ALLIANCE EXPANSION:

A guide to the future of the Five Power Defence Arrangements

GRADUATE FROM THE USAF SCHOOL
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A guide to the future of the Five Power Defence Arrangements

By

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This book is based on the thesis presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

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FOREWORD

It is my pleasure to present this monograph for publication by the Air and Space Power Centre.

Group Captain Sleeman wrote this monograph as part of his studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Air University (Alabama, US) and we are delighted to make it publicly available. The Beyond the Future Force series is intended to engage and challenge our readers to assess and understand today's dynamic geopolitical environment.

Focussed on the potential expansion of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom, GPCAPT Sleeman draws on the lessons of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to illustrate that there are favourable conditions that could underpin an expansion of the FPDA.

With the increasing inter-connected nature of the operational theatres in the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, coupled with entrenched strategic competition, a hallmark of today's global security environment, effective and credible Defence Arrangements must prevail in order to preserve liberal democratic values for future generations.

Importantly, this work critically assesses and provides guidance on how Australia could position itself amidst rising global tensions and address the complex geopolitical challenges to achieve Strategic Risk Reduction, Defence and Deterrence.

The Air and Space Power Centre is proud to publish this monograph which should challenge and influence Australia's position on the future of our alliances and partnerships.

I commend GPCAPT Sleeman on this valuable body of work.

AVM Dianne Turton
Australian Military Representative to NATO and the EU

DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this book are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the Australian Government, Department of Defence, Royal Australian Air Force, or the United States Government or Department of Defense or Air University.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Group Captain Michael Sleeman joined the Royal Australian Air Force in 1999 and attended the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is a pilot and qualified flying instructor with over 4300 flying hours. As of July 2023, he is the Director Air and Space Power Centre.

In 2020, Group Captain Sleeman assumed command of 11 Squadron, an operational P-8A Poseidon Squadron with 12 aircraft and over 300 people; and has deployed on numerous operations and exercises in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, South East Asia, South West Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the United States. He has held staff jobs at the operational and strategic level, focusing on whole of government responses to emerging issues.

Group Captain Sleeman holds a Harvard University National Security Fellowship, a Master of Philosophy (Strategy) from the United States Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), a Master of Arts from the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College and a Bachelor of Science (Chemistry) from the University of New South Wales.

This book is based on the thesis as part of the graduation requirements for the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA.

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Most importantly, I am grateful for the love and support of my wife and our children. I am forever thankful for the patience and understanding they exhibited throughout the academic year. It is to my family that I dedicate this book.

SYNOPSIS

This book examines three alliances to determine the lessons learned that can apply to a possible future expansion of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The study concludes there are three conditions necessary for the FPDA to endure: whether states in the alliance are democracies, whether democratically elected civilians control the military, and whether the alliance is based on an initial threat plus a common culture and history. Furthermore, whilst the FPDA does not currently have an integrated military command structure (IMCS), the evidence from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) suggests that if the FPDA were to grow in terms of mission set and member states, then an IMCS would be more important than it has been in the past. Therefore, an IMCS warrants re-examining as the FPDA operates in the evolving security environment of Southeast Asia.

