





# THE QUALITATIVE EDGE

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A ROLE FOR AIR POWER  
IN REGIONAL CO-OPERATION



**Edited by Chris Coulthard-Clark**



**RAAF Air Power Studies Centre**

**THE QUALITATIVE EDGE**

**A Role for Air Power  
in Regional Cooperation**

**The Proceedings of a Conference held by  
the Royal Australian Air Force  
in Melbourne  
22 October 1992**

**Edited by Chris Coulthard-Clark**

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## **Acknowledgments**

Several of the papers presented at the Conference, along with following questions and discussion, have been taken from a video recording of proceedings and are reproduced here essentially unaltered. A light editorial hand has been passed over the transcripts, and the final texts where provided by speakers, purely for the sake of improving readability, conciseness and clarity. All edited papers were sent to authors for comment before publication.

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## Abbreviations

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ANZUS	Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CAS	Chief of the Air Staff
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CDR	Closer Defence Relations
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
GPS	Global Positioning System
IADS	Integrated Air Defence System
MAP	Military Assistance Programme
MINDEF	Ministry of Defence
NAS	Naval Air Station
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORAD	North American Air Defense Agreement
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RSAF	Republic of Singapore Air Force
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR	Search and Rescue
TNI-AU	Indonesian Air Force
USAF	United States Air Force
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

## **Notes on Speakers**

### **Air Marshal Barry Gration, AO, AFC**

Air Marshal Gration is Chief of the Air Staff, Australia. He joined the RAAF in 1953, graduating from the RAAF College at Point Cook in 1956 as a pilot. In addition to filling a variety of flying and staff posts, he attended the RAAF Staff College in 1970, the Joint Services Staff College in 1975 and the Royal College of Defence Studies in England in 1982; he also completed a Bachelor of Commerce degree as an external student with the University of Queensland, graduating in 1965. He was posted to be Head, Australian Defence Staff and Defence Attache in Washington in 1987, and on his return became Air Commander Australia in 1990. He took up his present appointment on 2 October 1992.

### **Professor Paul Dibb, AM**

Professor Dibb is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University (ANU). He was previously a Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defence, and before that Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and Ministerial Consultant to the Minister for Defence. Earlier in his career he worked in the Department of Trade, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Department of External Territories, as well as being a Research Fellow in the Political Science Department at ANU. His major publications include *The Soviet Union: the Incomplete Superpower* (first published in 1986) and *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* (1986).

### **Major General Datuk Ahmad Merican bin S.T. Merican**

Major General Merican is Commander of Air Defence Command, Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). Commissioned in 1961, he completed pilot training in England and has specialised in helicopter flying throughout his career. During the 1970s he attended staff college in England and the Joint Services Staff Course in Australia (in 1976), and filled staff posts in the Ministry



of Defence. In 1980 he became commandant of the RMAF base at Alor Star, followed by appointments as Commander of the East Malaysia Region in 1982 and Commander Air Headquarters in 1985. After four years as Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) Plans at the Ministry of Defence, in 1990 he was promoted to Major General and became Deputy Chief of the Air Force. He assumed his present post in 1991.

### **Air Vice Marshal John Hosie, OBE**

Air Vice Marshal Hosie is Chief of the Air Staff, New Zealand. He joined the RNZAF in 1959 and, after qualifying as a pilot, flew Canberra bombers in New Zealand and at Singapore as part of the Far-East Air Force. On his return in 1966 he became a flying instructor and later led the RNZAF's aerobatic team. He has since commanded Skyhawk and Strikemaster squadrons, and the Strike Wing at Ohakea. In addition to various staff appointments in Wellington, he has served on the Headquarters of Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) in Malaysia and as Deputy Commander of the New Zealand Force South-East Asia in Singapore. After attending the Canadian National Defence College, he became Assistant Chief of Development on his return to New Zealand in July 1991 and was appointed to his present position on 25 September 1992.

### **Brigadier General Bey Soo Khiang, PPA**

Brigadier General Bey is Chief of the Air Force in the Republic of Singapore. He joined the Singapore Armed Forces in 1974 and attended Cambridge University under a SAF scholarship, graduating in 1977 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. Joining the RSAF, he completed pilot training in 1979 and subsequently, a flying instructors course. In 1982 he attended the USAF Air Command and Staff Course, and on his return held various staff appointments in Headquarters RSAF. In 1988, after completing a Masters in Public Administration at Harvard University, he became Head of Air Operations. He was appointed Commander of Paya Lebar air base in October 1991, Chief of Staff (Air Staff) in June 1992, and assumed his current appointment as Chief of the Air Force, RSAF, on 1 September.

## **Lieutenant General David Huddleston, CMM, MSC, CD**

Lieutenant General Huddleston is Commander of Air Command in the Canadian Armed Forces. He was born in Glasgow, Scotland, where he attended university and received a Bachelor of Law degree in 1959. During this time he completed pilot training in the RAF Voluntary Reserve, and when he arrived in Canada in 1960 he joined the RCAF. As a fighter pilot he spent much of his career in Europe, both with his own service and on exchange. He has commanded a fighter squadron, served on the NATO Military Committee, and as a Brigadier General was commander of 1 Canadian Air Group in Germany. In 1989 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and became Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters, before assuming his present position in August 1991.

## **Air Commodore F.X. Soejitno**

Air Commodore Soejitno is Deputy Governor of the Indonesian Air Force Academy. Since graduating from the Academy in 1965, he has served as a pilot and pilot instructor, and as Chief of Operations and Training of an air defence wing. After attending the USAF Air Command and Staff Course in 1979, he was appointed Air Attache in Washington in 1981. He was promoted to Air First Marshal (Air Commodore) in 1989 and assumed his current post in 1991.

## OPENING REMARKS

**Air Marshal I.B. Gration**

The title of today's conference has been carefully chosen: 'The Qualitative Edge' is, of course, shorthand for air power. As all of us here understand, the words reflect our conviction that the possession of air power offers the edge in conflict which will make the difference between success or failure. As well, the word 'qualitative' also carries with it the connotation of quality and professional excellence. Hence, the first part of our title is intended to encompass the belief that an assembly of those who understand air power - and especially of you professionals who are the practitioners of air power - will share a common professional language, a common set of beliefs and concepts, and a willingness to address common interests as professional equals sharing - figuratively speaking - a *lingua franca*.

The second leg of the title reflects a sincere belief that, even in the absence of any present prospect of external threat or conflict, the total regional capacity of air power and its practitioners have the inherent synergistic potential for contributing substantially to regional cooperation, particularly in a non-military sense.

Hence, my hope and expectation for this conference is that the bringing together of a group - such as this - of disciplined, like-minded thinkers who share a common understanding of the efficacy of air power can generate - in a brainstorming sense - practical ideas for the furtherance of regional cooperation which draw on our recognised air power characteristics of flexibility and versatility, not to mention surprise and mobility.

Without wishing in any way, then, to limit or even guide the distinguished speakers who will provide the framework for our discussions today, may I suggest that there are at least three separate avenues for air power to contribute to regional cooperation. The first is the obvious one in which we have already several examples bilaterally within the region: that is, military cooperation. The

second recognises that the possession of military capabilities also offers much opportunity for cooperation in a quasi or non-military aviation capacity: for example, in a shared undertaking of economic zone air surveillance.

But perhaps the avenue which challenges our imagination and creativity most is the possibility that our shared professional understanding will allow us to propose less obvious possibilities which might flow from those capabilities which are in the nature of support for air power: for example, communications, command support systems, logistics planning, training, education, the aviation industry, and so on. While this third avenue is the most demanding of our military imaginations, I believe it also offers professionally the most promising prospects for real regional cooperation.

So, ladies and gentlemen, we all understand the inherent difficulties of developing cooperation between independent nations, especially when there are present the inevitable differences of perspective, political structure, wealth, development and even culture. The challenge for us all today, therefore, is to capitalise on this opportunity of combined professional knowhow to generate real possibilities for cooperation which, while acknowledging those difficulties, offer the opportunities to circumvent them.

I encourage you all to listen, think flexibly, and contribute where you can. I look forward to the day's work with high expectation.

# **AUSTRALIA'S REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1990s**

**Professor P. Dibb**

## **The Changing World Order**

The question of regional security cooperation is at the heart of where I expect our defence and foreign policies will progress in the 1990s, irrespective of which government we have in power. I will begin by referring to the dramatic changes in the world strategic order that have centred around the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its East European empire, and what this means for future United States policies. The last time that, from an Australian defence planning point of view, we underwent such a dramatic change was with the events of 1945 which culminated in the defeat of Germany and Japan. Then, we had the expectation of a new world order based upon the role of the United Nations, of a more peaceful period, and with Australia moving away from its traditional alliance with the United Kingdom to a central defensive relationship which has existed ever since with the United States.

An important question for us to reflect on at the broadest level is whether we are at another turning point in world history in which the debate in Australia will necessarily be between the key platforms of our defence policy, the platforms as identified both in the 1987 White Paper and, I notice, more recently in the Opposition's comprehensive defence policy. Those platforms are: the priority for the defence of Australia; our alliance commitments particularly with the United States, but also with New Zealand and the Five Power Defence Arrangements; and our regional focus.

Increasingly, however, there is a view in some quarters that the role of the United Nations will be such that we need to think carefully about whether we need additional elements in the force structure for peacekeeping commitments. I mention this at the outset because I can detect tensions between those competing defence policy and force structuring elements.

We need to recognise early on in the piece - as I know Air Force does - that, whilst we need to move to a more outward-going and engaged defence policy in this new world order, there are clear limits to our defence capacity and influence as a medium sized defence power. In my view those limits to capacity and influence must be highly disciplined and must focus about the limits to our overseas involvement, and that includes in the United Nations area.

Increasingly I detect the emergence in Australia of a bipartisan defence view which is revolutionary in our post-war history. Not only does the defence of Australia come first in our force planning - and that is something new - but all political parties, certainly all the major ones, now place key emphasis on regional defence cooperation. That is the theme of this conference and it is an entirely appropriate and relevant one, and I applaud the initiative of the Air Force and of Computer Sciences of Australia in organising this conference.

### **Australia's Role in Regional Defence Cooperation**

What role then can Australia **realistically** play in regional defence cooperation? I sometimes think that we tend to under-rate our own defence capabilities. We are so used to examining the entrails of the difficulties of budgetary reductions, efficiency savings and so on that in that process we forget how others perceive our capabilities.

Australia is the major military power in the South Pacific, indeed the predominant military power, and in the South-East Asian region we have the most advanced military capabilities - including the most potent strike, intelligence and surveillance capabilities. An academic colleague of mine, Francois Heisbourg, the Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, has recently written about Australia and the region in the following terms:

Particular mention should be made of Australia, which in effect straddles the divide between the 'outside' and 'inside' states of Asia. Australia's active involvement in the area, based on an intimate knowledge of the region, provides Canberra with particular qualifications which are further enhanced by its geographical location alongside the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins.

He continues:

Although Australia's gross national product does not readily qualify it to join the G7 group of major industrialised nations as a global economic institution, Australia must be considered as one of the great powers in the Pacific Basin, just behind the United States and Japan.

I think that is a particularly worthwhile quotation, which draws to our attention at the outset how others perceive Australia's military capabilities.

When Australia's defence spending is looked at in terms of US. dollars (see Table 1), it will be seen that Australia spends about the same amount on defence, as all the ASEAN countries put together. That is a rather false measure, given the cost of our personnel and so on. It is clear, though, that the gross sum of money we spend on defence - and not least its application into the front end of technological advancement - gives us a clear lead and advantage in the region, although as the decade progresses I expect to see that lead narrowed but not eliminated. As a proportion of GDP we fall in about the same range as most other ASEAN countries.

What identifies Australia in the region, I will argue, is not only our key geographical location between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and our military size, capability and professionalism. It is also that we share with most of the ASEAN countries the characteristics of medium size of military power while not facing any clear and imminent external threat. We also share concerns about the long range future, about the changing global balance I mentioned at the outset, and - not least - about the potential for reductions in the longstanding United States military presence in our region. This last concern will, I suspect, be rather greater if there is a change in US Administration next month, which seems increasingly likely.

**TABLE 1:  
DEFENCE SPENDING OF  
MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES IN THE  
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

	\$US BILLION	% GDP
Australia	7.27	2.4
Indonesia	1.59	1.7
Malaysia	1.56	3.8
New Zealand	0.83	1.9
Philippines	0.98	2.2
Singapore	1.70	5.1
Thailand	2.06	2.6

Table 2 shows that, in constant dollar terms, defence spending in South-East Asia, Australia and New Zealand in the period 1985-90 has displayed - with rare exceptions and contrary to a lot of the public commentary - significant reductions or only modest increases in real terms, (that is in constant prices and exchange rates). The biggest exception is the Philippines, where the growth has mainly to do with counter-insurgency warfare. It is true that if the figures in Table 2 were updated to this year there would be some significant increases in Malaysia and elsewhere, but what we share in common with the ASEAN countries is modest defence spending, modest growth in defence spending, modest acquisition patterns.

The real arms races are in flanking regions, particularly North-East Asia, where Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are now sustaining large growth, and China would show very significant increases of 12 per cent per annum in the last two years. And secondly the large increases in defence spending and capabilities in South Asia, the other flanking region, not least in India and Pakistan. The areas of North-East Asia and South Asia are very large defence spenders, showing large increases in spending, competitive highly advanced conventional weapons programs, and increasing evidence of nuclear weapons, ballistic missile, chemical and biological weapons proliferation - none of which exists in our own region.



**TABLE 2:  
DEFENCE SPENDING 1985-90  
IN CONSTANT 1985 PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES**

	\$US MILLION		% INCREASE (+) % DECREASE (-)
	1985	1990	
AUSTRALIA	4668	4306	-7.8
INDONESIA	2341	1646	-29.7
MALAYSIA	1764	1567	-11.2
NEW ZEALAND	454	450	-0.9
PHILIPPINES	474	903	+10.5
THAILAND	1517	882	-41.9
<b>FOR COMPARISON</b>			
CHINA	6357	5693	-10.4
INDIA	6263	8506	+35.8
JAPAN	13151	16311	+24.0
SOUTH KOREA	4399	6637	+50.9
TAIWAN	4136	5304	+28.2

A key element of our defence policy is that we wish to see a basically stable regional situation continue, a situation which differentiates South-East Asia from North-East Asia and South Asia. Having said that however - as I have already alluded - there are growing pressures on the region, to do with perceptions of a power vacuum emerging with regard to the reductions in the United States military presence and the greater potential for influence, at the least, by the great Asian powers: China, Japan, and India. And most specifically there is anxiety in the region about the potential for military conflict in the South China Sea.

The central and real question that exists, both in the public domain and more especially in private discussions in ASEAN, is: where is the United States going in the 1990s? Particularly if there is a change in Administration, what sort of reductions might we see in the longstanding American presence? While it

remains to be seen, one should not exaggerate the reduction in American military power. The US has no competitor as a superpower any more, and even if it reduces its presence in the region it will still have very substantial capabilities for regeneration and for projection of power from the American continent.

My reading of a Clinton Administration's defence policy, which has been extensively underpinned by the work of Senators Nunn and Aspin, is that there will be some reductions. For instance, cuts in aircraft carrier battle groups and naval ships could be at least a quarter of the current base force level, which is the reduced force level of the Bush Administration. And there will be reductions of at least 25 per cent in Air Force battle wings.

Now a lot of those reductions clearly will occur in Europe rather than the Pacific region, but we might note the view of someone like Richard Holbrooke, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who could return to a position of some influence in a Clinton Administration, who has recently written that he would not be surprised if by the late 1990s there is no American military presence in either South Korea or Japan. Now that is a controversial and debatable issue, but I quote it to you from somebody of previous influence in the State Department.

### **Australia's View of Regional Security Policy in the 1990's**

I have been asked to answer several questions in my talk. Firstly, what common perspectives and policies are necessary to contribute to regional cooperation? I have touched on some of those aspects, in addressing the theme of Australia as a medium-size power sharing much in common with ASEAN countries. Secondly, what **practical** cooperative measures are possible to improve our defence relations and security in an uncertain period ahead, and to counter the intrusion of potentially destabilising forces - including weapons proliferation - from outside the region? And given the particular focus of this conference, which others more expert than me will develop, what are the prospects for regional cooperation in air power?

Turning, first of all, to Australia's view of regional security policy in the 1990s. The previously classified document *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, which was released early this month, focussed on the central need to improve our defence relations and contacts with the region, not least with Indonesia. That was in 1989.

I think now we would say that there is a need for us to emphasise our more self-reliant defence policy, because of the changing global and regional strategic situation. As the leading military power in the region we need to demonstrate our self-reliant credentials more. Our needs for the defence of Australia not only require that, but I believe the United States will expect us to do more for ourselves and also for the region. And I think, too, that the region will welcome a more active Australian defence policy. We are not threatening, we are technologically about the right level and size, and we are relevant to ASEAN strategic circumstances.

I have already said that with regard to Australia and the ASEAN countries, there are similar (but not identical) emerging defence perspectives. We have no clear and imminent threats, but share concerns about the future and about growing external influences and potentialities. Also, we face in common as medium-size powers the difficulties of threat assessments and force planning in a situation where the most likely threat for any of us will be low intensity conflict.

And we have similar sized air and naval forces. In terms of the numbers of personnel in ASEAN, Australian and New Zealand air forces and navies, the numbers of principal warships and submarines, and the numbers of fighter aircraft, we are similar in size (see Table 3). The figures vary a bit, but again if we compare these with, say, India or even Japan, we notice a dramatic difference. For instance, Japan has more surface ships and submarines than the whole of ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand put together, and indeed more fighter aircraft too.

**TABLE 3:  
COMPARISON OF MARITIME FORCES OF  
MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION**

	PERSONNEL ('000)		WEAPONS PLATFORMS		
	Navy	Air Force	Principal Warships	Submarines	Fighter Aircraft
AUSTRALIA	15.7	22.3	10	6	70
INDONESIA	42.0	24.0	17	2	54
MALAYSIA	10.5	12.4	4	-	51
NEW ZEALAND	2.5	3.9	4	-	21
PHILIPPINES	23.0	15.5	1	-	9
SINGAPORE	4.5	6.0	-	-	147
THAILAND	50.0	43.0	6	-	75

So, yet again, we group around a similar size, and that indicates similar-sized problems. Foremost, specifically with regard to air forces, is the question of sustaining the purchase of increasingly expensive platforms. These are doubling in price every generation - for instance, from the Mirage to the F/A-18, or the Iroquois to the Blackhawk helicopters - and we also see a doubling in the cost of operations. That seems to indicate that, increasingly, medium-sized countries can only afford moderate numbers of platforms. There is also a crucial need to manage attrition and an even more crucial need to avoid significant losses in combat.

All that indicates to me a growing requirement for us to share how we go about our business as medium-size defence countries, how we go about our business in husbanding our limited resources, and how we go about our business in sharing more information, technology, training and other elements of cooperation. Some of these things we already do, but there is more to do in the 1990s. And I will suggest some specific areas shortly.

There is an increasing emphasis in the ASEAN area on air and naval forces. Regional countries are moving from traditional counter-insurgency warfare to a perception of the need to defend their far-flung territories, which are often - as in the case of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines - large archipelagos with

very important maritime defence needs. The growing concern to protect distant offshore territories, resources, fishing areas, oil and gas fields is bringing about an increasing emphasis in the region on acquiring modest numbers of more advanced weapons platforms, both for air forces and navies.

There are similar problems for medium-sized countries, as I mentioned, of escalating costs that relate specifically and dramatically in the areas of acquiring advanced fighter aircraft. They also apply in such areas as Harpoon missiles (which cost over \$1 million a copy, \$2.5 million for an exercise missile), the increasing cost of capable surface ships with embarked helicopters, and the increasing cost of acquiring modern submarines.

All this suggests to me that we need to do more together in such areas as sharing:

- intelligence assessments and long-range threat analyses;
- force structure, programming and technical methodologies;
- operational, training, exercise and joint surveillance capabilities; and
- maybe in the longer term - and I recognise much more arguably - developing joint acquisition programs.

The last-mentioned may be perhaps more obvious in the naval area rather than the air force area, but it is something we need to examine.

If in the 1990s we **slowly** and **carefully** develop those sorts of relationships, then this would - I suggest - result in a more stable strategic environment to our north, which is to Australia's direct strategic advantage. And it would also bring about improved efficiency and effectiveness resulting from closer cooperation, and that includes for the Australian air force.

I do recognise that there are clear limits in what I am suggesting. The ASEAN way is to do things privately, not noisily and in the public domain as we so often do, and it is to do things iteratively, progressively - not dramatically. In any case, as you military professionals understand much better than me, all countries in the region - including ourselves - would recognise that there are clear limits to cooperation. To give one obvious example: sharing intelligence sources and methods is among the most sensitive areas of defence policy, and only amongst the closest of allies - such as ourselves and the United States - are

those things shared. It would take a long time and build up of confidence for those aspects of intelligence to be shared. Stockpiles of missiles and levels of operational readiness are also, quite rightly, regarded in most countries as highly classified information that need to be protected in terms of operational potentialities.

## **The Need to Develop a Common Security Approach**

When we look at the prospects of developing a common security approach, there is a lot of loose talk in Australia about the declining importance of military power in the new world order, about growing economic interdependence as a force for stability, and how we all should structure our defence forces for UN peacekeeping operations. There is some truth in these assertions but they do need to be kept in perspective. Certainly when you look at the views of our regional friends there are old fashioned neuralgias about sovereignty, about the need to protect the nation-state and its territories, and concerns about the ambitions of external powers. And whilst those attitudes may be old-fashioned, they are relevant and they determine defence policy and force structure.

I think in Australia's case we have been extremely fortunate that in 1986 we reached an historic agreement in our defence organisation that we would structure our forces for the defence of Australia. That gave us options in flexibility, in terms of range and endurance, for growing involvement with our region. Had we done what some wanted us to do in that period, which was to structure our defence force with regard to the Soviet Union, we would now be doing what Canada, Britain, Germany, France and the United States are doing - that is, slashing the defence force.

