doctrine loop'. The second printing happens only when the proper authorities approve the doctrine. Publishing goes beyond producing a manual. It more importantly means getting a piece into the hands of any reader.

¹³ WC The Writing Process, p. 11.
Submission for Approval

After validation and necessary cycles of 'doctrine loop' are accomplished within the PDSG, the PDB will review and approve the doctrine at the level of the PAF. The doctrine will be submitted to the higher headquarter for further approval. Appendix 1 and 2 shows the approval and work flow chart of PAF doctrines.

Summary

Doctrine writing is a task that no two air force personnel will do the same way. The task in itself is not different from other writing tasks and forms. The difference with the doctrine writing process is the 'doctrinal loop' phases that the doctrine writers goes through while doing the writing process in itself.

The processes described in this chapter are not exclusive of each other. The doctrine writer will notice that most of these steps are reciprocal; that is, work done in one area may necessitate returning to a step that was previously completed.
Appendix 1

PAF Doctrine (Approval) Process

Initiation

PAF DOC BD (PDB) Thru OSS

NO

Approval Recommended

YES

CG, PAF

YES

ENDORSE

NO

Doctrine Office J-8

CS, AFP Coord: SND

APPROVED

NO

Approval Recommend

YES

IMPLEMENT
Glossary of Terms

Conflict - a social phenomenon characterised by a severe clash of interests between individuals, groups of individuals, or nations/groups of nations. Resolution of conflict is through the use of force of arms in war.

Doctrines - a body of principles in any branch of knowledge; that set of beliefs which is set forth as speculative and/or self-evident truth, or as speculative working principles, especially as taught to others or recommended for acceptance in religious, or in the military professions. Doctrine serve three basic purposes: first, as aids to theological/military reflection, interpretation, understanding, actions, instructions; second, as catalysers to clues into religion or reason for meaningful existence of the military organisation; and third, polemical, in that doctrines exposed to rational probes or inquiries usually result in doctrinal discussion/arguments that end up in purer doctrine. Doctrines, as mode of instructions, are conservative but as modes of inquiry and studies, doctrine can be innovative, generating new insights that alter the rhetoric of instructions and very often, doctrinal substance as well. Dogma, on the other hand, is doctrine laid down with absolutely no deviation nor discussion allowed, through punishment or the threat of punishment. Doctrines, especially military doctrines, are dynamic and should accordingly change with the type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, political directives about the use of the military, and the ‘enemy doctrines’ in that particular conflict.

Basic Doctrines - fundamental concepts and principles which guide civil and military authorities regarding the roles, functions, organisations, and employment of national forces to attain national (political) objectives. As a minimum, basic doctrines must describe: the nature, characteristics, and dynamics of each present or future conflict; the mission and objectives of the organisation in the conflict, and the general guidelines of the roles, functions, and organisations.

Operational Doctrines - concepts and principles derived from the basic doctrines, which serves as guides for the Major Services and AFP Wide Support and Separate Units (AFPWSSUs) in the organisation and employment of their respective forces to perform their respective functions in a particular type of conflict within authorised resource entitlements.

Joint Doctrines - principles and concepts for the organisation and employment of joint forces within a single Major Service, or between forces of two or more Major Services/AFPWSSUs or between forces belonging to civil or military agencies pursuing the same or similar objectives. Joint doctrines describe missions, function, and organisation of the typical joint task headquarters and its ‘opcon’ units, the headquarters of Major Service or AFPWSSU; any joint civil-military organisation; the General Headquarters AFP (GHQ); and the Office of the Secretary of National Defense.
Combined Doctrines - principles and concepts derived from basic, operational, and joint doctrines, which serve as guides for the organisation and employment of AFP forces with the forces of another nation or group of nations.

Contextual - the aggregate of the external influences, political, psychological and social, geographic and ecological, economic, and technological/scientific - upon the AFP as it seeks to develop/deploy/use its ‘means’ through various ‘ways’ to attain the desired ‘ends’.

Function - the proper action by which the unit fulfils its reasons for existence. To plan, organise, equip, develop, deploy, direct, control, communicate, coordinate, supervise (management functions); lead, trail, blaze, command, provide guidance, supervise, conduct prompt and sustained operations (leadership functions) are functions.

Ideology - the aggregate or totality of ideas, attitudes, beliefs, ethics, values, doctrines and ways of life of the people within and/or related to a social organisation. There are national, political, religious, military and even economic ideologies.

Military Culture - ‘mind-set’ of the AFP ‘Military Culture’, or the ‘military mind’ has profound effects on the setting up of military weapon/strategy.

Military Objectives - definite state of conditions to be attained by military forces at the end of specific time frames. These military objectives have profound effects on military/weapon strategy.

Military Policies - set of inter-related and inter-faced guidelines issued by military authorities to carry out military strategy.

‘Mind-set’ - habitual ways of thinking, acting and reacting by a group of people long exposed to a particular set of experiences, values, doctrines and/or ideology.

Nation-State - a large group of people having common characteristics, occupying an internationally-recognised national territory, with a single government and enjoying the capability to make decisions free from foreign influences (sovereignty).

National Defense Act (NDA) 1935 - Commonwealth Act Number 1, the clearly outdated Philippine defense doctrine against invasion patterned after the pre-World War II Swiss defense model which relied on mobilisation of reserves within 30 days and the retreat to enclaves from which defense would be conducted. The rapidity of modern warfare prevents effective mobilisation, and modern weapon system render jampacked military enclaves as juicy targets. The Swiss changed to the ‘territorial defense concept’ in 1962 but the Philippines, in spite of its World War II experiences and the characteristics and dynamics of modern invasions, still clings to the 1935 NDA concepts. It is only this year (1999) that the Department of National Defense and GHQ, AFP began reviewing the 1935 NDA concepts.
National (Political) Objectives - definite state of conditions to be attained by national instruments of power at the end of relatively short time frames, as indicated by political authorities. Since the national goals cannot be immediately attained, national/political objectives are set to help attain, directly or indirectly, the national goals. These national objectives have a profound effect on national and defense strategies.

National Policies/Principles - guidelines or definite statements of the ‘ways’ by which the nation’s ‘means’ can, or cannot, be used to attain the ‘ends’.

Principles of War - basic tenets for the effective/efficient conduct of war. The US for example has the principles of the objective, mass, surprise, simplicity, manœuvre/mobility, offensive/initiative, unity of command, security and economy of force. The principles of war are the most fundamental form of doctrine and they represent the basic guiding elements of warfare. Although they help provide a better understanding of warfare, they are not checklist items that necessarily lead to success.

Strategy - selected course of action which describes the ‘ways’ through which the ‘means’ will be developed/deployed/employed to attain the ‘ends’. Direct strategy is a straightforward course of actions. Indirect strategy is the judicious development/deployment/employment of ‘means’ to attain the desired ‘ends’ by infinitely various ‘ways’, more of which are indirect rather than direct.

Military Strategy - selected course of action by military organisations which describes the military objectives to be attained and the correlated and interfaced policies which follow relevant political guidelines/policies through which the requisite military forces/weapon systems will be developed/deployed/employed to attain the military objectives within a certain time frame.

Weapon Strategy - a type of national and/or military strategy, which relies mainly on existing, or probable weapon systems, resulting in trying to force-fit present or future wars of characteristics of ‘weapons’ rather than designing the instrument of national power/military forces to fit such future wars.

War - a unique social phenomenon characterised by a most violent expression of conflict resolution, using the force of arms, between nations or between large groups of persons within a nation.
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