To determine the lessons to apply to the FPDA, I analyse the enduring NATO, the failed SEATO and the conditions present in the FPDA. The book further studies Asia today and determines that favourable conditions exist for FPDA expansion. By learning lessons that contributed to alliance endurance, expansion or failure, Australia can wisely invest its aid and assistance money in the region, to ensure its sphere of influence is maintained and expanded in the evolving security environment. As threats within the Southeast Asian region change, so too must the purpose, size and area in which alliances operate to ensure they facilitate the best possible outcome for the nations involved. This book attempts to provide such guidance, primarily to the Australian Government as it looks to navigate the stormy seas in the Southeast Asian region.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review reaffirmed Australia's partnership with the United States and other international partners to maintain regional balance in the Indo-Pacific and respond to emergent threats to the rules-based global order that threaten Australia and its interests.[1] This strategic objective is of particular importance within the Southeast Asian region; any threat to Australia is likely to come from the area directly to the north of Australia. Furthermore, the Australian way of life is sustained through economic prosperity based on trade, of which two-thirds of Australian exports travel through the South China Sea. The question becomes, by learning lessons from similar alliances, how can Australia focus its efforts within the region to strengthen and expand the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) to ensure strategic defence objectives are best met? To answer this question, this book analyses the conditions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) that contributed to the alliance's endurance or cessation. Rather than determine a generalisable theory that explains all alliances, this book focuses on lessons learned from NATO and SEATO, and how they can apply to the FPDA. To this end, while arguments that counter what I propose in this book surely exist, if they are not relevant to the context of the FPDA, I have not focused on them. For example, I have not analysed lessons on alliances between autocratic nations such as in the Warsaw Pact. From the conditions studied in this book, it is possible to determine if the environment in Southeast Asia today is such that a new alliance or the expansion of an existing agreement, such as the FPDA, meets the conditions necessary for an enduring or expanding alliance. If the conditions exist, then the Australian Government needs to put serious thought into the way it influences nations within the region. If the conditions do not exist, then the Australian Government needs to consider how it spends the money it has committed to the region, with strategic objectives in mind.

1. Australian Department of Defence, 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, ACT, 2023, p. 75

1.1: Relevance

On 5 March 2024, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced a $2 billion package to boost ties with Southeast Asian nations to deepen Australia's economic engagement with the region and ensure our shared prosperity.[2] These efforts are appropriately viewed as worthy causes that will have a positive effect on the targeted states as well as Australia's influence within the region. The aim of this investment is sensible and well-meaning; however, one must analyse how the money is spent to ensure the best use of taxpayer dollars. Is the money a broad-brush approach to achieve general aims, rather than specific, targeted investments with long-term strategic goals in mind per the latest Strategic Review? The primary goal of the Australian Government is protecting Australia and its national interests; any investment the government makes in the region must address this goal. Through examining conditions necessary to expand an alliance capable of successfully executing operations to protect Australia and its national interests, the government can target the creation of certain conditions as it invests money in the region. For example, is investing in infrastructure the best approach? Perhaps it is but, as an alternative, Australia could invest in institutions that promote and support democratic improvements within the region, or in updating the doctrine of regional militaries, to ensure it can best work with these nations in times of peace or war. This book does not examine the merits of alliances in protecting Australia's national interests, rather the book concurs with the vision stated in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review that strengthening international security partnerships is vital to Australia's security needs.[3] Protecting Australia's national interests means focusing on increasing the ability to 'work closely' with regional partners, which will assist in protecting the Australian way of life.

Trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region supports Australia's wealth and way of life. Australian trade relies on sea lines of communication, mainly through the South China Sea. Around 80 percent of the Australian export market is with nations that are part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the top three nations to which Australia exports along with two-thirds of all Australian trade relies exclusively on sea passage through the South China Sea.[4] The recent and increasing hostility within the South China Sea, based on competing maritime claims by Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam is a cause of concern for Australia. Although Australia has no claims within the South China Sea and takes no side in

2. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, '$2 billion investment facility to support business engagement with Southeast Asia', ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, 5 March 2024
3. Australian Department of Defence, 2023 Defence Strategic Review, p. 45
4. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia's Trade in Goods and Services*, Australian Government, Canberra, ACT, 2018

the dispute, Australia remains focused on ensuring that freedom of navigation and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remain enforced.[5] Likewise, piracy, particularly in the Strait of Malacca, remains a concern for Australia.[6]

Should a hostile actor choose to deny shipping through the South China Sea or the Strait of Malacca, Australia (along with allied nations) must be ready to respond. The best way for Australia and its partners to do so is by ensuring that the conditions required for a successful alliance are clear, allowing for the effective use of an alliance during times of crisis. While the threat of conflict is not currently high, Australia's way of life depends on allied preparedness, particularly in the wake of increased defence expenditures in the region. Defence spending in Asia in 2014, for example, was 14 percent greater than defence spending in Europe in total dollars, a difference that continues to increase.[7] Defence spending increases in Asia mean that Australia must engage regional concerns in an educated manner to best take advantage of the increase in defence spending by our partner nations to effectively offset the increase in defence spending by nations that are potential adversaries; however, the current limited size of the FPDA restricts the ability of Australia to take advantage of the increase in defence spending by like-minded nations. Increasing the size of the FPDA would increase the strength of the alliance, without requiring an overall increase in defence spending in the region, and hence not contribute to a potential arms race.

