A Framework for Campaign Analysis

by Sanu Kainikara

FOREWORD

The thoughtful consideration of past military campaigns is a sound and sensible basis for the education of military leaders and commanders. The study of military campaigns, be they successful or otherwise, has formed a core component of staff college curricula in modern times since before the past century, and it continues to the present. How wars have been fought, how individual battles have been waged and how commanders have orchestrated their forces to achieve military purposes is of fundamental interest to us as professional military members. Yet for many of us the mechanics of analysing a complex campaign is a task beset with challenges and uncertainties. What elements of the campaign should be considered? How important is it to establish the political and social context in which the campaign took place? Should the economic conditions of the protagonists feature in the study? Is there a place in the analysis for the less tangible considerations of operational art, friction and luck? Such questions have almost certainly vexed students in countless staff course seminars tasked with a campaign analysis or any number of military researchers looking to better understand or represent a particular battle, campaign or operation. Consequently, how to go about actually undertaking a campaign analysis is doubtlessly a topic of interest to many, and the focus of this latest Air Power Development Centre working paper.

Dr Sanu Kainikara explores and discusses the process of campaign analysis, and he does so in considerable detail. The object of his study is to provide a useful framework within which students of military history might apply their intellect and academic rigour in examining military campaigns. Dr Kainikara begins by discussing the need for campaign analyses, what benefits such studies offer and why they are of value to military professionals. He then turns to a brief description of operational art before stepping through the major elements to be considered in any thorough campaign analysis. Ultimately, Dr Kainikara produces a very thorough and comprehensive guide to conducting this sort of analysis.

This working paper will not only be of interest to military students and students of military history and art, but should serve as useful guide for those undertaking an analysis of any military campaign for a variety of purposes. I commend this working paper to you as a valuable addition to your professional library.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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INTRODUCTION

> *Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Fredrick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.*

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Napoleon Bonaparte[1]

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Napoleon's maxims, including the one quoted above, form the solid foundation for the study of modern military history. However, it is not the study of past campaigns alone that provides a modern commander with the acumen to wage a war in the future, but it is a holistic look at the conduct of these campaigns, and more importantly the ideas that the great commanders of the past developed, that would provide the substance to advance and mature innovative war-winning concepts. The study of historic campaigns, however far back in time they may be, must necessarily form the 'intellectual diet' of the soldier-statesman who wishes to master the subtle nuances of the military profession.[2]

Technology has continuously transformed the character of war, and does so even now on a regular basis. This is generally an evolutionary process; however, at times technology has also brought about revolutionary changes that have completely altered the face of warfare. The advent of air power and the more recent phenomenon of irregular warfare are two such events. Nevertheless, the fundamental issues connected with exercising leadership—at all levels of war, from the tactical to the strategic—under the extreme stress of battle and the essentials of human nature, upon which the course of a campaign often rides, remain immutable. Therefore, to ignore the past runs the risk of falling prey to the pitfalls that have been demonstrated repeatedly. For example,

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1   As quoted in David G. Chandler (ed.), *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*, Greenhill Books, London, 1987, p. 82.

2   ibid, pp. 240-243.

if Hitler had paid heed to Napoleon's Russian campaign of 1812 and the famed effects of 'General Winter', 'strategic consumption' and 'partisan warfare', perhaps the course of history would have been different.

It is a fact that the study of wars, campaigns and battles of the past has been an enduring educational enterprise in military forces from time immemorial. Study of past operations—considered in the correct political, social and military context—is vital to preparing a future commander to understand the present and make an educated guess regarding the future. Military strategists can learn various means of achieving the objectives of the campaign they are planning through analysing the wars and operations of the past, across the spectrum of conflict and time.[3] These analyses demonstrate the military brilliance of successful commanders as well as bringing to light the mistakes that defeated military commanders made. The patterns that can be discerned, both in terms of success as well as failure, normally provides an understanding about the implications of certain courses of action that were undertaken. These patterns can then be used to carry out a check on campaign or operational plans being developed, so that observed pitfalls from previous campaigns can be avoided. In essence, campaign analysis provides an indicator of the veracity of the planning being undertaken.

THE PURPOSE OF ANALYSING CAMPAIGNS

While it is clearly understood that the conduct of war has altered dramatically over the past few centuries, the more intellectual commanders have always exhorted their officers to study the campaigns and battles of history. This is because there are enduring elements in the conduct of campaigns that point towards good leadership, excellence in planning and audacity in execution—as well as long list of 'what not to do in conducting a campaign' that could be superimposed on the contemporary conflict scenario. To this end, there are five defined purposes to analysing previous campaigns.