Whilst in the last five years we have undergone difficult programming issues with regard to the allocation of resources to defence, zero growth - which is what we have practically had for the last four years - is a great deal better than cuts of 25 per cent, which is what some other countries mentioned have faced. There is no requirement for a peace dividend from Australia, no need to adjust our forces downwards with regard to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. There is every requirement to remain on track towards the force acquisitions we need if we are to develop a credible defence of Australia in the 1990s.

We have put in place a structure for the defence of Australia, and developed a capable defence industry in the last decade with the new generation submarines, Anzac ships and Project Jindalee, and P-3C and F-111 updates and so on. As a result we are better placed than we were five or ten years ago, *not only to defend ourselves but to cooperate more with the region.*

What then are the specific areas of regional defence cooperation that we can develop over the next decade, with particular reference to air power? Firstly, I mentioned at the beginning that it is central to our defence interests to ensure that there is not a leakage of weapons of mass destruction from either North-East Asia or South Asia into our own region. It is vital that we prevent proliferation of nuclear, ballistic missile, chemical and biological weapons, because otherwise our strategic circumstances will change dramatically. There is a key role here for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and I believe that Department has already played an outstanding role in the global agreements that deal with chemical weapons proliferation. I think there is also a key area here for sharing information and assessments with the region.

Secondly, as to conventional weapons proliferation, it clearly would not be in our interest, or that of the region, for an open-ended arms race to emerge. The most difficult area, and potentially the most explosive one, is the introduction by China of much more potent weapons systems into the region, and its track record of exporting ballistic missiles and having a hand in nuclear weapons proliferation. The acquisition of some 24, maybe 48, Su-27s would dramatically change the situation with regard to China's reach and potentialities in the South China Sea. That then runs the risk of a response of competitive acquisitions of much more capable regional interceptor and air defence systems.

Now, what I am saying is not to identify any regional country, including China, as a potential threat to Australia. But it does recognise that regional anxieties can be lessened through, for instance, more sharing of information so the region knows precisely what is going on. Equally, more sharing of capabilities and training can increase the critical mass that can be derived from the limited resources of medium-sized powers.

## Specific Areas for Air Power Cooperation

I would commend to you some specific areas for air power cooperation. The focus in the past has been more on prospects for naval cooperation given the maritime nature of most ASEAN countries. That clearly however, includes the air dimension of maritime power - for instance, with regard to the need for better information and surveillance data on offshore territories, oil and gas rigs, illegal fishing, boat people, drug-running and so on. Already there are a number of well-developed operations based on our experience in the South Pacific and South-East Asia - for example with the P-3C Orions. But can we go beyond maritime surveillance, to examine the prospects for broader air defence cooperation?

Australia and the ASEAN countries, I would suggest, share a similar air defence environment. What do I mean by that? Well, firstly, the potential air threats are generally of low intensity, compared with North-East Asia and South Asia. Secondly, distances - except for Singapore - are large, and the territories and archipelagos to be covered are demanding relative to limited air power resources. Thirdly, air power doctrine is similar, embracing small numbers of platforms, demanding air threat information requirements, and an inability to afford the loss of significant numbers of aircraft in combat. Therefore, setting priorities and managing attrition for a relatively small number of airframes are crucial factors in the air power doctrines of both ourselves and the ASEAN nations. And finally there is a growing technological threat that we all face, from stand-off missiles, from Doppler radars, from increasingly good ECM.

Some specific areas that could be **explored** further are the sharing of relevant intelligence assessments and surveillance data. Next, sharing of facilities such as simulators and weapons ranges, for example at Delamere in the Northern Territory. Combined operations, as we already undertake in the South-West Pacific between Australia and New Zealand, in the Timor Sea between Australia and Indonesia, and under the Five Power Defence Arrangements with our P-3C Orions in Malaysia and Singapore might be extended. Do we need to think about extending joint air defence arrangements, the model being the IADS system in Malaysia? Do we extend it to East Malaysia? If so, what does that mean for foreign relations with other ASEAN countries, and what sort of air defence methodologies for low intensity threat can we share with our friends? Can we develop bilateral maintenance contracts, with a vision of Australia as an



advanced aerospace maintenance centre for the region? And finally, would it be too much to ask that at some time in the future we might think of bilateral or even multilateral acquisition projects for capital equipment, for instance in such items as transport or trainer aircraft?

Now I recognise that many of these matters involve sensitive issues of nationalism. It involves central issues with regard to national dimensions of air power. A lot of the things I've mentioned we are already doing to some extent. We can do more, we can do it better, and we can extend it in some of the areas I've mentioned. I recognise that exercises, both bilateral and multilateral, are at the essence of the military profession getting to know each other better across national political barriers. And you will notice how, despite political disagreements in our region, our defence policy has often remained intact at the height of those disagreements - whether that has been with Indonesia or Malaysia - and that I think is for the good.

We already have training exchanges and some exchange postings. Can we move on from that into the areas of pilot training (some of that is already being done), air traffic control, search and rescue, air defence training, and - building on our staff college training - when we develop our National Defence College, do we see it having a distinctive regional role? I suggest we do.

Can we progress joint science efforts, to develop sensors capable of operations in tropical environments, for instance in the infra-red dimension? Stretching the Air Force involvement a little further, as space technology develops - in particular light satellites - can we optimise the development of a satellite capability for regional surveillance tasks? Can we help with force structuring concepts, such as the role of air power in low level maritime threat assessments? And can we develop commercial opportunities for Australia, not only in the area of maintenance but contracts to conduct specialist training, access to high quality and state-of-the-art simulators and weapons ranges, and maintenance of high technology equipment?

## Conclusions

Well, I've asked a lot of questions there and I hope that we might explore some of these issues. It is an ambitious list - it is, as Defence civilians would say, an indicative list - but I think it is something worth considering and debating. Finally, it would be my view that as the 1990s progress we will move towards a community of shared strategic interests with our regional friends. It will not be an alliance, it will not be collective security, but it would recognise those shared strategic dimensions that I have mentioned. I think that now, strategically, is the time to develop our defence relations with the region, and there seems to be sound scope for increased air cooperation.

Australia's national interests in Asia in the 1990s are not just economic, they are importantly defence and they are cooperating in air power. May I leave with you a final word, paraphrasing the RAAF's *Condensed Air Power Manual* of 1992:

Combat aside, there is a broader way of looking at the role of air power as an instrument of national policy. Air power can ... be used in peacetime through defence cooperation programs with neighbouring countries ... regional surveillance arrangements and combined exercises with ... neighbours. In this way Australia safeguards and promotes its economic and diplomatic objectives as well as contributing directly to the resilience of regional security.

## Discussion

**Squadron Leader D. Miller** (RAAF College): With the purchase regionally of ex-CIS weaponry, and the recent rapid approach to acquisition that we saw in the last week, could I ask for your comments on CIS weaponry and the impact regionally. Secondly, do you see any opening in Australia's defence purchases for such weaponry, particularly in space or land-based surveillance and perhaps local air defence?

**Professor Dibb:** That's a revolutionary thought. I guess I don't see any openings with regard to the latter, but maybe I'm locked into Cold War thinking. I notice that at the Airshow at Avalon there is an exhibit from the Urals, in Central Siberia, offering air defence missiles, computer software and advanced

fighter aircraft. It would be very difficult for us to integrate those sorts of weapons systems, based on different doctrines, avionics and so on, into our predominantly Western order of battle.

But I think your first question is a much more relevant and serious one. At least one country in the region - that is Malaysia - is already looking at advanced Soviet fighter aircraft, and the question is whether the acquisition of that capability might bring about a response elsewhere in the region. Much more central than the Malaysian interest in fighter aircraft is the concern I mentioned with regard to China. I think the clear evidence of China acquiring Su-27s, developing a better air defence capacity and a new generation of much more capable surface ships, all point towards its desire to extend its strategic reach. Those acquisitions of Russian platforms - which may, by the way, include Backfire bombers - could bring about an escalating arms race, which would be extremely unstable.

**Mr D. Wade** (RAAF Staff College): Another double-barrelled question. Firstly, in discussing regional cooperation, all the issues you mentioned seemed to be very much in one direction. What can Australia do for the rest of the region in, for example, aircraft maintenance, etc? Surely there has got to be two-way flow? And the second thing you mentioned was joint acquisition programs. I'd like you to comment on the idea of not acquiring the same type of equipment, but complementary equipment.

**Professor Dibb**: I think that's a very good point, and it's certainly not something I wanted to lead you astray on in my address. Although clearly we have the more advanced capabilities - militarily, in defence science, generally defence industry and so on - it simply cannot be a one-way street if regional cooperation is to develop. I think that in some areas the region is developing rather more rapidly than we are. One example I am aware of is mine counter-measures capacity, where we've had some particular difficulties. It could be that we explore the opportunities for learning from the region in that area as a two-way street.

Joint acquisitions are, I recognise, extremely sensitive even within the ASEAN group, let alone between us and ASEAN. But maybe in some areas, for example ship building, we can share some capabilities. They could do the more modest area of high technology which is clearly within their industrial capacity, and we

would focus on the areas where increasingly Australia has a comparative advantage in our defence industry - that is, the high technology, high value-added end. Having said all that, it is not going to happen soon. It is going to take a long time, if it develops at all. As you suggest, purchasing complementary equipment might be more practical in some areas.

**Air Commodore J. MacNaughtan (RAAF):** I think you have dwelt on our self-reliance and regional cooperation, and not mentioned very much the third part of Australia's defence policy of major alliance with presumably and predominantly the United States. Do you see any scope for a major alliance with a closer nation, such as Japan?

**Professor Dibb:** Not foreseeably. I guess on the positive side, Japan and Australia are the two closest allies of the United States in the region. One, if you like, is the anchor of the alliance in the north Pacific and the other, that is ourselves, is the anchor of the alliance in the southern Pacific. We have similar acquisitions programs in some areas - and similar force structuring concepts, but with the Japanese envisaging conflict at a higher level and depending much more on American combat assistance if push comes to shove. I think we will see Japan in the 1990s pursue a more independent policy, whilst still keeping the alliance - very much modified - with the United States.

On the other side of the coin, however, the Japanese will continue to be anxious about the future military capabilities and power of Russia - for obvious historic reasons - and that would differentiate us from Japan. The other thing differentiating us is that we are more advanced than them generally in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, defence science and - I would argue - in some areas of defence industry. You know, when we criticise our own defence industrial capabilities and some of the modest premiums we are paying for the submarines and Anzac ships, have a look at what it costs the Japanese to manufacture and assemble P-3C Orions, F-15s and so on. They are at least twice and sometimes triple American manufacturing costs.

So I guess I can see that, as the 1990s progress, perhaps there will be some moderate adjustment at the margin to our military relationship with the United States, while still keeping us in ANZUS, and some increased emphasis on not only our own region but countries such as Japan. But I don't see an alliance.

# **THE MALAYSIAN VIEW OF THE REGIONAL COOPERATION PROSPECTS**

**Major General Datuk Ahmad Merican**

At 0845 on 5 June 1967, ten flights of Israeli Air Force (IAF) fighter-bombers simultaneously struck the ten most important airfields in Egypt. Ten minutes later, just as the first aircraft were pulling off their targets, a second wave of the IAF planes swept in. This pattern continued for sixteen successive waves. By noon, the Egyptian Air Force and air defence system were smoking ruins; in barely three hours, the Egyptians lost 100 pilots and some 300 aircraft. Later that same day, the IAF completed its coup with equally devastating attacks against the Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces. Taking advantage of air power's ability to concentrate fire-power in time and space, the IAF gained complete air supremacy over the Sinai, the Golan Heights and the West Bank within the space of a day.

The extract is from the United States Air Force Manual 1-1 (1989), which describes the capability of air power in offensive air operations. Air power represents 'the ability to project military force in space, manoeuvre the resources through the air to gain initiative over the enemy'. The air medium enables virtually unlimited horizontal and vertical movement of air power through its inherent characteristics of speed, range, manoeuvrability, firepower and flexibility of employment. These characteristics, brought about by advanced technologies, offer the qualitative edge to the offensive actions described above. The US Manual also quotes Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, as recognising the quality of speed and flexibility of air power to give the offensive edge, when he said in 1947:

The speed and flexibility of air operations puts a premium on gaining and keeping the initiative. Of air warfare, if anything, is the old adage true - that offence is the best defence.

Air power is, therefore, quite different from other forms of military force. In essence, it is able to react to any threat at short notice, over enormous distances, and can concentrate fire power in time and space whenever it may be required. The advent of the Global Positioning System (GPS), laser technologies, satellite

communication and Stealth technology gives air power that extra edge in modern warfare. These qualities often create a phobia between neighbouring states in a region. The strength and capability of such assets is often construed as a potential for belligerence on the part of the country holding them in its inventory. There is also prestige for those who can afford to acquire modern technologies as part of their air power resources. The assets reflect a measure of the quality of the organisation.

In Operation Desert Storm, that qualitative edge of air power in the offensive mode was again demonstrated with statistics that will go down in history, to be discussed and analysed by students of tactics and strategy. From the outset of hostilities the Coalition Force, led by the United States, employed joint and combined operations to destroy the Iraqis' integrated air defences, and their offensive capability, and to disrupt their command and control systems. Air bombardment campaigns destroyed the Iraqi war fighting infrastructures and in the last 100 hours of the operation provided air support for combat forces to defeat Iraqi forces in the field. Air power ruled supreme in the Gulf crisis.

In the preceding paragraphs, I have viewed air power as an agent that employs its inherent characteristics to cause destruction and possible annihilation of a weaker enemy. Viewed from another angle, however, air power has virtues that can be employed for the benefit of nations, in particular small nations like the littoral states in this region. It must be acknowledged, therefore, that air power - from the perspective of small nations - needs to be considered in quite a different way. Air power as interpreted by the United States, with its enormous combat power, may not be relevant to small nations. For us, the definition of air power as 'the ability to project military force in the third dimension' is inappropriate. The efficacy of air power for small nations is more towards using aviation activities to achieve national objectives, both military and socio-economic - as the RAAF Air Power Manual observes. My discussion of this topic will, therefore, be on this understanding. In this sense, the qualitative edge inherent in the resources of air forces, and other related agencies that deal in aviation activities, can be exploited for the benefit of nations through regional cooperation.

In defining region, I opt to adopt a generic understanding of surface and space that encompasses geographical areas of common interest. A region in this context could mean the littoral land masses and contiguous waters of South-East

Asia, or surface and space that extend into the Asia-Pacific region. In order to confine the scope of discussion to manageable proportions, I suggest the region be confined to the practically-employable aviation resources of South-East Asian countries - including Australia and New Zealand, two countries that have a long-standing association with the region. I need to include Australia especially, lest I be branded as being less than grateful for sponsorship to this auspicious forum.

On a more serious note, cooperation in this region does already exist in ASEAN - an association of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Although Australia and New Zealand are not members of ASEAN, either directly or indirectly, mutual interests do exist. ASEAN countries have progressed through cooperation in the economic and cultural fields, devoid of any collective attachment to air power. ASEAN as a group will not include military subjects on its agenda, although students of defence studies cannot deny the existence of a military community within the Association - albeit through bilateral cooperative arrangements. At the Fourth ASEAN summit in Singapore earlier this year, regional leaders resolved to maintain multi-lateral arrangements for activities that support the economic and cultural rapport of member nations. Venturing into any military forum collectively is considered non-viable, for fear that such action would provoke a hostile reaction from states beyond the region and possibly encourage the formation of a counter-alliance.

Developing ASEAN into a collective military community is also contrary to the concept of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ASEAN members believe in peaceful coexistence of nations within the region. However, ZOPFAN does not preclude the right of countries in the region to build up their defence capabilities. Neutralisation is not demilitarisation. The concept of ZOPFAN should allow for countries in the region to develop national and regional resilience, so as to demonstrate to extra-regional powers that the region can stand on its own without interference from them. One essential element of national resilience is air power.

The collective military aviation assets of ASEAN nations could form a formidable force in terms of air power. Combining these resources for military activities in a collective arrangement, to provide resilience, may be construed as participating members being involved in a military pact. On this subject, Dr Zakaria Ahmad in his article entitled 'Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Cooperation', printed in the July 1989 edition of the *Asian Defence Journal*, discussed the probability

of ASEAN developing into such a military community in order to promote regional stability. The article described the relative difference between security cooperation and military cooperation, of which the latter has the true military flavour. He said: 'Security cooperation has to do ultimately with the survival of nation-states whereas military cooperation is more concerned with military security from external threat and aggression. ASEAN will not choose to operationalise their aviation assets in a collective military arrangement but may choose to employ those assets for collective security cooperation. The qualitative edge afforded by aviation assets can be gainfully employed to support activities associated with the socio-economic well-being of ASEAN members.

The phobia that brings anxiety and suspicion between neighbours should not abate the initiative to cooperate. We must view air power or aviation resources as a major asset with high utility in both war and peace. These assets must be adjudged as similar to facilities and utilities that are essential for the economic and social well-being of the people. The high cost involved in the purchase of military technology related to aviation should provide equitable returns to the taxpayer by way of employment for tangible benefits. Thus, purchases of high technology military equipment will not be seen as wastage by economists, but rather as part and parcel of nation-building machinery.

The prevailing peaceful atmosphere in the region offers us opportunities to employ aviation assets for mutual benefit, in whatever avenues are deemed necessary by respective countries. The characteristics of aviation resources offer an advantage over other surface transportation in terms of speed, range, manoeuvrability and flexibility of employment. Minus the destructive edge of fire power, the available resources will become platforms that support disaster relief, environmental control, socio-economic projects, diplomatic visits and rapport between political and military personalities. These activities give invaluable returns to the promotion of interdependency and understanding between nations in the region.

Interdependency and self-reliance are two factors which generate the need to cooperate. Small nations are normally beset with limitations in raw materials, natural resources (including skills in high technology), and the financial means to afford to purchase, maintain and sustain high-cost aviation hardware. Concepts of interoperability and corporate management of assets in terms of supportability could be effected, for both military assets and civil aviation



resources. Singapore Aircraft Industries and Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN) in Indonesia could get along with AIROD of Malaysia to work on corporate projects, bolstering the cooperation of the three nations. Australia and New Zealand likewise could also participate actively in non-military ventures to support the collective aspiration towards regional cooperation.

Cooperation in the service and combat support areas could also be worked out between appropriate counterparts to form the logistic lines to any zone of operations. Unfortunately, such proposals cannot be appropriately realised, given the differing security needs and interests of respective nations. As for ASEAN, it was stated by Dr K.U. Menon in his article 'An ASEAN defence community: real or imagined', in *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* of April 1991:

Singapore's Second Minister of Defence, Brigadier Lee Hsien Loong has made it clear that Singapore sees no possibility of a strategic defence industry being set up on an ASEAN basis, because of differing security needs and interests among the ASEAN states. The Honourable Minister declared that a joint venture in the field of strategic defence was out of the question because the respective ASEAN states produced defence products according to their priorities, especially so in military engineering, artillery and weapon systems.

In this context, I do not intend to dwell any further in respect of cooperation in defence production related to assets in military aviation. However, avenues are open for cooperation in joint ventures to support the other aviation resources of countries in this region.

As small nations we need to be secure militarily to provide for the stability of the region, and to simultaneously ensure the optimal employment of whatever assets are available to support nation-building programs. Every nation in the region is participating in projects to secure a share of the economic upsurge in the Asia-Pacific region, and national aviation resources have effectively supported those projects. One could not deny that the qualitative edge of aviation platforms has transported equipment to remote destinations to launch new projects. Communication into difficult terrain is made possible for access to raw materials which support the economic and industrial requirements of the country. From the security perspective, the employment of these assets may extend into unexplored regions culminating at the respective borders. The

probability of cross-border activities along a contiguous terrain may precipitate the necessity to cooperate for mutual benefit in security and socio-economic developments.

Stability, which is both a prerequisite and synonymous to economic prosperity, is essential to countries in the region. The mechanics of the bilateral cooperative network adopted by ASEAN will manifest itself into linkages between the involved nations. There is no necessity, therefore, for the Association to expand economic and cultural cooperation into a formalised defence arrangement. The degree of bilateral involvement very much depends on the requirements of the respective countries. Maintenance of contacts between relevant agencies and officials are necessary to sustain rapport, which provide the primary ingredient towards understanding and cooperation. The aviation resources of involved countries offer ready vehicles, and naturally become one tangible means to register the strength and effectiveness of such cooperation. These resources are utilised to render support and achieve the security, economic and cultural objectives of respective members of ASEAN.

The availability of these bilateral forums to discuss matters of common interest is relevant and useful. The stability of the region must be the one major interest of nations that are earnestly pursuing economic development. Prospects for suspicions which generate tension should be avoided. Since the qualitative edge of air power is the subject in discussion, it is appropriate to suggest that interaction between regional air forces and other aviation agencies can do much to enhance this mutual understanding and cooperation.

The Malaysia-Indonesia and Malaysia-Thailand General Border Committees have proven their worth in dealing with common security problems faced by the respective nations. The insurgency scourge along common borders was successfully suppressed through bilateral arrangements. Joint and combined operations were launched to track and harass the bandits. The aviation resources of the respective countries were employed to lend support as part of combined operations. With the subsidence of insurgencies in the jungle, ground operations decreased proportionately but the bilateral arrangements continue to provide a viable forum in other aspects of security and socio-economic activities. Air and naval elements continue operational activities that benefit the interests of the participating countries.

In pursuing respective interests, using varied modes and differing priorities, the subject of cooperation becomes ever more relevant and almost imperative. The employment of aviation assets in a contiguous theatre of operations may trigger misunderstanding. Conflicts relating to water boundaries or other related military issues demand understanding and close cooperation, otherwise the phobia and the will to enforce national interests could spur individual nations to unilaterally commit large defence budgets to secure power in pursuing petty squabbles. The bilateral arrangements could affect collective air and naval assets in the maritime theatre to spot illegal activities and environmental pollution within their common area of interest.

