

# Where to From Here ?

A roadmap for  
Royal Australian Air Force–Japan Self-Defense Force  
Engagement

Sarah Giles

**2006 CHIEF OF AIR FORCE FELLOW**

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**AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE  
CANBERRA**



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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sarah Giles commenced her career in the ADF at the Australian Defence Force Academy where she earned a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in history and politics. Since that time she has also received a Master of Arts (International Relations) through Deakin University.

As an Intelligence Officer in the RAAF, the author has had postings to Electronic Warfare Squadron, ADF School of Languages, No 81 Wing and the Air Power Development Centre, and is now Aide-de-Camp to Chief of Air Force. She has deployed on numerous exercises with F/A-18 squadrons throughout the region and has also completed two operational deployments to the Middle East Area of Operations, the first as the squadron intelligence officer at the C-130 detachment and the second as the Australian Air Threat Analyst in the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division of the Combined Air Operations Centre.

The author's interest in Japan was initiated during her study at the ADF School of Languages and subsequent roles as an escorting officer to visiting delegations of Japan Self-Defence Force leadership. Her Masters study culminated in a research paper examining the impact of the 'China threat' on Japan's security outlook. This led to a desire to take these research findings and use them to examine the RAAF-JSDF relationship and how it may be furthered, given recent significant developments in Japan's security policy. Most recently, the author accompanied Chief of Air Force on an official counterpart visit to Japan in September 2006.

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## ABSTRACT

In the 2005 Strategic Update, the Australian Government acknowledged the growing importance of North-East Asia to Australia's security. State-based tension and the rise of China to global power status mean that several of the defining features in our strategic outlook have their origin in North Asia. At the same time, within Japan, key leaders are seeking to free its defence policy from the shackles of the post-war pacifist Constitution imposed on it in 1946 and, in doing so make its defence posture commensurate with its economic and political power. Although this quest will proceed slowly, it is already opening up opportunities for Australia, particularly given that ad hoc coalitions of like-minded nations are increasingly becoming the method of choice for dealing with the range of threats to security now faced. It was within this context that Australian and Japanese forces found themselves working side by side in Iraq in 2005. Australia and Japan already have strong economic and political ties and in security the common bond of US alliances unites us. Defence ties are, however, relatively undeveloped.


Despite extremely positive academic and political rhetoric regarding the future of the defence relationship, translating this to meaningful engagement between defence forces is a unique and time-consuming process due to the pacifist nature of Japan's Constitution and the resulting restrictions placed on Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) operations. There is currently a disparity between the positive political intent and rhetoric and the practicalities of fruitful engagement with the JSDF. This paper will aim to bridge that gap by providing a roadmap for engaging with the JSDF, whether in exercise, operation or dialogue. The paper is written from a RAAF perspective but is aimed to be applicable to all Services of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and to defence civilians involved in international policy or the planning and conduct of activities with the JSDF.

## KEY FINDINGS

1. The relevance and value of increased ADF engagement with the Japanese Self-Defense Force is increasing.
2. There is currently a disparity between political rhetoric and the reality of developing meaningful engagement with the JSDF. Engaging with the JSDF is unlike engaging with any other regional defence force.
3. By focusing on niche areas of mutual benefit, the ADF and JSDF can make fruitful progress in their operational compatibility in the short term and lay the foundation for even more profitable engagement in the longer term.

# STRUCTURE OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

The army, navy and air force of the JSDF are entitled Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, Maritime Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force respectively. The Prime Minister holds supreme command and the defence minister is called the Director General, Japan Defense Agency. The organisation and order of battle of the JSDF is contained at Appendix A.



**Figure 1 – Structure of the Japan Self-Defense Force**

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
AEW&C	Airborne Early Warning and Control
AFB	Air Force Base
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
BCOF	British Commonwealth Occupation Force
COS	Chief of Staff
DSTO	Defence Science and Technology Organisation
EAS	East Asia Summit
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JDS	JMSDF Defense Ship
JGSDF	Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NEO	Noncombat Evacuation Operations
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific (Exercise)
RSAF	Republic of Singapore Air Force
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
UAV	Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNC(R)	UN Command (Rear)
UNPKO	UN Peacekeeping Operations
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Our advantage will continue to come from military-to-military international links – the key to enhancing mutual understanding.

ADDP–D.2—*Force 2020*<sup>1</sup>

A convergence of strategic interest, existing solid economic and political ties and the common bond of a strong US alliance between Australia and Japan have led to extremely positive political and academic rhetoric in recent years regarding prospects for strengthening the defence component of the relationship. While Government’s acknowledgment of the importance of North-East Asia to Australia’s security provides the political impetus for increased defence engagement, the reality is that there is currently a disparity between the positive political intent and the practicalities of developing meaningful engagement with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

Japan’s pacifist Constitution drafted by the occupying forces following World War II, as well as other legislative and cultural factors, severely limit the spectrum of defence activity that the JSDF can undertake and its interaction with the defence forces of other nations. Given these complications and the growing relevance and value of defence engagement between Australia and Japan, this paper aims to facilitate further and more effective interaction between the ADF and the JSDF. It will do this by providing a comprehensive background to ADF–JSDF engagement, highlighting the impediments to fruitful interaction and providing recommendations on ways the RAAF can overcome or circumvent these impediments.

### SCOPE

The nature of this thesis makes it applicable to all Services of the ADF. The final chapter will, however, deal predominantly with how the RAAF can best strengthen its engagement with the JSDF.<sup>2</sup> The work is intended to be a practical guide for ADF members involved in planning or conducting operations, exercises or discussions with the JSDF.

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<sup>1</sup> Australian Defence Doctrine Publication–D.2—*Force 2020*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2002, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Although the final chapter focuses on RAAF engagement, it is not limited to engagement with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force as Japan’s P-3C aircraft are operated by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

The paper commences with a brief overview of Australia's strategic environment in order to provide the context for discussion of the significance of Japan to Australia's security outlook. Following a historical perspective on the evolution of Australia–Japan security engagement, Japan's defence policy is discussed so that it can be compared and contrasted with that of Australia, and so the origin of the restraints on the JSDF's operations can be illuminated. The final chapter draws out the main challenges the ADF faces in developing meaningful engagement with the JSDF, as well as providing recommendations on how the RAAF can tackle these impediments.

### **THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE**

We live in an increasingly interconnected and complex world in which the US is likely to continue as the preponderant economic and military power for the foreseeable future. No longer does Australia look simply to its immediate neighbours when assessing its security outlook. Australia's area of interest has extended to North Asia and as far afield as the Middle East. The defining features of our security environment are non-traditional threats, the rise to global power status of India and China, and the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea with whom a peace treaty has still not been signed following the Korean War. The adjustment of the US defence posture in the Asia-Pacific presents another element of change in Australia's strategic environment.

The security environment of today is shaped largely by the economic and social impact of globalisation and the resultant accelerated movement of people, technology and ideas. The 2005 Defence Update talks less of traditional inter-state conflict and more of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction across borders. While the nation-state remains the core component of the international community, these non-conventional threats do not recognise national borders as security barriers.<sup>3</sup>

In a world in which transnational threats and intra-state conflicts are dominant, two of the most concerning areas of state-based security fall within North-East Asia, namely the potential flashpoints on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Noting the focus of this paper and the fact that the 2005 Defence Update stated that 'Australia's stake in strategic stability in North Asia is very high', it is important to look in closer detail at the region referred to as 'North-East Asia'.<sup>4</sup> This takes in the countries of North and South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan.

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<sup>3</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2003, [www.dfat.gov.au/ani/chapter\\_2.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/chapter_2.html), accessed 9 March 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005, p. 16.

## FOCUS ON NORTH-EAST ASIA

Fluid perceptions of power and fear, Thucydides observed, are the classic causes of war. And they are increasingly present in North-East Asia today.

Kent Calder<sup>5</sup>

There is no imminent threat of conflict on either the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. It remains vital, however, that steps are taken to reduce tension and increase transparency in these regions to ensure that miscalculation or misunderstanding does not result in the outbreak of hostilities. While burgeoning economic ties are binding countries of the Asia-Pacific together, a range of security tensions exists which pose a risk to current stability. Australia's role as a responsible middle power in the region and its alliance with the US mean that preservation of security in the region is in Australia's direct national interest.

The growth of China, economically and militarily, is the most dominant force for change in the region. For the first time in history, the Asia-Pacific is faced with the prospect of both Japan and China being major players at the same time. The implications of this are still being explored and must be carefully managed; 'the stage is now set for a struggle between a mature power and a rising one'.<sup>6</sup> Already both China and Japan are seeking to play a leadership role within Asia-Pacific multilateral organisations as a way of securing their regional influence. If the rivalry can be contained and regional institutions are strengthened rather than divided by these initiatives, the impact on multilateral security could be positive. Conversely, if Japan and China continue to disagree on the direction of forums, such as the East Asia Summit, multilateralism in the region will be prevented from making substantial headway.<sup>7</sup>

Economic ties between China and Japan are closer than ever before with their bilateral trade having doubled in the last five years.<sup>8</sup> However, the growth of Chinese military strength, coinciding with Japan's gradual movement along the road to becoming a 'normalised' power in which its security power is commensurate with its economic and political strength, has produced mutual suspicion regarding each country's intentions within the region.<sup>9</sup> This suspicion is evidenced in the fact that according to General

<sup>5</sup> Kent Calder, 'China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry' in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2006, p. 130.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid*, p. 129.

<sup>7</sup> China and Japan disagreed on the composition and role of the Summit, both countries seeing it as a chance to wield their influence. Many countries within the region (including Japan) believed that a broad membership would dilute China's dominance over the forum given that the US is not a member. See Alan Romberg, *The East Asia Summit: Much Ado About Nothing—So Far*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington DC, December 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Calder, 'China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry', *Foreign Affairs*, p. 129.

<sup>9</sup> William Tow and Russell Trood, *Power Shift: Challenges for Australia in North-East Asia*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2004, p. 6.

Massaki, Chief of the Joint Staff Office, Japan has scrambled fighter jets 107 times in the past year to intercept suspected Chinese spy planes.<sup>10</sup>

The historical legacy of Imperial Japan's actions throughout the region ensures that ties between Japan and both China and Korea are frequently strained over issues such as historical accuracy of textbooks and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine during his time in office.<sup>11</sup> While genuine resentment towards Japan exists in Korea and China, political leaders also capitalise on this sentiment in order to achieve their own domestic objectives. Kent Calder points out that the Chinese Communist Party in fact relies on its image as a defender of national interests during the war with Japan for much of its political legitimacy.<sup>12</sup> Political manipulation of historical animosity impairs meaningful security cooperation within North-East Asia.

### SECURITY MECHANISMS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Currently there is a range of multilateral forums within the Asia-Pacific, including the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), designed to increase regional exchange and cooperation on economic, social, political and security matters. The principle forum for security dialogue in the region is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It brings together 25 countries that have a bearing on Asia-Pacific security to discuss security issues and work towards regional initiatives to enhance peace and stability.<sup>13</sup> While such an institution does serve to enhance transparency and establish confidence-building measures, its reliance on consensus decision-making and the economic, social and cultural diversity of its member countries makes substantial progress on security matters extremely difficult. The ARF also suffers from the smaller member countries' distrust of the intentions of the major powers, namely China and the US.

In the absence of stronger regional multilateral mechanisms, the US 'hub and spokes' bilateral system of alliances established during the Cold War remains fundamental to Asia-Pacific security. In particular, the US-Japan alliance is considered one of the most stabilising factors within the region. Under the current US transformation strategy and associated US Force Structure Review, America seeks to increase its ability to

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<sup>10</sup> Sebastian Moffett, 'Japan Hopes China Ties will Ease Friction', *The Wall Street Journal*, Monday 1 May 2006, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Although most media attention is focused on Chinese and Korean anger over perceived inaccuracies in Japan's history textbooks, the Japanese have also expressed dissatisfaction with Chinese textbooks which omit political changes that have occurred in Japan since 1945, concentrating instead on Japan's occupation of China 1931–1945. 'China declines to portray Japan in positive light', *Japan Times*, 26 April 2006. The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo pays homage to Japan's war dead, including convicted war criminals.

<sup>12</sup> Calder, 'China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry', *Foreign Affairs*, p. 133.

<sup>13</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *ASEAN Regional Forum*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, [www.dfat.gov.au/arf/](http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/), accessed 29 June 2006.



respond swiftly to contingencies throughout the world. Within this, it is revisiting its basing arrangements in the region, namely in South Korea and Japan. The US is also encouraging increased cooperation between, for example, Japan and South Korea and Japan and Australia, essentially creating a direct link between some of the 'spokes' of the alliance system.<sup>14</sup> Using Japan and Australia as its northern and southern 'anchors', the US is trying to reduce some of its own burden while retaining strong influence in the region.<sup>15</sup> The changes currently occurring in the US–Japan alliance are covered in detail in Chapter 4.

While the US–Japan alliance remains strong (notwithstanding some economic and domestic tension), South Korea has gradually distanced itself from the US and is seeking a more independent foreign policy.<sup>16</sup> America's strong response to North Korea's program to develop a nuclear weapon capability has alienated many in South Korea and increasing numbers of people are calling for US troops in South Korea to be withdrawn. Meanwhile, China's constructive role in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea has brought it closer to South Korea as both countries push for a peaceful resolution of tension on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>17</sup>

Despite these changes in regional dynamics, within the Asia-Pacific the US bilateral system of alliances will continue to be the dominant security mechanism. While the United Nations and other multilateral organisations provide overarching security forums, a more ad hoc system of security ties between the 'spokes' of the US bilateral system can provide a buffer between the two layers. Such a tiered approach to security allows increased flexibility and provides the basis for military operations to be conducted by 'coalitions of the willing'—those countries with the most to lose if stability is not restored in a particular region.<sup>18</sup> This model was used for operations in Iraq in 2003 and, given the UN's challenges in adapting to the current international security environment, it is likely that such a system will become a feature of future military operations with or without the umbrella of the UN. It is within this context that the growing relevance of Australia–Japan defence engagement becomes evident.

<sup>14</sup> William Tow, *U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Moving Beyond 'Hub and Spokes'*, paper presented at Australasian Political Studies Association Conference 2003, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 2003, [www.utas.edu.au/government/APSA/Wtow.html](http://www.utas.edu.au/government/APSA/Wtow.html), accessed 10 March 2006.

<sup>15</sup> Tow and Trood, *Power Shift*, p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> William Tow, *The United States in North-East Asia; The Future of Alliances*, paper prepared for IRAPRU (UQ)-ASPI Workshop, 'North-East Asian Security: Policy Challenges for Australia', Brisbane, October 2003, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Tow and Trood, *Power Shift*, p. 10. The Six-Party Talks are held between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, the US, Russia and China, and are aimed at encouraging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon program in exchange for guarantees of its security. China hopes that its influence in the Six-Party Talks and closer ties with South Korea may help to reduce the influence of the US in the region.

<sup>18</sup> The concept of a three-tiered approach to security in the Asia-Pacific was raised by Peter McDermott in his thesis written while at the Tokyo National Institute of Defense Studies. Peter McDermott, 'Asia-Pacific Regional Security Frameworks: Cooperative Opportunities for Japan and Australia', unpublished, National Institute of Defense Studies, Tokyo, 1995.

Where to From Here?

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## CHAPTER 2

# THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY

To participate in, or to lead, a coalition, Australia requires detailed knowledge of coalition partners, including their military affairs and language, politics and culture.