The first purpose is to assist the student in learning how to conduct a campaign efficiently. In this context, the term campaign refers to operations within a conflict that have a clearly discernible start point with designated end-states to be achieved. These operations need not lead to the complete culmination of hostilities but should be viewed as subsets of the broader conflict or war that have substantial influence on the final outcome.

The second purpose is to enhance the ability to understand the adversary, their motives for going to war and the manner in which they could be defeated. The defeat of an adversary is fundamental to winning a campaign; however, defeat need not necessarily mean the physical defeat of the opposing armed forces or their annihilation and subsequent 'unconditional surrender'. Defeat can be achieved at the political level even while the campaign is ongoing. In order to achieve such results it is essential to know the adversary and have the ability to make predictions regarding the possible courses of action that they would undertake in any given situations. Analysis of previous campaigns provides a clear input to this complex activity.

The third purpose of analysing an older campaign is to gain the capacity to delineate both negative and positive aspects of a campaign, and then to draw lessons that could be learned and applied to contemporary situations. Since this is an exercise in hindsight, it will be possible to discard the lessons that have no direct or indirect bearing on current conflicts, and retain only the ones that improve the capability of the force. For example, lessons regarding the use of mounted cavalry taken from the Napoleonic Wars will have no direct bearing on the conduct of campaigns or battles today, but understanding their manoeuvre may have an indirect influence on the movement and positioning of mobile forces in contemporary battles.

The fourth purpose of analysing campaigns, both fought by one's own forces as well as by the forces of other like-minded nations, is the influence that such studies have on the doctrine development process. Doctrine is the fundamental basis on which a military force is built, trains and operates, and campaign analysis is one of the fundamental inputs into the evolution of doctrine. The importance of getting the doctrine 'right', in order to ensure optimum functioning of the military forces, can never be over emphasised. It could be argued that doctrine can be developed without taking recourse to historical lessons. However, time and again it has been

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3   Captain Randall G. Bowdish, *Campaign, Operation, and Battle Analysis,* http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/bowdish. html, 2006, accessed 09 July 2013.

proven that such a development process invariably produces a warped doctrine that does not have the necessary flexibility to adapt to different circumstances. In other words, a doctrine development process that does not include the lessons of history will always remain flawed.

The fifth and perhaps the most important function of campaign analysis is to further the understanding of *Operational Art*. This is developed through the educational process of analysing a campaign. The study of past campaigns has brought out some essential elements of Operational Art that have been articulated as theory and doctrine in a number of publications.[4] Their relevance therefore need not be doubted. The application of Operational Art to the conduct of a campaign is now widely accepted, and its study has become an essential part of the professional education of a military commander. Since the ultimate aim of campaign analysis is to inculcate a sufficiently robust understanding of the functioning of Operational Art in the conduct of a campaign, it is necessary to first have a clear notion of what it entails.

WHAT IS OPERATIONAL ART?

The concept of Operational Art, within the field of military theory, is derived from the Russian practice of 'operational warfare'. Operational warfare represented the level of command and control that coordinated the alignment of the intrinsic details of tactics, with the broad strategy developed to achieve the overarching objectives of a campaign. Strategy is the optimum manner in which the available resources and potential of the force can be employed to achieve the desired end-state, whereas tactics are the concrete steps or actions to be initiated to achieve short-term goals.[5] Operational Art translates strategy into operational and, ultimately, tactical actions that are aligned with, and contribute directly to, achieving the objectives desired at the grand strategic level. Thus a very generic definition of Operational Art is: the skilful employment of military forces to achieve strategic objectives through the design, organisation, sequencing, sustainment and direction of campaigns and major operations.

In a slightly different manner, the origin of Operational Art could be traced to the gradual understanding of military thinkers that a war could not be won by victory in a single battle and that victory at the tactical level was insufficient to win the overall war. The dictum that one could win all the battles but lose the war underpins the need to understand Operational Art. The corollary is that it will be necessary to achieve the strategic aims of a war through winning a series of battles, campaigns and operations. The fundamental design to achieve this is Operational Art.[6] The focus of Operational Art is the conduct of military campaigns in areas of operations and theatres of war through the coordination of tactical battles and actions. However, Operational Art is not focussed on tactical actions alone, but centres on the application of military resources to achieve a higher goal. Concentrating on purely the tactical aspect could lead to oversimplification of complex strategic problems through the implementation of tactical solutions, a tendency that must be guarded against at all times in the planning process.[7]

A more refined definition of Operational Art is provided by the US military, which defines it as 'The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity and judgement—to develop strategies, campaigns, and major operations to organize and employ military forces by

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4   For example, see Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992; James J. Schneider, *The Theory of Operational Art* and *Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*, Theoretical Papers Numbers Three and Four, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988 and 1991; Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, Frank Cass, Portland, Oregon, 1998.