China is expected to increase its defence spending at a rate that has it on par with the United States' defense budget by 2035.[8] China is using this increased spending to strengthen its power and influence within the region. Already China has the largest navy in Asia; its submarine force continues to grow; and the air force is acquiring fifth-generation fighter aircraft, long-range strike assets, and cyber and space capabilities. Yet no single nation can counter the growing power of the Chinese military. Moreover, the Chinese have begun to focus on a bilateral rather than a multilateral approach to international engagement. For example, instead of China dealing with the whole of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regarding the South China Sea, China bilaterally influenced Cambodia in 2016 to block an ASEAN statement mentioning the ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that decided in favor of the Philippines

5. Cameron Hill, 'Australia and the South China Sea: debates and dilemmas', Australian Parliament, Canberra, ACT (n.d.)
6. Andrew Forbes (Ed.), 'Australia's Response to Piracy: A Legal Perspective', *Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, No. 31*, Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2011, p. 5
7. Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 49
8. Ibid.

over China.[9] China is growing in power and flexing its new muscles, motivating Australia's partners in the region to increase their defence spending and capabilities. Japan announced in late 2018 its plans to develop two aircraft carriers; this is the first time since World War 2 (WW2) that Japan will acquire and operate aircraft carriers and continues a trend of slowly reinterpreting their post-WW2 pacifist constitution.[10] As countries within Asia internally balance and expand, Australia needs a plan to engage with them. The best manner for Australia to achieve its national interests is to determine the conditions required to form alliances that can deter, deny or defeat threats whenever they arise and invest in measures to create or nurture the existence of these conditions. Focusing on known conditions will help Australia in seeking to further develop current alliances such as the FPDA that are perhaps struggling to maintain relevance.

Specifically for the FPDA, the reason for its creation and Australia's participation in the alliance no longer exist. Formed in 1971 between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom, the FPDA served as a mechanism for which the powers could come together to decide actions that may be taken if Malaysia or Singapore is attacked.[11] The coming together in the event of an attack is always a valid reason for an alliance; the explicit threat no longer exists yet Australia continues to actively contribute to the alliance, a point I return to in Chapter 4. Instead of participating in an alliance based on outdated reasons, Australia should seek to update alliances to receive the maximum possible benefit from its commitment to the alliance.

In its current construct, the FPDA is unable to achieve national strategic objectives. The FPDA does contribute to some objectives by providing Australia access to strategically important bases in the region, however the FPDA is limiting for two reasons. Firstly, the very reason for the FPDA no longer exists, yet the alliance has not updated its purpose to deal with threats in the current security environment. For example, the increasing threat in the South China Sea is not an area in which the FPDA operates. Secondly, as the spending on defence in Asia increases, the limited size of the FPDA restricts the benefit Australia can gain from the increased spending of friendly nations, whilst doing nothing to counter the increased defence spending by potentially adversarial nations. This poses the question as to what Australia gains out of the alliance, and whether it should still participate in an unaltered alliance into the future.

9. Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard, 'ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement', *Reuters*, 25 July 2016
10. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Japan to launch first aircraft carriers since WWII as Government notes "national rivalries are surfacing"', *ABC News*, 21 December 2018
11. Carlyle A Thayer, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971–2011)', *Southeast Asian Affairs,* 2012, p. 61

Australia must analyse the FPDA to ensure it best aligns with national interest, rather than for stagnant reasons explained by organisational theory. Barry Posen explains that stagnant thinking keeps the organisation operating, without necessarily innovating to adapt to the evolving security environment.[12] As the FPDA approaches its 55th year of operation, the time has come to examine the benefits Australia gets from the arrangement. This examination will guide Australia as to whether it should look to continue or expand the FPDA. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review specifies strengthening relations within the region, yet the FPDA's current construct restricts this from happening. Therefore, this book uses NATO and SEATO to determine lessons that can apply to the FPDA, to assist Australia in making educated decisions as to whether the FPDA can expand in the current strategic environment, and hence better achieve Australia's national security objectives.