ADDP-D.1—*The Australian Approach to Warfare*<sup>1</sup>

International engagement activities carried out by the ADF fulfil two primary functions. Firstly, they play a role in shaping Australia's security environment. Through activities such as defence dialogue, platform visits and personnel exchange, transparency of defence activities and intent is increased and trust between nations developed. Such confidence-building measures aim to prevent misunderstandings that can lead to the outbreak of hostilities and are generally focused on a regional level. The second function of international engagement and the one focused on in this chapter is to enhance operational compatibility with prospective coalition partners. The multinational coalitions assembled for operations in East Timor and Iraq vindicate the need for such preparatory exchange. International engagement in this sense is used to better achieve objectives in the battlespace; maximising the effectiveness of military power requires a comprehensive understanding not only of potential adversaries, but also likely coalition partners.<sup>2</sup>

While defence of the Australian mainland remains the central role of the ADF, the 2000 Defence White Paper and the 2005 Defence Update recognises the likelihood of a direct conventional threat to Australia remains low. Thus the current focus is on dealing with the threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the risk of failed or failing states.<sup>3</sup> Renato Cruz de Castro says of terrorism: 'this type of security challenge demands a sense of common purpose among like-minded states to strengthen their ties against any form of extremism'. Indeed one of the key themes of

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<sup>1</sup> Australian Defence Doctrine Publication—D.1—*The Australian Approach to Warfare*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2002, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> The strategic framework for the ADF's contribution to national security has been defined in terms of shaping, deterrence and response. International engagement plays a key role in both the shaping and responding functions. Air Marshal Angus Houston, 'Reflecting on Security Issues', *Defence Magazine*, Coordination and Public Affairs Division, Department of Defence, June 2005; see website at [www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/20050601/groups/air\\_force.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/20050601/groups/air_force.htm), accessed 30 June 2006.

<sup>3</sup> For a study of the role of air power in the 'War on Terror', see Sam Gray-Murphy, *Air Power and Transnational Terrorism: The Possibilities, Advantages and Limits to Using Australian Air Power in the 'War on Terror'*, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2005.

the 2005 Defence Update is the need for a more international approach to Australia's security policies; 'the Government must ... ensure that it has defence capabilities that give credible options for the pursuit of international security policies necessary to support Australia's interests'.<sup>4</sup>

Australia has a long history of working with allies overseas. However, as demonstrated over the last decade with operations in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, the need for the ADF to forge close working relationships with foreign militaries beyond Australia's traditional allies around the world has increased. This is not only in order to tackle transnational threats, but also to be prepared to lead or take part in future coalitions of the willing, such as those employed in recent conflicts. If the application of military power is to be effective against the gamut of threats discussed above, interoperability, trust and effective intelligence sharing are key.

### **INTEROPERABILITY**

The multinational nature of coalition operations makes them particularly susceptible to fracturing through misunderstandings or unresolved differences in national objectives. This may be a critical vulnerability which hostile forces will target. The more a coalition is made up of national forces with some familiarity of each other, the easier it will be for the coalition leader to meld the constituent parts of the coalition as a cohesive force ... It is therefore important for the coalition leader to invest whatever resources and efforts are needed to foster trust and understanding.

ADDP 00.3—*Coalition Operations*<sup>5</sup>

Interoperability is defined as:

The ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

ADFP 101—*Glossary*<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.3—*Coalition Operations*, Defence Publishing Service, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2002, pp. 5-1–5-2.

<sup>6</sup> Australian Defence Force Publication 101—*Glossary*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1994.

It can essentially be divided into two areas: technological and organisational interoperability. Technological interoperability is equipment-based and refers to the ability of a force's systems to interface with each other. Datalink systems are one example of this. Organisational interoperability relies on processes and understanding to overcome gaps in system capabilities and is far more flexible as it is not reliant on a force's current inventory of equipment. In the case of traditional allies such as the US, the ADF aims for technological and organisational interoperability but this is not feasible with all potential coalition partners. Indeed, organisational interoperability is often the only option when coalitions of the willing are formed at short notice from disparate countries.

Under the Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model developed by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), the four attributes used to measure interoperability are preparedness, understanding, command style and ethos.<sup>7</sup> International engagement is key to developing these attributes with the ADF's current and future partners. Indeed, using the example of the Australian-led coalition tasked with enforcing peace in East Timor from September 1999 to February 2000, DSTO found that the ADF was able to operate more effectively with the forces of nations such as Thailand, Fiji and the Philippines due to prior exercises with them, even though the forces were quite different in size and nature from the ADF. This was contrasted with the example of South Korean forces who had no prior exposure to ADF operations and with whom several interoperability difficulties arose.<sup>8</sup>

The need for cultural and professional understanding in achieving interoperability in the air environment has been researched and presented comprehensively by David Jeffcoat in his 2003 Chief of Air Force Aerospace Fellowship Paper. Jeffcoat highlights the fact that cultural understanding of potential allies and partners is vital in the effective utilisation of air power.<sup>9</sup> Underlying this is the fact that a nation's air power doctrine, whether implicit or stated, is a function of the strategic and aviation culture of that country. If Australia is to truly understand how best to work with a foreign air force, it needs to understand the cultural basis of how that country chooses to develop and exploit its air power. Education and exchanges with that country's forces are the only way to achieve this. The importance placed on combined training is recognised by US Pacific Command's (USPACOM) engagement strategy which in 2004 alone, involved participation in more than 1700 exercises and other engagement activities with foreign militaries.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Thea Clark and Dr Terry Moon, 'Interoperability for Joint and Coalition Operations', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, No. 151, Department of Defence, November/December 2001, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid*, p. 33.

<sup>9</sup> For a detailed explanation of the importance of cultural understanding of potential enemies and partners, including a theoretical framework and case study for such analysis, it is recommended that the reader refer to David Jeffcoat, *Winning with Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures*, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2004.

<sup>10</sup> US Pacific Command, official website, [www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml](http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml), accessed 3 July 2006.

Success in Operation *Desert Storm* in Iraq in 1991 was partly attributed to the fact that the coalition was comprised primarily of NATO member countries who had been operating together for the duration of the Cold War and thus had common operating procedures, common training and interoperable equipment.<sup>11</sup> In stark contrast, the Asia-Pacific is a region with little history of close interstate cooperation, thus the challenge for Australia to use its regional engagement to establish a flexible yet effective means of operating with regional partners is considerable. Experience in East Timor showed that it is possible for military forces of significantly different ethos and technological standard to work effectively together, provided prior engagement activity has been conducted to enable a degree of understanding of that country's military operations.

For the ADF, interoperability is often thought of solely in the context of operating with the US. Given the complexity of the current security environment and the ad hoc nature of coalitions employed in recent operations, there is impetus for the ADF to look beyond traditional allies and seek to enhance cultural and professional understanding of those nations most likely to be coalition partners in the future. Even where technological interoperability cannot be achieved, some degree of organisational interoperability will notably enhance effectiveness of the military forces.

### **WHY JAPAN?**

Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan – our largest export market for almost forty years, and a strategic partner for regional peace and prosperity.

Prime Minister John Howard<sup>12</sup>

The RAAF already has an extensive network of international engagement strategies with regional and global countries. Why then, should Japan be a particular focus? Australia's defence priorities and geo-strategic reality ensure that the countries of South-East Asia will continue to take top priority for ADF international engagement activities. However, as Australia's 1997 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper noted, 'the security of South-East Asia cannot be separated from the rest of East Asia and because of the direct consequences of instability in North-East Asia for Australia's well-being'.<sup>13</sup> This marked a shift in the importance placed on North-East Asia within Australia's security environment. Similarly, by ignoring opportunities in North Asia now, particularly with respect to Japan, Australia risks negative consequences in the future as the regional security environment, and Japan's place in it, continues to evolve.

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<sup>11</sup> Alan Ryan, *From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and 'New Age' Coalition Operations*, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 302, Canberra, January 2000, p. 55.

<sup>12</sup> Prime Minister John Howard in address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia in the World', 31 March 2005, transcript at [www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1290.html](http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1290.html), accessed 16 May 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1997, pp. 1–2.

Australia has had a trading relationship with Japan since the signing of the 1957 Commerce Agreement and Japan remains Australia's largest export market. This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Protocol (the 'Nara Treaty'), which extended the relationship further into the political and cultural arena.<sup>14</sup> Annual Prime Ministerial meetings commenced in 1997 and in April 2001 the first Australia–Japan Conference was held, which brought together a range of people from the public and private sector and academia. The third of these conferences was held in February 2005.

In comparison with the economic and political relationship, Australia and Japan's security and defence ties are relatively undeveloped. This is in the process of changing for a number of reasons. Australia and Japan are technologically advanced democracies with strong economic and political ties and a shared strategic outlook; thus it makes strategic sense for them to develop the defence facet of their relationship. Through their work within the Asia-Pacific, particularly in encouraging and leading multilateral institutions and solutions to regional issues, and their respective roles in regional disaster relief, both countries have demonstrated their desire to be perceived as 'good international citizens'. Both nations are also strong supporters of the United Nations and Australia has offered its support to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).<sup>15</sup> Likewise, Japan was the most vocal supporter of Australia's inclusion in the recently established East Asia Summit.<sup>16</sup>

There is also convergence in the strategic interests of both countries. As maritime trading nations, Australia and Japan are highly dependent on the security of the sea lines of communication that run from North-East Asia through the Malacca Strait to the Middle East and Europe.<sup>17</sup> Similarly energy security is of prime importance.<sup>18</sup> This is one of the reasons behind the ongoing commitment by both countries to America's Global War on Terror (GWOT), as is the fact that both countries have been directly effected by terrorism in recent years. In order to defeat this threat and ensure energy security, the two countries share a geographic area of strategic interest extending through South-East Asia across to the Middle East.

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<sup>14</sup> The most publicised area of dispute between the two countries at the moment is over the legality of whaling. While this issue is having an impact on public opinion within Australia, it is not likely to have a significant impact on relations between the two countries as both governments acknowledge that other aspects of the relationship, especially trade, are too valuable to sacrifice over disagreement on whaling.

<sup>15</sup> Hugh Morgan and Kenji Yoshizawa, *Third Australia–Japan Conference Chairs' Statement*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Dr Malcolm Cook and Huw McKay, *Japan: Ripe for Re-assessment*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, February 2006, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup> Alan Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004, p. 45.

<sup>18</sup> Dr Kiki Fukushima and Hugh White, *Australia–Japan Conference 2005: Trigger Paper for Discussion of Political and Strategic Issues*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 2005.

Australia and Japan both rely on a stable Asia-Pacific for their economic prosperity and national security, and in line with this, recognise the need to balance China's power and prevent the outbreak of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Both countries are particularly focused on the Korean Peninsula, from the perspective of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the impact of any outbreak of hostility in the area. For Japan, this is because of the direct threat that North Korea can pose through its ballistic missile capability and because of the presence of US troops in Japan. For Australia, while its membership of the United Nations Command and Military Armistice Commission established after the Korean War does not commit it to any action, it is feasible that Australian involvement may be expected in the advent of a contingency on the Peninsula.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, both countries have already taken a leading role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed largely at North Korea.

Outside of North-East Asia, Australia and Japan are active in promoting good governance and stability in the Pacific through consultation at PALM (Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting). They also both believe in the promotion of regional multilateral dialogue through strengthening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS).<sup>20</sup>

In the past there has been a divergence in the stated roles of the ADF and the JSDF. While defence of the homeland is paramount for both forces, until recently this role has been seen as the sole determinant of force structure for Japan. While the formation of the Japan Self-Defence Forces in 1954 was justified by assurances that defence of Japan would be the only function of the forces, Australia's armed services have been involved in operations offshore since their inception. Thus while the ADF has developed as a flexible and expeditionary force, the JSDF force structure has been predicated on the need for heavy ground forces to repel any invasion of the Japanese mainland. In 2005 Japan officially recognised the change in direction that had been reflected in JSDF operations over the preceding 15 years and acknowledged that the JSDF needed to become a flexible, mobile and multi-functional force in order to respond to the new security environment.<sup>21</sup> This acknowledgment brought Australian and Japanese defence aims much closer into alignment and demonstrates the convergence in aspects of their security outlook.

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<sup>19</sup> Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword*, p. 47.

<sup>20</sup> Alexander Downer, *Building a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship*, Joint Ministerial Statement: Australia-Japan, Sydney, 18 March 2006, [www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint\\_statement\\_australia-japan\\_180306.html](http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint_statement_australia-japan_180306.html), accessed 21 March 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Summarised in provisional translation of *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, 10 December 2004, [www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html), accessed 30 January 2006.



The two nations also at times share a sense of isolation within the region. Despite Japan's status as an Asian nation, its strong alliance with the US and regional historical-based animosity have presented some challenges in its regional security engagement. Similarly, as a Western middle power in the Asia-Pacific, Australia often finds itself chastised by countries, such as Malaysia, which do not view it as a 'part' of Asia, despite its geographical proximity.<sup>22</sup> These obstacles have brought the two countries closer together as they recognise their ability to complement the other and both have a common goal of strengthening regional institutions and initiatives.<sup>23</sup> Australia and Japan can both be seen as a bridge between Asia and the West.<sup>24</sup>

A key factor in Australia–Japan security relations is their respective alliance with the US. It is often said that Japan and Australia represent the northern and southern 'anchors' of the American regional bilateral alliance system in East Asia.<sup>25</sup> As seen in the current Iraq conflict, it is likely that both Australia and Japan would be involved in future 'coalition of the willing' operations with the US, which heightens the importance of achieving interoperability. Given the prospect of future operational interaction, attention should be paid to David Jeffcoat's observation that such deployments rely on cultural understanding to be truly effective and this can only come through regular interaction.<sup>26</sup>

In the post-Cold War security environment, the US is urging its allies in the Asia-Pacific to take more responsibility for their own security. Within this context, the US is extremely supportive of the development of trilateral security dialogue between itself, Japan and Australia. Such a security dialogue commenced in 2002 and in March 2006 the talks were held for the first time at the ministerial level.<sup>27</sup> Among other issues discussed, including Iran's nuclear program, the ministers agreed to enhance the exchange of information and strategic assessments on major security issues, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the October 2005

<sup>22</sup> Takashi Terada, 'The Australia–Japan Partnership in the Asia-Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Co-operation?', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, Iss. 1, Singapore, April 2000, p. 179.

<sup>23</sup> Alexander Downer, *The Australia–Japan Partnership—Growing Stronger Together*, address to the Japan Institute for International Affairs, 22 March 2005, [www.australia.or.jp/english/seifu/speeches/index.html](http://www.australia.or.jp/english/seifu/speeches/index.html), accessed 9 March 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Terada, 'The Australia–Japan Partnership in the Asia-Pacific', p. 179.

<sup>25</sup> William Tow and Russell Trood, *The 'Anchors': Collaborative Security, Substance or Smokescreen?*, Griffith University, July 2004, [www.griffith.edu.au/centre/asiainstitute/conferences\\_workshops/towtrood01.html](http://www.griffith.edu.au/centre/asiainstitute/conferences_workshops/towtrood01.html), accessed 24 May 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Jeffcoat, *Winning with Australian Air Power*.

<sup>27</sup> Hamish McDonald, 'In Japan's Ruling Party, a Perverse Mindset Lives On', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 March 2006, [www.smh.com.au](http://www.smh.com.au), accessed 21 March 2006.

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Downer, *Trilateral Security Dialogue*, Joint Statement Australia–Japan–United States, Sydney, 18 March 2006, [www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint\\_statement-aus-japan\\_usa\\_180306.html](http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint_statement-aus-japan_usa_180306.html), accessed 21 March 2006.

revision of the US–Japan alliance called for US and Japanese forces to cooperate with third countries ‘to improve the international security environment’.<sup>29</sup> Given its position in the region and alliance with the US, Australia seems to be a logical option even though it was not specifically named.