5   Hubba Wass de Czege, 'Thinking and Acting Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art is Not a Level of War', *Small Wars Journal*, www.smallwarsjournal.com, 14 March 2011, accessed 9 July 2013.

6   Major Walter E. Piatt, *What is Operational Art?*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1999, p. 13.

7   ibid, p. 31.

integrating ends, ways and means.'[8] The cognitive approach requires creative thinking at all levels and brings in the human element. Essentially it is the commander's ability to have a clear vision of the desired end-state and to steer the military activities towards achieving it.[9] The desired end-state is typically the ultimate political condition to be achieved at the end of hostilities. Therefore, the strategic objective, which is the primary consideration in Operational Art, is inextricably tied to the desired end-state, and all actions should be directed to achieving it. It is to be noted that the military objectives are only one part of the desired end-state that also encompasses all other aspects (political, diplomatic, economic, social, informational and environmental) that are relevant to the context of the conflict.[10]

Operational Art embodies three distinct elements: operational analysis, operational design and operational planning. Operational analysis lays down the strategic aim and the commander's vision. Thereafter it considers own capabilities, the environment, and determines the centres of gravity. Operational design is the conception and construction of the intellectual framework that underpins operational plans and their subsequent execution.[11] Operational design takes into consideration the theatre design, combat capabilities of the military forces involved, command and control, friction of combat, vital points and vulnerabilities of own and enemy forces, the ability to conduct simultaneous operations, and the possible ways to culminate combat operations. It must also be able to consider the strategic objectives and derive appropriate tactical objectives to achieve them. Operational planning is essentially built on the commander's intent and elaborates the concept of operations that must have sufficient built-in flexibility.[12] Operational Art is the art of winning campaigns and learning this art is an essential part of professional military education—studying the campaigns of the past is key to meeting this requirement. In addition, the fact that learning the profession of arms in an ongoing conflict would be costly, in both lives and resources, this makes it necessary to study the campaigns and wars of the past.

A FRAMEWORK FOR CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

> *A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.*
>
> Giulio Douhet[13]

The first step in commencing a campaign analysis is to ascertain the sources of material that is available to examine.[14] This is of paramount importance since the analysis will only be as good as the veracity and details of the source material and the information that can be garnered from them. The sources of information could be in the form of narratives of participants, official histories, despatches from the battlefield that have survived over the years, the interpretation of the events by contemporary and later historians, and the consequences of the campaign as viewed from a much later period—a sort of 'hind-sight' detailing what if, and biographies of the strategic leaders of the conflict that are available. In modern campaigns, visual material might also be available

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8   United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/o/37.html, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 June 2013, accessed 15 July 2013.

9   In contemporary conflicts, the need for commanders to be 'visionaries' has become more important than any other time in history, because of the instant and microscopic inspection that they are subjected to in the conduct of campaigns, conflicts and wars. An example is the scathing analysis of the performance of two US Commanders in the Iraq War 2003, by Robert D. Kaplan, in 'Rethinking the Iraq War', published as Item 5 in *Stratfor Intelligence Brief 44/13,* 24 July 2013.

10   Prof. Patrick C. Sweeney, *Operational Art Primer,* The U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1 August 2012, p. 2.

11   United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations,* http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf, 11 August 2011, pp. xii-xiii, accessed 20 August 2013.

12   Walter E. Piatt, pp. 46-52.

13   Guilio Douhet, *The Command of the Air,* Dino Ferrari (trans.), Office of Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1983, pp. 145-146.