1.2: Scope

This book examines three alliances created since World War 2 to determine lessons that can apply to the future of the FPDA. The book focuses on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). There are similarities and differences in the examined alliances which assist in providing lessons that can guide possible changes to the FPDA. For example, the shared history of Europe is apparent, particularly in the immediate aftermath of World War 2; the history of the FPDA countries is one that has evolved and created its own shared history during the alliance's existence. Furthermore, the analysis of an existing alliance within Southeast Asia provides the ability to analyse present-day conditions, how they affect the alliance, and how they may influence any future expansion.

I chose the alliances of NATO and SEATO for two reasons. Firstly, NATO provides an excellent example of an alliance that not only endured through dramatic changes in international affairs but expanded, even after the collapse of the primary threat the alliance faced. SEATO provides an excellent case to examine for two reasons. Firstly, juxtaposed with NATO, SEATO ceased to exist, which provided me an opportunity to examine conditions from a different perspective; this strengthened the correlations I discovered between the conditions I observed, and their link to alliance endurance. Secondly, SEATO provided me with a context similar to that in which the FPDA exists; namely the mix of Asian and non-Asian nations operating together in Southeast Asia.

12. Barry R Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1984, p. 59

Chapter 2 analyses NATO, which provides an example of an alliance created in the early post-WW2 years to counter the Soviet threat as the Cold War emerged. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led numerous commentators, such as John J Mearsheimer to announce that the United States would subsequently pull out of NATO.[13] This is in line with what some alliance theorists predict, yet it did not happen. On the contrary, not only did NATO endure post-Cold War, it expanded; it expanded in its mission set, its area of operations and the number of partner nations. This case then provides a unique opportunity to learn a set of conditions that affect alliance durability; these conditions are applicable to the FPDA, which no longer faces the threat that led to its creation. The two other alliances analysed in this book focus on the Asian region, including the FPDA.

Chapter 3 analyses SEATO, which provides an example of an alliance created against a specific threat in the Asian region, yet one that failed despite a persistent threat of communism. SEATO provides an opportunity to examine an alliance in the Asian context, and the interaction of Asian nations with non-Asian nations. This analysis is particularly relevant for this book, as any alliances Australia strengthens or creates in the region will require the specific knowledge of operating with Asian nations and their unique cultures.

Chapter 4 analyses the FPDA. The FPDA, like SEATO, is set in Asia with both Asian and non-Asian nations yet, unlike SEATO, the FPDA is a very active alliance, approaching the 55th anniversary of its creation in 1971. Unlike NATO which has expanded, the FPDA has remained stagnant in the tasks, number of partner countries and area of operations, and has only made minor adjustments to the missions undertaken such as the inclusion of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR). That is not to suggest FPDA's purpose is irrelevant. Instead, it provides an opportunity to study the conditions leading to its endurance, determine if they are common with NATO, and then develop an argument as to whether the FPDA *could* expand to meet the current Australian Strategic Defence Objectives better, rather than fulfill obsolete requirements created last century.

Using the FPDA and the current environment in Asia, this book examines whether the conditions determined necessary for an alliance to endure and expand exist. Understanding the degree of durability in the alliance can assist Australian policymakers in determining the best means to focus resources, money and military forces to achieve national objectives. However, other nations for their domestic reasons may not wish to join or expand the alliance. Determining the likely decisions of other nations is outside

13. John J Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, Summer 1990

the scope of this book, yet the information provided by this book can assist decision-makers as to whether diplomatic and aid efforts focused on alliances with other nations within Asia are worthwhile. Likewise, when a potential adversary conducts diplomatic efforts within the region, this book guides as to whether this should be of concern to Australia, and therefore something on which the government should focus.

1.3: Literature review

Several authors provide significant commentary regarding alliances, alliance theory, organisational theory and civilian-military relationships. The ideas posed by these authors appear throughout this book, sometimes to bolster the argument, yet at other times I disagree with at least some of their propositions. The principal authors I look at in this book are those who contribute to alliance theory, and those who propose an alternative to alliance theory.