Collective security through bilateral arrangements will invariably incorporate the concepts of interoperability and corporate management of military assets, in terms of supportability with regard to aviation resources, between the respective nations. The spin-offs from cooperation will secure several benefits for all nations. Firstly, closer rapport will enhance understanding and ensure the continuity of relationships between the involved groups. Secondly, it creates avenues for interdependency which will inhibit any belligerent tendency between the countries involved. Such cooperation will also keep the respective military forces developing in parallel towards nation-building objectives and hopefully avoid any arms race. Thirdly, the cohesive association will provide a combined counterweight to the intrusions of extra-regional powers into the region and effectively combat related common socio-economic problems. Fourthly, the availability of such forums materially allows for interactions to discuss policy initiatives and the means of addressing and solving problems amicably for the benefit of the region.

Viewed purely from the non-military aspect of regional cooperation, environmental security has become an important agenda item at many international forums. The recent convention in Rio de Janeiro discussed global pollution, desertification, deforestation and the greenhouse effect, along with the related issue of rising sea levels which is a concern for littoral states. Large-scale oil spills in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea could do irreparable damage to marine life and other off-shore resources which affect national economies. The most recent incident involving the tanker **Nagasaki Spirit**, which threatened to spill some 57,000 tons of crude oil, could have damaged marine life and polluted the waters off Penang and Langkawi. Aviation resources were intensively employed to monitor the spread of oil slicks,

and to contain these with the Aerial Delivery Dispersant System (ADDS). The incident served as a reminder on how crucial it is to be quick on the job. There was also the need for cooperation to manage legal aspects arising from such a crisis, apart from the collective need to prevent a major ecological disaster. Pollution of this nature must be contained collectively for the survivability of our region.

Additionally, these environmental issues will become a source of international dispute. Environmental degradation is not confined to the national borders of the country in which the activity is generated. The effect is experienced by the neighbours who have to bear the costs for countermeasures against activities that provide no benefit to them. Conflicts will increasingly occur over attribution of responsibility for offshore pollution and damage to marine resources, desertification, acid rain, rising sea levels and environmental refugees. Coordinated activities to combat these environmental issues may be the only solution for our collective survival.

Institutionalising regional cooperation can also be affected for non-military objectives in maritime surveillance, airspace surveillance, and Search and Rescue (SAR) responsibilities. Air operations to support humanitarian causes are becoming more common as the surrounding waters and sea lanes experience denser traffic flows. Similarly, a proportionate increase in illegal activities is expected. Employment of aviation resources in the respective area of operations to contain illegal activities could be coordinated to prevent duplication or the crossing of each others' path. The real-time activities of aviation assets present potential for misunderstanding and may require some form of coordination to manage deconfliction. The plan to have naval tripartite activities between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in the Straits of Malacca is a step in the right direction, although the mechanism to manage the resources is still unclear. A similar tripartite arrangement is possible to coordinate air surveillance and SAR activities in the areas of interest of these nations.

When discussing security and cooperation within the region, one cannot ignore the existence of the Five Power Defence Arrangement. The executive component in the Integrated Air Defence System has provided effective training to participating members. Disregarding military value, where air power becomes prominent the employment of aviation assets in training, cross-deployment and visits has nurtured better understanding among personnel which augurs well for

regional cooperation. Contemplating an evolution towards wider regional security arrangement, Senator Gareth Evans, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 1989 made a significant statement in 'Australia's Regional Security':

...It would make sense for us to work, in a low-key and incremental way, towards the establishment of complementary kinds of defence cooperation with Thailand and Indonesia. This will, however, take time. It might eventually prove possible and appropriate to subsume such arrangements in a wider new regional security community arrangement.

This statement could promote the need for wider regional security cooperation.

The mode of arrangements, either bilateral or multilateral, may be the means to serve the objectives and purposes of nations within the region. Aviation assets could be the primary vehicle to support both military and non-military activities. The importance of coordination in regional maritime surveillance, regional airspace surveillance and SAR operations could lead to these activities being operationalised into an institution. Effort towards coordination in the employment of air assets in general seem to be practical and beneficial to all nations in the region. It could see a mere formalising of existing arrangements in the bilateral mode into a multi-lateral mode, without any major changes in substance. The tripartite maritime arrangement involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore could be the acid test for regional cooperation of any such wider scope.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that air power, or aviation resources, has a role to play for the well-being of nations in regional cooperation. Although air power is associated with an inherent destructive capability, there are virtues in aviation resources that offer benefits to small nations when collectively employed to achieve common objectives. The employment of aviation activities towards nation-building could render more value for the taxpayers' money.

ASEAN could, as the viable regional organisation, explore new avenues in collective security cooperation, with coordinated employment of aviation resources to combat common social and environmental problems that are a scourge to regional security and economic prosperity. The qualitative edge of air power, in its non-destructive form, provides an available platform for just such cooperation. Its advanced technological qualities provide tangible services for

the benefit of the littoral nations. The vision of broadening the present scope of cooperation into a bigger military community is not necessary, since current arrangements satisfy the needs of the region.

In a much wider perspective, regional security very much depends on mutual understanding and cooperation amongst nations having their interests in the vicinity. A strong corporate posture of nations within this region could foster an equally strong defensive capability to deter extra-regional powers from exerting their influence on individual nations. The collective air power of nations within this region has the qualitative edge to provide for regional stability, and also economic prosperity for the participants. Aviation resources, whether military or non-military, are vehicles which accentuate cooperation. Air power, or aviation resources in general, definitely play a role in regional cooperation.

## **Discussion**

**Mr C. Stewart (Australian):** Last week the Australian Government announced it would buy eighteen more F-111 aircraft and this week the Australian Coalition, in its defence policy, said that it would enhance Australia's strike capabilities. What is your view of the necessity for doing this in the current strategic climate, and what implications, if any, do you think this has for Australia's desire to have closer defence links with the region?

**Major General Merican:** Australia already has 21 F-111s. The additional F-111s which the Australian Government announced are being purchased are to replace, and also to update, the current aircraft. In the context of the Five Power Defence Arrangement, and as far as Malaysia is concerned, it augurs well. We have no direct objection to the additional acquisition. So far as the FPDA is concerned, the normal deployment and rotation basis on which the F-111 participates in major air exercises provides the opportunity for the Royal Malaysian Air Force and our pilots to benefit from training.

**Air Vice Marshal R. Bradford (McDonnell-Douglas):** We are aware that Malaysia has a very large Economic Exclusion Zone, has assets out in the South China Sea, and - I believe - a legitimate claim to some of the Spratley Islands. You also mentioned concerns about the outcome of potential oil spills in the Straits of Malacca. That would seem to me to create a requirement for an

increased maritime surveillance capability within the Malaysian armed forces, one that does not really exist at the moment. We have RAAF P-3s up at Butterworth, doing some of that work for you. Do you see the government of Malaysia giving any priority in the future to the development of a maritime capability, so that Malaysia itself can then exercise some regional cooperation, say, with the states of Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and perhaps Brunei?

**Major General Merican:** The Malaysian government has made the announcement that we have acquired additional aircraft for offshore surveillance. So far as the maritime role is concerned we seek cooperation, and in the existing context the P-3 Orions from Australia have been giving us the necessary information that we require. Occasionally we do conduct our own maritime operations using C-130 Hercules aircraft. There are no plans to purchase additional aircraft to perform this extra task. And as you know, while it is disappointing for the military, the nation is not in the position yet for more capital equipment purchases.





# **DEFENCE IN NEW ZEALAND: WHERE WE'VE BEEN AND WHERE WE ARE GOING**

**Air Vice Marshal J.S. Hosie**

The last eight or so years have certainly heralded major changes and challenges for our region's air forces. As one of this conference's advertising leaflets so eloquently put it, 'the Royal Australian Air Force faces major changes and challenges arising from the need to maintain and enhance its operational capabilities with fewer resources'. They are not alone!

Without digressing too far from the stated theme of this Conference, I thought that I would approach the issue of New Zealand's quest for the 'qualitative edge' and our air power role in regional cooperation in an around-about manner. Rather than a lengthy dissertation about the wherewithal of air power doctrine and how it might be regionally applied *per se*, I thought it might be useful if I began my presentation by taking you through the maze of where defence in New Zealand has come since our current Defence White Paper was released in 1991. I will also briefly touch on the reason for our fundamental change from the defence policy espoused in the earlier 1987 Paper. This, I hope, will provide you with a better understanding of our perspective on defence and regional cooperation within the framework of New Zealand's strategic outlook, before returning to the theme of this conference.

Now, of course, there is a certain risk with this approach, but I am conscious that there are seven of us speaking today and - although we have not compared notes nor coordinated our presentations - I would be surprised if our thoughts on the conference theme were markedly different from one another. Accordingly, I throw the following into the hat if it will assist general discussion.

Before coming to power in 1990, the present National Government signalled to the electorate that New Zealand's defence policies, as elaborated in the 1987 White Paper, were too isolationist in their thrust. It came as no surprise, then, that almost immediately after its election, the Government set about re-ordering New Zealand's defence policies and strategy. The result was the 1991 Defence of New Zealand White Paper.

In the preface of the paper, Prime Minister Bolger said 'This statement on defence policy sets out my Government's commitment to an internationalist approach to New Zealand's foreign and defence policies rather than a purely regional outlook.' He went on to say that:

Isolationism makes less sense than ever for a country with trading and other interests which range across the globe. It reaffirms also New Zealand's long standing reliance on collective security. Many of our major international interests are shared with others and can only be advanced in cooperation with them.

These were telling statements. The 1987 White Paper was, therefore, really an aberration. New Zealand's defence policy had to cover both an extensive home environment and an even more diffuse need to support our economic and other interests at great distances from our shores. This was a complication for strategic planning.

We knew that the forces required to maintain the appropriate presence and capability in the South Pacific would not necessarily coincide with those that would best bolster our presence further afield. Indeed, they were likely to quarantine both policy and capabilities. At the same time however, there was - and is - a powerful and legitimate public perception that the first duty of armed forces is to protect the homeland.

A balance had to be struck between participation in regional and other concerns nearer home and the wider collective security doctrine. Of course, the argument then became one of where should the balance lie. To further complicate the issue, it was known only too well that the point of balance would shift from time to time as circumstances changed. That was a given. It was also a very important consideration when formulating defence plans, given the impossibility of predicting what the world and our region would look like in five, ten or even twenty years hence.

Our analysts were also aware that military force would remain, for the foreseeable future, the final arbiter of relations among states. Very few countries have foregone the possession of military power or the right to its possible use in defence of its interests. For New Zealand, this meant that we could not assume that other states would not at some time in the future use their military

capabilities to pursue national security goals. The key words were 'at some time in the future'. The unpredictability of it all still hangs over us - all of us, I guess - like the Sword of Damocles.

Our external policies, of which defence is a part, had to be directed at discouraging and deterring any wayward behaviour. Such policies, we considered, would in turn contribute to regional stability and collective international security. They would have to be modest in their manifestation - that is, the level and quantity of force elements, and their preparedness - but the logic would be there. The '91 White Paper provided the broad framework and guidance under which detailed planning could be carried out in order to achieve the sought after goal of regional security and stability.

In essence, New Zealand in 1991 was actually restating a more outward-looking position in regional and global affairs. Our introspective posture was being reshaped. We were looking at the Asia-Pacific region again, not just the South Pacific.

Nature has ensured that New Zealand's strategic situation is highly favourable geographically. Indeed, if security is defined as the freedom to decide one's own interests, unconstrained by the threat or use of force, then there are no direct threats to our security. Defence of the homeland has not been our major concern for over 50 years. Nor has it been the determinant of the structure and main tasks of our Defence Force. Our defence has, for half a century, been indirect, pursued through external policies and in company with other nations. Defence planning has therefore been less concerned with New Zealand's security needs than with New Zealand's security interests.

Our interests are both broad and general, more diffuse and therefore more difficult to grasp than direct threats. We are aware, though, that a major disruption in the Asia-Pacific region would threaten the very fabric of New Zealand life as surely as any direct threat. The lines of communication to most of our economic partners are long and vulnerable. This, and our historical and ethnic ties to Oceania, gives us an interest in the stability of the regions through which our economic lines pass. As global citizens and traders, international peace and stability must therefore remain high on the list of our concerns.

New Zealand's security interests, we have acknowledged, are inseparable from foreign policy. The maintenance of a professional Defence Force therefore signals that New Zealand has the resolve, within her force's capabilities, to support her friends and deter actions harmful to her interests. A professional Defence Force also provides the Government with more options in pursuing external objectives. It also helps secure strategic stability in the South Pacific and in the Asia-Pacific region. But more importantly, it enables New Zealand to join in wider collective security action where this is desired.

Notwithstanding the well-intentioned rhetoric, if a defence policy is not fiscally sustainable over long periods then it is neither effective nor economical. The aim, then, in New Zealand's present circumstances, is to be a credible minimum Defence Force - credible in the eyes not only of New Zealanders but, more importantly, credible in the eyes of our neighbours. And it has to be the minimum that can be fiscally sustained given the current economic realities. Overall then, it has to be the *minimum needed to meet our essential security interests* and to reassure our neighbours and allies that we have the resolve and the capability to do so.

Reconciling the imperatives of economy and credibility is a matter of political judgement rather than precise calculation. To miss the mark, however, risks being unable to sustain our chosen defence policy or failing to convince our friends that we are making the most effective contribution within our means. A defence policy that protects New Zealand's widely dispersed interests must seek the goodwill and cooperation of others. We are therefore committed to collective security; it must have our highest priority.

The '91 White Paper study of our strategic situation and national interests made it possible to define New Zealand's defence policy goals which, in turn, form part of our broader foreign policy aims. The ten goals that were identified are not novel, but are based on the bedrock of strategic permanency for New Zealand. By their very nature they should be evolutionary, changing only slowly over time.

Having determined a set of defence policy goals, a broad strategy had to be adopted in order to meet them. Any defence strategy for New Zealand has always needed to fuse the two fundamental requirements of wide geographic spread of our interests and our small population and fiscal base. Because the

likelihood of direct defence of our territory was seen as low, an indirect strategy of defending our interests abroad was evolved. Regrettably, there was no neat logic to defining requirements incurred in the latter. National fiscal realities of the new decade had already determined for us the credible minimum Defence Force concept.

There were a number of alternative strategies from which to choose - all with their own particular strengths and weaknesses. These included such diverse policies as:

- neutrality,
- defence non-alignment,
- home defence,
- defence in depth (or layered defence),
- forward defence,
- regional defence (as first outlined in the 1987 White Paper), and
- alliance defence

The preferred strategy, however, that best fitted the realities of New Zealand's situation was uniquely termed self-reliance in partnership. It attempts to make clearer sense of our huge geographic ambit by avoiding two separate and uneasily-matched categories - the South Pacific, and Beyond - and replacing them simply with a single entity view looking outward from New Zealand. Self-reliance in partnership is defined as the strategy 'to protect the sovereignty and advance the well-being of New Zealand by maintaining a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved'.

Of all the strategic options, self-reliance in partnership best acknowledges the breadth of New Zealand's defence concerns. It is the only option, I suggest, that links the need for self-reliance in handling immediate national tasks with broader interests shared in partnership with Australia, the South Pacific and countries beyond, without attempting to predict the likelihood of any particular contingency. Of even greater importance, this preferred strategy enables New Zealand to maintain the ability to provide worthwhile assistance to treaty and other partners.

Having selected the defence strategy best suited for our circumstances, the next problem was to determine the capabilities needed to put it into effect. This was not a straightforward task, particularly since the '91 White Paper had already acknowledged the lack of an identifiable threat. And, at the same time, there was no definitive answer to the question of what constituted an optimal force structure for New Zealand.

Obviously, the question posed about optimal force structure could only be settled by New Zealand political judgements driven by fiscal priorities and constraints. Notwithstanding this, a task-oriented management approach was accepted as the most suitable way of addressing the problem. It was a practical way of deducing from national defence policy goals the broad tasks likely to be asked of Defence.

In the end, eight tasks were defined. These - reduced to seven in the 1992-93 Corporate Plan - are now termed 'Output Classes'. They are, in essence, an abbreviated amalgamation of our ten defence policy goals. With regard to regional cooperation, the three important ones are:

- to contribute to regional security,
- to provide mechanisms for participation in defence alliances, and
- to contribute to collective security.

This provided the basis for the level of capability required for each output task to be investigated. That is now being done via a series of force structure studies, in concert with a new integrated Defence Planning System.

Obviously, if New Zealand had been designing its defence force afresh then the eight tasks I referred to, and the capabilities required, would have been the architect's plan for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) of today. But that was not possible. We had a force-in-being, which meant more analyses were required to compare what we had with what was required in accordance with the architect's plans. From all this will emerge identifiable under-and-over-capacities that affect our desire, and the Government's, to achieve the credible minimum optimal force structure.

As an aside, to an outsider looking at New Zealand's modest defence capability, one could forgive a wry smile to any suggestion that we have an 'over-capacity' in anything. But the process is required and it does give the ability to perhaps strengthen some capabilities at the expense or exclusion of others to provide, in due course, a more effective overall force. For example, we acknowledge the need to improve both our deployability and levels of sustainability.

Notwithstanding all that I have said - and to steal some words from Professor Geoffrey Blainey that Paul Dibb picked up on - the 'tyranny of distance' will always rule our economy and, indeed, will always be a major determinant in our defence planning. The unfortunate fact, from where I stand in Defence, is that the latter - despite being a major determinant - must line up behind the dictates of the New Zealand economic situation.

We know that there is a need to restructure our Defence Force to gain greater efficiencies given the fiscal constraints imposed on us. This is not news to us. It began back in 1984 when, almost immediately after coming to power, the Third Labour Government set about turning New Zealand upside down and inside out. There were no economic sacred cows, defence funding included. The Government commenced its retreat from previously established public sector areas. State-owned enterprise and privatisation was all around us as New Zealand moved away from a controlled to an almost totally deregulated economy. In this regard the present National Government has just continued Labour's reforms.

To be quite pragmatic about the present situation, we in Defence realise the part we have to play in helping New Zealand recover its economic health. For decades the public sector has had a major impact on the performance of the New Zealand economy, but this all began to change in the latter part of the 1990s with the introduction of fundamental reforms. State trading activities were put on a more commercial basis - including Defence - and continued with improvements to financial accountability and personnel regimes in the core state sector and in local government. Less, rather than more, government was and remains the name of the game.

The State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989 ushered in reforms of the state sector that were unprecedented in New Zealand's history and possibly unique in the world. The key features of the reforms were specification of the

responsibilities of Ministers and Chief Executives, including decentralisation of management decisions to departmental level. Together, these changes made accountability clear and enforceable. Collective accountability - as in the previous Defence Council - was out; individual and personal accountability attaching to the CDF alone, for example, was in. And they took the Secretary away from him and put him in a separate department as well.

The accountability was made possible through an integrated planning and budget cycle embodying departmental corporate plans, Parliamentary appropriation of resources, and individual performance agreements negotiated by Chief Executives with their appropriate Ministers. Under this system Ministers are responsible for achieving the Government's desired 'outcomes' and the Chief Executive Officer is the one who is charged with delivering.

Defence, for its part in this process, has two types of outputs: capability and delivered. Capability outputs describe the contingencies to which the NZDF may need to be able to contribute, and the programmes to which it contributes to increase regional security. What is produced in these outputs is maintenance of the means of providing the response, rather than the response itself. Delivered outputs, on the other hand, describe the tasks and activities expected to be actually carried out during the year.

The fundamental change and what is unique to us is that the Government either buys capability, which is an insurance of sorts, or it buys an activity. It no longer funds specific force elements, such as frigates or transport aircraft, only the contribution to defence that these produce. It is an interesting concept to buy what is done, not what it is.

The theory is that Ministers are now in a better position to specify in detail what it is they wish to purchase from departments, and Defence is no different there. This also allows flexibility in the event that priorities attached to outcomes change over time, and gives Ministers and Parliament better information. Part of the problem with that is, of course, that so many other departments are in an almost year-to-year basis while Defence is in it for the long haul. Chief Executives, including the CDF, are now responsible for determining how their outputs will be produced. They are also responsible for the financial management and performance of their departments.



The Public Finance Act 1989 also required departments to change from a centralised cash-based approach to budgeting and reporting, to their own financial management systems on an accrual basis. It has provided a major advance in the amount and type of information about Defence and other departments' activities.

The reforms introduced have affected the operations of all departments, including Defence, in a big way. Gains have followed from the financial management reforms. We had a review recently that allowed us to move into multi-year appropriation and, even more, devolve flexibility with finance. They have cut our central machine; we had a very modest, I thought, about 1400 in a head office, we are now down to 340, both civilian and military - a real shoestring operation. Defence now appears to be a business operation.

I would like now to touch on the nuclear issue. There can be no denial that New Zealand's stance over nuclear issues has affected the Defence Force. A resolution of the differences would contribute over time to the effectiveness of the RNZAF and the NZDF at large in areas that have clearly suffered as a result of the ANZUS rift. And I freely acknowledge the problems this has created for our friends.

Public opinion in New Zealand, however, remains firmly anti-nuclear, such that the present Government cannot ignore it. The dilemma is that, despite the anti-nuclear sentiment, the majority of New Zealanders have also indicated in various polls a willingness for the country to rejoin defence alliances with traditional allies. This is also what the Government seeks - as stated quite openly in the '91 White Paper as a defence policy goal.

There is a problem in all of this, of course. On the face of it, to have a policy of self-reliance in partnership, and also to qualify 'partnership' in the way New Zealand has done on the nuclear issue, appear to be directly at odds. And clearly, this is a difficulty. It is, however, a difficulty of implementation rather than one to do with the underlying strategic logic. The logic stands on its own. The problem lies in carrying it through, and for the moment it remains unresolved.

On the other hand, if the situation remains as it is, the objectives of self-reliance in partnership may not be fully attainable. The strategy might not then be able to sustain its credibility. In that case, I guess, we would have no option but to go back to the beginning and adopt a different logic altogether - something we clearly do not wish to do.