14   The source could be classified, in which case the analysis will automatically become classified. While classified analyses are conducted in most of the military forces at the end of any campaign, this paper suggests the framework for an unclassified and strategic analysis of campaigns. The framework can be suitably modified to carry out a purely military analysis at the classified level, if required.

to analyse and ascertain facts. After the sources have been identified they must be examined to determine the following:

- Are the sources available sufficient to provide the analyst with the depth of information necessary to carry out an unbiased appreciation of the campaign?
- What is the veracity/authenticity of each source and the material that it provides? Can it be completely trusted?
- Are there any previous analyses done of the same campaign? If so, does the analysis provide an unbiased narrative of the events? Is there new evidence or information available that can add to the existing analysis or change the perceptions?
- Is it possible to produce a coherent narrative of the events—the what, why, how and when of the conduct of the campaign—that can be clearly discerned from the available sources?

The subsequent analysis can take the form of a narrative, a report or a presentation, depending on the audience, and the proposed use of the analysis. For example, the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta has been analysed in detail by a number of historians, almost all of them in the narrative format.[15] In the analysis of more recent campaigns, there is a visible trend to have a group of experts analyse different aspects of the campaign and then collate them to produce a coherent report.[16]

All military campaigns can be analysed within a comprehensive framework that encompasses all aspects of a campaign and facilitates the distilling of the strategic and operational lessons that could have an impact on future operations. It is important to understand that the lessons brought out would influence future conflicts only in a contextual manner, and must not be superimposed on all other campaigns without consideration of the evolving environment and prevailing circumstances. This framework provides a five-step process to the analysis of a campaign: studying the background to the conflict; providing an overview of the campaign itself; identifying and analysing the primary external factors that influenced its conduct; similarly identifying and analysing the fundamental internal factors that shaped the campaign in its entirety; and determining all the lessons that can be extracted and then establishing the ones that could have relevance to a current or future campaign. In addition, this paper will highlight the considerations that must be evaluated in assessing an air campaign. While few of these considerations or factors would be unique to the employment of air power, most of them could however be used to evaluate the performance of either the naval or land forces either within the same campaign or in separate campaigns. The framework being suggested in this paper is generic in nature.

Background to the Campaign

A detailed study of the background to the campaign establishes the issues that led to the hostilities. In examining the issues it will be necessary to study the factors that may have exacerbated the situation, either political or non-political, and led to hostilities becoming inevitable. Invariably, the commencement of a conflict will be the culmination of a series of events that spiralled out of control because of the ineptitude or recalcitrance of one or more of the belligerents. In order to understand the complete background and place the conflict in its correct context, it is prudent to carry out a deliberately detailed examination of the contributing factors.

The next step would be to establish the key players—at all levels, starting from the political hierarchy to the military commanders—who would be responsible for selecting the objectives, planning and executing the campaign and determining when hostilities must cease. The cessation of hostilities would normally be a joint politico-military decision, dependent on timeframe as well as the achievement of objectives. In order to obtain

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15   Read Victor Davis Hanson, *'A War Like No Other'*, Methuen Publishing Ltd, London, 2007; or Robert B. Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War*, Touchstone Books, New York, 1996.

16   A good example is Nubar Hovsepian (ed.), *'The War on Lebanon: A Reader'*, Olive Branch Press, Massachusetts, 2008, where a number of subject matter experts have written on different aspects of the war ranging from historical background, international law, the actual war, contemporary politics, and the repercussions to produce what is undoubtedly an exhaustive analysis of the 2006 Israeli campaign in Lebanon.

an appreciation of the full extent of the campaign, it is essential to clearly understand the decision-making hierarchy and the various people involved within the process. Individual personalities often play an important role in this process, which must be evaluated to see if individuals or their predilections directly or indirectly affected the conduct or the result of the campaign.

The third basic step would be to determine who initiated the campaign so that the sequence of events that led to conflict can be correctly identified. This is essential background information because the further development of the campaign and the manner in which it progressed could have been influenced by the initiation of conflict.

The fourth and perhaps the most important step in examining the background of the campaign is to carry out an analysis of the state of the military forces that took part, in terms of their doctrine, readiness, operational orbat, equipment, training, leadership, morale, command and control, and infrastructure. If possible, a comparative study of the opposing forces covering the same issues would make the background information more holistic. Another aspect of studying the military forces is to examine the historic development of the forces to the extent that it influences their battlefield performance. These four steps or factors that must be considered in analysing the background to the campaign are very broad and are the bare minimum that must be examined. Although they cover the underlying background of the campaign, they are also the ones upon which further study can be undertaken to increase the depth of knowledge regarding a particular campaign.