Alliance theory states that alliances principally form to counter a common threat, and by joining together the alliance amasses enough forces to counter the threat that would otherwise be unachievable as individual states.[14] When the common threat dissipates, the very reason for the alliance ceases to exist, and hence the alliance will likewise end. From a realist viewpoint, the collapse of a threat will alter the international balance of power, and new alliances will form. Alliance theory provides sound reasoning for alliance formation; however, I argue that it is too simplistic regarding reasons as to why an alliance will continue to function post threat cessation. Alliance theory fails to explain why NATO endured post-Cold War or why the FPDA exists today. Other factors that influence alliance endurance exist, as this book argues.

Organisational theory provides reasons as to why an organisation, including militaries and alliances, exhibit predictable characteristics. At the organisational level, as Posen states, 'students of large businesses, large bureaucracies, and large military organizations have found striking behavioral similarities'.[15] Organisational theory and its application described by Posen underwrites the argument this book makes that Australia needs to consider how it operates in Asia, and not simply let the FPDA exist because of organisational inertia; critical analysis rather than bureaucracy should determine policy. Organisational theory, however, does not consider other variables unique to alliances. For example, the theory does not consider the fact that unlike the armed forces of a

14. Stephen Walt, 'Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 43, no. 1, Summer/Fall 1989, p. 4

15. Barry R Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, p. 36

state, which will always belong to that state, alliances function in an anarchic world, and no overarching body forces them to belong to a particular alliance. Like alliance theories, organisational theory helps explain some of the behavior within an alliance, such as the lack of innovation and stagnant doctrine, yet it does not adequately address the variables that hold an alliance together. This book endeavors to fill this void, to enable better decision-making in the future.

Risa Brooks outlines two conditions that are most favourable for strategic assessment within a state, low preference divergence between civilian and military leaders and dominant political leaders.[16] I define strategic assessment as a calculation made that guides a state or alliance as to how to proceed with a given concern to best promote the interest of that state or alliance. Brooks' theory applies to alliances as well as relationships within a single state, as it describes the requirements for effective sharing of information, and a clear decision-making process. Brooks' theory assists with describing the requirement of having democratically elected civilian control over the military, and the value of an integrated military command structure (IMCS). However, Brooks examines the quality of strategic assessment, rather than the endurance of an alliance, as her outcome of interest. For this reason, this book will utilise some aspects of Brooks' theory, while acknowledging that it is not a perfect fit for alliances.

1.4: Book and description of terms

The argument this book proposes is that through analysing similar alliances, Australia can learn the conditions that will assist in the endurance and expansion of the FPDA. The book does not examine alliances that I assess Australia will not participate in for the foreseeable future, hence I do not examine alliances such as that between the Soviets, the United Kingdom and the United States during World War 2. The lessons examined are: whether an alliance is *democratic* or non-democratic; whether the *military is subordinate* to the *democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance has an *integrated military command structure*; and, finally, whether the alliance is solely based on a common threat, or whether there is an initial *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. I selected these four conditions based on two reasons. Firstly, the authors described above provide an enormous amount of information regarding alliances, however they primarily address alliances' creation as a means for states to provide security against threats. I am interested in whether the initial threat is only one of several conditions most favourable for alliance endurance. Stephen M Walt stated that 'doubts remain regarding the universal applicability of this [balance of power] hypothesis'; this

16. Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2008, p. 11

warrants further examination to determine the other conditions.[17] Secondly, because alliances endure or fail regardless of the continuing presence of the external threat, it is important to examine the internal workings of the states involved, and the interactions between these states within an alliance. Whilst I agree that typically alliances form to counter a threat, I argue that the internal workings of the alliance based on other 'non-balance of power' factors are key to explaining alliance endurance. I therefore focus on the four conditions described in this book as I determined they provided the most applicable lessons to alliance endurance, and they help to fill some of the gaps that I perceive exist in current literature. This book does not claim a definitive causal link between the conditions and the possible expansion of the FPDA, nor does it suggest that it is mere correlation. Likewise, the book does not provide a generalisable theory applicable to all alliances; it is solely focused on learning and applying lessons from alliances that I deem similar in nature to the FPDA. I propose that the lessons learned from analysing NATO and SEATO are applicable to the FPDA, and Australia can therefore focus on creating or maintaining the desired conditions to best enable the FPDA to endure, expand and hence contribute to meeting stated national objectives.