In all of this it has to be recognised that, within New Zealand, the anti-nuclear question has very seldom been put in the framework of external grand strategy. Instead, in New Zealand its origins are a matter of intense domestic politics. And the public view gains its emotion and its essential energy from domestic politics. It must therefore be solved, one way or the other, in terms of that arena. This is not always clear to outside observers. Rightly or wrongly, New Zealanders dislike being told what is good for them, and what this means is that the resolution one way or the other will come from within New Zealand in its own time. Social politics aside, the ending of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union do not alter the conclusion that it is vital for New Zealand's security and defence interests for a solution to this impasse to be found.

Now, where is the NZDF heading in 1992? The Government is confident that New Zealand's economy is poised for a sustained and balanced recovery. Inflation is down to 1 per cent, interest rates have fallen substantially, confidence is returning to the market place and economic growth has resumed. The recovery is being led by the export sector with domestic demand growing more slowly.

Despite the indications of recovery in the domestic economy, Government remains deeply concerned about the fiscal outlook. Financial deficits over the next three years are forecast to average around 3.5 per cent of our GDP, although that is growing quite dramatically at the moment. To finance this deficit, additional public debt will need to be raised, adding further to the problem - and it is a problem, obviously, which Defence gets swept up in. Nevertheless, government has been getting out of the business of owning anything at all, and therefore the owner's equity of some of these problems continues to decline. Through the medium term at least then, defence planning will continue to take place in an environment of constraint, given the current strategic situation.

The '91 White Paper noted that geography, not surprisingly, has led both Australia and New Zealand to recognise that the security of either will be at risk if the other is threatened. The assumption that both countries will act in concert is now driving Closer Defence Relations, or CDR as it is commonly termed. CDR acknowledges that Australia is New Zealand's most important defence partner and that there are operational, strategic and financial advantages to be gained from complementary force development activities.

To facilitate examination of the degree to which closer defence relationships might shape force structure developments over the longer term, a Combined Force Development Group has been established. Based on a consideration of defence roles and tasks that are common to both countries, the Group will recommend capability areas where the setting of combined longer-term force structure goals appear appropriate.

There is an explicit acknowledgment that while force development in both countries should proceed along lines of common interest, each nation must preserve the military capabilities essential for national sovereignty reasons. CDR is thus seen as but one of a number of regional security and stability building blocks. And this is where I will attempt to return to the theme of this conference.

Our adopted defence strategy of self-reliance in partnership dictates that New Zealand, by itself, should have the capacity to deter and defend against low level threats to sovereignty and low level contingencies in the South Pacific and South-East Asia. Deterrence and defence can only be achieved through regional and collective security arrangements, and through defence alliances. To achieve both requires an ongoing high degree of regional cooperation. In the sense of air power, we practise this on a regular basis with the Orion maritime surveillance tasks that we coordinate with the RAAF in support of the South Pacific Forum countries. Air transport and helicopter cyclone disaster relief flights have also seen us out and about the region over the years.

Our interests are reflected in three of our policy goals that I mentioned earlier:

- to contribute to the security of the South Pacific states with which New Zealand shares historical and other particular interests;

- to develop further the existing defence cooperation with Australia, including combined planning, operations, logistics and industrial base; and
- to maintain and develop defence cooperation with ASEAN countries, and to preserve the partnership obligations of the Five Power Defence Arrangement.

Close to home, Australia is obviously New Zealand's most important defence partner. A significant security threat to Australia would represent a threat to New Zealand and would require a military response by New Zealand. Indeed, the main focus of CDR is force development issues. Each country has undertaken to consult with the other as force structures evolve and develop in order to ensure that their CDR implication such as interoperability are taken fully into account.

New Zealand's defence relationship in the South-East Asian region rests firmly on important strategic, political and economic considerations. South-East Asia forms the only land bridge by which Australia and New Zealand could be threatened. Furthermore, the South-East Asian countries straddle vital oil and trade routes, including key choke points such as the Malacca Straits.

New Zealand's contribution to regional security involves maintaining a presence through maritime patrols on surveillance missions, regular port visits and exercises. New Zealand seeks also to demonstrate an interest in and commitment to the region through participation in such arrangements as the FPDA and in exercises such as the Starfish series.

What then are the implications of regional cooperation for the Royal New Zealand Air Force? Under the regional cooperation Output Class, for example, the RNZAF has provided assistance to regional security forces in the form of the Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) which is programmed each year. MAP students from nations such as Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Singapore and Malaysia attend a number of residential courses in New Zealand such as the RNZAF Staff Course at Auckland. But the key word there for us is, I think, 'mutual', as there must be reciprocity to the Programme.

Of great importance, the MAP also enables the NZDF to train in other countries and thereby gain valuable experience of operating in different conditions and also improving interoperability. In sum, training in New Zealand in 1992-93

will be provided for 220 students from the security forces of MAP countries, to the extent of 33,000 man-days. For our part this has given us the ability to train and exercise offshore.

The RNZAF has also assisted in surveillance of regional countries' EEZs in concert with the RAAF. EEZ protection against unlicensed foreign fishing vessel incursions is an established and ongoing task for maritime patrol aircraft elements of both air forces. In 1992-93, for example, 54 RNZAF Orion surveillance patrols during the course of twelve deployments will be conducted in support of South Pacific Forum countries.

We have also assisted with the provision of disaster relief. Based on historic data, we expect that in 1992-93 the RNZAF will be called upon to conduct patrols to assess levels of damage following two natural disasters somewhere in the South Pacific. Sufficient photographic coverage will be provided to enable responsible authorities to plan relief operations and to advise the overall extent of damage. In addition, RNZAF aircraft will undertake 200 fixed wing transport and 100 helicopter flying hours for the movement of freight, personnel and casualties to, from and within disaster areas. Hopefully we might have a year where this does not happen, but traditionally it does.

In other areas - for example, under the terms of CDR - we presently operate a squadron of Skyhawks from NAS Nowra in New South Wales. Ostensibly the task is to provide maritime attack training for the Royal Australian Navy. We do that, but we are also involved with our own Skyhawk pilot conversion programmes and a smattering of miscellaneous exercises that involve, in part, air defence work as well as close air support tasks.

Another CDR development that we have just finalised this morning is combined RAAF-RNZAF navigator training at East Sale, Victoria. The first combined course is planned to commence in June next year. We are planning to have six New Zealand students on that course. That means for us that we stop all navigator training in New Zealand, and also all air electronics operator training for the P3 crews.

The RNZAF regularly supports exercises throughout the region. For example, we have just concluded a successful deployment of Skyhawks and Orions to Korat in Thailand (Exercise Vanguard), and back into Malaysia and Singapore.

This particular activity was then followed by Exercise Starfish involving multinational IADS and maritime forces, so we see the FPDA as a very important and ongoing operation.

The implication in the widest sense is, therefore, that through the effective and efficient use of air power throughout the region, modest although it might be, we in New Zealand are able to display our resolve in our desire for a more stable and secure area. We are achieving this through our stated defence strategy of self-reliance in partnership. Perhaps it could also be called self-reliance in regional partnership in many instances.

So, to return to the conference theme, consequent to the implementation of Government-initiated reforms and our own reorganisation initiatives, we in the RNZAF are actively seeking the referenced 'qualitative edge'. We fully endorse both notions that enhanced security may result from regional collaboration, and that closer cooperation will lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness.

At the risk of boring you and drifting a little from the theme, I have taken the liberty of explaining where we are coming from in New Zealand in 1992 and how we believe we are setting the stage for future development that should be in accord with the theme being addressed here. Our drive to greater efficiencies and effectiveness is being actively pursued across the entire air force. To that end, we have followed the RAAF's lead and adopted a total quality management programme that we have called Air-Q.

There is still a lot of hard work to be completed within Defence to implement the policies that emerged of necessity from the '91 White Paper and its reviews. To date it has been a long and often painful process. We still do not know if it has been the right way. Only the passage of time will give us a clear indication of that. We have been reviewing almost everything that involves our force structure - to some Australian observers it must seem that we have done this two or three times over - and we still some way to go. Despite all that, I am optimistic that we will emerge to a brighter and more meaningful horizon. We have a new totally-integrated Defence Planning System, to an extent we have never had before, and that is showing us the way forward down the track.

All the previous speakers have made telling points with regard to ways of improving regional cooperation. For our part, we endorse their thrust and would welcome further initiatives for improvement. In particular I acknowledge Professor Dibb's suggestions. It is clear that our assistance ability will remain modest, but I am sure we can play a part to develop the cooperative theme that is clearly in the interests of all of us.

## **Discussion**

**Air Marshal R. Funnell (Retired):** Some of your earlier remarks raised within me a deep professional concern. Perhaps I should preface my remarks by saying that I believe that anyone who holds a commission in the military force of any democracy must be, at heart, a true liberal and one who places very high value on human life and human dignity. Perhaps I should also say that I do not want to seem critical of just New Zealand, because it seems to me that we are in danger of going down - indeed are already embarked upon - the same sort of avenue.

That having been said, it worries me when defence is considered to be just another business enterprise. To use your words, I think you said at one stage that, in New Zealand, it seems defence has now become a business operation. But when you look at our core 'business' it is not only unique, it is fundamentally different from any other business. We are talking about the management of violence, and combat operations which are beyond the ken of anyone who has never been involved in them. We are talking about blood and terror, violence and death, and that is just not any other business enterprise.

So, it concerns me when we start talking in terms of corporate plans, chief executive officers, and inputs and outcomes, that we may - without ever wishing to - breed a defence force that thinks in those terms, one whose ethic and fundamental culture is quite different from the way in which they will need to be used in the ultimate. Do you have a similar concern?

**Air Vice Marshal Hosie:** Thank you for raising this. Yes, of course I share your concern. Although I slanted my presentation more to the financial approach, within Defence we do not see it as a purely business operation but from the way we are managed in terms of financial appropriations that is where

it is coming from. The CDF is not just another CEO, I was just using that as an example; in terms of financial appropriations there is a similarity, but he has quite unique and different responsibilities.

With regard to your concern, I guess further down the track - if we are not careful - that could happen. All I can say is that the present CDF, and for my part and also knowing the other two chiefs of staff, we certainly do not see it that way at all. We are not captive to a public sector approach and it is not the case that the subtleties of defence, and all the things that you quite rightly raised, are not considered any more. No, that is not where we are coming from.

This may not be answering your question very well. Perhaps it would have been better to downplay the management aspect, but I did want to go through the gambit of it with you. Nonetheless, all the way through the process I have described, it has been occupying our minds that what was being done with respect to public sector reforms did not fit Defence. We are a different business. It has been a long and painful argument with our Treasury, not surprisingly, to go down a track that just never seemed to fit. If we are now, to an extent, accepting it and saying that this is a way of doing it, we believe we can do so in terms of the way we handle appropriations. But if we start to lose sight of what we are on about, then we have given it all away - that's for sure.

I would like to try to reassure you that the people I speak for at home have not lost it, but there is always a risk further down the track if we do not make sure that what we are on about is quite clearly there in spades. I think that with our new Defence Planning System, and going onto an Air Force one, we are rewriting doctrine in a positive way. In other words, we are taking a look at ourselves in 1992-93 and in some ways looking at our own staffs and doing some quite 'wary' thinking again in that sense. This is a somewhat off-the-cuff answer and I would like to talk with you some more about it. But we share your concerns, and I would like to give some assurance that we are not really going that far - it might seem like that from the outside, it does not feel like that from within.

**Mr P. Somerville (Aviation Report):** I want to pick up on your point about New Zealand's return to internationalism and seeing the previous policy based on the '87 White Paper as an aberration. I want to suggest that what that policy actually did, in terms of foreign policy, was deliver a much greater international



profile to New Zealand. It said, in effect, that we do recognise the great limitations of our armed forces and the impact that our forces can have on the region, and it is much better to pursue a different sort of strategy.

I would go further to suggest that what we have now seen in the most recent White Paper is a return to the comfort of post-war alliances. This must deliver a very secure feeling to the armed forces in New Zealand, but perhaps does not recognise sufficiently the dynamics of the region of which we are all part. What is needed now is to encourage dialogue and talking, such as we have seen so far, for example, in Cambodia; even the various parties in dispute over the Spratleys might start talking. We have got to re-emphasise and encourage that process and, really, re-integrating back into a post-war alliance structure is not necessarily going to foster the process of dialogue.

**Air Vice Marshal Hosie:** How do I answer that? All I am doing here is being the messenger and stating the background to a government policy. It would be inappropriate for me to expand on that, or suggest alternatives or anything else. I am not in a position to do that quite clearly. That is why I have not attempted to redefine, alter or anything else the Defence of New Zealand '91; all I have done is quote from it. I really cannot answer you any other way, I think, otherwise I am debating foreign policy.

**Mr Somerville:** I suppose what I was trying to emphasise was the fact that statements about the return to internationalism or isolationism being an aberration were, in a sense, qualified statements. They were not objective statements; they exist in a context. You can look at things in a different way and see that we are back to New Zealand doing something less useful. That is what I was suggesting.

**Air Vice Marshal Hosie:** That is a view, I suppose.



# **WHY REGIONAL COOPERATION IS INEVITABLE**

**Brigadier General Bey Soo Kiang**

However, it is not enough to have the capacity to defend what we have worked so hard to create. We must also have the patience and foresight, through diplomacy, to maintain conditions of stability and security over our region.

Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister

I am honoured to be able to share with you my thoughts on the role for air power in regional cooperation. I will attempt to show that air power is ideally suited to play a leading and vital role in defence cooperation in our region, which in turn serves to sharpen the edge of regional air forces.

In my presentation I will discuss the trend for regional cooperation and the role the military can play in this field. The role of air power in enhancing regional cooperation will also be discussed. I will then share the experience of how the RSAF contributes to national and regional resilience through regional cooperation.

## **Why Regional Cooperation is the Future Trend**

Over past decades, the presence of the US military has been a driving force for regional peace and stability. The ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries have exploited this stability, to focus and accelerate regional economic development.

Ironically, this may change with the general reduction in East-West tension. The end of the Cold War, coupled with domestic economic problems, have led the US to reduce its defence spending, scale down overseas military commitments and focus more on domestic issues. The US military has fully withdrawn from the Philippines and has reduced its forces in the Pacific by about ten per cent. It also has plans to cut back further on its military presence in the Pacific.

The reduction of the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific area is likely to be destabilising. This may induce contiguous powers in the region - like China, India, Japan, and even Korea - to rearm. We will then have a region fraught with potential for a competition for influence. In this situation, countries will attempt to strengthen their national resilience, to avert becoming another 'Kuwait' or suffering the tragedy of being bullied by a bigger and stronger power.

Nobody gains if, and when, the forces of destruction have to be unleashed through the use of military might to secure strategic goals. Therefore, rational nations, while strengthening national resilience, will seek to establish cooperative relationships with other countries to resolve differences. These relationships will build regional resilience and help ensure that the countries in the region are left in peace to focus on economic development. ASEAN is an example of this principle in practise.

Within the context of ASEAN and FPDA, Singapore has adopted the concept of Total Defence as our formula for national resilience. We believe that we must be strong, self-reliant and robustly independent as a nation in order to contribute to the peace, progress and stability of the whole region. Total Defence provides us with the capacity to deter threats and to respond decisively should deterrence fail. Our ability to defend ourselves effectively minimises the likelihood of challenges to our national survival arising in the first place.

But a condition of peace and stability is not just a matter of having a strong defence capability and military deterrence. It also requires an ability to pursue security through diplomacy, and to maintain good relations with other countries, especially with our ASEAN neighbours.

This is why Singapore is committed to regional resilience as another pillar to guard against threats to regional peace and stability. Regional resilience can be achieved in three ways.

Firstly, ASEAN countries will continue to invest in defence to ensure peace and stability in the region. Such a strategy ensures a climate conducive to economic development and improvement in the quality of life for people in ASEAN,

without distraction or diversion of scarce resources to war. In ASEAN's parlance, each of us strives to achieve national resilience. This, in turn, contributes towards regional resilience.

Secondly, each of the countries will foster closer defence relations with its neighbours. Nearly all the ASEAN defence forces have bilateral relations with their ASEAN counterparts. Our experience is that bilateral relations give us the best configuration of defence cooperation. If you imagine a network made up of a lot of criss-crossing, overlapping relationships, you have a picture of the very strong ASEAN consensus in defence matters. We believe that this is very effective in enhancing mutual cooperation and mutual understanding. It is also easier to develop because the pace depends mainly on only two parties for each bilateral link, although sensitivities of other parties must also be considered. We believe this is much more effective than any formal pact involving all six ASEAN countries. Indeed, since there is no common enemy, any formal pact would only give rise to misunderstandings by countries outside of ASEAN. They may misinterpret ASEAN's desire for regional resilience, which we believe is the foundation for peace, progress and prosperity in our region.

Thirdly, ASEAN countries can help the US and other benign extra-regional powers remain engaged in constructive economic and political cooperation with us. To play its part, Singapore offered the use of its facilities to the US for port calls by warships and rolling deployments by aircraft. A Memorandum of Understanding to provide for use of our facilities was signed in 1990. Other ASEAN countries have also offered the US maintenance and repair facilities for warships and aircraft. Such actions signal ASEAN's desire to see the continued engagement of the US in the region and our willingness to assist.

### **Role of Air Power in Enhancing Regional Resilience**

The special characteristics of air power makes it ideally suited to play a leading and vital role in forging the particular form of defence cooperation to enhance regional resilience.

The speed and reach of modern aircraft permits air power to deploy swiftly to troubled areas with sufficient force to act as an initial response, before follow-on forces are mobilised and transferred by airlift to where they are needed. Indeed, this is one of the principal doctrines of the FPDA. For instance, RAAF F/A-18s

can deploy from home bases in Australia to Singapore and Malaysia within a day or two. RAF Tornados from the United Kingdom can deploy to this region in a matter of a few days. By the same token, ASEAN air forces can deploy aircraft as well as Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircraft Artillery equipment to each others' countries within hours.

The flexibility of modern air power offers a wide range of options to induce cooperation from an aggressor. This can range from air blockade to using precision and surgical strikes on key installations to apply pressure. The ability to avoid collateral damage to an adversary's civilian populace, through the use of precision weapons, makes air power an ideal instrument - as clearly demonstrated in the Gulf War. The recent conflict against Saddam Hussein also showed that the effective use of air power also helps minimise the casualties of war, making it acceptable to the home front.

But the capability of air power to enhance regional resilience is something that has to be developed in peacetime. Contingency plans have to be formulated to enable the quick deployment of the Air Force to potential trouble spots. The RSAF has been willing to provide access to support infrastructure and facilities at Paya Lebar Airport for transits and periodic detachments from other Air Forces. The RAAF, RMAF, RNZAF, RAF and USAF all use hangars and operations buildings in Paya Lebar Airport during their periodic fighter detachments to Singapore. Such access to facilities which can be activated in times of need will ensure that friendly air forces are engaged in the region to enhance regional resilience.

Besides looking at the logistical aspect for responsive deployment to potential trouble spots, regional air forces must be properly developed and well trained - both individually as well as with one another. There are also other opportunities for regional cooperation to help develop the capability of the individual air forces.

We already have some fruitful experiences in cooperating with the joint development of training facilities. The RSAF and the Indonesian Air Force shared the cost of developing Siabu Air Weapons Range in Sumatra. The joint project was outstandingly successful. As they say, one good turn deserves another, so the RSAF and the Indonesian Air Force are now building on the success of this experience by presently working together to jointly develop a

state-of-the-art Air Combat Manoeuvring Range, also in Sumatra. I believe the joint Siabu range and joint ACMR between RSAF and TNI-AU can be models for other bilateral projects on a cost-share basis.

Another useful form of cooperation involves joint usage of simulators. Regional air forces operate several common aircraft types such as F-5s, A-4s and C-130s, but each individual air force operates too small a fleet of any particular aircraft type to be able to optimise the respective flight simulators. Sharing of this equipment allows us to maximise the use of simulators, and it is definitely more cost effective than each air force operating its own simulator for every aircraft type. The RSAF has such an arrangement on sharing the use of our A-4 and F-5 flight simulators with RMAF and TNI-AU. Again, I see this as a useful model for other similar projects.

The joint purchase of aircraft spares and the development of logistic capabilities also enhances operational readiness of each partner, at lower cost in terms of stocking of spares and depot facilities. Possible programmes which can benefit from economies of scale include joint facilities for airframe and engine maintenance, and joint research and development addressing technical problems such as structural fatigue, common production plants for high-usage spare parts, and so on.

Another area of cooperation is the use of each other's resources during exercises. For example, friends can be invited to contribute resources to test one's contingency plans. Australia maintains a number of bare bases which would be activated in times of need to support air operations. From time to time, the RAAF tests its contingency plans on these bare bases, since pilots need to be familiarised with the terrain and ground crew need to be kept warm with working in unfamiliar environments. The RSAF was most pleased to be able to contribute during Exercise Pitch Black 91 and Exercise Western Reward 92.

Sharing of information, knowledge and expertise can take the form of conferences, seminars, study visits, exchange visits, attendance of each others' courses and so on. Such forums are necessary in order to cope with technological changes which can have significant impact in operational doctrines, procedures and tactics. One example would be the RTAF-RSAF F-16 Goodwill Visits programme. This has proved to be an excellent forum for the F-16 pilots and logisticians of both air forces to share experiences and lessons learnt. A positive

spin-off of such sharing of information and experience is also greater transparency and mutual confidence, as it enabled our personnel to know each other better.

Interactions between air forces will also stand these services in good stead when they have to exercise with one another to ensure interoperability. To this end, the RSAF conducts regular joint exercises with regional air forces. These include FPDA Air Defence Exercises with FPDA members, Exercise Air ThaiSing with the RTAF, Exercise Elang Indopura with the TNI-AU as well as those exercises I have just mentioned with the RAAF. Besides these, the RSAF also participates in exercises with the USAF and US Navy, such as Red Flag, Cope Thunder, Merlion and Mercub. And with the regular deployment of USAF and USN detachments to Singapore under Cope Sling, the RSAF regularly conducts joint training with these forces. We are also glad that the USAF is conducting similar joint training with the respective air forces of ASEAN. These joint exercise and training help ensure that we would be able to exploit the full range of air capabilities in times of need by developing interoperability with our friends in peace. Joint exercises also help each other sharpen skills.