Overview of the Campaign

In order to understand any campaign fully, it is necessary to know the chronology of events—the details of what happened from the beginning to the end. In establishing the chronology and the description of the events themselves, the first inkling of the results and influences can be understood, although the overview is only the precursor to the actual analysis. The events will also provide information regarding the actual conduct of the campaign, and the final status when combat operations were ceased. The manner in which the conflict was brought to an end will also indicate which side achieved their aims, and which side did not. More importantly, the chronology will provide a clear picture of the offensive and defensive postures that the opposing forces assumed, how these postures could have changed during the campaign, and also indicate the impact of such changes if they did take place.

A comprehensive overview—what, when, how and by whom—will assist in clearly establishing the significance of a campaign within an historic perspective. It will also provide a perception of the importance of the campaign in a sort of hindsight, when events and factors that were not perceivable at the time of the actual campaign could be viewed and analysed dispassionately in an unbiased manner. The significance of a campaign is always the highest during its conduct and in the immediate aftermath of its conclusion. With the passage of time, and clearer information availability, the impact of a campaign within the broader war can be assessed. This will provide an indication of whether or not the campaign needs to be studied for its further influence to be understood. In a number of cases, such an assessment would suggest that the influence was limited and therefore, the campaign could be considered minor and of little importance in the larger study of war. The overview can be as detailed or as comprehensive as the analyst wants it to be; the detail being limited only by the final outcome of the analysis that is desired. Furthermore, it can span the entire spectrum of the conflict from the strategic to the tactical, as desired.

The overview of the campaign being analysed should be done in such a manner that it sets the scene for the detailed analysis to follow. This would obviously depend on its purpose, which could be as an exercise in military analytical study. The analysis could be:

- by either the victor or the defeated to establish reasons for failures as well as successes;
- to establish the veracity of new concepts of operations that had been implemented;
- to assess the effectiveness of equipment and materiel; and/or
- to judge the performance of particular forces that were employed.

Each of these would need a different type of overview to guide the analysis. While the overview would have to be tailored to suit the detailed analysis, the analyst must keep in mind that the overview should not be more than 10-15 per cent of the total analysis.

Primary External Factors. The external factors that influence a campaign are those over which the military forces have little or no control, but are fundamental to the conduct of the campaign. These factors can be categorised broadly under the groupings of political considerations, legal aspects, economic influences, socio-cultural and historical aspects and geography.

Political Considerations. Since most conflicts are generated because of political challenges and requirements, any campaign analysis of necessity must start with the examination of the various elements that make up the political considerations. To start with, the political objectives that each participant sets out to achieve must be clearly delineated and listed. Thereafter, these objectives must be examined to establish their influence or otherwise on the development of military strategies that were employed in the campaign being analysed. This study must scrutinise the process by which the political objectives were translated to military objectives, plans and strategy. Furthermore, it must be determined whether or not an achievable end-state was identified, and thereafter, whether or not it was achieved must be examined.

The other political considerations are: observing and analysing the status of existing alliances and how they were employed during the campaign; whether or not new alliances were forged immediately prior to or during the conduct of the campaign; the influence of the political leadership, particularly in democracies, on force preparedness and posture; and to establish whether or not there was political influence or interference during the conduct of the campaign, and if there was, then to examine in detail the impact of such politico-military interaction. There may also be other contextual political considerations that may crop up in some campaigns such as international support or opposition to either side, the role of the United Nations, and domestic political compulsions and considerations. In order to ensure the veracity of the overall analysis it is imperative to have the political considerations analysed in an unbiased manner. Any prejudice or bias in this area will tend to get amplified in the further analysis of the campaign and diminish its value.

Legal Aspects. A detailed examination of the legal aspects of the campaign should be undertaken to determine whether or not any Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) was broken, or if a force acted contrary to international norms in the conduct of operations. Equally important is to determine whether the United Nations had passed any resolution regarding the conduct of the campaign. This aspect is particularly important in the contemporary context because of the increased incidence of irregular warfare campaigns. In examining the conduct of the campaign from a legal perspective, special attention must be paid to the influence of the LOAC and Law of the Sea on its progress and possible outcome. Legal aspects are important elements to be examined and understood in analysing a campaign since the legality or otherwise of the military action will have a direct impact on international perception regarding the involvement of the belligerents. In examining the legal aspects of a campaign, professional assistance in analysing actions of units and individuals may have to be sought in instances wherein such actions are difficult to decipher by persons not well versed with the LOAC.