One of the positive by-products of trilateral engagement is that it can provide a possible conduit for closer bilateral ties between Australia and Japan. It is highly unlikely that the relationship will develop into a ‘JANZUS’-style alliance as has been suggested in the past and in the short term it will not extend far beyond high-level discussions. However the commonality of equipment, the potential for future cooperation in ‘coalitions of the willing’ and the significant influence of the US on both militaries provide many avenues for ADF–JSDF cooperation which will be addressed in Chapter 4.

There was a certain geo-strategic elegance about the Howard Government’s deployment of 450 new Australian troops to Iraq. This elegance centres on Japan.

Greg Sheridan<sup>30</sup>

Prime Minister John Howard’s decision to send troops to Al Muthanna Province in Iraq to provide security for Japanese forces in 2005 was a clear indicator of the importance that Australia now places on its security relationship with Japan. Compared to the economic relationship, it is still relatively undeveloped and for this reason focus now needs to be placed on ADF engagement with the JSDF. The benefits of such engagement will be reaped not only at the governmental level but also through greater levels of interoperability and understanding in future operations where ADF forces find themselves alongside the JSDF, whether it be in disaster relief, peacekeeping or even, in the future, peacemaking.

Conversely, if Australia does not make a concerted effort to increase security engagement with Japan, not only would it be wasting an opportunity to work with a like-minded partner in the region but it would also risk reducing Australia’s leverage in regional affairs in the future. Japan’s economic and political strength, combined with its emerging security role will make it a key player in regional security in the future and perhaps even earn it a permanent position on the UN Security Council. Just as Australia’s defence forces have reaped rewards from closer ties with the US in recent years, so they stand to gain from close relations with Japan in the future. By ignoring the opportunity now, Australia would be risking its relevance and bargaining power in the future.

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<sup>29</sup> Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Nobutaka Machimura and Yoshinori Ohno, *Security Consultative Committee Document – U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*, Washington DC, 29 October 2005, [www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55775.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55775.htm), accessed 20 March 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Greg Sheridan, ‘Help for Japan Pays Off’, *The Weekend Australian*, 26–27 February 2005, p. 22.

## CHAPTER 3

# AUSTRALIA—JAPAN DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

### THE BEGINNING

Immediately following World War II, Australian participation in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) from 1946 until 1951 ensured that Japan remained a strong influence in defence planning. During this time about 16,000 Australians served alongside British, New Zealand and Indian forces in Japan under BCOF with participation from the RAN, RAAF and Army.<sup>1</sup> An Australian officer commanded BCOF for the whole period of the occupation and at its height the Australian component of BCOF was responsible for more than 20 million Japanese citizens.

Australia's primary perceived threat following World War II was a resurgent Japan. Indeed one of the driving factors behind the 1951 signing of the ANZUS Treaty between the US, Australia and New Zealand was to provide some sort of security guarantee against Japan in exchange for Australian and New Zealand acceptance of the relatively lenient terms of the 1951 Peace Treaty.<sup>2</sup> The ANZUS Treaty was signed at the same time as the Mutual Security Agreement between Japan and the US, and came into force at the same time as the Peace Treaty.<sup>3</sup> Despite initial fears, however, relations between Australia and Japan thawed and developed relatively quickly as noted by Alan Rix in his study *The Australia–Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present*.<sup>4</sup>

With the onset of the Korean War, the threat of communism steadily took on a higher profile in Australia's security outlook. Given Japan's geographical location close to the USSR and China, it was seen as more important to engage Japan to maintain it as a bulwark against communism, than to continue to isolate it. The first visit by an Australian Prime Minister to Japan occurred in 1957 and was reciprocated in the same year.<sup>5</sup> This year also saw the signing of the Commerce Agreement, which cemented the

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<sup>1</sup> Australian War Memorial website, *British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946–51*, [www.awm.gov.au/atwar/bcof.htm](http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/bcof.htm), accessed 5 July 2006.

<sup>2</sup> The US wished to sign a non-punitive peace treaty with Japan so that it could be used as a bulwark against the threat of communism. Australia and New Zealand preferred a punitive peace treaty but agreed to the US plan on condition that the US signed the ANZUS Treaty, assuring their defence against Japan. Department of the Parliamentary Library, *Upside, Downside: ANZUS After Fifty Years*, Department of the Parliamentary Library Current Issues Brief No. 3 200102, Canberra, 2001, p. 4, [www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib03.pdf](http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib03.pdf), accessed 27 June 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Alan Rix, *The Australia–Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present*, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 148.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 29.

trade relationship between the two countries and set the rules for bilateral trade.<sup>6</sup> The 1976 signing of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation put the political and economic relationship into a legal framework.<sup>7</sup>

Despite advances in the trade and diplomatic relationship, bitter memories of World War II in Australia and constitutional constraints in Japan hampered security engagement. Strong anti-Japanese sentiment among many remained, reflected by a Labor Member of Parliament's comments in July 1951:

Japan has all the tensions that lead to war rather than those that lead to peace ... The idea of Japan as an ally in any overall security plan is repugnant to Australia.

Les Haylen<sup>8</sup>

The official Australian stance on the rearmament of Japan was that it was acceptable, provided it was purely for self-defence purposes. Japan was seen as a buffer against communism and hence it was important for it to be able to defend itself and prevent a power vacuum in the region.<sup>9</sup> There were many debates during the 1950s concerning the necessity of a security alliance, either bilateral or multilateral, with Japan. It was concluded, however, that the US system of bilateral alliances in the Pacific, combined with the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (of which Japan was not a member) would suffice. The security relationship between the two countries thus remained low key and relied on the common link of the US.

The first Australian Service attaché post was established in Tokyo in 1961 and defence ties have gradually increased from that time.<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to note that by the early 1970s there were even suggestions that Australia might purchase defence equipment from Japan. Although this never eventuated, it is of interest given the strict restraints on arms exports from Japan and is an area that will be explored further when looking to the future of defence relations between the two countries.<sup>11</sup>

### **POLITICO-MILITARY DIALOGUE AND EXCHANGE**

The first visit to Japan by an Australian Defence Minister occurred in February 1965 against the backdrop of tension between Indonesia and Malaya, raising questions of a

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<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>8</sup> Les Haylen, MP in Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, Vol. 213, 10 July 1951, p. 1190.

<sup>9</sup> Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment*, p. 152.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>11</sup> In 1976 the Government of Japan extended its limits on arms exports, expressing that, in the spirit of the Constitution, Japan would refrain from exporting arms, and equipment and technology for manufacturing arms, to other nations.

greater role for Japan in South-East Asian security.<sup>12</sup> The first to Australia by a Director General Japan Defense Agency (Defence Minister equivalent) occurred in 1990. Far higher profile was the 1992 visit to Japan by Senator Robert Hill as Minister for Defence. During that visit, agreement was reached on increasing defence contacts between the two countries and the possibility of regional collective security was discussed.<sup>13</sup> This visit ‘helped to institutionalise the mechanisms of closer defence relations, and consolidate the strategic agreement and defence cooperation between the “southern and northern anchors” of the Western Pacific alliance’.<sup>14</sup>

Since that time there have been numerous Prime Ministerial, ministerial and official-level talks and meetings. In 2001 the inaugural Australia–Japan conference was held which brought together participants from a wide range of backgrounds, including government, business and academia, to discuss a number of issues, including security and defence.<sup>15</sup> The third of these conferences was held in 2005 and the resulting joint statement from the two Prime Ministers, Australia–Japan Creative Partnership, laid out the future direction for cooperation between the two countries across a number of areas.<sup>16</sup> The 2003 Australia–Japan Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism stated several measures the two countries will take to combat terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>17</sup>

### 2003 MEMORANDUM ON DEFENCE EXCHANGE

This memorandum signals the strength of the existing bilateral defence and security relationship. It also demonstrates the increasing emphasis that Australia and Japan are placing on security cooperation.

<sup>18</sup>  
Senator the Hon Robert Hill

The tone for the future of ADF–JSDF engagement and cooperation was set by the 2003 signing of the Memorandum on Defence Exchange Between Japan Defense Agency

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<sup>12</sup> Rix, *The Australia–Japan Political Alignment*, p. 159.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia–Japan Conference for the 21st Century*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2001, [www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/aj\\_conf/ellis\\_statement.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/aj_conf/ellis_statement.html), accessed 12 April 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Prime Minister John Howard, *Joint Statement with Prime Minister Koizumi: Australia–Japan Creative Partnership*, Prime Minister of Australia, Canberra, 1 May 2002, [www.pm.gov.au/news/media\\_releases/2002/media\\_release1623.htm](http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/2002/media_release1623.htm), accessed 12 April 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Australia–Japan Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo, 2003, [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pmv0307/terrorism.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pmv0307/terrorism.html), accessed 12 April 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Senator the Hon Robert Hill, *Australia–Japan Defence Relationship*, Minister for Defence Media Release 124/2003, Canberra, 29 September 2003.

and Department of Defence Australia by the respective defence ministers. While this is not a legally binding document, it does provide the strongest indications yet that Japan and Australia recognise the need for closer defence cooperation. A copy of the Memorandum is contained at Appendix B.

### **ADF—JSDF LIAISON AND COUNTERPART VISITS**

In 1967 the JSDF Chairman of the Joint Staff Council visited Australia for meetings with his counterparts, with equipment standardisation between the US and its allies seemingly the key topic for discussion.<sup>19</sup> The first visit to Japan by an Australian Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Evans, occurred in 1984. In the same year, Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara, Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS), visited the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, General Murai, although this visit appears to be often overlooked in historical records. In his autobiography, *The Quiet Man*, he notes his modest expectations before the visit, the reasonable rapport that was established, the frankness of discussion on Australian perceptions of Japanese people and the personal warmth that the General showed the CDFS and his wife, noting ‘the strong desire of the Japanese to establish good relations’.<sup>20</sup>

Since that time, such visits have become a regular occurrence with the most recent Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) visit being by General Cosgrove in 2004 for the Chiefs and Heads of Defence Conference. Chief of Air Force (CAF), Air Marshal Houston, also visited in that year and Air Marshal Shepherd visited in August 2006 as CAF. The Chief of Staff, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) made reciprocal visits in 2003 and 2005, and equivalent visits have occurred with Army and Navy counterparts. Counterpart visits also occur regularly between Australia’s Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and Japan’s Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH).

At the working level, airman-to-airman talks commenced in 1998 and are now held every 12–18 months to exchange ideas and explore future avenues for engagement. A two-star officer leads the RAAF’s delegation. Similar working level talks are held between Army and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), and Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). A number of other visits have occurred for consultation on issues such as AEW&C, surveillance, intelligence and Special Forces. It is interesting to note that within the period 2004–05 the number of defence visits to Japan numbered approximately three times the number that came from Japan to Australia. While there are many explanations for this, including the tight budgetary constraints on JSDF travel, it does highlight the need to keep the relationship in perspective, as the US still remains the overwhelmingly dominant defence engagement partner for Japan.

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<sup>19</sup> Rix, *The Australia–Japan Political Alignment*, p. 158.

<sup>20</sup> Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara, *The Quiet Man*, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2006, pp. 218–219.

### EXERCISES AND TACTICAL-LEVEL EXCHANGE

While the intellectual level of exchange can occur up to the highest echelons of defence, Japan's ban on collective self-defence presents a number of obstacles to meaningful engagement at the unit level. RAN–JMSDF engagement is the most mature of tactical-level exchange, with the first JMSDF ship visit to Australia occurring in 1962 and numerous subsequent visits by both countries. It is important to note, however, that JMSDF ship visits have all been of a non-operational nature, such as visits for commemorative events, due to Japanese political and legal constraints. This restraint is bypassed in the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off Hawaii, in which both Japan and Australia participate. Japan's participation is technically on the basis of bilateral training with the US, which overcomes its constitutional constraints while allowing interaction with the other participants. RIMPAC thus provides the RAN platforms and RAAF P-3C aircraft valuable exposure to JMSDF operations. RIMPAC may in fact provide a framework for future training with the JSDF where constitutional constraints prevent closer bilateral engagement.

The first multilateral exercise hosted by the JMSDF was *Pacific Reach 2002*, a submarine search and rescue exercise in which the RAN's HMAS *Farncomb* participated, along with vessels from the US, Republic of Korea and Singapore. In the same year HMAS *Sydney* took part in a multilateral search and rescue exercise in Japan. RAN mine warfare and clearance diving personnel have also exercised with the JMSDF in the 2004 Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures/Dive Exercise, hosted by Singapore and Indonesia and attended by 18 countries.<sup>21</sup>



**Figure 3.1 – HMAS *Farncomb* alongside JDS *Bunho* at Pacific Reach 2002**

<sup>21</sup> Sea Power Centre-Australia, 'The Western Pacific Naval Symposium', *Semaphore: Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre-Australia*, Issue 5, March 2006, Sea Power Centre-Australia, Canberra, 2006.

Maritime patrol has formed the basis of RAAF engagement. In Japan this responsibility falls to the JMSDF; consequently exposure to the JASDF is more limited. RAAF P-3C aircraft have been deploying to Japan since 1997 for Exercise *Goodwillex*, involving training with JMSDF P-3C aircraft. The last exercise occurred in 2003. Significantly, in May 2006 a JMSDF P-3C deployed to RAAF Edinburgh. This marked the first time that a JSDF platform has visited Australia other than in transit.<sup>22</sup> While planning and execution of the visit presented a range of challenges due to Japan's ban on collective self-defence, the exercise allowed for significant interaction between the operators and was deemed a great success by both the RAAF and JMSDF.

Aside from P-3C and VIP visits, the only recorded time that RAAF aircraft have landed at a JASDF base was in February 2001 when a C-130J visited Iruma and Komaki JASDF bases and discussions were held on peacekeeping operations, Non-combat Evacuation Operations (NEO) and airlift planning. In 1998 Australian F/A-18 aircraft deploying to Alaska for Exercise *Cope Thunder* transited through Japan. Constitutional constraints again came into play, however, and they were obliged to utilise the UN Command (Rear) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to land at a US airbase rather than a JASDF one. Japan sent two observers to Exercise *Pitch Black 04* and although insufficient notice was given for observers to attend in 2006, the Japanese Defence Attaché was present in an observer capacity.

Both Australia and Japan are leading players in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and have participated in and hosted a number of exercises under the PSI aegis. PSI and the role it can play in RAAF-JSDF cooperation will be discussed in Chapter 5.

## EDUCATION AND TRAINING

JSDF students have attended Australian Command and Staff Course (ACSC) since 2001 (with the exception of 2005). The JASDF has yet to send a representative, although it was offered positions in 2000 (RAAF CSC), 2001, 2002 and 2006. Currently, there is no annual program of ADF officers attending the Japanese staff colleges. Instead, students attend the Japanese Command and Staff Course prior to taking up the position of Assistant Defence Attaché in the Tokyo Embassy or the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) prior to appointment as Defence and Armed Services Attaché-Tokyo.

Each year an invitation is extended to the RAAF to send an officer to the International Air Force Education Seminar and this invitation has always been accepted. The theme of the 2006 seminar was *Education of Military Officers and Military to Military Exchange*, centred specifically on military operations other than war. One student from ACSC also attends the JASDF Command and Staff Short Course annually.

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<sup>22</sup> Two JASDF C-130s visited RAAF Darwin in February 2003 but no significant engagement activity was undertaken.