1.5: Democracy

The first lesson is determining if the states within the alliance are *democracies*. This is not a simple yes or no answer, as there are a variety of different forms of democracy. Furthermore, there are certain aspects of democracy that have the most significant influence on their contribution to whether an alliance endures or ceases to exist. The main point of determining whether a state is a democracy or not is determining if a state and the leadership of that state has the required attributes to succeed in alliance maintenance. Democracy instills the norms of compromise, negotiation and pragmatism. The need for all parties within an alliance to have these democratic attributes, and the trust they therefore enable, is critical for the endurance and expansion of an alliance such as the FPDA. To be clear, this book is not stating that simply being a democracy promotes alliance endurance; it is certain aspects of democracies that are required, as I describe below. Also, I am not stating that non-democratic nations are incapable of demonstrating the required traits, rather the traits are more prevalent in democratic nations.

Democracy forces leaders to negotiate and resolve differences that invariably arise. The very process of democratic governance requires negotiation skills, patience and the ability to work with others. In a democratic state, there are always differences; some

17. Stephen M Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1987, p. 7

differences are small and almost meaningless, while other differences are large with significant consequences. Without the ability to pass bills into law, guide the national agenda and achieve the very promises made during the election campaign, then a government is likely to be short-lived. On the other hand, a government that can work through disagreement and conflict, make compromises where needed, and achieve the election promises it made, is more likely to succeed at the next election.[18] For this reason, democratically elected leaders tend to have better negotiating skills, are better at compromising, and assist in the endurance of an alliance. This is not to suggest that democracies are perfect, or that dictators cannot negotiate; rather, I suggest that overall democracies have more experience in negotiations and compromise, and are therefore generally better at these skills.

Non-democratic states lack the general negotiating skills and the ability to compromise when compared to democracies. Furthermore, there is a lack of trust that underpins negotiations involving non-democratic states. I am not suggesting a dictator does not seek opinions or value the input of others; rather, once they have made up their mind, the decision stands and the dictator has little requirement to sell his idea. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita describes a leader's requirement to gain support for an idea, which ranges from requiring a large amount of support in a democracy to relatively low levels of support in non-democratic states.[19] Compared to the democratic countries in NATO, the Soviet dictator Chairman Joseph Stalin ruled with an iron fist; if people dissented from his views and ideas, Stalin had little hesitation in killing that person or their family.[20] Although any citizen in Stalin's Soviet Russia could become a party member and potentially influence decisions, only a few were chosen.[21] As a result, within an autocracy, corruption, cronyism and oppression are expected.[22] Non-democratic nations like China do not necessarily execute dissenting citizens, however there is little doubt that corruption and oppression exist in non-democratic states to a greater extent than in democratic societies. Additionally, as there is a greater degree of trust between democracies, their negotiated agreements are more likely to last.

Democracy ensures leaders look to the future, rather than hold grudges that may undermine the success of an alliance; democracies require payoffs for re-election. For

18. Rick Hampson, 'When it comes to campaign promises, presidents usually try, often fail', *USA Today*, 6 July 2016
19. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M Siverson and James D Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003, p. 70
20. A L Unger, 'Stalin's Renewal of the Leading Stratum: A Note on the Great Purge', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3, January 1969, p. 326
21. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival,* p. 53
22. Ibid., pp. 72–73

the same reason, democratically elected leaders must negotiate and compromise to achieve success, they must also be willing to overlook past failures or betrayals. The voting public is not overly interested in who caused issues or failures; instead, they are interested in successes. If a democratically elected leader holds onto resentment and continues to bring up negative aspects of his or her government, then he or she is likely to suffer in the next election. As a result, the leaders generally move past issues that occur and look for a positive future, rather than languish on an issue the voting public will see as a failure of the government.