Economic Influences. It must be established whether or not the outbreak of hostilities had been underpinned by economic factors. Economic decisions could have been influenced by domestic political calculations and therefore this aspect needs to be examined and either negated or analysed. In the next step, the economic impact of the campaign on all the participants must be established, and if there was a sizeable impact, its repercussions further analysed to establish whether or not economic hardship could create further challenges to the well-being of the nations involved. Third, the economic impact of sanctions and blockades, if any were carried out prior to or during the campaign, must be established. Such blockades or sanctions should be analysed in terms of them becoming economic forces that could be influential in the conduct as well as the outcome of the campaign in the medium to long term. The analysis of economic influence on the campaign should be conducted after the economic status of all the participants are ascertained as accurately as possible. This must take into account the industrial, trade and commercial capacity of the nation.

Socio-Cultural and Historic Aspects. The attitude of a nation towards military operations is always influenced by the culture, ethnicity, religion, history and basic education of the people. In examining a campaign, each of these factors has to be analysed in some detail in order to understand the 'fighting ethos' of a nation that would directly impact the conduct of a campaign. It is also necessary to examine the root cause for the genesis of the conflict and determine whether there was a religious or ideological background to the confrontation. It will therefore become necessary to have a fairly detailed understanding of the basic socio-cultural and historic

aspects of all participants in a campaign. This knowledge will have to be carefully superimposed on the events of the campaign to discern any direct or indirect influence they may have imposed on laying down the end-state, planning, decision-making, and/or conduct of the campaign. Changes in any of these elements will always be evolutionary; therefore, the impact of these factors in one campaign could also be projected or extrapolated to future campaigns to gain an insight into a particular society's profile to the conduct of a future campaign.

Geography. The geographic factors that influence a campaign include terrain, climate and weather. These factors, individually or in combination, can and do influence the timing of the initiation of a campaign, the manner in which a campaign is conducted and the performance of the forces and equipment. At the planning phase of a campaign the side that is initiating action would obviously attempt to have these factors in their favour and at a disadvantage to the adversary. Analysing the influence that geography had on a campaign could also produce insights into the force development process of a nation as well as provide a clear indication of the force posture vis-à-vis the doctrine of the military.

Key Internal Factors

In campaign analysis the internal factors are the ones that the military has the ability to manipulate or control. These would be the military strategy, campaign planning and the actual execution of the campaign. However, in the contemporary security environment, political interference or intrusive oversight in the planning and execution of a campaign is becoming increasingly common-place, especially in democracies. Even under such circumstances, the military would have more control over these factors than the political leadership.

Military Strategy. An analysis of the military strategy must start with a study of the strategy development process of the participants, identifying any shortfalls in the process and then examining the strategy that was employed in the campaign under investigation. An examination of the development process would provide an insight into the manner in which a particular force approaches war; it also provides a window to understand the operational concepts and tactics that would be developed and employed by a military force. During the analysis the connection and alignment between national security imperatives and the military strategy must be studied, and any misalignment highlighted, with a view to further examining the impact such misalignments could have on the conduct of the campaign.

It may become necessary at times to study the military strategy that was already in place before the campaign and then ascertain whether or not any changes or adaptations were made to it before or during the actual campaign. If the strategy was flexibly adapted during the campaign it must then be established whether the alterations created the desired effects, or, if they became impediments to the smooth conduct of the campaign. It will also be necessary to determine at what level of command the need to adapt the strategy was felt so that the responsibility for the actual conduct of the campaign can be clearly understood.[17]

Campaign Planning. There are two reasons to study the campaign planning process. First is to establish the fact that there was sufficient effort made to understand the various factors that would influence the conduct of the campaign; including the ones that cannot be predicted with any kind of assurance of accuracy. Second is to examine how the political objectives were incorporated into the strategic campaign plan and then translated into operational objectives that would further provide the impetus to develop the necessary tactical plan. It is important to scrutinise the directness of the connection between the campaign plan and the desired political objectives since this will provide an indication of the politico-military relationship prevalent in the nation at the time. In turn, an understanding of this relationship is significant to clarify the adequacy of the campaign plan and its execution. The campaign plan will also indicate what the military forces were attempting to achieve as an end-state to conflict, and how this related to the political objectives and desired final end-state.