In 2005 the RAAF Air Power Development Centre invited Mr Hiroyuki Shindo from NIDS to speak at the RAAF History Conference.<sup>23</sup> This was the first time that a speaker from a country not allied with Australia during World War II has been asked to present and reflects a desire to engage internationally not only in current operations but also in gaining a broader perspective on past operations. At the same time it laid the foundation for increased interaction between the Air Power Development Centre and NIDS. In addition to this, the Australia–Japan Research Project was launched at the Australian War Memorial in 1997 and seeks to ‘establish a database for historical materials dealing with the Australia–Japan relationship from 1901 to –1957’.<sup>24</sup>

In 1997 the author participated in the inaugural cadet exchange between the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) and National Defense Academy (NDA), which continues to occur annually. Each year one ADFA cadet also attends the NDA International Cadets Conference. Engagement at such a grassroots level demonstrates eagerness by both countries to increase mutual understanding at all ranks and to invest in the future of the relationship. As the ADF–TNI relationship highlights, development of personal networks at the lower levels cannot be underestimated in the impact it can have on higher level engagement and understanding. Furthermore, it provides a means of engagement that is not hampered by high-level political sensitivities. This was demonstrated in June 2006 when personal relationships between senior RAAF and TNI–AU (Indonesian Air Force) were able to withstand political tension over Australia’s acceptance of West Papuan asylum seekers.

Other activities hosted by Japan and attended by the ADF include the Tokyo Defense Forum, NIDS Asia-Pacific Security Seminar, Asia-Pacific Naval College Seminar and Asia-Pacific Air Force CSC Seminar. JSDF representatives regularly attend the ADF-hosted International Peace Operations Seminar, Regional Special Forces Conference, Air Power Conference, Pacific Sea Power Conference and Army’s History Conference.

### **UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

The 1992 signing of the International Peace Cooperation Law allowed JSDF troops to be deployed overseas for the first time. Their deployment to Cambodia in 1992-93 saw a JGSDF engineer battalion serving alongside an Australian signal regiment under the overall command of an Australian, UNTAC Commander Lieutenant General Sanderson. Since that time Australian and Japanese forces have worked together on peacekeeping operations in East Timor and have also participated together in various peace operations seminars and conferences, most recently at the International Peace Operations seminar in Australia in 2005.

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<sup>23</sup> Wing Commander Keith Brent (ed.), *Masters of Air Power: Proceedings of the 2005 RAAF History Conference*, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2005, p. 73.

<sup>24</sup> Morris F. Low, ‘The Australia–Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial’, *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, Issue 30, April 1997, p. 1, [www.awm.gov.au/journal/j30/morris.htm](http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j30/morris.htm), accessed 19 April 2006.

In his paper *The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific*, Mark Hoare discusses the challenges and opportunities provided by peacekeeping operations for ADF–JSDF engagement.<sup>25</sup> Noting that the paper was actually written in 2001, he points out the different approaches that the two countries have had to peacekeeping operations.

Japan's 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law precludes JSDF forces from participating in operations conducted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter due to the use of force required for such a role.<sup>26</sup> This was one of the reasons given by Japan for not being able to contribute troops to the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). In spite of its significant financial contribution to the initial operation, misunderstanding regarding the reason for Japan being unable to deploy troops under INTERFET created some tension between Australia and Japan and reflected their differing approach to peacekeeping operations.<sup>27</sup> It was not until February 2002 that JSDF troops were dispatched to participate in peacekeeping operations sponsored by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). An engineering contingent of between 500 and 700 JSDF personnel was deployed from February 2002 until June 2004, taking part in rear support and reconstruction activities.<sup>28</sup> Increased engagement will ensure such misunderstanding is less likely to occur in the future given the growing support for a higher level of defence exchange between Australia and Japan.

## DISASTER RELIEF

Disaster relief is an area that both Australia and Japan have significant experience in. For Japan much of this work has been for domestic earthquake relief. Overseas, they contributed to disaster relief in Honduras in November 1998, Turkey in August 1999, India in February 2001, Iran in December 2003 and Indonesia in 2006. Following the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005, Japan dispatched three UH-1s, four C-130s and 120 personnel. The deployment of personnel and platforms to provide relief to the December 2004 Asian tsunami was the largest overseas JSDF operation ever conducted, with 1000 personnel deployed from the three Self-Defense Forces. The tsunami relief effort provided another platform for consultation between the ADF and JSDF and

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<sup>25</sup> Colonel Mark Hoare, *The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific*, Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 123, Canberra, September 2003, pp. 32–35.

<sup>26</sup> The full name of the bill is 'Law Concerning Cooperation for UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations'. Two of the five conditions for JSDF stated in the bill are that a ceasefire is in place and that the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operations.

<sup>27</sup> Yoichi Funabashi, 'Uncertainty and Irritation Taint Australia–Japan Relationship', *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 November 1999 (morning edition), p. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004*, Defense White Paper, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 2004, p. 288.

also provided insight into the JSDF command and control arrangements that will be discussed in Chapter 5.<sup>29</sup>

### **OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

Common experiences in peacekeeping, disaster relief and more recent Middle East deployments have led to the gradual development of common ground for liaison and information exchange relating to operational deployments. Although the US is the obvious first port of call for inquiries, the Japanese see the ADF as an alternative and valuable source of information for such deployments as it is a smaller force which faces many limitations not encountered by a force on the scale of the US. Currently this exchange is somewhat one way as the JSDF lacks the depth of experience possessed by the ADF in expeditionary operations.

### **COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

As will be explored further in the following chapter, a number of legislative changes were passed in Japan in order to provide support for the Global War on Terror following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. One of the higher profile operations the JSDF has undertaken is refuelling in the Indian Ocean. The possibility of JMSDF refuelling RAN vessels was explored but not pursued as the RAN ships' operations were not confined to the Global War on Terror and thus supporting them was not allowed under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

The deployment of Australian and Japanese forces together in southern Iraq was a significant step in the advancement of ADF–JSDF relations. Quite aside from the political implications, the deployment has provided a large number of soldiers from both countries the opportunity to work alongside one another and has raised many issues, including a number of challenges, which highlight the unique nature of coalition operations with the Japanese. There is thus now an increased awareness within the ADF of the reality of engaging with the JSDF.

The public reaction to the announcement of the deployment is interesting to note, given that there are still a number of World War II survivors in Australia with bitter memories of their experience with the Japanese. While some opposition was evident and indeed understandable, the reaction was generally positive and encapsulated by the Victorian RSL President:

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<sup>29</sup> The JSDF also deployed in response to the May 2006 Indonesian earthquake. Following this, Japan's Defense Minister, Mr Nukaga, proposed the establishment of an Asia-Pacific framework for joint relief operations.

## Where to From Here?

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We can never forget or forgive what they did then, but it was a long time ago and now we need to work with them to ensure that what happened then never happens again.

Major General David McLachlan, AO (Retd)<sup>30</sup>

Such a statement reflects the progress that has been made in ADF–JSDF relations over the past sixty years. The changes have not, however, been dramatic. Rather as domestic opinion and political constraints alter, the two countries have slowly made advances in their defence ties. The progress is limited when compared with the cooperation on the economic and political level but strategic realities have now raised the priority of military cooperation and there is now impetus to focus more on security ties. That political intent brings with it further opportunity for progress. The future of this relationship will be explored in Chapter 5 once the intricacies of Japan’s defence policy have been explored.

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<sup>30</sup> In Garry Barker, ‘From Changi to Iraq. Former foes come a long way’, *The Age*, Melbourne, 23 February 2005.

## CHAPTER 4

# BACKGROUND TO JAPAN'S DEFENCE POLICIES

The new threats have potential for spreading throughout the world beyond the borders with accelerating interdependent relationships among nations, globalisation, and the rapid development of new means for communication and conveyance. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that it has become even more difficult for one country to resolve these issues alone.

*Defense of Japan 2005*<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

Just as Australia's 2005 Defence Update emphasised the importance of international solutions to international security challenges such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, so the 2005 Defense of Japan White Paper has a similar emphasis. There are, however, significant differences in the defence policies of the respective countries and the constraints that are placed on them. These constraints curtail what is possible in engagement between the ADF and JSDF and for this reason it is important that commanders have some understanding of them.

### THE PEACE CONSTITUTION

In order to truly understand Japan's Defense Policy and why it is that engagement with the JSDF is quite unlike engagement with any other regional defence force it is necessary to look at the historical context in which the JSDF was formed. Following its defeat in World War II, Japan's post-war Constitution, imposed on it by the allies, was promulgated in 1946. Article 9 or the 'Renunciation of War' clause states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

*Article 9, The Constitution of Japan*

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<sup>1</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, Defense White Paper, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 2005.

Japan regained its sovereignty in 1951 with the Japan Self-Defense Force being established in 1954 following the Korean War.<sup>2</sup> The argument for allowing the JSDF in 1954, and now, is that the Constitution recognises the right of self-defence as an inherent right of a sovereign state.<sup>3</sup> The level of self-defence allowed is limited, however, to the minimum necessary level and precludes Japan from developing or acquiring overtly offensive weapons. The definition of self-defence has, like most aspects of Article 9, been reinterpreted since its inception. At the current time, however, it does still preclude Japan from possessing long-range strategic bombers, attack aircraft carriers or long-range missiles.<sup>4</sup> The geographic limits of the application of self-defence will be discussed later in the chapter.<sup>5</sup>

### **PRINCIPLES OF JAPAN'S DEFENCE POLICY**

Although much has changed regarding the interpretation of the Constitution and how it relates to the JSDF, the four principles set out in the 1957 'Basic Policy for National Defense' remain largely unchanged. They are to:

- support the United Nations' activities, and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace;
- stabilise the people's livelihood, and establish the foundations for national security;
- establish effective defence capabilities; and
- defend the nation on the basis of the Japan-US security arrangements.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Fukushima Nukaga, 'Japan's Defence Policy: Basic Principles and New Initiatives', *Rusi Journal*, Vol. 151, No. 1, London, February 2006.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Rust Deming, 'Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?', *Strategic Forum*, No. 213, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2004, [www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF213/SF213\\_final.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF213/SF213_final.pdf), accessed 18 April 2006.

<sup>5</sup> Note that in the same way that Japan has now acquired an air-to-air refuelling capability, these restrictions on certain capabilities will probably be further relaxed in the future. For example, in response to North Korea's test firing of seven missiles in 2006, the DG JDA and the Chief Cabinet Secretary suggested that Japan could possess the capability to attack bases in North Korea when launch of ballistic missiles is imminent. They declared that this would be within the realm of self-defence and this raises the possibility of Japan acquiring a long-range strike capability.

<sup>6</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Overview of Japan's Defense Policy*, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, May 2005, p. 2.

Subsequently, additional 'non-constitutional' fundamental policies were added to the original four and these were reaffirmed in the 1976 'Basic Outline of National Defense'.<sup>7</sup> The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines state that all these principles are still applicable today, in spite of the expansion of the role of the JSDF. The additional principles are to:

- maintain its exclusively defence-oriented policy;
- avoid becoming a major military power that may pose a threat to the rest of the world;
- adhere to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing nuclear weapons and not permitting nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan;
- ensure civilian control of the military;
- firmly maintain the Japan–US security arrangements; and
- build up defence capabilities within moderate limits.<sup>8</sup>

### **THE US–JAPAN SECURITY TREATY**

The US–Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951 on the same day as the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty that ended the allied occupation of Japan. It allowed for the continued presence of US forces in Japan for maintenance of security in the Far East, given Japan no longer possessed the means to exercise its inherent right of self-defence. The 1960 signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security strengthened security ties between the US and Japan, placing responsibility on the US for defence of Japan and committing Japan to defence of the US in territories administered by Japan. On the same day, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to cover the presence of US bases and forces in Japan was signed and that SOFA forms the basis of the continuing presence of approximately 36,860 US service personnel stationed in Japan today.<sup>9</sup> Since that time, the US–Japan security alliance has acted as the linchpin not only of Japan's defence policy, but also of stability in the Asia-Pacific, particularly during the Cold War.

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<sup>7</sup> Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Japan's Defence and Security in the 1990s*, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Paper No. 79/93, Canberra, June 1993, p. 51.

<sup>8</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Overview of Japan's Defense Policy*, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Headquarters United States Forces Japan, *The History of U.S. Forces, Japan*, US Forces Japan: <http://usfj.mil/history.html>, accessed 23 March 2006.

Through the treaty, the US was given permanent bases in the region while Japan could shift its focus from its own security to economic growth which allowed it to develop from a defeated and devastated nation following World War II to a leading world economy. Furthermore, the treaty reassured regional countries that as long as the US was primarily responsible for Japan's security, Japan would not have the opportunity to remilitarise and once again threaten the region. The US–Japan Security Arrangements continue to be one of the defining features of the Asia-Pacific security environment.

### **COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE**

When considering ADF engagement with Japan, it is necessary to understand its self-imposed restrictions with regard to collective self-defence. Collective self-defence can be defined as the use of force to defend another state when Japan itself is not under attack. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that every country has the inherent right of collective self-defence. The Japanese Government acknowledges this but under the official interpretation of the Constitution collective self-defence exceeds the bounds of Article 9 and is therefore not permitted.<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that the prohibition of collective self-defence is derived from official interpretation, not from the Constitution itself. Therefore, should there be sufficient political will in the future, this constraint could be lifted without formal amendment of the Constitution. Such a move was supported by 54 per cent of Diet (Japanese Parliament) members in a 2002 poll.<sup>11</sup> There is consequently a real possibility of change within the next ten years, which would remove many barriers to meaningful engagement. In the meantime, this interpretation severely limits the range of exercises and operations in which the JSDF can participate with countries other than the US. It also has a significant impact on the way in which the JSDF operates as part of multinational coalitions as evidenced in operations in Al Muthanna Province, Iraq. This will be examined in Chapter 5.

### **COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY**

A number of key events motivated Japan to take more responsibility for its own security in 1980. Within the context of the Soviet Union's growing influence and its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, as well as the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Japan sought closer cooperation with the US, strengthened its own defence capabilities and strived to secure its supply of raw materials to guarantee continued economic growth.<sup>12</sup> Under

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<sup>10</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, p. 451.

<sup>11</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004*, Defense White Paper, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 2004, p. 106; the poll was conducted by *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a national newspaper, in 2002 in Richard Samuels, *Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9*, The Brookings Institution, Center for North-East Asian Policy Studies, Washington DC, 15 December 2004, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Alan Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004, p. 2.



the policy of 'comprehensive security', Japan took the view that a country's military security was intertwined with its economic security. It was at this point that overseas development aid (ODA) became a tool of foreign policy. By providing aid to regional countries, Japan aimed to shape its security environment and ensure stability within the region. This provided a way of contributing more to its security environment without the use of military force, so sensitive under the Constitution.

### **CHEQUEBOOK DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE COOPERATION LAW**

The limits of such an approach were realised, however, in the aftermath of Gulf War One, which marked a turning point in Japan's defence policy. Although Japan made a financial contribution of US \$13 billion to the war effort, it received strong criticism from the international community for not making a contribution of personnel.<sup>13</sup> As a result, four minesweepers and a support ship were despatched to the Gulf on 26 April 1991. This marked the first overseas deployment of Japanese forces since World War II.<sup>14</sup>

Although there were heated debates between pros and cons on this issue, this decision was made with the rising recognition among the Japanese public that Japan should make some kind of personnel contributions to world peace and security.

Professor S. Kondo<sup>15</sup>

The passing of the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992 provided a legislative basis for the overseas deployment of JSDF troops on limited peacekeeping operations (PKO) missions. This law enabled the dispatch of troops to Cambodia in September 1992 where they worked with Australian forces for the first time. The law outlines five principles, contained at Appendix E, which must be met before deployment and the terms are somewhat restrictive. For example, JSDF fill only non-combatant roles on UNPKO deployments; roles such as engineering and transport have dominated.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, the troops may only carry light arms and only use them for the purpose of self-defence.<sup>17</sup> This does not include defence of other UN contingents, although it was extended for the 2002 deployment to East Timor to include individuals under the

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<sup>13</sup> Nukaga, 'Japan's Defence Policy'.

<sup>14</sup> Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Japan's Defence and Security in the 1990s*, p. 81.

<sup>15</sup> Professor S. Kondo, *A Japanese View on the Asia Pacific Security Environment and Japan's Role in the Region*, NIDS submission to Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Japan's Defence and Security in the 1990s*, p. 82.