### **Regional Air Power Cooperation and the Qualitative Edge - The RSAF's Experience and Perspective**

The RSAF has long understood and benefited from the positive cooperative role which air power can play in enhancing national as well as regional resilience. Indeed, cooperation with friendly air forces has always played a key role in the RSAF's development. From its inception in 1968, the RSAF cooperated with the more established air forces to help accelerate its development. In particular, we are grateful for the assistance of expatriates from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and also India, who helped train our pilots during the formative years. They, and experts from other friendly air forces, helped us put the appropriate building blocks in place to give the RSAF a proper foundation.

The RSAF has a unique problem in that flying training is constrained by the island's limited airspace. Our limited airspace and terrain makes it necessary for us to seek training for our pilots overseas. Fortunately for the RSAF, our friends in the region have generously opened their airspace to meet our needs. We regularly deploy fighter and helicopter detachments to Thailand, Indonesia,



Brunei, here in Australia, and even as far away as Continental USA. RSAF fighters also routinely use the Low Flying Area in Malaysia with the goodwill of our Malaysian friends.

The RSAF's friends not only offer it quality airspace for value-added training, but also excellent facilities such as the Air Combat Manoeuvre Instrumentation (ACMI) range in Thailand and the jointly developed Siabu Air Weapons Range in Indonesia. Australia has also generously offered RSAF access to Delamere Range. Use of these training facilities provides RSAF pilots with valuable opportunities to conduct challenging, realistic training.

The RSAF is also an active partner of the IADS formed under the framework of the FPDA. The IADS provides an umbrella of security for Singapore and Malaysia during the window of vulnerability and also gives us access to the expertise of extra-regional FPDA partners. Each year, two minor and two major air defence exercises (ADEXes) are conducted under IADS, to ensure the interoperability of the different air forces.

IADS continues to grow in importance, as is evident in the scope and sophistication of its exercises, as well as the level of involvement of the participating countries. For example, the recently concluded ADEX 92-4 involved all FPDA members, who together fielded nearly 150 aircraft. These included state-of-the-art aircraft like Tornados, F/A-18s, F-16s and E2Cs. The IADS not only plays a significant role in Singapore's national and regional resilience, but also exposes the RSAF to the latest technological advances, operational concepts and training methods. For example, our pilots have a regular chance to pit their skills against pilots from FPDA air forces in challenging Dissimilar Air Combat Training.

All these forms of cooperation with friendly air forces not only develop and maintain our ability to operate jointly, but are valuable to the RSAF for providing useful means to further enhance its skills, knowledge and professionalism. It also prevents the RSAF from becoming an insular air force.

## **Problems of Cooperation**

But our cooperation with other air forces is not totally plain sailing, to borrow a phrase from the Navy. The obvious problem is the political sensitivity of the host country. With less people required for deployment of aircraft, the lower profile of air power permits two countries to enter into military cooperation gradually - at a pace which both parties and also their neighbours are comfortable with. For instance, it is easier to commence cooperation by conducting humanitarian type activities such as joint SAR or joint disaster relief exercises. Subsequently, with greater confidence and mutual understanding, and when the regional political climate is right, the partners can progress to higher profile air force cooperation, or even move on to sea and land force cooperation.

Another problem faced by the RSAF is the asymmetry or inequity of relationships. While the RSAF appreciates the generosity of our friends in extending access to their airspace, facilities and expertise, it is not always able to reciprocate in kind - due basically to a lack of airspace, manpower and other resources. The RSAF needs to train in many countries, but cannot offer the same. Let me illustrate my point with two examples. Limited airspace and tight air traffic control means that we can only accommodate foreign air forces at Paya Lebar Airport. Another example. While flying with foreign air forces under a pilot exchange programme, our pilots enjoy value-added training with the host air forces, but we are not always able to reciprocate with similar training for their pilots attached to RSAF. This is because most of our mission-oriented training is conducted overseas, and it would require the approval of the country whose airspace we are using to permit the attached pilot to train with us. Sometimes this is not possible.

## **Conclusion**

Given the fluidity of global and regional developments and the unpredictability of inter-state relations, ASEAN - and the Asia-Pacific as a whole - cannot afford to be complacent in defence and security matters. As the economies of various nations develop and become more intertwined, the impetus is there for countries to avoid conflicts through development of their own capability for national resilience as well as cooperating with each other to create regional resilience.

The armed forces of ASEAN countries will continue to foster closer defence relations with each other, and with the armed forces of other countries. The characteristics of air power mean that air forces are well-placed to be key instruments in fostering closer defence relations. Through various bilateral cooperation programmes and joint exercises with each other, ASEAN air forces have developed their own capabilities, as well as the capability to operate together. Through similar programs with non-ASEAN air forces, we have ensured that other nations remain engaged in this region, thereby further enhancing regional resilience.

And, by our experience, regional cooperation with other air forces has in turn benefited us. Today, the RSAF is balanced and operationally-ready because of the role other air forces played in its development. The qualitative edge of the Singapore Armed Forces has been further sharpened to contribute to national as well as regional resilience. We would continue to establish new relationships with other air forces and further strengthen existing ones.

## **Discussion**

**Mr E. Stanton** (RAAF Association): You explained very well to us how the RSAF operates in its area of responsibility and, how, through cooperation with your neighbours, you have adequate airspace and sea-space in which to train. Do you have any major problems at Paya Lebar, in your circuit work and the like, through your proximity to a very busy international airport ie. Changi?

**Brigadier General Bey:** To answer the question directly, obviously yes. If you take a look at Singapore you see that while you have the problem of the tyranny of distance in Australia, we have the tyranny of smallness in Singapore. We do have a lot of restrictions. My pilots find when they operate out of Paya Lebar that the air traffic instructions are very tight and specific; they have very little scope for manoeuvre. But we overcome that problem through joint military and civilian manning in what we call the Joint Air Traffic Control Centre, to try and facilitate the movement and operations of military aircraft as much as possible. So, in respect of your question, the answer is yes but we can overcome it.

**Squadron Leader D. Miller** (RAAF College): We've seen you involved in a very high level of joint training around the region. Do you see a role for Singapore in United Nations operations in the future?

**Brigadier General Bey:** We are actually already involved in UN operations, particularly our land forces who were involved in Kuwait and even Namibia. For the RSAF, I think that is something to think about down the road. Obviously there is a cost element to consider, and the other aspect which is peculiar to our Air Force is that a substantial portion of personnel are reservists. We have a national service system, and many of our people come to work in the Air Force for something like 40 days a year. So, for long-term operations there would be a difficulty in terms of manpower, but I would not rule it out completely.

**Air Commodore R. Richardson** (AOC Training Command, RAAF): Could you expand a little further on your perspective of the future of IADS?

**Brigadier General Bey:** The current arrangement, to my mind, is adequate to meet the needs of the region. I think what is really needed is periodical involvement of all the air forces participating in the IADS arrangement with regard to contributing assets when it comes to exercises. That would 'up' the training value as well as the political deterrence aspect of the arrangement, and that is how I see it going on in the next couple of years.

**His Excellency S. Siagian** (Indonesian Ambassador): This is not a question but a footnote from a fellow Harvard alumni. You remarked that a reduction of the US presence in Asia would trigger increasing competition, and you mentioned some countries. I think this should not be taken as a 'given' by us in the region, considering the increased intra-region trade volume as pointed out by the recent survey of the *Asian Wall Street Journal*. I do not think it would be conducive for countries, including those that you mentioned, to engage in adventurism. The reduction of the US presence, on the other hand, should motivate us to work harder for the kind of regional security cooperation that Professor Dobb suggested in his presentation.

**Brigadier General Bey:** I agree with your point that it is for ASEAN and extra-regional countries coming into this region to make sure that things are reasonably well in control and the situation does not deteriorate further.

# **THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE FLIGHT PLAN: OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES**

**Lieutenant General D. Huddleston**

This is a rare and welcome opportunity for me to participate in a forum whose perspectives and, I expect, whose pre-occupations are significantly different from those which I have normally encountered in NATO and in NORAD discussions. Of course, some of the changes to which Canadians are now adapting are global in impact and, in addressing these, we are likely to meet our colleagues from other regions more frequently. And, despite the distance which separates us, there has always been a strong bond between Canada and Australia and, in the narrower military sphere, a remarkable number of parallels which have encouraged us to compare solutions constantly.

Despite these and, undoubtedly, many other common circumstances, it would be presumptuous of me to attempt to translate the Canadian experience into an Asia-Pacific analogy. I'll leave that to you. What I will propose to you is that, for my Air Force at least, the negative aspects of recent events must not be allowed to overshadow the many opportunities for progress which they have uncovered and even created, the principal common feature of which is the impetus they provide for a return to fundamental precepts. Hence the title of my dissertation.

What, in brief, are the challenges which face us? Let me suggest these:

- what is the threat?
- what is a realistic long-range financial model?
- how much defence will the Canadian taxpayer pay for?
- *what type and how much war-fighting capability does Canada need?*

In recent years, a vocal minority of Canadians has challenged the validity of the threat against which NATO nations long postured themselves. While I had little patience with those arguments, there is no doubt that the ease with which we were accustomed to defining the need for forces by first describing a specific, and generally agreed, threat is a thing of the past. There is a strong public

consensus that the world has changed permanently, that security concerns are much diminished, that armed forces can be dramatically reduced and that funds heretofore earmarked for defence can be diverted to other causes.

I certainly view the developments of the last few years in the former Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and, by extension, in other areas of the world where superpower rivalry was played out, as extremely positive. Nevertheless, I find it curious how the general public has decided that these dramatic developments, which they did not foresee, represent a reprieve from security concerns. If the Cold War stability can unravel so quickly, how does one conclude that the situation which has replaced it will be permanent and present no threat to our way of life?

Perhaps we should look to the state of our economy, to the benefits which our citizens have come to expect during more prosperous times, to their desire to postpone adaptation to the more competitive world in which we now live, for the answer to that question. Certainly these factors emphasise the importance of articulating the need for defence in more fundamental and less opportunistic terms than we have employed in the recent past.

If our Cold War-threat world has, indeed, been replaced by a new security order, what are its ingredients? For the purposes of this discussion, perhaps I can suggest that a listing of these should include: flashpoints; weapons proliferation; Europe; North American aerospace defence readiness; humanitarian and disaster relief; and national security. This illustrates the disturbing spread of powerful weapons, the continued propensity of nations and races to fight, the removal of the former hostility across the European fault-line, longer warning time permitting reduced readiness, concern for national security in a much broader context than before, and a willingness to use military skills for non-military purposes rather than resenting the loss of valuable training time.

To expand on these changes or, in some cases, this increased awareness of already existing conditions, a Canadian view of the world takes in global trouble spots, the current state of nuclear proliferation, of ballistic missile proliferation, and of submarine proliferation. The message is clear that, even as the total number of nuclear warheads diminishes as quickly as they can be dismantled, the ingredients of conflict are widespread.

What is the impact of this on Canada's Air Force? Let me refresh your memory on some of the factors which have influenced our development to this point. First, the size of the Canadian land mass and the remoteness of many communities caused the Air Force, between the two world wars, to be an instrument of national development. The Second World War set the tone for Canada, as a totally independent nation, to ally itself to other nations for the common defence and to become a training ground for other air forces. And United Nations peacekeeping, often identified with Lester Pearson, a former Canadian diplomat and later prime minister, has at the same time softened the image of alliance membership and created an image of trusted global helper. Finally, the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968 fragmented the former RCAF in such a way as to erode the unity of air power even as it brought all those directly engaged in air operations, from the three former services, into the same personnel structure.

A recent article in the USAF's *Air University Review* compared the typically articulate reaction of Navy and Army officers to a request for a description of naval or army doctrine with the rather bemused reaction one might expect of an Air Force officer to a similar question. That this is equally true in Canada is not a reflection of the intellectual capacity of Air Force officers, nor is it solely attributable to the fact that they are preoccupied with doing the job rather than contemplating it. It has developed, in my view, because their leaders have allowed themselves to be diverted from the fundamentals and have therefore failed to pass on to succeeding generations a convincing answer to such questions as: what is an air force, and why should we have one?

It is easy for air forces to become fragmented in thought, given their propensity to self-identify by functional activity. We Canadians have encouraged this however, by replacing the study of air power with the study of scenario-based commitments of elements of air power. The most obvious example is that of our fighter commitments to NATO and NORAD. These have seen us focus, at various points in time, on clear air mass air combat, on all-weather intercept, on nuclear strike, on tactical reconnaissance and on the gamut of conventional attack roles, each gathering its own fan club to the exclusion of the others. Even with the introduction of a single aircraft type, the CF-18, we continue to wrestle with those who would advocate their favourite role rather than promote the strength which air power derives from its flexibility.

Unification in Canada exacerbated this tendency by producing seven air organisations from the three which the new force inherited from its predecessors. The formation of Air Command in 1975 reduced the seven to three and there are now only two, the second being the third and fourth line materiel organisation which includes our test and engineering development units. We have no further excuse for failing to indoctrinate our personnel. Of course, unification also captured the Air Force's excellent educational system, and turned our Staff School and Staff College into the unified force equivalent. However much one gains from tri-service professional development, there remains a need for thorough training in one's own area of expertise. We are, at this very moment, running our first dedicated Air Force staff course in over twenty years. The Navy and Army did not allow this to happen.

Unification was permitted to have a further deleterious effect on the Air Force. The Navy had its shore bases and the Army its camps or garrisons. These were support bases for operational units or formations. The Air Force, in contrast, had stations which doubled as operational and support organisations. In the unified force the support function was emphasised, placing the base commander in an ambivalent position in the operational chain of command between the functional group commander (Fighter, Maritime etc), normally far distant, and the squadron commanders on his own base. We are in the process of rectifying this by superimposing an Air Force wing structure upon the unified base structure, thus re-establishing the Air Force chain of command. We are using this opportunity to place the air operations and aircraft maintenance elements of the wing within the same operations branch. This permits us to employ maintenance structures appropriate to the operational environment, that is integral to the squadron, to the wing, or any combination of the two, while maintaining the same operationally-oriented maintenance posture.

I have offered some examples of where we have gone astray, and how we are rectifying our mistakes, but I'm getting ahead of myself because the real point is that we must get back to basics, and to do that we must start at the beginning.

First, we must re-establish the primacy of the doctrine of the whole Air Force in place of our preoccupation with the practices of its parts. Now, to be relevant, doctrine must embody foresight, or vision. An old friend of mine insists that, to have foresight, one must have insight, and that insight is impossible without hindsight. That is, knowing where we've been and learning from our experiences



is of great help in plotting the course ahead. One of my top priorities therefore, is to hasten the publication of our Air Force's official history, which is bogged down in the middle of World War II. Equally important is the reflection of that history in displays and collections at our air bases and across our land.

It is a short distance from the revitalisation of our doctrine to the indoctrination of our members, particularly those who are just joining our ranks, and to rebuilding a training structure which ensures that, whatever else Air Force personnel may learn as they join our unified force, they acquire a clear appreciation of the *raison d'être* of our Air Force. This is not accomplished overnight, but is well in hand.

Next comes a command and control structure which truly embodies the principle of centralised control and decentralised execution vice the situation we had allowed to develop where the 'tail' was wagging the 'dog'. The past year has seen this condition corrected.

Next comes the affordable, combat-capable Air Force structure to handle the tasks which we expect to be called upon to perform. The climate is admittedly an uncertain one; however, Canada demonstrates an insatiable thirst for alliances and for contributing to worthy international causes, so the issue is not whether, but when and where. At home, national security has assumed a much broader dimension than before, and we find ourselves assisting other departments of government in the execution of **their** mandates, just as we did in our formative years.

To do all these things with a smaller budget, but with the related perception that we are less immediately threatened than before, logically means more time to react to the next emergency, fewer full-time people and a key place in our structure for reserves.

Reserve growth is thus an important element of our current force restructuring. Fortunately, we are a country with a tremendous wealth of aviation skills, much of it the product of our own training system. We are progressively introducing reserves into all operational activities, to produce a 'total force' worthy of the name. To facilitate this, we are allying ourselves to the commercial aerospace sector and to the education industry, so as to increase equivalence of skill qualifications and standards, and thus to increase their portability and

flexibility of delivery; that is, to train reservists, so far as is possible, through institutes in their own community as and when they can make themselves available. As a corollary, we are creating the conditions for industry to mobilise as a component of the Reserve.

Smaller budgets means fewer people which, in turn, prompts us to look at how we are employing them. As an example, technology no longer permits us to support all aircraft types in the same uniform manner. We are about to reduce a structure of thirteen distinct trades to one of three basic trades with progressive specialisation where the sophistication of the equipment demands it. A similar review is underway in our air traffic control and fighter control occupations.

In flying training, we are progressively moving away from a single-stream approach. A look at the changing trend in where we employ our pilots (see Table 1) will show you why.

**TABLE 1:  
PILOT FLYING POSITIONS (%)**

	1980	1992	2007
Multi-engine	39	34	28
Tactical air	20	19	17
Trainers	17	17	17
Helicopters	24	30	38

Recall that Canada's Air Command comprises all military flying activity, hence the strong rotary wing component. We retain some 150 hours of common training but, with some very recent changes, now split three ways for the final pre-wings training element.

You might note that we have also introduced a training contract whereby the contractor provides our primary training (principally the selection process) and also the aircraft and logistic support for basic helicopter and multi-engine training, leaving the Air Force to presently operate basic and advanced training. If successful, we might well consider extending the latter formula to our basic training package.

Contracting-out has a fascination for some of the nations with which we associate most closely. Fortunately, we are not plagued by such ideological pressures. However, just as we must examine how best to employ our military personnel, so must we be critical of all of the cost elements of our business. And it has many of the characteristics of a business. Our operations and maintenance costs are high, and the centralised systems which our unified force (and, I should stress, our integrated military and departmental headquarters) have promoted, tend to detract from accountability and from the incentive to do better. Much of our current attention is focussed on delegating resource management authority to the level of operational responsibility, thus recapturing the opportunity to improve cost-effectiveness. Within this climate of innovation, no holds are barred and, if contracting-out is best, we will not shrink from it.

By maximising the return on each personnel, operations and maintenance dollar, we provide the best opportunity to equip the Air Force for its tasks. The Department is on track to increase progressively the percentage of our budget devoted to capital investment; at present it is 22 per cent, by 1996 it should be 26 per cent, rising to a target figure of 30 per cent. Within the Air Force, we seek to further increase the return on the investment dollar by applying the following guidelines:

- define requirements to maximise capability across the widest possible range of defence roles;
- avoid purchasing 'gold-plated' equipment;
- reduce the number of types of equipment;
- purchase equipment with proven performance whenever possible;
- evaluate carefully the marginal cost increases in the capability of new equipment; and
- avoid unique 'made-in-Canada' solutions.

Table 2 gives examples of fleet rationalisation, while our most recent confirmed acquisitions are shown in Table 3. The position in which this will then leave our air force can be seen in Table 4.

**TABLE 2:  
FLEET RATIONALISATION**

Voodoo	)	
Starfighter	)	----- Hornet
Freedom Fighter	)	
Kiowa	)	
Iroquois	)	----- Bell 412
Twin Huey	)	
Chinook	)	
Buffalo	)	
Hercules	)	----- Hercules
Labrador	)	EH-101
Sea King	)	

**TABLE 3:  
MAJOR CAPITAL PROGRAMMES**

- 5 new Hercules aircraft modified for air-to-air refuelling
- 100 Bell 412s to replace Twin Huey, Kiowa and Iroquois helicopters
- 50 EH-101s to replace Sea King and Labrador helicopters and retire Buffalo
- 5 Airbus 310s to replace Boeing 707s

**TABLE 4:  
AIRCRAFT ESTIMATED  
LIFE EXPECTANCY**

* Kiowa	<u>1971</u>	<u>1995</u>	
* Sea King	<u>1963</u>		<u>2000</u>
* Twin Huey		<u>1971</u>	<u>2005</u>
* Boeing 707	<u>1970</u>	<u>1996</u>	
* Buffalo	<u>1967</u>	<u>1998</u>	
* Labrador	<u>1962</u>		<u>2003</u>
CF-5		<u>1968</u>	<u>2005</u>
Twin Otter		<u>1971</u>	<u>2010</u>
Aurora		<u>1980</u>	<u>2010</u>
CF-18 Hornet		<u>1982</u>	<u>2010</u>
T-33	<u>1952</u>		<u>2005</u>
Tutor		<u>1966</u>	<u>2005</u>
Cosmopolitan	<u>1960</u>		<u>2010</u>
Hercules	<u>1963</u>		<u>2010</u>
* Iroquois		<u>1968</u>	<u>2010</u>
Challenger		<u>1983</u>	<u>2010</u>
Dash 8		<u>1989</u>	<u>2011</u>

(\* denotes projects funded to replace or retire)

The increasing lifespan of our equipment leads, inevitably, to the need to upgrade them at mid-life, and our next preoccupation, not surprisingly, is with determining the useful operational life of major fleets (see Table 5) and the most essential, affordable updates to allow them to perform their operational mission effectively.

This brings me to my final point, that we will only succeed in sustaining our fundamental military contribution to national objectives, within a climate of severe fiscal constraint, if we forge alliances with all those who can aid us in achieving our aim. Here I am thinking of such allies as other government departments, the aerospace industry, the training industry, employers and society generally.