There are logical reasons a nation wants to apply democratic values; for a nation to prosper, it must be a stable, reliable and an efficient partner. Trade is vital to a nation's prosperity and, through adhering to and promoting the *rule of law*, nations can gain trust and efficiency in their international trade. The rule of law and international agreements 'help states create a predictable and cost-effective environment in which to pursue their interests'.[23] Efficiency and knowing that a nation will obey laws enables increased trade and hence increased long-term prosperity. The empirics I use in this book are from the 2018 Varieties of Democracy report (V-Dem) which gives fine-grain measures of democracies, and rates all the countries in the world according to their performance against these measurements.[24] I use the V-Dem scores to measure each county, in particular its score in the category of 'Deliberative Component Index (DCI)' which measures the ability of a government to negotiate, engage in a range of consultation and act for the common good, rather than for parochial or self-serving interests.

1.6: Democratically elected civilian control over the military

The second lesson is determining whether there is explicit *control of the military* exercised by *democratically elected civilian leaders*. This condition is closely linked to the condition of *democracy*, however, the *control over the military by democratically elected officials* is worth mentioning as it can have a significant effect on the endurance of an alliance, as I discuss regarding the Philippines in Chapter 3. Furthermore, in the NATO 'Membership Action Plan', the requirement for democratic and civilian control over the armed forces is an explicitly stated condition for aspiring nations.[25] If democratically elected civilian leaders do not dominate a subordinate military, then the ability of a state to remain in an alliance such as the FPDA, and hence promote alliance endurance,

23. G John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011, p. 91
24. V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for all? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden, 2018
25. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'Membership Action Plan', 24 April 1999, art. I, para. 2d

diminishes. Like the lessons learned from democracy, this book uses the V-Dem scores to determine if each county has democratically elected civilian control over the military, and therefore how the lesson can apply to the FPDA.

There are two reasons for the necessity of *democratically elected civilian control over the military*. Firstly, for different nations to work together effectively, they must demonstrate sound strategic assessment within their nation, as this promotes common thought and increases the ease of decision-making within the alliance. Risa Brooks describes the conditions for effective strategic assessment, and control over the military by political leaders as a significant factor.[26] Secondly, the leader of the government must be elected democratically, rather than gain power by coup or the transformation from a democracy to an autocracy. Non-democratic leaders often 'coup-proof' themselves by retaining strict dominance over the military, however their emphasis is on retaining their power rather than focusing on governing and promoting democratic values. This hinders their ability to produce effective strategic assessment, and thus reduces the nation's ability to effectively function as part of an alliance.

Brooks posits that the form of civilian control over the military does not matter to the strategic assessment. Brooks argues that 'autocracies should, at times, perform perfectly well at strategic assessment'.[27] I argue there is merit in this opinion, however, when analysing the form of civilian control as it relates to states' behavior and ultimately the viability of an alliance, there are two issues with the Brooks' proposal. Firstly, if a dictator controls the military, then the leader is likely to use the military to ensure he remains in power, rather than for the sole aim of ensuring the security of the nation. As I describe in Chapter 3, the use of the military to secure the power of a non-democratic leader occurred in the case of the Philippines. Other nations within the alliance will see this undemocratic use of the military, especially in today's increasingly connected world, and will not approve of the actions that go against the democratic values of the alliance. This will put pressure on all nations involved in the alliance and will potentially lead to a split within the alliance if issues remain unresolved. Keeping in mind, as discussed in the previous paragraphs, one of the critical attributes of having democratic leaders is their ability to discuss issues, compromise and move on; in the case of a non-democratic civilian leader, they lack the experience of compromising, and the trust that backs up negotiations.

The second issue with Brooks' thoughts regarding the benefit of autocracy is the contribution a nation makes within an alliance is predicated on the ability of that nation to make sound strategic assessments. For example, Brooks describes that if

26. Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessement*, p. 13

27. Ibid., p. 12

there is political dominance over the military (as well as low preference divergence; an issue not studied in this book), then strategic assessment is sound.[28] The reason for this assessment is that in a democracy, the information sharing between the military and the government tends to be effective. I argue that this is not always the case for a non-democratic government as the military leaders may be attempting to seize power themselves, so they will not necessarily pass on accurate information to the government; they want to maintain the knowledge, as it may assist their future attempts at a coup. This situation may lead to poor information flow or lead a military to collect information that supports a potential coup, rather than intelligence required for national security, or alliance concerns.