<sup>16</sup> Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword*, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Japan's Defence and Security in the 1990s*, p. 132.

care of the JSDF.<sup>18</sup> The deployment must be under UN auspices and must be carried out only with the permission of the host country and the parties to the conflict.<sup>19</sup> A table of JSDF involvement in international peace cooperation activities since 1992 is contained at Appendix F.

### **EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES: 1995-99**

The JSDF's enhanced profile through UNPKO in Cambodia and response to the Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake and the Tokyo sarin gas attacks in 1995, all provided impetus for the 1995 National Defence Program Outline, reflecting the fundamentally different security environment and the increased role of the JSDF.<sup>20</sup> The US-Japan security arrangements have continued to provide the baseline of Japan's defence policy. These arrangements were reviewed in the post-Cold War environment and their importance reaffirmed in the April 1996 'Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security' by US President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto.<sup>21</sup>

Bearing in mind the context of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis and the 1996 Taiwan Strait stand-off between US and China, the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation for the first time reflected Japan's intention to contribute to security outside its immediate territories. This led to the enactment of the 'Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Near Japan' which was passed in 1999, following further challenges to Japan's security with the August 1998 North Korean launch of a Taepodong-I missile over Japan.<sup>22</sup> The legislation allowed for the JSDF to provide logistical support to US forces in order to defend Japan in the event of contingencies in Japan's periphery. The significance of this was that it provided the JSDF with the legislative backing for extending its operations outside of Japan's territories without a UN mandate, but in support of US forces. This was recognition of the potential threat to Japan of conflict in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula and provided the new geographical boundaries for JSDF operations.

### **THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN**

Much of the debate regarding Japan's evolving role in the international security environment has arisen out of its actions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Given Japan's own experience of terrorism in the 1995 subway Sarin gas attacks, public support for a JSDF contribution to the Global War on Terror was high. The passing of an 'Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law' on 29 October 2001 enabled the

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<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, p. 109.

<sup>21</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era*, 1996 Defense White Paper, Tokyo, 1996, p. 65. The declaration is contained on p. 266.

<sup>22</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Overview of Japan's Defense Policy*, p. 3; and Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword*, p. 6.

dispatch of JSDF units to support the Afghanistan campaign.<sup>23</sup> This included refuelling of coalition ships in the Indian Ocean and logistical support. Given the tight Constitutional restrictions on collective self-defence, this operation was significant as Japan was providing direct support to nations other than the US. It also once again extended the geographical boundaries of the JSDF's operations beyond Japan's peripheries, as allowed by the 1999 legislation, to the Indian Ocean and then on to the Middle East.

The deployment of JASDF C-130s to Kuwait and JGSDF personnel to Al Muthanna province in Iraq where they work alongside the ADF, was allowed by the July 2003 passing of a 'Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance'. This signified the first time the JSDF has been deployed to a combat zone, albeit to a relatively safe area.<sup>24</sup> The passing of this law was helped by UN Resolution 1483 supporting the reconstruction of Iraq. Japan has continued to use UN legitimacy to justify JSDF deployments. It has done this by referring to its own Constitution, the preamble of which states that Japan should work with international society for the preservation of peace.<sup>25</sup>

In this way, without amending the Constitution, Japan has managed to contribute military forces to the Global War on Terror through passing of additional legislation and the use of UN legitimacy. Not only has the geographical scope of JSDF operations been expanded by this legislation, but its functional scope has also grown. In contrast to the legislation of 1992 and 1999, the latest legislation allows for JSDF use of weapons not only for defence of JSDF personnel and equipment, but also those who 'have come under their control', interpreted as meaning wounded coalition personnel and refugees from the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts.<sup>26</sup>

### **NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES (NDPG) FY 2005**

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organisations such as the United Nations.

*National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005–*<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Christopher Hughes, 'Japan's Security Policy, the US–Japan Alliance, and the "War on Terror": Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 4, Carfax Publishing, December 2004, p. 427.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, p. 428.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, p. 433.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, p. 429.

<sup>27</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005–*, approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 10 December 2004.

The release of these Guidelines provided an update to those of 1995, much as the Australian 2005 Defence Update had done for the 2000 Defence White Paper, and provides the vision for the future of the JSDF for the next decade. Rather than representing a dramatic change in policy, the Guidelines reflect the gradual change that has been occurring over the past ten years. Like the Australian update, the NDPG notes the transnational nature of many of the threats currently facing Japan with terrorism, ballistic missiles and proliferation of WMD taking high priority.<sup>28</sup> There is recognition that a direct attack on Japan is now less likely, bearing in mind the threat still posed by North Korea's ballistic missile capability. The Guidelines state that Japan will continue to uphold its basic principles of defence and that it will continue to rely on the US deterrent. It also names China and North Korea as specific threats for the first time.<sup>29</sup>

The basic principles of the Security of Japan, as outlined in the Guidelines, are as follows:

- **TWO GOALS**
  - Defence of Japan.
  - Prevention of emergence of threats by improving the international security environment.
  
- **THREE APPROACHES**
  - Japan's own efforts.
  - Cooperation with the alliance partner.
  - Cooperation with the international community.<sup>30</sup>

One of the key changes from the 1995 Guidelines is the focus on international peace cooperation efforts. The original outline of 1976 focused heavily on defence of the Japanese territories and the 1995 outline extended the area of interest to Japan's periphery, taking in areas such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait. The 2005 Guidelines state that 'stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan'.<sup>31</sup> In line with this more global approach, the Guidelines set out the

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<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Summarised in provisional translation of *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, 10 December 2004, [www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html), accessed 30 January 2006.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*

intention to 'develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose'.<sup>32</sup> This marks a move away from the heavy, conventional land forces designed for defending against an attack on the islands of Japan and a new emphasis on highly mobile air and sea forces. It also commits Japan to participation in the missile defence program.<sup>33</sup>

The Guidelines state efforts will be taken to establish the necessary infrastructure for the fast deployment of JSDF forces overseas. This process, including strengthening of joint operations, has already begun and will be discussed later in the paper as it provides an area of potential and existing cooperation with the ADF. In introducing the Guidelines, the Chief Cabinet Secretary also noted the inference in the Guidelines that the necessary legislative changes will be made to formalise the JSDF's role in international peace cooperation activities.<sup>34</sup> The significance of this development must be noted as it marks a shift in mentality concerning the JSDF, an intention to increase involvement in overseas operations and cooperation with other countries.

## 2005 GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN—US DEFENSE COOPERATION

... a relationship that was once only about the defense of Japan or perhaps about the security in the region, has truly become a global alliance.

Condoleezza Rice<sup>35</sup>

In October 2005, following a Security Consultative Committee meeting between the defence and foreign ministers of the US and Japan, a document titled *U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future* was released which detailed significant changes in the bilateral alliance.<sup>36</sup> The review of the alliance was based on Japan's 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines and the US Global Posture Review. The most controversial point was regarding the realignment of US forces in Japan, in particular the proposed move of around 8000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Once these details had been finally agreed upon, the statement was ratified, allowing the new arrangements to proceed.

Aside from the movement of US forces, the document contains some key changes in the alliance, some of which are of particular interest to Australia. For the first time since 1996, the geographic scope of the alliance has been expanded from areas surrounding

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<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, in *Remarks with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Japan Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno, and Japan Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura* at the Pentagon, Washington DC, 29 October 2005, [www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55775.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55775.htm).

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*

Japan to the wider international security environment. The document also calls for expanded cooperation across a number of operational areas, enhanced information sharing and intelligence cooperation, improved interoperability and expanded training opportunities, including increased participation in multilateral exercises and JSDF training in Guam.

Significantly, yet often overlooked, the document states that ‘the US forces and the JSDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners’. While not specifically naming Australia, given recent US enthusiasm for trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia, this implicitly suggests increased cooperation between the three countries. Also significant for the ADF, the report states that a bilateral and joint operations coordination centre will be established at Yokota Air Base (currently for sole USAF use), as will Japan’s Air Defense Command. At Camp Zama the JGSDF will set up a Central Readiness Force Command. The implication of these changes for the ADF is that as the US and Japan slowly move towards greater levels of interoperability through collocation and combined units, the way will be paved for easier integration of ADF troops given existing commonalities with the US system. Thus while the proposals laid out in the document will take significant time to implement and even more time to become effective, the more outward looking nature of the alliance and the intention to engage more with third countries bodes well for future engagement between the ADF and JSDF.

### **CIVILIAN CONTROL**

As laid out in the original 1976 ‘Basic Outline of National Defense’, one of the key principles of national defence in Japan is civilian control of the military, which arose as a reaction to the militarism of the country during World War II. Civilian control refers not only to the Prime Minister having supreme command of the military forces but also to the authority of civilians over uniformed personnel within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). As Figure 4.1 shows, under the system in place until March 2006 the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services did not have direct liaison with the Director General. All expert advice from uniformed personnel was passed through a civilian ‘filter’.<sup>37</sup> Although the structure has theoretically changed with the appointment of Chief of the Joint Staff Office who has a direct line to the Minister, the reality is that the culture of civilian dominance within the JDA is likely to linger for some time.<sup>38</sup> This has the added affect

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<sup>37</sup> That civilian ‘filter’ was provided by a layer of civilian bureaucracy referred to as the Defense Counsellors who, under the Defense Agency Establishment Law, are tasked to aid the Director General in giving instructions, authorisation and supervision to the three Services. They have three-star civilian rank and head the internal bureaus and other specialised areas. All advice from the JSDF was passed through the civilian component offices headed by those Counsellors.

<sup>38</sup> Miyuki Nakazato, ‘The Upgrading of JDA’s Status to a Ministry’, unpublished, Office of the Defence and Armed Services Attaché - Tokyo, 16 March 2006.

of forcing uniformed members into a bureaucratic mentality, particularly those located at JDA Headquarters in Tokyo.




Figure 4.1 – JDA Command and Control Pre- and Post-27 March 2006

### UPGRADING OF THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY

A key area currently undergoing change is the upgrade of the JDA to the level of a ministry. The fact that it has thus far remained an agency is a reflection of the low priority given to Japan's indigenous defence capability and the sensitivity surrounding the existence of a defence capability within Japan. It is for this reason that the official title of the head of the JDA is Director General JDA rather than Minister for Defense. A bill has now been drafted for the upgrade to ministry status and is likely to be passed and the changes made by mid-2007.<sup>39</sup> Among other changes in administrative processes, the upgrading of the JDA to ministry status would provide more operational flexibility by hopefully authorising the Defense Minister to play a larger role in approving

<sup>39</sup> The bill was to be submitted to the Diet in early 2006 but when executives from the Defense Facility Administration Agency were arrested for bid rigging in January 2006, the submission was deferred.

deployments and emergency response rather than relying on the Prime Minister, thus streamlining the decision-making process.<sup>40</sup>

### **PUBLIC INTEREST IN DEFENCE IN JAPAN**

In parallel with the developments in Japan's defence policy since 1954, public opinion and interest in defence matters has matured. The parallel is no coincidence as significant developments in policy and the introduction of new legislation often occurred as a result of changes in the international security environment.<sup>41</sup> Such events include:

- involvement in UNPKO since 1992;
- the JSDF's role in the Kobe earthquake;
- the 1995 Sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway;
- 1998 North Korean launch of a Taepodong-I missile over Japan, and subsequent missile tests in the Sea of Japan;
- North Korean spy boat incidents;
- terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001;
- 2002 revelation of kidnapping of Japanese civilians by North Korea;
- November 2004 incursion into Japanese waters by a Chinese submarine;
- successful, high profile deployment of Japanese troops to Al Muthanna Province in Iraq; and
- July 2006 North Korean missile tests in the Sea of Japan.

Public interest in defence issues ensures that the development of defence policy and future deployments and activities of the JSDF will maintain a high profile. Public perception of the JSDF has also improved, particularly as a result of their involvement in disaster relief activities within Japan and the ability of local governors to directly request the support of the JSDF thus integrating the force more fully into the local community.

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<sup>40</sup> Nakazato, 'The Upgrading of JDA's Status', p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword*, p. 6.



## CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: WHAT ARE THE CHANCES?

Japan is turning a historic corner toward amending Article IX of its constitution, but the process is likely to be protracted and the implications for Japan's defense policy evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Rust Deming<sup>42</sup>

As has been demonstrated, there is a vast difference between the roles and responsibilities of the JSDF today and when it was first established. This has been made possible not through Constitutional change, but through the introduction of supplementary legislation providing for specific scenarios and reinterpretation of the Constitution (the responsibility of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau).<sup>43</sup> These changes have not occurred without controversy.<sup>44</sup> Even today, some claim that the very existence of the JSDF is unconstitutional because Article 9 states that 'land, sea and air forces ... will never be maintained'.<sup>45</sup>

As the Diet confirmed through its Constitution Research Councils from 2000 to 2005, opinion within Japan is divided on whether the Constitution should be amended and if so, to what extent.<sup>46</sup> Some feel there is a need to revise the Constitution because the Americans imposed it on the Japanese following World War II.<sup>47</sup> For others, change is necessary for Japan to take on a stronger leadership role in the world and, in particular, gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.<sup>48</sup> Others feel that Japan is currently 'living a lie' because, with the third largest national defence budget after the US and China, the reality of the JSDF and the roles it is involved in are far removed from the wording and original intent of Article 9. The US also provides impetus for change as it urges Japan to a more active role in regional security. The main opposition to change comes from pacifist groups who do not wish to see the rearmament of Japan and believe Article 9 reflects a positive approach to security and changing it could be misinterpreted by regional players.

<sup>42</sup> Deming, 'Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy', p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> Samuels, *Constitutional Revision in Japan*, p. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Nukaga, 'Japan's Defence Policy', p. 17.

<sup>45</sup> In February 2006 the Social Democratic Party, once Japan's main opposition party, reverted to its policy of over 12 years ago that the JSDF is unconstitutional. It is assessed that this was done in a bid to increase its support base based on its standing as a pacifist party; *The Asahi Shimbun*, 'SDP: SDF Activities are Unconstitutional', *The Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, 4 February 2006, [www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200602040128.html](http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200602040128.html), accessed 23 March 2006.

<sup>46</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, p. 107. The report of the Lower House's commission says that the opinions were divided three ways regarding collective self-defence: to allow it; to allow it with certain conditions; and not to allow it.

<sup>47</sup> Samuels, *Constitutional Revision in Japan*, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*

A poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in April 2006 indicated that 71 per cent of Japanese people think that the Constitution should clarify the existence of the SDF.<sup>49</sup> Those in support of amending Article 9 were the highest for five consecutive years at 39 per cent. Opinion over whether collective self defence should be exercised was more divided and is likely to remain one of the more controversial aspects of constitutional reform in the next few years.

The author assesses that in the long term, Article 9 in its current form is untenable. Revisionists currently dominate the Diet and they will ensure that debate on constitutional reform continues. The current Director General JDA, Fukushima Nukaga, has expressed his desire to see constitutional debate and change, particularly to recognise the JSDF's role in international peace cooperation.<sup>50</sup> The influence of younger politicians with no emotional ties to World War II will also increase. The very fact that there is now significant public debate surrounding the validity of the Constitution serves to desensitise the people to notion of change. However, revision will be a slow process. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is spending most of its political capital on domestic economic reforms and while revisionist factions within the LDP currently dominate, they must operate in coalition with the New Komeito Party, many members of which oppose reform.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, a two-thirds majority in each house of the Diet and a majority in a national referendum, a target that will take some time to reach, must support changes to the Constitution.<sup>52</sup> It is more likely in the short term that piecemeal changes and the further introduction of legislation specific to particular operations will occur.