Execution of the Campaign. There is an indelible connection between the campaign plan and its execution. From an analytical perspective, a close study of the actual execution of the campaign will reveal the following: whether or not the plan was executed faithfully by the elements of the force concerned with it; whether the

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17 It must be noted that some of the details regarding Military Strategy may not be available when an unclassified analysis is being undertaken.

plan succeeded in achieving all objectives; whether the plan needed to be adapted during the execution to ensure that objectives were achieved: if so, was the adaptation successful or too difficult to carry out?; was the adaptation required because of the ineptitude or limitations imposed on the executing authority or was it because the plan itself was flawed?; in the final analysis, was the desired end-state achieved?; and was the expenditure in resources and lives in excess of what was presumed? If so, at what stage of the campaign was this realised and where was the flaw—in the plan or the execution?

The execution of the campaign, while a completely military matter, can also be influenced by political interference, especially in the case of coalition operations. In coalition operations the differences in the accepted rules of engagement of the participating nations will also influence the execution of the campaign. In a direct manner, the analysis of the execution will provide information on the veracity of the campaign plan and the efficacy of the forces involved. The alignment between the execution, campaign planning and efficacy of the forces is the crux of the matter in terms of studying a campaign.

Lessons Learnt

The fundamental reason to conduct a campaign analysis is to identify the lessons learnt with the intention of either incorporating changes to mitigate weaknesses that have come to light, or to emulate the parts of the campaign that made it a success. In other words, it is essentially meant to improve the force and to ensure that identified mistakes are redressed and not repeated. Studying the campaigns of other forces can provide a list of 'dos and don'ts' for the future.

The identification of relevant lessons, however, is not an easy task. It is relatively easy to distil the tactical and most of the operational lessons, which is a pitfall in many campaign analyses that tend to stay at that level. A campaign analysis provides the best utility when it is able to take a broad and overarching look at a campaign and bring out the strategic lessons clearly while connecting these with the operational and tactical lessons. It will be necessary under these circumstances to also examine whether the operational and tactical 'mistakes' were made because of strategic oversights or whether strategic lapses were exacerbated through ineptitude at the operational and/or tactical level. In all cases, the analyst must keep in mind the fact that there will always be a connection, both up and down, between the strategic and operational, and between the operational and tactical lessons in a campaign. The first requirement, therefore, is to correctly identify all the lessons from a campaign, both good and bad, and at all levels.

The next step in terms of analysing the lessons is to identify the connection of the lessons to the external or internal factors that may have been influential in creating the situation from which lessons have emerged. Such an examination would further produce the reasons for the failure, or success, of the employment of force to achieve the national political objectives. While the campaign analysis by itself will be focused on the conduct and the end-state, the preliminary investigation should be able to create a continuing thread that connects all the events and then can logically arrive at the lesson(s) that is to be further analysed. There are two fundamental reasons to identify lessons from a campaign analysis. First is to institute remedial measures to avoid the same 'mistakes' (as stated earlier) and the second to carry out detailed research to ascertain the doctrinal implication of the lessons that have been identified. When doctrinal implications are identified, it may become necessary to incorporate changes to the existing doctrine. The entire force would have to be made aware of and have to act upon these changes in order to ensure that the doctrinal base of the force remains sound.

Environmental Assessment

In all campaigns, whether they are single Service or joint operations, it is necessary to carry out an environmental appreciation after the campaign analysis has been conducted. This will provide a clear indication of the individual environmental drawbacks and in the case of joint campaigns, whether or not the individual 'campaigns'—naval, air and land—combined effectively to achieve joint campaign objectives. Furthermore, it will also provide an indication of the alignment of the joint and individual environmental campaigns with the desired political objectives and end-state.

Turning to the air campaign, it should be analysed by investigating the following:

- What were the relative air power capabilities of the contestants in terms of their force size and systems?

- What was the influence of technology? Specifically the relative ease with which the belligerents were able to accept and operationalise specific technologies that would have enhanced air power capabilities.

- What was the overall air strategy? How did this strategy dovetail with the joint strategy? How was the strategy implemented?

- Where there any personnel issues? This should include the morale of the force, leadership (at all levels), level and adequacy of training across the entire air force, whether or not the force was suffering from fatigue, and the demonstrated ability of the force to function under extreme stress.

- What logistical factors might have affected the campaign? This is an examination of the sustenance capability or logistics aspects—availability of spares, ammunition and attrition replacement, availability and adequacy of food and clothing, and the level of assurance of resupply at critical junctures.

In the discussion of the air campaign the blueprint should be to assess the employment of air power against its recognised roles and subsequently to superimpose the principles of war over them to obtain a broader perspective. The suggested framework is sufficiently generic in nature for it to be used to assess the other environmental campaigns.