**TABLE 5:  
EQUIPMENT LIFE UPDATE**

- Hercules avionics
  
- Aurora mid-life update
  
- Hornet mid-life update and precision guided munitions
  
- Omnibus projects, such as GPS and microwave landing system

A number of other government departments have mandates which overlap the security mandate of national defence. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is our federal police force and has responsibility for combating illegal immigration and the importation of illegal drugs. These call upon our air defence and maritime forces. We similarly support the Department of Fisheries with naval and air forces and the Department of the Environment with offshore patrol aircraft, all as corollary activities to our surveillance mission. We are also expanding our links with the Department of Transport in the joint use of facilities, in the combining of air traffic and radar surveillance systems and through the employment of its personnel in the Air Reserve.

We have made significant strides in altering our relationship with the aerospace industry. Competitive procurement remains our government's policy. This does not prevent us however, from collaborating with industry in the development of our equipment requirements or in exploring new methods of supporting equipment during its service life. On the contrary, we can, in cooperation with industry, ensure that their development efforts and our specifications are targeted realistically.

I have already discussed the training industry. Although this alliance has much broader application, it is particularly important to the growth of a capable reserve in a country as large as Canada. We must take skills training to the reservist, not expect him or her to conform to our schedule nor to attend our distant schools for lengthy periods. The contribution of the Reserve is founded on equality of standards with the regular force. This does not however, require that the means of achieving those standards must be identical. That said, the

more we explore new ways of delivering training for the benefit of reservists, the more we find that we can exploit them to the benefit of the entire Air Force.

Our alliance with employers is critical to the availability of the Reserve. Our message must be that reserve training offers the employer value-added in his employee, worth the loss of time to training. At the present time, retention of reservists equals that of regulars, but there is no reason that, given the greater stability of reserve service, it should not exceed it. That is certainly the American experience, one from which we are endeavouring to learn as we develop our employer support program.

Finally, we have been remiss in assuming that the Canadian public supported our existence without question. Indeed, we do enjoy very strong public support as a stabilising factor in frequently turbulent times. Nevertheless, economic conditions cause this support to weaken when major expenditures are mooted and other programmes are more immediately attractive. We have had a tendency, in our unified force, to rely on 'the centre' to present our case to the public. Unified or not, the fact is that navies, armies and air forces have different public images and we must, consistent with the overall defence message, conduct our own campaign for 'the hearts and minds' if we are to enjoy wide support.

I realise that my presentation today has diverged somewhat from the regional theme of your conference. You would not expect otherwise. Nevertheless, we always seem to find much more common ground than we might, at first glance, expect. I hope that has been the case and that some of our current experiences and endeavours have been of interest to you.

## **Discussion**

**Commodore S. Bateman** (RAN Maritime Studies Program): You have effectively just acknowledged the contribution the military can make to regional security cooperation. I think we would all agree that a better dialogue between regional military forces is a quite fundamental confidence and security building measure, and a building block to regional security cooperation.

In the last couple of years Australia and Canada have been associated with regional security initiatives - some of which have not gone down as well as we

might have liked - and of course, more recently Canada has been running with the North Pacific cooperative security dialogue. On my recent visits to Canada, and in talks with Canadians, it has never ceased to amaze me that your defence organisation is not really associated with those proposals. I wonder if that is not a consequence of Canada having what is still basically a European focus on security issues - despite the rhetoric of some Canadian Navy people about its relations with Asian countries. I wanted to ask you specifically what is the scope for a greater involvement by the Canadian defence organisation in your regional security initiatives in this part of the world?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** I would suggest that, rather than focussing on any other region, specifically this region, what is happening is that our focus on Europe is being progressively but very definitely modified. Clearly, withdrawing our stationed forces from Europe where they have been for forty-odd years, as the sharp end of the Army and one of the sharp ends of the Air Force (the fighter community), is a rather traumatic experience. It is however, part of the evidence of a shift.

Now we still have a NATO commitment, involving deployable forces from the Army and Air Force; the Navy has not changed its NATO commitments significantly. All three have signed on to having basic combat capable forces with less of a European focus and more of a 'put me in, coach' approach to involvement. As examples, during the Gulf War - which involved principally the Navy and Air Force - and until recently, we had a ship in the Red Sea; a ship has been in the Adriatic; and we are contemplating occasionally putting a ship into the Mediterranean. Also, we have always participated in RIMPAC exercises which bring us together with Australia and other participants, including to some degree Japan, in recent times.

I hesitate to suggest that we would be orienting ourselves in any particular direction, because that almost creates the image of a busy-body. But no direction is, as of now, barred from our participation. So, you see us in Cambodia, for instance, with about 200 people - including some naval personnel - and Somalia, as well as Yugoslavia (which in this case has nothing to do with Europe, it just happens to be there). I would be reluctant to suggest that our former European focus has been redirected in this direction specifically; essentially it has been redirected **everywhere** that the requirement for our participation might arise.



For that reason we are building again, for the first time in many years, genuinely deployable fighter squadrons, maritime patrol units, tactical aviation units. This is just speaking from the Air Force point of view; the same activities are occurring in the Navy and Army spheres. The Navy's ASW frigates are now referred to as general purpose frigates, and I suspect they probably are exactly that.

**Wing Commander B. Sutherland (RAAF Williams):** You spoke about the increased emphasis on reserves in the Canadian armed forces. Will part of your reserves be involved in the operation of operational aircraft? If so, how do your costs compare with the United States experience, where the Air Reserve and Air National Guard squadrons cost roughly 25 per cent more?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** Your last point is based on your source. I don't necessarily ascribe to those figures because I can't verify them, so a comparison with your version of the American costs is difficult for me to make.

Yes, we are already employing reservists in a number of our operational activities and we will continue to do that until they represent an augmentation element in all of our operational activities. Although we have had an Air Reserve, historically consisting of purely Air Reserve units, now we have total force units. Even the Air Reserve units are now only reserve-dominant units, with regular force elements. And we are not creating more of those Air Reserve units. What we are creating is reserve augmentation to regular units. For example, as we bring our fighter squadrons in Europe back to Canada we are increasing their size from twelve aircraft to fifteen manned by regular people, and to eighteen manned by reservists. So, by incorporating a reserve element we will have the size of fighter squadrons we think is necessary to do the job.

Clearly, there are different degrees of readiness associated with the regulars and reservists. Using experienced fighter pilots, however, and maintainers who are trained to the same standard, means there is only a relatively modest difference in the readiness of these two classes of people. As far as costs are concerned, we are not creating units as in the Air National Guard or the US Air Force or US Navy Air Reserve. We are basing our Reserve growth on existing infrastructure and existing units, so I think we get the benefit of reservists for the least possible costs.

**Air Vice Marshal T. O'Brien (DCAS):** Does that mean you are going to have reservists actually flying the aircraft?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** *We do at the moment.*

**Air Vice Marshal O'Brien:** How do you keep them up to speed? What rate of effort do they fly?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** They have to maintain the basic currency requirements on the aircraft. For example, with an F-18 pilot who already has 1000 hours on that aeroplane and has left the Air Force, we expect we will have a similar experience to the United States where a F-15 or F-16 Reserve or Guard pilot flies about 130 hours a year.

**Air Commodore R. Richardson (AOC Training Command, RAAF):** If I understood you correctly, you said that you do, or you were planning to, contract out all pilot training up to the award of wings standard for all of your three different elements. I have two particular concerns about that.

We've been thinking about doing this in the RAAF. We are heavily involved in contracting out a number of functions, but if we accept that the Air Force's primary combatants are aircrew I have concerns touching on points raised earlier by Air Marshal Funnell, about the loss of service ethos - or combatant ethos - that is enjoined by training by military people.

The other concern that I have relates to the need to have a body of flying instructors with basic training experience who are then able to apply their skills more specifically in the operational area. In other words, I am concerned about the loss of instructional expertise through contracting out functions. Would you care to comment?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** I think you misunderstood what I described. The only part of our training system where we have removed military flying instructors is the primary training which, as I said, is essentially a selection program. For the other portions which we have contracted out - and it is all part of the same contract - the contractor owns and maintains the aeroplane, and we fly it. That is currently the case with helicopters, multi-engine and advanced training to wings.

The next thing that we would contemplate contracting out is the common basic portion, which at the present time is 130 hours on a Tutor jet like a T-37. Those people who go to helicopter or multi-engine wings start out with 130 hours on the Tutor. We could take that part and turn it into a turbo-prop trainer element, such as you have, although you take it to wings level and we would not be particularly inclined to do that. We would retain a common basic training element on the turbo-prop trainer, which would in all likelihood be owned by the contractor. So he would buy our equivalent of your PC-9 and we would buy the training time from him, but we would be employing the instructors.

Actually, it can have exactly the opposite impact to what you are concerned about. We do not have the flexibility, given the approach we take to capital equipment procurement, to work in a market place. And there is an enormous market place out there. We have had a lot of people over the years come to us asking us to train their pilots. We presently train some Turks and some Caribbean students, but there are a lot of other traditional customers of the Canadian training system who would like to come back to us.

There is, however, a basic rigidity built into our approach to capital procurement. We could not buy aeroplanes in order to train Danes, for example, but a contractor can. And we would then have more instructors because we would be training other people's students, as we used to many years ago, in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and subsequently in the NATO training scheme. So, if we go this route - and in fact it is starting to happen already - I would envisage that, because now we have three streams, we can offer just about any training package that anybody conceivably could wish. So we are basically in the international training market, with our own instructors.

**Squadron Leader R. Vickery (RNZAF Air Staff, Wellington):** In your study of air power you made considerable use of scenario studies to formulate your air power theses. One of the key elements of the New Zealand Defence Force revised planning system is similar use of illustrative scenarios to test strategic statements and formulate force development plans. I guess the question is which scenario do you choose, who chooses them, and how often are they updated? Could you shed some light on this please?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** The point I was making is that we have failed to do what you are suggesting. That is, we simply took the scenarios and let that be our doctrine. Political decisions which determined the roles that we would perform, and the equipment we would use from time to time, became our employment doctrine, and we lost track of the fundamentals of an air force.

For example, when we were in Europe post-Berlin/early 1950s, we had the F-86. Then Canadian industry produced an interceptor for NORAD, that was exported to our Air Division in Europe and so we became an all-weather fighter force. And then a decision was made to get us into the nuclear business, and we got the F-104 and became nuclear. Then France would not let us have nuclear weapons on French soil, so we got into the reconnaissance business instead. Then the government decided that nuclear was nasty, so we converted all of those 104s into conventional attack.

We've created generations of fighter pilots who have been trained to do this or that, or this or that, and none of them have had any real concept of what part fighter aircraft were designed to play in an air force. That is the scenario orientation that I was referring to, and that is starting at the wrong end in my view.

# **THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE IN INCREASING REGIONAL RESILIENCE**

**Air Commodore F.X. Soejitno**

As we all know, the international situation has recently gone through some significant changes that require special attention. The end of the Cold War between the Western and Eastern Blocs has an impact on policy orientation for all nations in the economic, political, and social culture areas, as well as in defence and security. The post-Cold War period poses new challenges that may detract from security and stability. The presence of multi-polarisation and mutual dependency is causing inter-relationships among countries in the Asian region to undergo some changes, particularly due to economic factors. The new structure does not always create harmony and stability. Competition for technological opportunities and resources, as well as markets, is getting stronger. Nationalism has become narrow and inter-ethnic strains also threaten stability.

On the other hand, the positive side of the end of the Cold War is the reality that countries have concentrated more on improving their own welfare matters. Better directed and effective economic development is required for the improvement of people's standards and prestige. Considering that economic development requires a solid and stable condition nationally and regionally, the existence of national and regional resilience is very necessary. Such a condition may be better acquired when neighbouring countries in this region manage to establish better mutual cooperation.

In this respect the Air Force community - as an integral part of the armed forces of each country - may take a great role in supporting the stability of each nation, and mutually supporting the regional stability and, simultaneously, the expected regional resilience. The forms of regional cooperation which may be implemented by an Air Force are, among others: establishing the security of scarce regional technological and human resources, and the effective utilisation of aerospace. In fact, we in the Indonesian Air Force have done all these things,

and come up with reasonably pleasing results. However, when related to developments in the international situation mentioned above, such cooperation still needs a broader spectrum and as well as increased frequency and quality.

## **The Development of the Indonesian Air Force**

To understand the outlook of today's Indonesian Air Force, and its future development, we must flash back to the history of its founding. The Indonesian Air Force, as with the Indonesian Armed Forces as a whole, was established in the midst of the Indonesian population while defending their freedom. From the beginning, the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force identity and personality was conceived as more than that of just professional soldiers; above all, they were required to be patriots.

Another typical characteristic of the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force is its absolute fusion with the population. It is impossible to separate these Forces from the Indonesian people's problems in matters of ideology, politics, economy, social culture, as well as security and defence. This is at the root of the manifestation of the Indonesian Armed Forces, including the Indonesian Air Force, embodying two functions: the defence function, and the social political function. For the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force these latent functions are two sides of the one coin.

The Indonesian Air Force was formed as an integral part of the Indonesian Armed Forces to achieve objectives identical with the national goals. The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states those goals as being: to form the national government for the protection of the entire people and land of Indonesia; to improve the prosperity of the community; and at the same time further the betterment of the world based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice. In connection with these national objectives, the Indonesian Armed Forces (and that covers the Indonesian Air Force), in its role as the nation's defence and security power, functions as early preventer and opponent of every threat, domestic as well as from abroad. It also acts as the people's instructor in implementing national defence and security tasks.

As a social political power, the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force acts as the dynamiser and stabiliser. Together with other social political powers, it performs tasks and responsibilities for establishing security, making a success of the nation's struggle for well-deserved independence, and as well, improving the welfare of the entire Indonesian people.

Based on the concept of war and peace described above, and in comparison with how other nations achieve their national objectives, Indonesians do not emphasise the country's military physical strength but, instead, the people's moral strength and will to consistently defend their freedom and sovereignty. The defence and security means are therefore put into balance, into harmony with efforts in the fields of politics, economics and social culture, so that the whole makes for an integrated effort containing authority and independence. This concept is called the National Resilience, and is one of the National Doctrines that forms a substratum to the way of thinking and acting within the scope of guidelines for the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force.

Holding to the National Defence concept, the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force adhere to the belief that the prevention and extermination of threats to the existence of the nation, both from inside as well as from outside, is not possible of achievement through military capability alone.

The National Resilience states that, to face and overcome a threat to the country, a dynamic condition of the nation should be created in all its integrated aspects, revealing perseverance, and integrity capable of being turned into strong national power. The result aimed for by this doctrine is the abstract one of deterrence effect, both in security as well as prosperity aspects. We emphasise the persuasion factor more, rather than that of military power stated in the doctrine of force and authority (power concept).

Through this brief explanation of the concept of National Resilience, it may be connoted that Indonesia emphasises self-reliance in defending its sovereignty and nationhood. However, because priority is given to creating conditions for peace, we always put effort into the chance of establishing cooperation with others, particularly neighbouring countries.

As has been stated above, the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force has, as its typical identity and personality requires, that its members be patriots above all, then professional soldiers. It has dual functions in national defence and social politics.

Based on these characteristics, the prime tasks of the Indonesian Air Force are:

- As the upholder of sovereignty in the air, maintain the integrity of national airspace and keep law-enforcement supremacy in the air, both independently or together with other defence and security power components of the country.
- Develop the national potential in defence and security power in the air medium.
- As a social political power, participate in the field of social politics in providing security and making a success of the nation's struggle to preserve its independence, while improving prosperity for all Indonesians based on Pancasila (the state philosophy) and the 1945 Constitution.
- Guarantee every effort and activity in furthering implementation of the prime tasks as stated above.

With reference to the prime tasks, the role of the Indonesian Air Force in the defence and security of the country is to defend the air space dimension, so as to be capable of guaranteed command and control of the air space over the national territory. The role covers every effort based on command and control of the national air space, including activities to develop Air Force power to give shape to its posture in accordance with demands of the time, and establishing the operational readiness of its units during peace or war.

Based on the prime tasks and role stated, the policies and strategic development of the Indonesian Air Force are aimed at giving shape to the deterrence power of the nation by optimally applying national resources to its efficient use. This will be accomplished, firstly, by developing the potential for building the capability of the entire Indonesian people as the executors and source of national security power in the national defence system. Secondly, the Indonesian Armed



Forces/Indonesian Air Force must be built as the nucleus of a national defence system. This must have ready ability in the form of small, effective, and efficient elements having sufficient reserve power, be capable of being expanded within a short time, possess high mobility, and have developed ability as a social political power operating in a harmonious way.

The capabilities required of the Indonesian Air Force has always derived from the six capabilities determined for the Indonesian Armed Forces. These are:

- strategic intelligence,
- defence,
- security,
- social political,
- territorial, and
- support.

To support the realisation of these six Indonesian Armed Forces capabilities, the effort of developing the Air Force involves five typically Indonesian capabilities. Therefore the power of the Indonesian Air Force comes into shape as the following capabilities:

- basic air operation,
- specific air operation,
- air space establishment potential,
- support, and
- social political.

The basic and specific air operation capabilities are universal characteristics of all air forces, while the three others are specific to the Indonesian Air Force as an integral part of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

Implementing capability development is done in stages, as an integral part of National Development. These stages are described in the Development Program of the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Air Force for a five-year period, in accordance with the Five-Year Development Program. This will be revised from time to time, taking into account current environmental developments, so that adaptations will always be possible.

## **Regional Security Cooperation**

National welfare is principally a dynamic condition in which every territory is supported by National Development along with high national stability. National stability itself cannot be separated from national and regional resilience that guarantee it. Regional resilience is a dynamic condition within a region, reflecting the state of the national resilience of each member country, the level of interaction among countries, their commitment to the region, and the adaptive capability of the region in facing challenges and opportunities.

Elements which constitute regional resilience are as follows:

- The national resilience of each member country, which is an important element of regional resilience because it is recognised that the collective contribution of all nations is important to the viability of the region as a whole.
- Interaction among member countries contributes towards the total sum of cohesiveness and an attitude of accommodation, and is necessary to enable the region to withstand pressure and eventually rebound to its natural state.
- The degree of commitment to the region of each member country is an important ingredient - the greater the degree of each country, the higher the resilience of the region.
- The ability and capacity of the region to adapt itself and to respond accordingly to a changing environment.

The requirement for regional resilience itself derives from consideration of the following factors:

- a mutual interest in guarding and creating stability, particularly in overcoming the post-Cold War threat and supporting a positive condition of development;

- limited resources of each country, due to the high costs of air space technology, may be overcome by utilising together every air space installation, equipment and facility in the region;
- the geographical closeness of nations in the region means they have a mutual interest in the political, economic, and social culture fields;
- the direct connection between national and regional stability; and
- the direct connection between national and regional resilience.

Regional security cooperation has two principal objectives. These are firstly, to create peace for the countries in the region and secondly, to meet the possibility of enforced desire from countries outside the region that may harm the interests of countries within it.

In furthering regional security cooperation it is agreed that a military pact should not be formed, because such would invite suspicion from extra-regional powers. For that reason future security and defence cooperation should be built on firm and strong bilateral relationships between individual countries. Furthermore, the enhancement of bilateral defence cooperation among countries in the region will contribute positively to overall security.

In general, this condition has existed and been realised by nations in the region. But to reach the desired level of regional security in the future, these factors still need to be developed, particularly in regard to guarding stability and improving the economic development of each country.

Indonesia and a number of ASEAN member countries are presently in the process of development. For these countries, economic conditions play a very important role in determining their defence budget. Indonesia always puts demands for the development of defence power at minimal levels so as not to disturb the development process.

Pursuing security cooperation represents an effective method for guaranteeing defence power in the long term, and reducing security risks due to having strength below the minimum necessary. Efficiency may also be improved

through common utilisation of relatively small resources to develop a function to provide a supporting infrastructure. For instance, supporting infrastructures might be handled by or utilised among a number of air forces in the region.

While ASEAN has been successful in developing a cooperative mechanism in the political field, up to the present time cooperation in the defence sector is generally still at the bilateral level. Development of capabilities involving sophisticated technology provides however, a particularly strong motivation towards cooperation. When undertaken with development of the infrastructure of the industrial sector (as a means of supporting other military equipment), as well as operational infrastructures that further defence goals, such cooperation will have a spill-over effect in other industrial sectors where its impact will be felt in macro-economic development. The condition of South-East Asia in respect of air space in general, and air forces particularly, makes it highly possible that initiatives can be developed into regional security cooperation.

The effort of establishing friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries is given shape by planned arrangements and agreements. The following description outlines the state of cooperation between Indonesia and its neighbours at the present time.

### **Cooperation with Malaysia**

In consideration of the security situation and condition of the border region between the two countries, the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia have increased their cooperation through the formation of a number of working groups in accordance with the 1972 Security Arrangement, which was revised on 3 December 1984. Basically, this agreement provides for the formation of a security committee (General Border Committee/GBC) in the border area, and stipulations on the operational performance by armed forces units of the two countries.

Principally, the 'Security Arrangement 1972' between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia means that:

- operationally, it is possible for armed forces units of both countries to implement operations which may involve border crossings in hot pursuit, to prevent and stop illegal activities in the border area;

- strategically, there is an arrangement offering opportunities for cooperation in non-operational matters for the armed forces of both countries, including their air forces; and
- politically, the arrangement also allows for developing the concept of national resilience, which in turn is of importance to regional resilience.

Operational units are formed as instruments of the GBC to handle matters with an air dimension. A planning team representing the Air Force has been established to organise coordinated air defence. It coordinates the activities covering the Malacca Strait region entailing the mobilisation of air force power and facilities. It also supervises and protects the security stability in the border area of both countries. Aside from operational activities, cooperation includes an exercise area for operational squadrons, and educational activities for both officers and non-commissioned personnel. An example of the close bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is the joint exercise Elang Malindo XV, carried out at Butterworth and Medan in the middle of September 1992.

### **Cooperation with the Philippines**

Relations between Indonesia and the Philippines have traditionally been going on for hundreds of years, particularly between the community around the Sangir Talaud archipelago of Indonesia and the South Mindanauan people in the Republic of the Philippines. Cooperative contacts have been increasing over recent years, furthering an agreement pioneered over 25 years ago.