In the meantime, engagement with the JSDF remains possible. The Diet has demonstrated an ability to use interpretation and the introduction of new legislation to achieve its desired aims with the JSDF. Recent rhetoric in the NDPG and the passage of new legislation has already allowed greater cooperation through the Iraq deployment and the Proliferation Security Initiative. In this way, it is possible to strengthen ties between the RAAF and the JSDF even before Constitutional change occurs. This will allow a good grounding in interoperability which can be further developed if and when constitutional change occurs.

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<sup>49</sup> The poll was based on results from 1812 voters across Japan. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, '71% Want Constitution to Clarify SDF Existence', *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 4 April 2006, [www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20060404TDY02010.htm](http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20060404TDY02010.htm), accessed 10 April 2006.

<sup>50</sup> Nukaga, 'Japan's Defence Policy', p. 19.

<sup>51</sup> The New Komeito Party is the junior coalition partner of the LDP. Its Buddhist origins mean that its foreign policy has a pacifist slant.

<sup>52</sup> Nukaga, 'Japan's Defence Policy', p. 5.

### **THE UN–JAPAN SOFA: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?**

Japan and the UN signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on conclusion of the Korean Armistice in July 1953. Eleven countries, including Australia, were signatories to the SOFA based on their participation in the Korean War.<sup>53</sup> It provides for the use of Japan as a staging point for supporting operations, which contribute to regional peace. In 1957 the United Nations Command was relocated from Camp Zama, Japan, to Yongsan in South Korea, and UN Command (Rear) was activated in Japan. One of the primary reasons for UNC(R) is to ensure that the SOFA remains in force by maintaining a presence of US forces and one other member country in Japan at all times. If there were no UN Command element physically located in Japan, its legal right to base foreign forces (other than US) on Japanese territory would cease. Similarly, upon conclusion of a peace treaty on the peninsula, UNC(R) has 90 days to vacate from Japan.<sup>54</sup> The arrangement is thus not a permanent one.

Squadron Leader Sonja Halloran, current Assistant Defence Attaché to Tokyo, has written a paper detailing the significance of the SOFA to Australia–Japan defence relations.<sup>55</sup> In essence, the SOFA currently allows Australian forces a second means of deploying to Japan outside of normal diplomatic channels. A visit under the UN–Japan SOFA involves UNC(R) advising the Government of Japan that Australian assets are visiting, rather than permission having to be sought. Indeed, there is no requirement for consultation with the Government of Japan for the use of designated UN bases in support of UN forces in Korea in the event of renewed hostilities.<sup>56</sup>

Signatories to the SOFA are encouraged to exercise its conditions regularly by deploying to designated UNC(R) bases. Given that all UNC(R) bases are also US bases, this presents a simpler method of visiting, given Australian experience and familiarity with US logistic support. However, overuse of this arrangement obviously raises significant issues and sensitivity with regard to Japan's sovereignty and thus the ADF should continue to use a combination of the SOFA and normal diplomatic channels to facilitate platform visits to Japan. In this way, while the UN–Japan SOFA does provide another avenue for ADF assets visiting Japan by circumventing many of the legal constraints, it is a non-permanent arrangement and does not replace the need for bilateral visits to enhance Australia–Japan defence relations. As relations progress between the ADF and JSDF, the necessity and viability of establishing a bilateral SOFA with Japan should be explored.

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<sup>53</sup> There are currently eight signatories to the SOFA: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

<sup>54</sup> UN–Japan SOFA Article XXIV.

<sup>55</sup> Sonja Halloran, 'The UN–Japan SOFA and Its Relevance to Australia', unpublished, March 2006.

<sup>56</sup> P.S. Giarra, 'U.S. Bases in Japan: Historical Background and Innovative Approaches to Maintaining Strategic Presence' in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.), *The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1999, p. 125.

Where to From Here?

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## CHAPTER 5

# CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

In the Asia-Pacific region ... each country has its own restrictions and sensitivities. But when we really try to be creative, such restrictions or sensitivities do not necessarily become obstacles to cooperation ... We can start from something more acceptable, something that is easier to do.

Fukushiro Nukaga, Director General JDA<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

This paper has established the strategic background and historical context of the ADF–JSDF relationship and examined the various facets of Japan’s defence policy which directly impact on engagement. It is now necessary to look at these factors in the context of what they mean for RAAF commanders and units who are likely to engage with, or plan RAAF engagement with the Japan Self-Defense Forces. As has been made clear, operating with the JSDF is unlike operating with any other of Australia’s regional security partners. There are a host of complicating factors arising from history and from domestic circumstances within Japan which currently curtail substantial working-level engagement between the two forces.

Currently the bulk of RAAF–JSDF engagement is limited to high-level talks and exchange. Most interactions at the tactical level do not extend beyond goodwill visits or highly scripted exercise scenarios. RAAF and JSDF personnel have come into contact in the operational environment through peacekeeping, disaster relief and reconstruction efforts but when compared with other significant security partners in the Asia-Pacific, collaboration is very limited.

For some, this frustration and perceived lack of meaningful engagement can lead to a belief that there is not enough value for the RAAF to justify the energy and cost of developing the relationship. However, given the importance of North Asia to Australia’s security and the increasing importance of ad hoc ties on which to build future coalitions to deal with global security issues, enhancing understanding and interoperability between the two countries is not only logical but also vital. It is likely that the deployment

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<sup>1</sup> Fukushiro Nukaga, ‘Deploying Forces for International Security’, speech given at 5th International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 3 June 2006.

of Australian and Japanese forces to southern Iraq will not be the last time that the two nations work side by side on military operations. Furthermore, by investing in the relationship now, Australia will reap the benefits when Japan's influence in the security realm becomes greater and it is able to exercise greater authority in the international security realm.

The 2003 Memorandum of Defence Exchange encapsulated the political will within both countries to bring defence ties closer to the level of current economic and political exchange. Constraints on JSDF activity are gradually being loosened. Within the next ten years the Japanese people may well choose to amend their post-war Constitution although the extent of this change cannot yet be predicted. Whatever the changes, it will likely become easier to achieve the meaningful engagement that political and military leadership desires. In the meantime, maintaining and, where possible, increasing current rates of effort can smooth the path to this point and provide a strong basis for combined operations in the future.

This chapter aims to provide practical advice to commanders on ways to develop the RAAF's relationship with the JSDF in spite of the obstacles that exist. This is important not only in the context of responding to the Australian Government's political will, but also in ensuring utmost effectiveness in future military operations in which RAAF and JSDF forces are working alongside each other. There is no denying that there are challenges to be faced but if there is sufficient awareness of these in the Air Force community and a flexible attitude is adopted, there are a number of ways of creating new opportunities for cooperation.

While the chapter is divided into several challenges and corresponding opportunities, it is important to note that much overlap exists between them. Several challenges impact on broad spectrum of engagement opportunities. Additionally, the opportunities presented are not intended to be an exhaustive list, rather an example of the way to approach interaction between the RAAF and JSDF. The key is to accept that until such time as Japan's defence policy is 'normalised', there will be challenges that are not easily surmountable so instead, niche areas of mutual benefit to Japan and Australia should be pursued.

### **CHALLENGE: REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS**

Wariness and animosity towards Japan within the Asia-Pacific remains powerful. Despite the progress that Japan has made in the last 60 years, there remains a significant voice in the region that ensures that the legacy of the Second World War and Japan's history of aggression does not fade. That voice opposes a relaxation of Japan's defence restrictions. In South-East Asia, Japan's efforts to be a 'good international citizen' through generous overseas development aid (ODA), disaster relief and strong involvement in multilateral institutions have gone a significant way to improvement in its image. Many South-East Asian nations also accept the security that the US-Japan alliance brings to the region.

Anti-Japanese sentiment in North Asia, however, remains strong. This is partly due to longer history of Japanese militarism in the region and partly due to domestic political advantage to be gained from exploitation of the ‘history card’.

When planning to strengthen defence ties with Japan, one of the biggest difficulties the Australian Government faces is in maintaining a balance between this closer relationship and its ties with China. China–Japan relations are continually plagued by issues such as Chinese anger over Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni War Shrine, territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, Japan’s cutting of aid to China as well as China’s perceived exploitation of the history card for domestic political gain. In contrast, Australia’s ties with China continue to deepen, based largely on the economic importance of China to Australia.<sup>2</sup>

It is important to mitigate the risk of China viewing closer military ties between Australia and Japan as developing into an anti-China alliance and the potential damage this could bring to the Australia–China relationship. A bilateral relationship with Japan is unlikely to create significant angst, however the current move towards a trilateral arrangement between Australia, Japan and the US, while holding many benefits for Australia, must be carefully managed. As Alan Dupont warned, the potential exists for the trilateral dialogue to move toward an alliance ‘which is exclusive rather than inclusive, risks needlessly alienating China and looks increasingly like the forerunner to an old-style, Cold War alliance’.<sup>3</sup>

## **OPPORTUNITY**

There is already a large amount of commentary on how to deal with this issue. Some of the most common themes are the importance of deepening Australia’s security dialogue with China, developing confidence and trust building measures, working more closely together in multilateral settings such as ASEAN + 3,<sup>4</sup> and remaining as transparent as possible in US–Japan–Australia security efforts. The need to increase defence cooperation with Japan does not negate the need to nurture more transparent security dialogue with China and this is recognised by Air Force, which continues to pursue engagement activities with the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

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<sup>2</sup> Dr Kiki Fukushima, Hugh White, *Australia–Japan Conference 2005: Trigger Paper for Discussion of Political and Strategic Issues*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Alan Dupont, ‘We Need to Tell Condi Some Blunt Truths’, *The Australian*, 15 March 2006, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> ASEAN+3 refers to the ten ASEAN member states plus China, Japan and South Korea.

### **CHALLENGE: JAPAN'S BAN ON COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE**

The background to Japan's ban on collective self-defence was outlined in Chapter 4 with the main point being that the Constitution does not explicitly refer to collective self-defence but that the restriction is based on the official Japanese interpretation of the document. More recent Japanese contributions to international security have been justified not under Article 9 but under the Preamble to the Constitution, which states that Japan should work with the international community for the preservation of peace.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Japan's Iraq and Indian Ocean deployments were legally predicated on the relevant UN resolution, as opposed to the US and NATO allies who justified their deployments under the right to individual and collective self-defence.<sup>6</sup> Had there not been a UN resolution condemning the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 it would have been far more difficult for Japan to deploy forces because of its inability to exercise collective self-defence.

#### *Collective Self-Defence and Rules of Engagement*

Even though the JSDF has been able to participate in multinational operations, its freedom of action on those deployments is severely limited, as ADF personnel working alongside the JSDF in Iraq can attest. The JSDF is limited to non-combat roles and are only deployed to regions where the risk of conflict is considered minimal. One of the most practical manifestations of the restrictions is in the rules of engagement under which Japanese forces operate.

Two examples illustrate this issue. JGSDF personnel worked alongside Australian forces in southern Iraq. As discussed previously, under legislation allowing for overseas deployment, Japanese troops are strictly limited in their ability to use firearms. In Iraq and Afghanistan the JSDF they can use weapons for self-defence or to protect those people who 'have come under their control', implying wounded coalition forces and refugees.<sup>7</sup> What this means however, is that if Australian soldiers were to have come under fire from insurgents and Japanese forces had been present and in a position to act to defend the Australian position, they would have been legally unable to do so. The impact of such a scenario on trust levels between the ADF and JSDF would be severe.

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<sup>5</sup> Dr Kiki Fukushima, Hugh White, *Australia-Japan Conference 2005: Trigger Paper for Discussion of Political and Strategic Issues*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 2005.

Christopher Hughes, 'Japan's Security Policy, the US-Japan Alliance, and the "War on Terror": Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 4, Carfax Publishing, December 2004, p. 435.

<sup>6</sup> UN Resolutions 1483 and 1511 called upon member states to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. UN Resolutions 1377 and 1456 renounced terrorism as a threat to international security and called for member states to combat it.

<sup>7</sup> Hughes, 'Japan's Security Policy, the US-Japan Alliance', p. 429.



To take another example, the US and Japan are currently collaborating on development of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. Within the next ten years, this system is expected to have the capability to intercept missiles launched from mainland North Asia and directed at the continental US. Given the joint nature of the project, the US may well be relying on Japanese interceptors such as its Aegis destroyers to intercept those missiles. If, however, in ten years time Japan's constitutional interpretation still prohibits them from participating in collective self-defence, will they be able to intercept missiles aimed not at Japan but at mainland USA or US territories in the Pacific?<sup>8</sup> And would Japan legally be able to pass on tactical intelligence gathered by their radars? What would the implications of a failure to act be for the US–Japan alliance?<sup>9</sup> Such questions may well become applicable for Australia if it continues to move down the BMD path in cooperation with the US and Japan.

*Collective Self-Defence and Exercising with the JSDF*

Collective self-defence is of relevance to RAAF engagement with Japan not only on operations but also in peacetime. Not only does it curtail the scope of activities that can be carried out to those not deemed in contravention of the Constitution but it also raises additional factors in planning platform visits.<sup>10</sup> Issues as simple as provision of aircraft fuel and maintenance become complex in this environment. Even though several Australian air assets have visited Japan, the May 2006 visit of two JMSDF P-3 to RAAF Edinburgh was the first time that a JSDF aircraft has landed in Australia in other than a transit capacity. On the transit to RAAF Edinburgh one of the aircraft experienced some mechanical difficulties. In equivalent scenarios with other countries, Australia would be able to lend the necessary spare part to the visiting aircraft to enable its return home. The JMSDF were unable to do this, however, as it would have been seen to be breaching collective self-defence constraints. The result was that a replacement part was couriered from Japan, delaying the aircraft's return. Although only a simple example, this highlights the kinds of complications that can arise out of Japan's proscriptive security legislative constraints.

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<sup>8</sup> The Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japanese Diet has stated that Japan's BMD system is aimed at independent operation and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. See *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, 19 December 2003, [www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html), accessed 24 May 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Umemoto Tetsuya, 'Japan–U.S. Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defence', presentation at US–Japan Track II Meeting on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Verification, Washington DC, 27–28 March 2002.

<sup>10</sup> The range of tactical interaction currently acceptable within Japan includes goodwill visits, exercises carried out under the Proliferation Security Initiative, search and rescue exercises and, increasingly, maritime patrol activities.

## OPPORTUNITIES

As has been demonstrated, Japanese restrictions on the conduct of collective self-defence is the single largest challenge when planning engagement of substance with the JSDF. The introduction of new legislation has circumvented some of the issues and more substantial change is likely in the future but in the meantime, the RAAF needs to work within these boundaries to establish the most fruitful way in which to expand cooperation with the JSDF. Areas such as peacekeeping operations, non-combat evacuation operations and disaster relief can all be carried out within existing boundaries and they are discussed in detail later in the paper in the context of interoperability.

The rise of non-traditional threats has presented new opportunities in security cooperation. Japan acknowledged through its 2005 National Defense Program Outline the need to combat threats such as piracy, terrorism and WMD proliferation through international cooperation. Such areas are less politically sensitive within Japan than more traditional forms of security cooperation and thus provide new avenues for exploration. Due to the RAAF-centric nature of this paper, the Proliferation Security Initiative will be focussed on as a means of enhancing interaction between the air forces of Australia and Japan.