CONCLUSION

Tactics, evolutions, artillery, and engineer sciences can be learned from manuals like geometry; but the knowledge of the higher conduct of war can only be acquired by studying the history of wars and battles of great generals and by one's own experience. There are no terse and precise rules at all …

Napoleon Bonaparte[18]

Why is it important to analyse past campaigns especially if one is a supporter of the belief that all future battles, campaigns and wars would be different to the ones that have so far been conducted? It is indeed true that no two conflicts are alike, however, there is a common thread in all campaigns, generally at the highest level of planning and execution, that connects the past with the future. Understanding this commonality lays the foundation for clarity in the preparation for future campaigns. Essentially, distilling the ideas that drove the decision-making process of successful leaders of the past will enhance one's own ability to appreciate the varied requirements in the conduct of a campaign. It also provides an insight into the issues that emerge in the conduct of a campaign—in the exercise of effective leadership and the actual employment of the forces, irrespective of their technological sophistication.

Analysis of past campaigns is also essential to enhance the ability of a commander to conduct a campaign by examining the pitfalls that could accrue in the planning and execution as well as in the post-conflict phase. By studying the campaigns of a potential adversary, a commander could get a better appreciation of their warfighting ethos and other intangible factors that would have a salutary influence on the adversary. The most important reason for carrying out an analysis is to glean the lessons of the campaign—both positive and negative—so that one could be improved upon and the other not repeated. A common theme in the analysis of earlier campaigns is the study of Operational Art as it was practised during a particular campaign. Operational Art—the methodology to translate strategy to operational and tactical actions—also provides an awareness into operational analysis, planning and design of a campaign. Any break in the continuity of this process will lead to a less than optimum conduct of the campaign and may also be detrimental to achieving the desired outcome. The study of the employment of Operational Art is an important component of campaign analysis.

This paper suggests a clear framework as the basis for a detailed campaign analysis, detailing a number of logical steps in the process and commenting on the specific factors that must be examined. Furthermore, it provides a specific framework for the analysis of an air campaign, stating the unique focus points that must

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18 Quoted in Rudolf von Caemmerer, *The Development of Strategical Science During the Nineteenth Century*, Hugh Rees, London, 1905, p. 275.

be addressed. However, this framework can also be easily employed to analyse joint or single-environment campaigns because of the generality of factors that have been considered.

As an educational and force preparedness tool, the importance of campaign analysis cannot be understated. As this paper has revealed, a study of past conflicts is an essential component of future operational preparation, and as such, campaign analysis remains a fundamental building block to professional military education at all levels.

CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS: AN AIDE-MEMOIRE[19]

Source Material
- Availability, authenticity, information and previous analysis, if any
- Can a coherent narrative and analysis be created from available sources?

CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

Background to the Campaign
- Issues leading up to hostilities
  - Factors that exacerbated the situation
  - Series of events leading to hostilities
- Key personnel at all levels
  - Decision-making hierarchy
- Who initiated the conflict?
- Status of military forces that took part
  - Doctrine, readiness, operational orbat, training, leadership, equipment, morale, command and control, infrastructure

Campaign Overview
- Chronology of events
  - Offensive and defensive postures
- Significance of the campaign
  - What, when, how and by whom?
- Should set the scene for more detailed analysis
  - What is the purpose of the analysis?

Primary External Factors
- Political considerations
  - Political objectives, end-state, alliances, political influence on military
- Legal aspects
  - LOAC, UN
- Economic influences
  - Was this the cause? Did the economy get affected?

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19 In analysing campaigns, it may not be necessary to apply all the factors and sub-factors listed in the framework to all cases being studied. It must be borne in mind that the factors listed are broad, and meant to cater for all contingencies.

- Socio-cultural and historic aspects
    - Influence of culture, ethnicity, religion and history
- Geography:
    - Climate, weather and terrain

Key Internal Factors

- Military strategy
    - Translation of political objectives to military strategy
    - What were the armed forces trying to do
- Campaign planning
    - Understanding the various factors
    - Incorporation of political objectives into military planning
- Execution of the campaign
    - Connection between plan and execution
    - Efficacy of the force

Lessons Learnt

- Identification of lessons learnt
    - Connection between strategic, operational and tactical lessons
- Connection of lessons to external and internal factors
    - Remedial measures, doctrinal implications

Environmental Assessment – Air Campaign

- Overall air strategy in relation to joint military strategy
- Relative capabilities, influence of technology
- Personnel issues
    - Morale, leadership, training, fatigue
- Logistics
- Air power roles
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