The establishment of a Border Crossing Agreement/Border Patrol Agreement (BCA/BPA) was due to the border situation between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines in the regions of Marore, Kawalusa, Miangas, Mabila, and Cape St. Agustin. The communities in these regions are very closely related to one another, through common descendants and social, cultural and economic links over generations. Such relationships cannot be broken, though there is a border dividing the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines. This living reality goes on, regardless of the border. In recognition of this fact, Indonesia and the Philippines formed a bilateral agreement to organise the relations of communities in the border of both countries.

In the course of organising cooperation between the Republic of Indonesia and the Philippines a number of areas have been pioneered to provide a legal basis, among which are:

- joint directives and guidelines on implementing an Immigration Agreement on Repatriation and a Border Crossing Agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines, dated 16 September 1965; and
- a Border Patrol Agreement and revisions to the Border Crossing Agreement, signed in Manila on 1 July 1975

Activities conducted by the two countries up to the present time include:

- posting of a Liaison Officer in Davao;
- posting of communication and electronics officials and personnel at Border Crossing Stations in Mabila, Cape St. Agustin and Bagao;
- formation of Border Crossing Posts in Miangas, Marore, and Tarakan; and
- placing a Coordinated Security Patrol at the border.

Since, geographically, the ocean dominates much of the border between the two countries, the Navy performs many patrol activities. At the same time however, the Air Force regularly carries out maritime patrol activities in support of the Navy. While the Air Forces of the two countries have not, up to the present, exercised together, it is hoped that this will happen at some time in the near future.

### **Cooperation with Singapore**

Formerly, cooperation with Singapore was limited only to exercises with each other's Army, Navy and Air Force, but this has been increased now to include joint utilisation of facilities to the benefit of both countries.

Up to July 1992, joint exercises between the Indonesian Air Force and the RSAF named 'Elang Indopura' have been held seven times. This cooperation has been expanded with the signing of cooperation agreements covering an air weapon range as well as an air combat maneuvering range in Sumatra.

In the frame-work of security cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore, the formation of a joint committee to manage and coordinate patrols between the Indonesian Armed Forces and Singapore Armed Forces has been discussed.

### **Cooperation with Thailand**

Cooperation between Indonesia and Thailand is still in the form of tactical air operations exercises, which have been held on seven occasions so far. These joint exercises are called 'Elang Thainesia' and this coming November a meeting is to take place in Bangkok to arrange 'Elang Thainesia VIII'.

Another form of cooperation working towards better and closer friendship between both Air Forces involves a program of exchange visits by young officers. Cooperation between the Indonesian Air Force and the Royal Thai Air Force also covers the employment of Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI). A memorandum of understanding covering ACMI equipment owned by the RTAF has been agreed upon.

### **Cooperation with Australia**

The particular topic of cooperation relevant to Australia concerns the continental shelf in the Timor Gap. During discussions in Jakarta in September 1988, Australia and Indonesia agreed to cooperate in forming a joint development zone and have followed up by completing negotiations to organise and perfect a draft agreement on the whole. A draft treaty has been agreed upon which covers various aspects, such as the regulation of oil and natural gas mining, and the method of profit sharing.

In furtherance of this agreement, meetings between teams from the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have met to discuss maritime surveillance needs resulting from a mutual agreement. In line with the agreement produced at the higher level, the Indonesian Air Force and the

RAAF have continued their cooperation in training and education matters having more of an 'air dimension'. So far, joint exercises involving cargo dropping have been carried out twice between C-130 crews and as well, airman-to-airman talks between fighter pilots of the two Air Forces have taken place twice. In the field of education exchange, officers have been sent to the command and staff college.

In accordance with the policy of the government of Indonesia, all forms of regional security and resilience cooperation mentioned above are done bilaterally. Each country has felt the benefits of such cooperation, though it has not been implemented at its optimal level. In developing security cooperation among the countries in the South-East Asian region there seem to be some constraints, internal as well as external, among which are:

- differing perceptions of the form of cooperation needed and the threat that exists to the region, which still require intensive effort to minimise the dissimilarities, and
- the failure of regional countries to seriously and consistently implement the concept of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) and the NWFZ (Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) previously agreed upon.

Cooperation activities still need to be improved, particularly the realisation of regional resilience which is so necessary to the welfare of each country.

### **The Concept of Improving Cooperation**

Apart from explaining the regional security cooperation that has been going on to date, effort is still required to develop it so that each country gains the maximum benefit. The goal of this effort is to improve the capability of each nation's air force and their regional resilience, which in turn may create regional stability.

To achieve this target there is a wide area of opportunities which can be identified from time to time, according to the need and capability. Based on the experience and observations of the Indonesian Air Force, the priority areas for



attention are: regional security, environment control, SAR, contraband, meteorology, communications, manufacturing and services, science and technology, and research and development.

To realise cooperation targets as stated above, a strategy for improvement needs to be organised, focussed on the factors of potentials, constraints, opportunity, and challenges. Existing potentials that may motivate cooperation in the region are:

- a shared perception among the nations in the region on the importance of the role of air power;
- political will based on the consciousness of each nation to realise regional stability;
- means and infrastructures through which each nation may equip one another, which represent 'capital' in cooperation; and
- relatively steady regional stability.

Constraints that may be encountered are:

- differences in economic and technology levels among nations, and
- doctrinal differences between nations, revealed through differences of opinion on the importance of creating military alliances and the presence of foreign air bases in the region - aside from which, differences are still reflected in opinions on such issues as ZOPFAN.

Motivation towards improving cooperation may come from existing opportunities, mainly as follows:

- the post-Cold War period has oriented nations more towards achieving prosperity through international cooperation, a condition which is highly conducive to realising mutual cooperation in various fields;
- rapid economic growth in the Pacific Rim driving regional cooperation in the frame-work of maintaining and improving regional stability; and

- the potential for air power of each nation being utilised for cooperation.

A number of challenging factors should be taken into consideration in realising and improving cooperation. These factors are, among others:

- a military power vacuum could invite foreign great powers into the region;
- border conflicts and disputes over natural resources are still going on in a number of regions;
- arms competition is still occurring in the region;
- conditions for domestic security to become critical are still possible in each nation; and
- different conceptions of regional security still exist in each nation.

To give shape to well-established cooperation, a number of principles need to be emphasised to form a basis. These principles are:

- **Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states**, reflecting respect for both intra- and extra-regional interests of the Association as well as each member country.
- **Abstention from threat or use of force**. Divergence of interests may lead to intra-regional tension, which in turn adversely affects the resilience of the Association; therefore, in time of tension, each member country should adhere to this principle.
- **Peaceful settlement of disputes**. Should any dispute arise within the region, as a result of intra- or extra-regional conflicts, this principle should guide the parties concerned.
- **Equal rights, self determination and non-interference**. Reflect the commitment of each member state to be responsible for its own affairs and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

- **Regional solidarity and cooperation in all areas.** The credibility of ASEAN upon rests its integrity as one indivisible entity; nations in the region may also create positive credibility through unity.
- Giving attention to the living reality in one's own country, as well as the countries in the region.
- Giving attention to mutual interests beneficial to each country in the region.
- Creating mutual confidence.

The concept of improving cooperation has to cover the spectrum and intensity of cooperation. The spectrum may be determined in accordance with the demands of time and each country's ability. In the future, such spectrum should cover the fields of regional security, environment control, technology, human resources, SAR, and military and civilian facilities. The intensity of cooperation, as mentioned, may be improved according to the demand, time, and strategic environment that is influencing our region - always taking into consideration the condition of each country.

Measures to be taken, among others, are:

- Increased mutual understanding to create similar perceptions. This may be done through expanding cooperation in the fields of education and training.
- Discussion to advance a common concept for improving regional security. ASEAN's concept of regional resilience may well be used as initial start-point.
- Expanding cooperation not merely among air forces, but in air power as well.

Indonesia could take a positive role in promoting regional cooperation in air power, considering that it has a number of comparative supremacies - particularly its geographic location and the availability of its aircraft industry. Such a positive role may be directed towards the following choices:

- the regional security field, covering joint border patrols, joint exercises, aerial survey, information and publication exchange, combined communication procedures, border crossing procedures, and handling of the problem of 'black flights';
- the environment control field, covering communication procedures, sea surveillance, early detection systems, and common law enforcement procedures;
- the technological field, covering exchange of information and publications, utilisation of the products of research and development, scientific meeting forums, joint projects, and accident investigation;
- human resources, covering exchange of officers and experts, education and training;
- search and rescue, covering communication procedures and the carrying out of SAR, and joint exercises; and
- Military and civilian facilities, covering manufacturing, maintenance, aviation medicine, education and training.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, it will be seen that enhancing cooperation among the air forces in our region depends on several essential factors. These include the ending of the Cold War and a resultant flourishing orientation towards accomplishing global and regional prosperity. Especially for our region, the post Cold War inclination will be towards making the Pacific Rim even more stable as a centre for dynamic economic growth. Yet, potential remains for an arms race to destabilise our region.

Therefore, I would say that this is the right moment to implement increased regional cooperation, including among the Air Forces in our region. Through this cooperation we may maintain stability, enjoy its benefits and achieve its advancement. With the experience of cooperation that we have, and the deeper

mutual understanding and realisation of the importance of facing problems together in the region, I have the greatest hope that we can implement and increase the best cooperation.

These are some views of the Indonesian Air Force, which I think would result in improved cooperation in achieving regional resilience. I am certain that the views we hold are entirely based on the concept of regional resilience itself.

## **Discussion**

**Squadron Leader G. Cull (RAAF College):** Defence or security cooperation has to start with a first step. Given the emphasis that has been placed in a number of speeches today on the economic approach of ASEAN, would that first step perhaps be more through economic cooperation of the defence infrastructures of the region rather than direct or closer military ties?

**Air Commodore Soejitno:** I think your view is quite right. We emphasise not merely military cooperation but other factors: socio-cultural and economic, as well as political. That is why we believe that cooperation should enhance national resilience for each member country in the region, because that will create resilience for the region as well.

**Air Commodore N. Middleton (HQ ADF):** Towards the end of your speech you mentioned combined communications policy. I am not sure whether your reference was to air force-to-air force communications, defence-defence communications or indeed some form of joining of the civil infrastructures. Would you care to expand on what you proposed at that point?

**Air Commodore Soejitno:** We are discussing air force cooperation among nations in this region, but the Indonesian Air Force cannot stand alone; it is part of the Armed Forces as a whole. So, if we are discussing cooperation in communications, it must be for the Armed Forces as well as for the Air Force. This also goes for civilian proposals, things like search and rescue, and disaster relief. They must be considered along with the military and air force aspects.

**Mr P. Somerville (Aviation Report):** I think I heard in your presentation a reference to confidence-building measures. One of the matters you averted to, but did not go into detail about, was your aircraft industry in Indonesia. Can you talk a little about what could possibly be done in a cooperative way within the region involving Australia or the members of ASEAN?

**Air Commodore Soejitno:** I did mention the Indonesian aircraft industry. But since a previous speaker - my friend from Singapore - has already explored this area in depth and at greater length I do not think it appropriate for me to go into it further, apart from repeating that we do utilise this industry for cooperative purposes between Indonesia and Singapore, and also with Malaysia as well.

## **CLOSING ADDRESS AND SUMMATION**

### **Air Marshal I.B. Gration**

Contrary to what the program says, I will not be making a presentation. Rather, I thought it might be useful if, in a slightly inchoate way, I simply tried to draw out the essence of the points made by the excellent speakers we have had today which were particularly relevant to the topic. I am not sure how long that will take, because - as I say - it is fairly unstructured, but I would suggest probably ten or fifteen minutes. We will then have a short break and I will then ask today's speakers to join me on the platform for an open forum. This will be an opportunity for the questions that you might have wanted to ask earlier in the day, and also for a discussion to-and-fro, if that is what you want.

Knowing that I was going to be in this capacity at the end of the conference, I listened very carefully to all the speakers. I will not attempt to sum up what each of the speakers said - no doubt you listened to them all just as I did - but I was delighted with the ground we covered today. I was really encouraged, firstly, by the way the first two speakers set the scene for what the conference was about. Then the other speakers filled in, each from their own perspective of their own country, in a way that has left us now, at this point in the afternoon, with some real convictions about what air power can contribute to regional cooperation.

Two or three points struck me very starkly, and I am sure you would share these with me. Firstly, every speaker clearly agreed - and indeed, two or three argued positively - as to why regional cooperation is essential. That is a good starting point. If we are all agreed that there is scope and a need for regional cooperation, then we have achieved something today.

Secondly, you will have all been struck by the similarity of the comments that the speakers made. Each of them prepared their addresses quite independently, and yet through all of them there was a common theme which you would have identified. And some of the specific recommendations were almost identical.

That encourages me again to believe that, not only is there quite general agreement that we need this sort of cooperation, but that there is also agreement about what types of cooperation are practicable.

Thirdly - and I guess this is where we will leave the conference - if those two assumptions are correct, where do we go from here? How do we now initiate the ideas that have been floated around today? Some of the measures are there waiting to be initiated, in my view. Some are quite simple, and some have already been employed on a bilateral basis. The opportunity now is there, I think, to perhaps extend that within the region - as one of the speakers said - in a continuing bilateral way, but increasing the number of parties involved so that we have a mesh of bilateral arrangements. That is not only a strong arrangement, as the speaker pointed out, but it is one that allows account to be taken of many of the sensitivities which two or three of speakers quite properly identified.

So, as I said at the beginning, I was hoping the day would be productive and I believe it has been in that way. I thought it might be useful to attempt to draw together the general thrust. You may not agree with my summing up, by the way. It does reflect my own personal views which I touched on at the beginning, in my introduction.

One of the first points that seemed to me absolutely essential, and underpinning nearly all the comments which the speakers made, was what I call the personal dimension. Many of us here have seen this in operation - I know I have in my own personal experiences with the other chiefs. I think, too, our CDF has been recognised throughout the region as strongly encouraging and working on personal relationships at his level. The concept can be worked at every level, and I believe that - probably more than any of the other single initiatives mentioned by the speakers today - development of relationships on a personal level is probably the best cooperation we can have within the region.

There are some very obvious reasons for this. Firstly, it increases trust. You understand what the other person is about, where he or she is coming from. You know - or at least have a good understanding of - how the individual thinks or approaches problems, and you have better awareness of the culture, the politics and the general dimensions behind that person's reaction. That sort of understanding and mutual trust can only be beneficial when problems arise. I



can think of at least two examples where significant political problems have arisen in the public forum between Australia and other nations of the region, and yet, partly because of personal relationships, particularly at the senior level, the defence relationship has continued almost untouched. That has to be very good for the region. So the personal dimension to cooperation is, I think, absolutely critical.

Of course, we have in place already much of that. We have airmen-to-airmen talks between several couples of parties. We do not - at least we in Australia do not - do that with every nation in the region, but there is no reason why we should not do so. My own experience has been that we start these airmen-to-airmen talks at around deputy chief level, and if the groundwork is done properly and that turns out to be a successful arrangement it can be extended vertically up and down - down probably to a unit level, if that is appropriate. Having pilots at a flight commander level within a squadron talking to their counterparts from another nation builds trust, and builds understanding.

Another attraction of this sort of approach is that it is very flexible and very easy to put into place. Really, to make it effective the only thing that is required, and you should all be very good at this, is adequate preliminary staff work. This ensures that you are not just going through the motions of airmen-to-airmen talks but are, in fact, discussing concrete matters. I would qualify that, however, by saying - and again this is a personal view - that the real benefit of such talks is not the substance of the discussions, but what goes on behind them: again, understanding the other person and developing mutual trust.

That notion leads me to what I thought was the second of the areas that were touched on by many of the speakers. I call it 'the intellectual level' but that is probably just shorthand. What I am referring to here is opening up what some people term 'transparency' although that is not accurate in this particular case - perhaps visibility is a better word. An example of this might be developments at a capital equipment level, and this is probably very pertinent to events of the last few days. Where a nation is going to take a major capital equipment decision, that action should be conveyed quickly to its neighbours, to avoid surprises and explain the rationale behind the government's decision. Again, that sort of activity encourages trust.

The principle can be extended also into intellectual groupings such as the RAAF's Air Power Studies Centre. That organisation, headed by Group Captain Hamwood, exists to encourage, primarily within Australia, thinking about topics of interest. But of course, from a regional point of view, these sorts of organisations can be open to the whole region. The essence here is getting people who share a particular problem to sit down and talk about it in an unfettered intellectual way. That can range from, at one end of the spectrum, long-term fellowships where students might attend one of these centres of learning for perhaps twelve months or six months or three months or whatever, down through workshops to a very informal unstructured level of a short visit. Again, building up trust and understanding, but this time using the *lingua franca* of air power which I mentioned at the outset today, to discuss whatever it is that is useful within the region. I am not suggesting that should just be done at an Air Power Studies Centre in Australia, but rather you can do that wherever it is convenient within the region. So it is very flexible, and once again it simply stretches peoples' brains and allows all the best ideas to come out.

That leads me to the third area which was touched on in various ways by virtually all the speakers, which is communications. You can take this to mean whatever is appropriate. Either we are talking in technical terms, as one of the questions from the floor was about, or you can use communications in the sense of what I am trying to do now - communicate to you. But again, regional cooperation rests on adequate communications of the latter type in particular, ensuring once again that we understand what each other is doing, that we know why they are doing it, and that we have openness, visibility and trust.

You might recall that I spoke of three different avenues of cooperation, the third of which was drawing on our air power skills in a non-military or a quasi-military way, that is, in a support way. Communications is one of those aspects. As an example we might consider developing the ability to transfer information among like-minded people within the region, in a way akin to the press networks that operate around the world. One country - this is what I envisage anyway - might have a piece of information which may be of interest to its neighbours. This information would be put 'on the line' for the neighbours to see. If they are not interested they do nothing with it, but, if they are interested, they pick it up and use it in whatever way they wish. Of course, I am talking unclassified information - or at least information of limited classification or of a general nature - but which encourages neighbours to believe that there are no surprises

and they know what is going on. This can be done so easily with the technology available to us right now. In a limited way it can be done on a telephone, but it can be expanded to video conferencing, teleconferencing, and, of course, all the other normal facilities. So it seems to me there is much that can be done in the way of conveying information, quite apart from the technological.

One of the questions asked earlier on was about confidence-building measures, and again that aspect was touched on by a number of speakers. Most of you would be familiar with the various lists of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) that have been prepared by various speakers - indeed I think Professor Ball, who is here, made a list recently. You recall that CSBMs originated in the European scene and were there to try to lessen tensions between the major protagonists of the Cold War, but they were later extended into the North Asia region. The present Governor-General of Australia, Mr Hayden, made some suggestions when he was Foreign Minister for introducing CSBMs into Northern Asia, to try to minimise the interaction between the US and the Soviet Union in an unfriendly way. He did not get much of a hearing at the time, for some fairly understandable reasons, but I think those ideas have found their time. The list that Professor Ball made of CSBMs for the North Pacific-Northern Asia area is now very relevant and many of them have been touched on today.

Among CSBMs there are particular possibilities that seem relevant to our air power understanding, and perhaps I could draw out some of these. But let me firstly emphasise what the purpose of CSBMs would be in a regional context. The aim would be to break down barriers of mistrust and misunderstanding, and increase visibility to avoid surprises. That is a shorthand way of describing what we are about. Some of the commonly listed CSBMs I have already covered under the headings of personal and intellectual links. Encouraging professional openness captures both the personal and intellectual headings that I used.

Access to published papers, reviews and doctrinal manuals is another one. Much of that already occurs within the region but there is scope for doing a lot more. One thing that does not get mentioned in any of the CSBM lists is the follow-up explanations that go with such access. Sure, Australia can produce air power manuals of one sort or another, and make them available to our neighbours if

they wish to use them. This is, however, much more effective if we then send people to the various countries who can explain the thoughts behind the manual. And of course Australia has done that.

In April this year some of you may have attended the CGS Exercise in Darwin where the Malaysian Defence Minister proposed, among other things, establishment of a forum for regional defence dialogue. I alluded to this earlier when I was talking about centres of intellectual study. One of the advantages of the sort of proposal that the Minister made was that such a forum does not need to be locked into bricks and mortar in one particular place. A forum is whatever you want to make it, and it can be moved around the region quite flexibly. So the notion of bringing together, intellectually, people who want to talk about various problems is a very flexible approach, and it can be done very easily within the region.

I think that to extend the concept that the Minister had at the time, we would probably need some sort of monitoring secretariat if you like. I am not talking about building up a big staff entity, so much as establishing points of contact in each of the participating countries. Using communications and the visibility that I have alluded to, it would be possible to discuss in advance and to prepare just how those forums can be used.

From most of the speakers we also heard more practical and, in fact, quite familiar, operational capabilities and various activities that we can undertake. They are primarily of a military nature, or what I call quasi-military, and you will recall many of them. All three of the Asian neighbours spoke of regional maritime and airspace surveillance regimes. I think they are well understood by most people here. There are difficulties in setting up such regimes, but there are also good pay-offs. All of us in the region share problems that would benefit from application of air power to maritime and airspace surveillance.

I know there are technical difficulties in doing some of those things - particularly surveillance - but where there is a will, there is a way. And we have already demonstrated in the South-West Pacific just what can be done in maritime surveillance, even with nations with rather uneven capabilities. In this case I am thinking of Air Marshal Hosie's mention of the application of New Zealand

and Australian P3s to surveillance of the EEZs of some of the South-West Pacific nations - and not just surveillance, but the transmission in an effective way of the intelligence gained to the user nations.

Two of the speakers also mentioned search and rescue, and all three of the Asian speakers spoke of environmental protection. Both of those are very real problems that we all face, particularly the environmental one, and there are real, practical ways that nations in the region now can get together to help all of us cope with those problems. A more difficult one, touched on by at least one of the speakers, was establishment of multilateral cooperative arrangements for coordinating government and non-government responses to natural disasters. I admit the speaker did not use those words but that is what I think he was referring to.