*Proliferation Security Initiative: What is it and how can it be used?*

The PSI was formed in May 2003 as a result of concerns over WMD materials and technology ending up in the hands of terrorist or rogue states.<sup>11</sup> It aims to prevent shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.<sup>12</sup> There is neither formal treaty nor a binding agreement for PSI and it operates on a voluntary basis. There are now over 70 countries which have endorsed its Statement of Interdiction Principles and around 35 meetings and exercises have been conducted under its auspices. Although the reality of interdiction of WMD-related shipments is that they would be carried out unilaterally or by a small number of countries, PSI takes a multilateral approach as a demonstration of resolve within the international community.<sup>13</sup>

Both Australia and Japan are founding and active members of PSI. The twentieth PSI exercise, *Pacific Protector 06* was held in Darwin in April 2006 and in October 2004 Japan hosted Exercise *Team Samurai 04*. Bearing in mind the complexities involved

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<sup>11</sup> Michael Richardson, 'The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): An Assessment of its Strengths & Weaknesses, With Some Proposals for Shaping its Future', *Trends in Southeast Asia Series: 3(2006)*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, March 2006, p. i.

<sup>12</sup> Department of Defence, *Proliferation Security Initiative Overview*, Department of Defence, [www.defence.gov.au/psi/default.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/psi/default.htm), accessed 8 May 2006.

<sup>13</sup> In October 2003 the UK, US, Germany and Italy acted under the auspices of PSI and stopped the transfer to Libya of centrifuge parts to be used in uranium enrichment.

in the Japanese bureaucracy approving the deployment of forces for exercises with countries other than the US, Japan has been a relatively active participant, sending both observers and forces to several of the exercises.

As can be seen from the table at Appendix G, JMSDF and Coast Guard (JCG) units have been the most active participants in PSI activities. This is partly because of the dominance of maritime interdiction exercises. It also reflects a more conservative stance within the Air Staff Office of the Japan Defense Agency towards moving beyond traditional notions of self-defence as well as a perception that air interdiction constitutes a more aggressive stance than maritime interdiction.

In the future, Australia could provide a driver to ensure more involvement by JMSDF and JASDF air assets in PSI activities by suggesting scenarios in which the JASDF would feel comfortable participating. This would provide the chance for RAAF assets to work alongside JSDF aircraft. For example, given the relatively strong community of North Korean sympathisers within Japan, the scenario could entail a shipment of WMD-related material, which is shipped into a Japanese port for on forwarding by air to a non-state actor.<sup>14</sup> By drawing the Japanese mainland into the equation, JASDF participation could be justified under self-defence, within the bounds of current constitutional restrictions.

In this way, increased awareness of non-traditional security threats can in fact provide new opportunities for engagement with Japan. Exercises conducted under the auspices of PSI are one example of the way in which defending against non-traditional threats is seen within Japan as a responsible contribution to the international security environment and thus more open to JSDF participation. Similarly, the RAAF has had discussions with the JMSDF regarding the possibility of combined maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits.

#### *People, Education and Training*

By focusing on less sensitive areas of cooperation more substantial progress can be made. Educational exchange is already far more developed than tactical exchange, as highlighted in Chapter 3. The possibility of personnel exchanges such as exist with a number of other regional air forces should be explored. By adopting a bottom-up approach in developing closer personal relationships and cultural understanding, the RAAF will be better prepared for more substantial engagement as it comes to fruition. As seen in the ADF's relationship with Indonesian Armed Forces, the value of person-to-person ties cannot be underestimated, particularly in situations where higher level exchange encounters difficulty.

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<sup>14</sup> The *Chosen Soren* society is an organisation of North Korean residents in Japan who still boast solidarity and retain links with the North Korean regime.

## Where to From Here?

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One of the biggest barriers to such exchange is the language. While many of the younger generation of JSDF personnel have reasonable English skills the ADF cannot take that for granted. In order to display that Australia is truly committed to the relationship it is diplomatically important to demonstrate ADF willingness to gain some grasp of the language of the country being engaged. This is not only diplomatically important but also operationally.

This factor was recognised by US Forces in early 2006 when a significant increase in defence budget allocation for language proficiency allowances and training was announced 'to equip US forces with language and cultural skills appropriate to the areas and missions in which they will be employed in the 21st century'.<sup>15</sup> In stark contrast, the ADF closed down its Japanese language department at its School of Languages in 2004. This department should be reopened and more ADF members trained in the Japanese language.

One factor that should be noted when planning to invite JSDF personnel to attend training, conferences or any activities in Australia including exercises is the budgeting timeline within which the JSDF must operate. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) requires advanced notice for every planned overseas visit in order to have it scheduled in the next year's budget. Given that within the ADF many activities and visits occur with less than six months notice, planners should be aware of the JDA's timeline and where possible provide adequate notice to the JSDF. In particular, invitations to those activities that occur regularly or are planned well in advance, such as the Air Power Conference should be dispatched as early as possible.

### *JSDF Unilateral Training within Australia*

Although at first glance JSDF use of Australian ranges and airspace appears to be a one-way street to the advantage of Japan, it does open the door to ad hoc engagement opportunities and the opportunity to observe JSDF training. It also sets a positive precedent for the future when the possibility of bilateral training in Australia or even deploying RAAF F/A-18s, for example, to Kadena AFB for exercises with the USAF and JASDF could well become a reality. Such a reality lies not too far into the future.

Australia already has in place a number of MOUs and treaties with Singapore, which could be used as a template for developing a similar concept with the JASDF. Such an idea has been mooted and indeed in 2003 two JASDF personnel from the Air Staff

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<sup>15</sup> US Department of Defense, *President Bush's FY 2007 Defense Budget*, Department of Defense, February 2006, p. 2, [www.defenselink.mil/news/feb2006/d20060206\\_Budget\\_Rollout.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/feb2006/d20060206_Budget_Rollout.pdf), accessed 15 May 2006.

Office visited Australia to inspect its range facilities at Delamere and Saltash. Australia's arrangements with Singapore allow for the RSAF's use of commercial flight screening facilities, flying training at RAAF Pearce, use of the air-ground range at Lancelin, the basing of a helicopter squadron at Oakey among other areas of access. A precedent thus exists for regional countries conducting unilateral training in Australia and is an area that the JSDF has expressed an interest in. Unilateral training opportunities for JSDF in Australia should be further investigated.

#### **CHALLENGE: INTEROPERABILITY**

Given the hurdles laid out already in the paper a significant challenge is to develop ADF-JSDF interoperability so that if and when they are required to work alongside each other in future operations they are able to do so efficiently and effectively. As discussed in Chapter 2, interoperability can be measured in both technological and organisational terms. From a technological perspective there are clear advantages in Australia and Japan working together as both countries source a significant amount of equipment from the US so there is naturally a degree of commonality.

Equipment alone cannot provide interoperability however, as the two countries must develop a sound understanding of the other country's doctrinal employment of that equipment and have experience in operating together. Once again, security legislative restraints on exercises with foreign militaries impair the ADF's ability to gain this experience. Even the US, who has a sizeable force presence in Japan, has not yet made a great deal of progress in improving interoperability with the JSDF. This was recognised in the 2005 *'Transformation and Realignment for the Future'* document referred to in Chapter 4 of this paper which calls for an increase in combined training to overcome current weaknesses.<sup>16</sup>

Organisational interoperability also suffers from Japan's constraints on collective self-defence but much can be done to improve it. One of the stumbling blocks for both Australia and the US in doing this is the lack of JSDF experience in joint operations, which Japan is only now starting to address.

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<sup>16</sup> Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Nobutaka Machimura and Yoshinori Ohno, *Security Consultative Committee Document: U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*, Washington DC, 29 October 2005, [www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55775.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55775.htm), accessed 20 March 2006.

*Joint Operations and Command and Control*

The cumbersome nature of the JSDF's previous command and control structure was demonstrated in the 2004 tsunami relief operations when JGSDF members were embarked on JMSDF vessels and the respective commanders, embarked on the same vessels, were reporting back to and receiving guidance from the JDA independently. Indeed the current Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, General Massaki, has acknowledged that this operation was a 'touchstone for the JSDF integration'.<sup>17</sup>

On 27 March 2006 the JSDF introduced a new joint command structure. While previously, the Chiefs of Staff of the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF all reported directly to the Director General JDA, they will now report to the Chief of the Joint Staff Office.<sup>18</sup> As depicted in Figure 5.1, the three chiefs of staff now hold responsibility for the raise, train and sustain aspects of their respective services and operational command rests with the Chief of the Joint Staff Office.<sup>19</sup> On the surface, this brings the command and control more closely into line with the US system. A key difference, however, is that the Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Joint Staff Office are all of three-star rank. Given the lack of joint culture within the JSDF, it is likely that there will be significant inertia in adopting the new chain of command and in the Chief of the Joint Staff gaining real operational authority over the three services, especially given the lack of rank difference between the positions.

While these changes reflect recognition that the JSDF's lack of jointery needs to be addressed, they lag well behind the ADF and US Forces in doing so. Given the challenges that the ADF still faces with developing a truly joint force, it will be a long time before the JSDF achieves proficiency in joint operations. This is reflected in the absolute lack of joint operational units currently in the JSDF and subsequent lack of a joint mindset.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the concept of merging functions such as logistics into a joint organisation, as the ADF has done, has not been pursued by the JSDF. Thus while joint command structures can be created relatively quickly, the transformation of JSDF culture and mindset will take significantly longer.

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<sup>17</sup> General Hajime Massaki in interview with *Nihon Keizai*, 25 March 2006, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> The predecessor to the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council was the Chairman of the Joint Staff Office. This position held no operational command and only played a role on a contingency basis. He had no forces under his command and relied on the provision of forces by the three Services.

<sup>19</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, Defense White Paper, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 2005. The Joint Staff Office has replaced the Joint Staff Council, which wielded little practical authority and was only utilised during operations.

<sup>20</sup> The only joint units in the JSDF are the Provincial Liaison Office, District and Central Hospitals, and the Physical Training School.




Figure 5.1 – Old and New Joint Operations Structures

### OPPORTUNITIES

While technological interoperability depends on some factors such as acquisition and indigenous development that cannot be influenced by the ADF, much can be done to raise levels of organisational interoperability. Education and personnel exchange are two of the simplest, least controversial forms of engagement which can lead to cultural and professional understanding of JSDF operations and subsequently the ADF can reap the reward of greater efficiency when the two nations are working side by side on operation. Raising interoperability levels does not require adopting identical equipment, command structures and doctrine, it does require an understanding of the differences and how best to operate within those differences.

The JSDF's slow move towards a joint operations system will make combined operations more effective. Recognition of the need for improved US–Japan interoperability as reflected in the latest US–Japan alliance update is promising. The impact of this is already starting to filter down into JSDF operations, with strong

## Where to From Here?

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USAF involvement in the introduction of an aerial refuelling capability to the JASDF F-15s, culminating in the deployment of F-15s using aerial refuelling to Alaska for Exercise *Cope Thunder* in 2005. The training included the deployment of JASDF F-15s to Kadena AB in Okinawa for instruction by the USAF.<sup>21</sup> The gradual breaking down of barriers between the USAF and JSDF bodes well for future RAAF interaction.<sup>22</sup>

### *Liaison and Discussion*

In recent airman-to-airman talks and three star visits, joint operations and command have formed an important part of discussion. In addition, joint staff talks have become a regular item on the engagement calendar. The JSDF looks to Australia to seek an alternative opinion from the US on such issues. As the JSDF moves further down the joint road, such discussions will be able to become more substantial. There is also scope for the JSDF to send personnel to Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) in order to observe how Australia has implemented a framework for joint operations. For the foreseeable future, the transfer of information will be predominantly one-way with the ADF now having significant experience in the conduct of joint operations but with time the information will begin to flow in both directions and the ADF will stand to learn from Japan's experience.

The long-term value of investing in such a relationship is evidenced by the RAAF's relationship with the Royal Singapore Air Force (RSAF). For many years this relationship consisted primarily of information flow and assistance from Australia to Singapore yet now the relationship is an equal one. In fact recently Singapore has offered to provide air-to-air refuelling assistance to the RAAF to fill the gap before the new refuelling capability is introduced. Thus although the RAAF-JASDF relationship may currently appear unbalanced, committing to it now will reap rewards in the future.

### *UN Peacekeeping Operations, Non-combat Evacuation Operations and Disaster Relief*

These three areas will continue to form the basis of common operational experience in the short term and with time will build the foundation for cooperation on more complex military operations. The JSDF is building experience in these areas, particularly in

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<sup>21</sup> Master Sergeant Jon Scudder, *Florida Unit Competes in Alaska*, Pacific Air Force News Service, 19 June 2003, [www2.hickam.af.mil/PACAF/newsarchive/2003/200306/2003186.htm](http://www2.hickam.af.mil/PACAF/newsarchive/2003/200306/2003186.htm), accessed 3 May 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Although US-Japan defence cooperation is permitted under the Constitution, there is not a history of combined operations for the defence of Japan and interoperability levels are currently low. Thus while there are less legislative barriers in this relationship, the cultural barriers have, until now, been considerable.



disaster relief and peacekeeping operations so increasingly there is benefit in transferring<sup>23</sup> knowledge and experience to seek mutual improvement in conducting such operations. The ADF has already capitalised on this through extensive discussions and visits to benefit from the JSDF's experience in responding to the Sarin gas attacks of 1995.

Specifically in terms of interoperability, such deployments offer the best chance possible for ADF and JSDF troops to observe each other's operating methods and develop cultural and operational understanding, which can be transferred to other theatres and operations. This is especially true in the context of US-led 'coalition of the willing' type deployments in which the common alliances and training with US Forces can simultaneously enhance Australia–Japan interoperability.

#### *Trilateral Cooperation and Capability Development*

The reference to increased engagement with third countries in the most recent US–Japan alliance review as well as the history of trilateral talks between Australia, Japan and the US have already been discussed and the risk of marginalising China through trilateral security efforts has been highlighted. If correctly managed, however, trilateral cooperation provides a logical and fruitful step forward for Australia–Japan cooperation and interoperability. Efforts have already begun to improve operational compatibility by using Australia–US collaboration to provide a blueprint for the future.

As an initial step, RAAF squadron deployments to Japan to exercise with the USAF under UN SOFA arrangements are already a feasible option under consideration. Such deployments may provide the opportunity for ad hoc engagement with JSDF forces. In the medium term these exercises could be extended to trilateral activities, particularly if they are conducted under the auspices of less politically sensitive areas of search and rescue (SAR) or PSI.

US base relocations may also create opportunities for trilateral exercises, especially as constraints on the JSDF relax. For example, there has been discussion of JASDF assets deploying more regularly to Guam which may enable the possibility of RAAF deployments to the island to exercise with both countries.<sup>24</sup> Given the relative geographic proximity of Guam to Australia, this could prove an economically and logistically attractive option for the RAAF. Such trilateral cooperation may well extend

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<sup>23</sup> In the wake of the June 2006 earthquake in Java, Japan is currently trying to garner support for a regional response mechanism for dealing with natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific.

<sup>24</sup> JASDF assets already deploy to Andersen AFB, Guam, for example to participate in Exercise *Cope North Guam*.

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across a number of capability areas in the future, particularly given the commonality of capabilities currently being introduced such as AEW&C, UAVs, and, in the longer term, missile defence. Beyond exercises, such emerging capabilities may also become a focus of technology exchange and collaboration for Australia and Japan, particularly given their equivalent status within the US foreign military sales program.

	ACTIVITY	TIME FRAME				
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011–2015
Liaison	Airman-to-Airman talks *					
	Counterpart visits *					
	Joint Staff Talks *					
People, Education, Training	Biennial attendance at ASDF Staff College					
	CDSS/NIDS student workshops (1–2 days with interpreters)					
	Attendance at forums, seminars and conferences *					
	Annual cadet exchange (1–2 weeks) *					
	JSDF unilateral training in Australia					
	Re-introduction of Japanese language training					
	Provision of in-country language training					
	Short-term personnel exchange (1–6 months)					
	Establishment of exchange positions					
	Pre-deployment cultural/professional awareness training (½ day) <sup>25</sup>					
Capability	Counterpart discussions on AEW&C development and doctrine <sup>26</sup>					
	Trilateral discussions on missile defence development and doctrine <sup>27</sup>					
	Cooperation in UAV doctrine and training					
Exercises	P-3C <i>Goodwill</i> *					
	Air-centric PSI exercises					
	Trilateral exercises with US, eg <i>Extendex</i>					
	Increased interaction in multilateral forums: RIMPAC, <i>Cope Thunder</i> etc					
	Airlift, disaster relief and NEO exercise					
	Bilateral training with USAF in Japan					
	Combined exercise of AEW&C and SAR <sup>28</sup>					
	Bilateral air defence exercises with JASDF					
Operations	Cooperative regional anti-piracy surveillance <sup>29</sup>					
	Disaster relief: co-development of regional rapid-response procedures					
	Tactics, procedures, lessons learnt liaison: pre and post operations *					

\*Activity already occurring

Figure 5.2 – Suggested RAAF-JSDF Engagement Activity

<sup>25</sup> This would be similar to that conducted on pre-deployment training on host-country culture.  
<sup>26</sup> Initial discussions have commenced.  
<sup>27</sup> This would be limited to general discussion in the short-medium term as part of preparation for the introduction of the Air Warfare Destroyer.  
<sup>28</sup> The JSDF has indicated in discussions with visiting RAAF officers that they would be interested in pursuing cooperation in this area.  
<sup>29</sup> As above.

## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter has provided a realistic appraisal of the key obstacles to developing meaningful engagement with the JSDF, with self-imposed constraints on collective self-defence being the foremost of these challenges. As has been outlined, even within these constraints, there are still avenues of niche collaboration that can be explored to a greater extent than currently witnessed. Furthermore, given that changes to the collective self-defence restrictions are not dependent on full constitutional change, there is real hope that some of those obstacles will be removed within the next five years and both countries can move forward in their defence cooperation. In the meantime, provided that RAAF commanders have a realistic view of what is achievable, fruitful engagement between the RAAF and the JSDF can be more than just a pipedream.

Where to From Here?

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## CHAPTER 6

# CONCLUSION

Common economic and political ties and a shared strategic outlook within the Asia-Pacific make Australia and Japan natural security partners. While South-East Asia will remain the top priority region for defence engagement due to geo-strategic realities, the Government has acknowledged that more focus needs to be directed to North Asia given the range of traditional security challenges and the rise of China in that region. The Government has therefore provided the strategic direction for closer security involvement with Japan.

For the ADF, increasing defence engagement with Japan has wider implications than fulfilment of strategic objectives. The operational reality is that, just as the ADF and JSDF worked together in East Timor and Iraq, the increase in coalition operations and the normalisation of Japan's defence policy mean that Australian and Japanese forces are very likely to work together more in the future. This is particularly true given common US security alliances and Japan's increasingly active security policy as restrictions placed on its defence activities following World War II are gradually relaxed. The onus is therefore on the ADF to strive to improve interoperability levels, both technological and organisational, so that the effectiveness of the forces is maximised in future operations.

Even within Japan's current strict limits on what its self-defence forces can do, especially in terms of collective self-defence, there are several ways in which cultural and professional understanding between Australian and Japanese forces can be improved. Efforts to combat non-traditional threats such as piracy and WMD proliferation, for example, are less politically sensitive and thus provide scope for engagement opportunities. Provided RAAF commanders are realistic in their expectations and flexible in their approach, mutually beneficial activities can be undertaken. Even in areas where information flow is currently predominantly one-way and minimal advantage to the ADF can be identified, it is vital that a long-term view is adopted. Just as the ADF's relationship with Singapore's armed forces has developed into an arrangement where Singapore is able to provide valuable assistance and advice, so Australia stands to benefit from investing in a defence relationship with Japan now. It is highly likely that within the foreseeable future, many of Japan's restrictions on defence activities will be lifted through Constitutional change and reinterpretation. When that time comes, Australia stands to have a close and powerful regional security partner through whom it will have a better ability to shape its own security environment.

Where to From Here?

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## APPENDIX A

# ORGANISATION AND ORDER OF BATTLE OF JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

The following information on the Japan Self-Defense Forces is sourced from the Office of the Defence and Armed Services Attaché–Tokyo.<sup>1</sup>

### JAPAN GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JGSDF)

#### Authorised Establishment:

Regular: 159 921 (146 960 actual—as at Mar 04)  
Ready Reserve: 5 726  
General Reserve: 46 000  
(Note: Almost all manning shortfalls are concentrated in the lower enlisted ranks.)

#### PRINCIPLE UNITS (AS AT MAR 04)

Units	Present	Projected	Remarks
Infantry Divisions	10	8	Bde (+) size
Armoured Divisions	1	1	Type 90 MBT
Infantry Brigades	2	6	
Combined Brigades	2	0	Bn Gp size
Airborne Brigade	1	1	Bn Gp size
Helicopter Brigade	1	1	CH-47J
AD / Arty Groups	8	8	Improved Hawk
Engineer Brigades	5	5	
Artillery Brigades	1	1	

The JGSDF is undergoing a long-term force restructuring plan that will see the reduction of some formations from division to brigade level. A standard JGSDF infantry division comprises around 6000 troops organised into three or four infantry regiments (battalions), plus supporting troops (armoured battalion, engineer battalion, air defence battalion, artillery regiment (12–14 batteries). In the four infantry divisions that are comprised of four infantry regiments, the fourth regiment is composed of Ready Reservists.

<sup>1</sup> Office of the Defence and Armed Services Attaché - Tokyo, *Japan: Background Brief for Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Overseas Study Tour*; Office of the Defence and Armed Services Attaché - Tokyo, April 2006.

## Where to From Here?

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A JGSDF brigade differs from a division in that the supporting troops are very much reduced to an armoured company, engineer company, air defence company and artillery battalion, but the infantry component is increased to four companies. The Combined Brigades are organised along the lines of a regimental (battalion) combat group.

### Principle Equipment (as at Mar 04)

Role	Equipment	Numbers	Remarks
Main Battle Tanks (Total 1000, to reduce to 900)	Type 90	260	120mm gun. Composite armour Concentrated in 7 <sup>th</sup> Armoured Division
	Type 74	740	105mm gun
Armoured Personnel Carriers	Type 96 Type 89 Type 73 Type 60	1 220	
Artillery	203mm SP 155mm SP 155mm towed	740	
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems		110	
Attack Helicopters	AH-1S	88	TOW-equipped Cobra Two (eight-ship) companies per Army (Army Troops). To be replaced by AH-64D
Observation Helicopters	OH-6J/D	162	
	OH-1	16	
Transport Helicopters	CH-47J	49	
	UH-1H	157	
	UH-60J	21	



## JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JMSDF)

### AUTHORISED ESTABLISHMENT:

Regular: 45 839 (49 390 actual—as at Mar 04)  
 General Reserve: 1 100 (1 058 actual—as at Mar 03)

### PRINCIPLE UNITS


Type	Class	Tonnage	Numbers	Remarks
DDH	Shirane	5 200	2	
	Haruna	5 050	2	To be replaced around 2007~ by a new 14,500 ton design
DDG	Kongo	7 250	4	Aegis equipped
	Hatakaze	4 650	2	
	Tachikaze	3 850	3	
DD	Murasame	4 550	9	
	Hatsuyuki	2 950	11	
	Asagiri	3 500	8	
LST	Oosumi	8 900	2	
	Atsumi	1 550	1	
	Yura	590	2	
SSK	Yuushio	2 250	5	(+2) Yuushio (lead class)
	Oyashio	2 700	5	
	Harushio	2 450	6	
Patrol Aircraft	P-3C		99	

The Self-Defense Fleet is organised into four Escort Flotillas, each comprising eight vessels embarking between them eight helicopters (known as the 8-8 flotilla concept). Flotilla structure is one DDH (the flagship), one to two DDG, and five to six DD. The submarines are organised into two eight-boat flotillas, and a smaller training and trials unit.

In addition to the Escort Flotillas, the JMSDF maintains second-tier vessels organised into five Maritime Regional District Units.

The JMSDF also has a first-rate mine countermeasures capability.

## JAPAN AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JASDF)



### AUTHORISED ESTABLISHMENT:

Regular: 47 286 (45 459 actual – as at Mar 04)  
 General Reserve: 800

### Principal Equipment (as at Mar 04)

Role	Aircraft	Numbers	Remarks
Air Defence	F-15J	203	
Support Fighters	F-4J	92	
	F-1	23	Being replaced by F-2
	F-2	49	
Reconnaissance	RF-4E/EJ	27	
Airborne Early Warning	E-2C	13	Upgrading to Hawkeye 2000
	E-767	4	
Transport	C-130H	16	
	C-1	26	
Refuelling	KC-767	-	Planned purchase for four aircraft
Air Defence		6 Groups	Patriot

The JASDF is organised into three regional air forces and one composite group. Some airfields are dual-use military-civil facilities, such as Chitose and Komaki. The JASDF will acquire its first air-to-air refuelling capability over the next four years (B767-based, boom type refuelling capability). The JASDF is second only to the USAF in terms of capability within the Asia-Pacific region.

Where to From Here?

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## APPENDIX B

# MEMORANDUM ON DEFENCE EXCHANGE BETWEEN JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Department of Defence of Australia (DOD) (hereinafter referred to as both defence authorities) recognise that the Japan–Australia Creative Partnership, established at the Japan–Australia summit meeting in Canberra on 1 May 2002, will form the basis of a strategic plan for the development of the Australia–Japan defence exchange.

Based on this recognition, and noting that Australia and Japan have many common interests in the defence area, both defence authorities further recognise that the development of a good working relationship between both defence authorities will be instrumental in promoting mutual understanding and trust between the two countries, and in consolidating peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, to ensure the smooth advancement of a defence exchange, both defence authorities hereby express the following intentions:

1. Both defence authorities share the intention to implement the following joint defence activities, within legal and budgetary constraints of each country.
  - (a) High Level Exchange
    - (i) Hold reciprocal visits by the Minister of State for Defense of Japan and Defence Minister of Australia.
    - (ii) Hold high-level dialogue between the Administrative Vice Minister of the JDA and the Secretary of the DOD; between the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Self-Defense Force and the Chief of the Defence Force of the Australian Defence Force (ADF); and between the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces and their respective ADF counterparts.
  - (b) Working Level Exchange
    - (i) Regularly hold military-to-military consultations on security and defence matters at the director-general or deputy director-general level.
    - (ii) Hold a working level PKO dialogue on the occasion of the above MM consultations.
    - (iii) Regularly hold staff talks between the JDA Joint Staff Office and the Headquarters Australian Theatre of the ADF.
    - (iv) Regularly hold staff talks between the JDA Ground Self-Defense

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- Force (GSDF) and the Australian Army.
  - (v) Regularly hold staff talks between the JDA Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) or the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as relevant to a particular subject matter.
  - (vi) Regularly hold staff talks between the JDA Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and the RAAF.
  - (vii) Participate in multilateral staff level consultations held by both defence authorities.
- (c) Unit-to-Unit Exchange
- (i) Propose to participate in exercises conducted by each defence authority (including observer participation).
  - (ii) Implement unit-to-unit exchange between GSDF of JDA and the Australian Army.
  - (iii) Implement friendship exercises on the occasion of mutual ship visits by the MSDF and the RAN.
  - (iv) Implement friendship programs on the occasion of mutual aircraft visits by the MSDF, ASDF and RAAF.
- (d) Other
- (i) Exchanges of students between educational institutions of both defence authorities.
  - (ii) Exchanges of representatives between educational and research institutions of both defence authorities.
  - (iii) Active participation in the Tokyo Defense Forum organised by the JDA.
  - (iv) Visit by the MSDF Icebreaker 'Shirase' to Australian ports.
2. Cooperation measures between both defence authorities are not limited to those listed above. Both defence authorities will make efforts in exploring new areas of cooperation for promoting and deepening Japan – Australia defence exchange.
3. Both defence authorities express their intention to ensure that the information acquired in the process of their defence exchanges is administered appropriately, in line with their respective laws and fully taking into account the requests from the other side.
4. Both defence authorities may review this Memorandum at any time and amend it by mutual consent in writing.

29 September 2003

Shigeru Ishiba  
Minister of State for Defense  
Japan

Robert Hill  
Minister for Defence  
The Commonwealth of Australia

## APPENDIX C

# JAPAN—US SECURITY TREATY

### 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1951

Japan has signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the United States of America. The Treaty of Peace recognises that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and, further, the Charter of the United Nations recognises that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

**ARTICLE II**

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

**ARTICLE III**

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

**ARTICLE IV**

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.

**ARTICLE V**

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF**, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

**DONE** in duplicate at the City of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.



## APPENDIX D

# 1960 TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

### ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

### ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

### ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

### ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

### ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional

provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

#### **ARTICLE VI**

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

#### **ARTICLE VII**

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### **ARTICLE VIII**

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

#### **ARTICLE IX**

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

#### **ARTICLE X**

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

**FOR JAPAN:**

Nobusuke Kishi

Aiichiro Fujiyama

Mitsujiro Ishii

Tadashi Adachi

Koichiro Asakai

**FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:**

Christian A. Herter

Douglas MacArthur II

J. Graham Parsons

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## APPENDIX E

# JAPAN'S PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES

Japan's peacekeeping operations (PKO) law, passed in July 1991, required five preconditions to be met prior to JSDF commitment to a PKO:

1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflict.
2. Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations has been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflict.
3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favouring any of the parties to armed conflict.
4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guidelines cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw International Peace Cooperation Corps.
5. The use of weapons will be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of JSDF personnel. An amendment to the law, passed to ease the JGSDF Engineer Unit PKO deployment to East Timor, extended this provision to include people in the care of the JSDF.

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APPENDIX F

**JSDF ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE  
COOPERATION ACTIVITIES<sup>165</sup>**

**INTERNATIONAL PEACE COOPERATION ACTIVITIES:**

<b>OPERATION</b>	<b>CONTRIBUTION</b>	<b>DATE</b>
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Cease-Fire Monitors Engineering unit	September 1992– September 1993
UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff Transport Coordination Unit	May 1993–January 1995
Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan Refugee Relief Unit Air Transport Unit	September–December 1994
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, Golan Heights)	Headquarters Staff Transport Unit	February 1996–present
Humanitarian Assistance to East Timor	Air Transport Unit	November 1999–February 2000
Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air Transport Unit	October 2001
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	Engineer Group Headquarters Staff	February–May 2002
UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	Engineer Group and Headquarters	May 2002–June 2005
Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air Transport Unit	March–April 2003
Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air Transport Unit	July–August 2003

**Activities Based On the Special Measures Law For Humanitarian And Reconstruction Assistance In Iraq**

<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>DATE</b>
JGSDF	Southeast Iraq	January 2004–July 2006
JMSDF	Persian Gulf	February–April 2004
JASDF	Kuwait	December 2003–present

<sup>165</sup> Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, Defense White Paper, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 2005, p. 535.

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**Cooperative Activities Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law**

<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>ROLE</b>	<b>DATE</b>
JMSDF	Northern Indian Ocean	Materiel supplies to coalition forces	November 2001–present
JASDF	US Forces in Japan	Transportation of materials	November 2001–present



APPENDIX G

**JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISES  
CONDUCTED UNDER PSI AUSPICES**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>EXERCISE</b>	<b>HOST</b>	<b>ASSET</b>
September 2003	<i>Pacific Protector</i>	Australia	JDS <i>Shikashima</i>
October 2004	<i>Team Samurai</i>	Japan	P-3C Super Puma Coast Guard Patrol Vessels JMSDF vessels
August 2005	<i>Deep Sabre</i>	Singapore	JDS <i>Shirane</i> JCG PV <i>Shikishima</i> JMSDF Boarding Team Coast Guard Boarding Team
April 2006	<i>Pacific Protector</i>	Australia	Customs team Police Large Observer Force

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