Again, some of this occurs in the region now, particularly involving Australia and New Zealand in the South-West Pacific, where our neighbours are much less well-placed to deal with a natural disaster than we are. But the real advantage is to plan the cooperation in advance. What we all tend to do at the moment, as most of you understand, is wait for the natural disaster to occur before then drawing on our military prowess to quickly get together and provide assistance as best we can. I think we can do better than that, and again this is neutral in respect of capabilities within the country.

All the nations in the region who would benefit should participate in a thinking way, not necessarily in assets. Some of the obvious contributions would be air transport support, but less obvious is the skills developed in most of the air forces of the region for planning, movement control and communications. All the nations have skills in those areas, and yet we do not really bring them together in a very cohesive way. The skills are there, and so is the opportunity.

There are some other less obvious things. Such things as engineering skills - not necessarily within the air forces of the region, but within the defence forces of the region - wide engineering skills. The sort of get-together of minds we have here today allows nations to tap into not just brother air forces but brother services. Let us look at administrative skills too. Most of the countries of the region have traditionally developed within the military strong administrative skills. Yet in a governmental and non-military sense, those sorts of capabilities are - I think - under-used.

There are a number of other points raised by the each of the speakers, but in trying to draw all of them together - and I have done this twice now during the day - I keep coming back to the original points I made. Most of the ideas that have been put forward are very practicable and could be implemented virtually immediately. Recognition of the need is there, and the capability, and so too is the will in many cases. The three fundamentals underpinning each of them are the personal contact, the intellectual exchanges that I mentioned, and communications in the widest sense of transferring information between ourselves.

We have the opportunity. Where do we go next? From the Royal Australian Air Force's point of view, I have gained a number of ideas from the speakers today. I believe that there are initiatives that I can personally push, in the hope that - in whatever way Australia can - we can really contribute to the visibility, to the understanding, to the absence of surprises within the region.

## PLENARY DISCUSSION

**Squadron Leader D. Tramoundanis** (RAAF Staff College): I have a question for Professor Dibb. In your talk this morning, you speculated on several possible developments in regional cooperation. One of these was surveillance information and intelligence sharing. Do you see that this will be feasible with the current lack of a regional security arrangement, or forum for dialogue, and the apparent reluctance of some of our neighbours to create such a forum, preferring to maintain a network of bilateral arrangements instead?

**Professor Dibb:** Well, it will not be easy. We are embarking on a new path. Traditionally, Australia has only exchanged intelligence with its close allies - the United States, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. But there is already a network of bilateral intelligence assessment exchanges between our national bodies, that is, between the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and each of the ASEAN countries. Every year they have what are called Intexes or intelligence exchanges, which are formal conferences. Similar arrangements exist between the Defence Intelligence Organisation and each of the ASEAN countries. So, at the national assessments level, there are already in place significant exchanges.

To build on that - you are quite right - will demand trust, as CAS has said, and need to be done incrementally. There will be issues of what are called third-party releases which affect us and all of our neighbours. But I also agree with CAS where he so accurately said that what we need is visibility. Like him, I do not like the word transparency. There are limits to transparency that I mentioned this morning - in areas such as intelligence sources and methods, stock-holdings, levels of readiness - and any realistic professional military practitioner knows there must be limits to the level of information we are talking about.

But, in addition to the sorts of national assessments that we exchange, it seems to me that there are things to do with, for instance, in the surveillance area, exchanges of information that - to use Professor Ball's words - would be building blocks for confidence. That is, they would focus in the first instance on non-

military issues of surveillance. For instance, illegal fishing, illegal migration and boat people, piracy, environmental pollution, information that would help in search and rescue - the sorts of thing CAS set out so exceptionally well for us.

If we developed that sort of information exchange, building on the national assessments we have and recognising that the exchange of raw data - particularly classified data - is more sensitive, and if we start in the non-military areas and establish trust, then I could see a situation later on where we might exchange somewhat more sensitive information. These are issues that are at the heart of national capabilities, and things will have to be done slowly and incrementally. But, let me stress, this non-military area of surveillance information exchange is, I think, a promising start.

**Air Vice Marshal T. O'Brien (DCAS):** A follow-on question, Professor. Most of my question has been hijacked, but CAS mentioned the effectiveness of the Forum fisheries operation in the South-West Pacific. I believe one of the reasons that has been so successful is because the coordinating body - the Forum itself - is, in fact, a civilian organisation. One of our problems in working military-to-military is with third party source, platform and sensor type information, all of which can be sensitive.

Perhaps we could set up some sort of organisation with a free agent or neutral to manage it. If we could have an individual military cell which would process data and just pass it into a data base, where it would be managed by perhaps, a surveillance authority run by a group of civilians, a neutral group of some sort, we might in fact be able to put this surveillance operation into place a heck of a lot quicker than we will ever be able to do it by going through military bilateral arrangements.

**Squadron Leader R. Smallwood (RAAF Staff College):** My question is to General Huddleston. Sir, the quality of air power relies basically on hardware and personnel. Have you seen any actual evidence, in the Canadian Air Force, of the structural changes now being implemented adversely affecting the qualitative edge of air power?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** I am not sure which changes you are alluding to. The purpose of any structural changes in which we are currently engaged is to improve that qualitative edge. That is to say, within the constraint



of our budget, we have to maintain the combat capabilities which we have developed. We have to take advantage of the opportunity to operate at the reduced readiness level and to maintain the force structure that we would expect to require in times of emergency, otherwise we would be constantly depleting our operational forces below what I would consider to be the critical viable mass. Still, everything that we are currently engaged in is designed to focus on those essential operational capabilities and to maintain them for times of emergency. If there was something that I said specifically that you are questioning, then perhaps I have not answered you.

**Squadron Leader Smallwood:** We are currently going through major structural changes and, as everyone knows, the military tend to be creatures of habit. Change is a very frightening experience. I know that when the Canadians combined their services there was a major change of attitude. Now, coming back into forming the wings, etc, in your organisation, is that having the adverse impact that might have been expected?

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** No, that is having a very positive effect in fact, because it is focussing Air Force minds on what is Air Force business and not trying to fit an air force operational structure into somebody else's mould. Nevertheless, we are not moving away from the unified structure whereby, as an example, our air bases provide support services to Army and Navy units which happen to be in their vicinity. We continue to do that, but not to the detriment of a well-defined Air Force chain of command.

Now, I gather when you refer to structural change you are quite preoccupied with certain directions to look at civilianising or contracting out things. The difference between us - I gather in my short time here - is that we are being allowed to look at those things on our own initiative, at our own pace, and not being driven by the notion that they automatically make sense. By and large, that is a function of the lack of interest of Canadians in defence. We have very few people professing to be experts in how to do our business - they leave it to us. The one thing they do not leave to us is how much money we have, and we then have to make that fit, but as to how we structure ourselves to make that fit we get very little interference. Consequently if we were to allow that qualitative edge to be lost, we would have nobody to blame but ourselves.

**Air Marshal Funnell:** This is not a question but a statement. There is no doubt that today's conference has been highly successful, and the key theme of regional cooperation is, as CAS so well put it, an idea whose time has come. But it is very easy when we discuss really quite complex matters such as these to state general goals. It is ever so much more difficult to give them operational effect. We have been playing around with these notions of regional cooperation for at least the last decade, and progress has been made. But progress has also been slow. I think if we are to have true regional cooperation, and truly resilient relationships, then we are going to have to put more effort into it - each of us individually, and each of our countries.

You spoke, CAS, and you were quite correct in what you said, about the way in which in a couple of recent instances the defence relationship - relying very much on personal contact between senior players - not only survived a ruffling of the surface in the more general relationship, but was in many ways one of the parts of the base on which the general relationship was rebuilt. Nevertheless, I think we would have to say that all of us were a little surprised, given the work that has gone into it over the last decade, at how fragile the surface relationship was. All of us were worried that the problems would soon have come down into the basic defence relationship as well.

I think one of our major problems in this whole area is one of cultural dissonance, the fact that the cultures of the nations here represented and represented in the region are in many cases distinctly different. When I think of some of the difficulties that sometimes arise between the RNZAF and the RAAF, I suppose it is no small wonder when nations which are much more different than those two have difficulties. In most cases we really should not be surprised.

I agree with you the important thing here is personal contact, but what I would encourage is a much greater rate of exchange of people of all ranks between our several services - exchange programs and visits at a much higher level than we have had in the past. Certainly, the medium for those exchanges and visits may well need to be a project or training program, but it is not the project or training program which is of greatest lasting benefit - it is the improved knowledge which comes about through direct contact and a true working relationship that is important. Now, we will have the bean-counters tell us that this is expensive -

hey, it is not expensive at all. Compared with the alternative of a continued lack of knowledge of each other, which can lead to mistrust and breakdown in international relationships, the price is very small indeed.

**H.E. Mr Siagian:** I would just like to follow up on the statement of my good friend, Air Marshal Funnell. I have the feeling that the 'pushing' factor overcoming the sort of timidity in forging a more visible security arrangement could well be having a new president in the White House, Mr Bill Clinton. Barring unforeseen circumstances two or three weeks from now, it could well happen. I am not the only one today who can foresee a gradual reduction in the US military presence in East Asia. That is not necessarily a disaster. It could be a 'pushing' factor for all of us here to get our act together. It does not mean the US will leave East Asia entirely - the trade figures, investment figures, services, chief economic indicators, all that shows they will still be around.

What we are doing here now, in this conference so far, is a sort of warming up to a new security arrangement based on a lower level, a lower equilibrium, in the balance of forces. With that backdrop, the question is what kind of a Japan could we see emerging? Actually the challenge for Japan will be to have the right weapons in East Asia - not too bold but also not too timid. And what kind of China? The 12th Party Congress at least indicates that there will be a sober China gradually emerging, but then it depends on when these old men become disappointed with Marx. If this happens too soon then the whole balance from the Party Congress could become unravelled. These are just responses to Air Marshal Funnell's remarks.

**Squadron Leader D. Deck (RAAF College):** One of the themes which seems to have come from many of the speakers today, notably General Merican but also Air Marshal Hosie and Air Commodore Soejitno, is the idea that an important use of air power or air assets is for what has been termed quasi-military purposes. Some of the uses quoted are fisheries surveillance, law enforcement such customs, disaster relief or environmental protection. These have been raised in terms of both the internal security of each nation and also how they may contribute to regional coöperation.

My question is really three-fold: firstly, to what extent would you see that these quasi-military uses of air assets actually meet regional security needs; secondly, is this quasi-military use of air assets for the time being more important than meeting regional defence needs; and, thirdly, would you see this as an appropriate use of air assets?

**Air Marshal Gration:** Before any of the panel answers, I would like to take the opportunity to very quickly pick up those points. The first one, regarding relevance to regional security: in the sense that one or two of the speakers explained quite well I thought, my answer would be yes. Regional security - taken in the wider sense of the word security - really involves many things other than military solutions, and one of those is the type of quasi-military activities that you mentioned. It would seem to me that a contribution in that way, especially when the region is not facing any identifiable threat, is in fact a very significant contribution to regional security.

To answer your third point as to whether this is a proper use of military assets, I would say absolutely yes - with the one proviso that in force structural terms we do not buy equipment for that purpose. We are really talking here of the equipment, the assets, we already have, being used in an appropriate way in the circumstances. With that proviso I believe the answer is a very strong yes. The middle question - I cannot quite remember it, but I had a very good answer and I think it was no.

**Air Vice Marshal Hosie:** Perhaps I can follow up, and I will begin by fully endorsing all that has just been said. Employment of defence forces on ancillary tasks is a proper use, in my view, because these forces exist. If you look at the question on the basis that we have defence forces for insurance, then it is quite a proper use of them to perform ancillary tasks. In fact we all do this, for example, operating in support of Antarctic programs, EEZ surveillance and so on; the list is long.

Provided that is not the force determinant for purchasing equipment and maintaining it in the first place - in other words, we do not lose sight of our core reason for doing things and existing in the first place - then, sure. And that, in itself, perhaps takes away some of the reason for having insurance in the first place, or the need to possibly use it. So I would endorse the RAAF's view on this.

**Lieutenant General Huddleston:** Let me make the observation that this is not necessarily an either/or issue. For example, with a maritime patrol aircraft *en route* to an air facility exercise and passing through fishing lanes, it is matter of maximising the employment of what we have for the greatest number of compatible missions. It is not necessarily an issue of dedicating flying time for what would be referred to as a non-military purpose.

**Squadron Leader Miller:** Earlier on, when General Huddleston was talking about the force structure of the Canadian defence force, I started nodding my head and thinking that this sounded very familiar. From half-way around the world, we are all doing the same thing. Then, on reflection, it began to concern me how much was this a case of independent minds coming to the same conclusion, and what was culturally sound for people of a similar background?

My question is to General Bey. Because the people who are engaging in civilianisation and producing force structure are pretty much the Commonwealth countries and from a very similar cultural background, I would ask how you see this looking at us from your side? Do you see similarities, and do you see any value in it?

**Brigadier General Bey:** We are not particularly affected by this business of force structuring. It is quite a different proposition for us. Because Singapore is very small, we are constrained by manpower resources. For the last four or five years we have been following what is called a zero manpower-growth policy within the Air Force, Navy and Army, and even the civilian group within MINDEF. That means if we want to grow in a new area, we have to find the people from another area. If we want an F-16 squadron, we have to think about phasing out some other squadron. In a sense that helps, because it then minimises changes to us. I agree with the comment that change is quite traumatic, and if you go for force structuring you really have to take time to go through the process. Sometimes you do not have the time to do it.

Although the situation is different for us, looking at it there are similar trends also - like that of 'commercialisation', which is our term for your civilianisation. Already, maintenance of our training aircraft has been commercialised all the way down to first line; industry does it for us. Some of our ground units, like ground radio and radar systems, are going to be commercialised. The next step

will be to commercialise our maintenance for transport aircraft, because we really need the manpower for somewhere else. So far this has not involved monetary budget constraints because, obviously, when you commercialise you need money to fund these arrangements. We are currently taking that money from operational costs. But the next step will be constraints on our operational budget as well, and then we will be in a really tight squeeze.

To return to your question, because in our context it is a quite different consideration altogether, I cannot comment on what the Canadians or USAF, or even the Australians, are doing, except to say that we are watching with great interest to see where we can learn lessons.

**Dr C. Coulthard-Clark** (RAAF Air Power Studies Centre): One step that is often raised in the context of regional cooperation, and was mentioned here again today, is the idea of advising major arms and equipment acquisitions in advance, in private, before they become public announcements, as a means of promoting confidence. There is obvious superficial attraction to that sort of approach, but the thought struck me that consultation on such a basis is really inviting neighbours to become participants in a domestic political debate. I wonder if Australia's neighbours really expect that sort of thing from us? Are they prepared to adopt those sorts of practices themselves, or are they worried about giving away too much national sovereignty? Would any of the panellists care to respond?

**Brigadier General Bey:** Obviously this matter of consultation in weapons acquisition has got pros and cons. It depends really on the maturity of the relationship in the first place. I think it would help tremendously if, when advanced 'strategic' weapons are purchased, the neighbours get to know about it in advance. It would simply help them to explain to their own local population why the other country is purchasing these weapons. In that way it would give support, in a sense, for what governments are doing for regional cooperation in terms of building that sincere, confident relationship between people, that toing-and-froing in terms of communications - and even domestic matters for that matter. It would help give extra visibility to cooperation.

**Air Vice Marshal Hosie:** I might add a brief comment. I would agree that maturity is probably one of the key determinants here. Clearly it has got to be what each country, or the country concerned that has an initiative on the table

that they are working on, feel comfortable with. We have been looking at this in the context of CDR between Australia and New Zealand. At what stage do you consult: when you are thinking about force structure changes, or a bit later down the track when you feel comfortable? I think the answer is when you are ready and comfortable about it.

I also think that the key to this issue is not to forget about it. That is to say, to ask yourself at what stage can you talk bilaterally or even in a bigger forum. And of course, the question always arises at home. At what stage should you go into the public arena domestically in debate? If you start right at the outset it is like committee via the media, and you just cannot do business like that. So this is a very difficult area, and it is a very good question in fact. There is no easy answer to it, except perhaps that somewhere on the checklist you make a note about what stage you will consult, and then do not forget about it. This has already been raised, so I am just supporting General Bey's comments on it. It really is a very good question though.

**Brigadier General Bey:** I am not sure that what 'consult' means in this form should influence the decision. In my mind it is really 'inform' rather than 'consult'. In other words, you are not asking the other party for a decision on whether you should go ahead with the acquisition but really 'what do you think about it?'. In that sense you are soliciting their opinion, but in the end I think you make the decision yourself and bear the brunt of the consequences.

**Air Vice Marshal Bradford:** We discussed earlier the business of maritime reconnaissance. I am aware - as is everyone else here - that there are sensitivities within the region, and I think the point was made by General Bey that through a series of overlapping bilateral arrangements eventually you build up a strong enough web on which other things can then be developed. It is the realistic way to go, given the fact that we have difficulties even with the New Zealanders, as has already been said. So we can understand why as Australians we should also have difficulties with the Indonesians, the Singaporeans, the Malaysians and so on.

Getting from the general down to the practical, it seems to me that one of the ways that we can foster this regional cooperation using air power assets is to use our maritime reconnaissance elements. There is bipartisan support for doing that within the Australian political scene, and I suggest that support is

mirrored, in a sense, within the region. However, we see our P-3Cs being deployed only to Butterworth under the FPDA, and used only to assist Malaysia and Singapore. We do not have a regional type arrangement with, for example, Indonesia. So far as I am aware, Indonesia does not have one with Malaysia or Singapore. Practically and pragmatically, this seems to me a realistic way that we could start. I was going to ask Professor Dibb if he could comment on that?

**Professor Dibb:** I think, from memory, there are about 100 maritime surveillance air platforms in the region - that is, from ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand. They vary considerably, from P-3Cs which we and the New Zealanders have, through to things like maritime versions of the C-130, Dorniers, reconnaissance versions of Hunter aircraft, and so on. It is quite true that, as we slowly and incrementally, and in private rather than in public, explore the viability of developing some sort of community of strategic interests based on things like exchanging maritime surveillance information, and not least in those non-military areas that I mentioned, there will be practical issues to resolve.

One of these - as Air Marshal Funnell pointed out - will be how to cope with things like the different platforms, and the fact that there will be some no-go areas because of national sensitivities. We would need to identify those geographical areas that are of high interest and are go areas, along with how the different platforms, ranges, endurances and electronic capabilities would work. And most of all, we would need to look at how we would get some joint communications going, given that we all have different communication systems.

So, Air Marshal Funnell is precisely right about this, and that is, once you get into the nitty-gritty of operational details - on which I am not expert - you can clearly see that there are difficulties. But that simply should not prevent us. It seems to me that the sort of consensus we have heard today, the sorts of views I have heard in private in my visits to the region this year to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, are moving us in that direction.

I think that some other issues that would be able to help us are the sorts of things that Ambassador Siagian mentioned. That is, while we do not see external threats in the maritime environment of a major nature - there is a requirement for better information, visibility, confidence, etc. If China and other



countries are not going to come clean with what they are doing, and what they are acquiring, then we have to find some other ways of exchanging that sort of information.

**Mr Wade:** Some of the words and terms mentioned in today's debate have been 'maturity', 'cultural differences' and 'domestic politics'. I would like to see if I can broaden the debate a little beyond direct air power, and remind speakers that the ABC - the Australian Broadcasting Commission - is about to start broadcasting into the South-East Asian region using the Indonesian Palapa satellite system. I would like to find out what the reaction of the various panellists are to that, and also what they feel their nations should do to help educate the general Australian public more about their own countries.


**Air Marshal Gration:** Air Commodore Soejitno said he thinks the Ambassador can handle that question. (Laughter) A very difficult question for our guests to answer, I think.

**Flying Officer C. Perry (HQ Logistics Command, RAAF):** This is a general question. Do you think there is any advantage to be gained by standardising our equipment in the region, and perhaps our procedures, to encourage and facilitate interoperability in exercises and in conflict, and also to help with training and general cooperation?

**Air Vice Marshal Hosie:** I would like to make a very quick comment, possibly one of clarification only. Standardising of equipment is not the same thing as interoperability. We do not all need to have the same equipment in order to interoperate. There are areas, particularly with light ammunition and several other things, where it is obviously in everyone's interest to be the same if we are going to cooperate. But I think we need to be sure that we are not necessarily confusing the two. Interoperability is very important; standardising equipment in some areas just does not matter.

**Air Marshal Gration:** Ladies and Gentlemen, I think it is time to draw the function to a close. In finishing the proceedings I would like to personally thank everybody who has participated in the conference today, for the way you have done that. You have been a delightful group, and I say that quite sincerely. I asked, I invited, at the beginning, that you listen, discuss and - perhaps most

importantly - take away with you some of the thoughts that have been generated today. By your questions and your participation, you have clearly heard that plea and I hope you really do that last one - that is, go away from the conference and continue to think about, and discuss, the subjects we have touched on here.



In the 1990s the Royal Australian Air Force faces major changes and challenges arising from the need to maintain and enhance its operational capabilities with fewer resources. Air power may have been accorded a pre-eminent role in the defence of Australia due to geostrategic circumstances, but the RAAF has to learn to do more with less. By working smarter, not harder, it should still be possible to retain a qualitative edge.

But other countries—Australia's natural partners in preserving the security of the Asia-Pacific region—are confronted with the same challenge. While Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia all have advanced aerospace systems in their defence acquisition programs, they also face significant budgetary pressures. So what are the prospects for regional cooperation in air power?

This book explores the issues and possible solutions to this conundrum through a series of papers by Professor Paul Dibb, Major General Datuk Ahmad Merican (RMAF), Air Vice Marshal J.S. Hosie (RNZAF), Brigadier General Bey Soo Khiang (RSAF), Lieutenant General D. Huddleston (RCAF), Air Commodore F.X. Soejitno (TNI-AU) and Air Marshal I.B. Gration (RAAF).

As a platform for addressing current and prospective regional security concerns, this book provides a valuable contribution to exploring ideas and furthering dialogue in an area of vital concern to future regional security.