This book does not strictly imply that all nations without democratically elected civilian control over the military will always have poor strategic assessment, or that their military is likely to overthrow the government; however, to learn lessons that apply to the FPDA, I have focused on what is likely to provide the best outcome for the alliance. Therefore, when considering nations which the FPDA could expand to include, if a nation is more likely to have flawed strategic assessment, then the ability of that nation to contribute to sound strategic assessments within the FPDA will likewise be flawed. If nations have continuously different assessments of a situation, then over time the ability to work together and agree on courses of action will diminish, thus rendering the alliance ineffective and potentially obsolete. There will always be differing opinions regarding assessments; however, if made with the best information possible, shared in the best possible manner, then the likelihood of these differences will be diminished.

1.7: Integrated military command structure

The third lesson to apply to the FPDA is the effectiveness of an *integrated military command structure* (IMCS). I define an IMCS as the full integration of the allied nations into the command and decision-making of the alliance whereby service personnel are working for the organisation rather than the nation to which they belong. Militaries rely on a clear, defined chain of command to guide all operations. In an alliance, there likewise needs to be a clearly defined chain of command; however, as it is an alliance, there must be staff from all nations involved. The alliance staff command, develop plans, courses of action, future concepts, logistics and personnel support, and direct exercises. These functions provide the integrated command with diverse capabilities, as well as the integration of hardware and doctrine, which increases the effectiveness of conducting operations by the alliance. In their work on the socialisation of militaries through

28. Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessement*, p. 45

multinational exercises, Frazier and Hutto find that the integration between nations and alliances improves through exercises, as exercises not only allow nations to modify doctrine, but they enable socialisation of the nations through shared experiences.[29] Analysis of NATO and SEATO indicated that the condition of an IMCS assists in an alliance enduring, and the greater the integration, the greater the shared experiences and the greater the ability of the alliance to endure. The FPDA does not have an IMCS, yet it endures. I examine this indeterminant relationship in Chapter 4, followed by recommendations to guide the future of the FPDA regarding an IMCS in Chapter 5.

An alliance command structure must have people solely dedicated to the alliance for integration to occur. Should members in the headquarters operate with the interests of their own country as their priority, then integration is unlikely to occur. Naturally, members will have the objectives of their nation as a consideration, however, they work for the alliance. This may mean that more capable nations sacrifice some of their efficiency and prowess, yet this is required to fully integrate the alliance and assist in the development of weaker nations. Likewise, it requires nations that contribute the most to an alliance, such as the United States regarding NATO, to commit to the integration of the alliance, rather than operating unilaterally within the defined alliance area, as they have the power to do.

Alliance partners that fully integrate require common procedures, doctrine, logistics and plans. Integration requires significant effort and dedication. For example, it is far easier for a professional military to operate its own logistics than it is to form a common logistic supply chain with other nations. Integration involves altering the way a military operates within the alliance, which may be vastly different to existing national systems. By integrating, the alliance 'glues' itself together as the nations become dependent on each other for operations they may conduct. Another critical factor in the integration of the alliance is intelligence producing and sharing. If it is the case that nations individually produce intelligence and do not share it due to security concerns, then there is less prospect of full integration. However, when producing intelligence for the alliance, a common set of classification standards enables the nations to work together in a more integrated manner.

To assess the 'integrated-ness' in an alliance, I use the structure of George Liska. Liska defines the levels as 'paper tiger' which has no real structure, 'coordination' which deconflicts rather than integrates, and 'integration' which works together in all aspects to

29. Derrick V Frazier and J Wesley Hutto, 'The socialization of military power: security cooperation and doctrine development through multinational military exercises', *Defence Studies*, vol. 17, issue 4, September 2017, p. 385

achieve the desired outcome shared between the partners of the alliance.[30] An example of a paper tiger is the alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, ANZUS. An example of coordination, although not an alliance, is the deconfliction that occurred between the USAF and USN in Vietnam by operating separate route packages during the Vietnam War. Finally, as Liska describes, an example of integration is the NATO alliance. I use these levels in this book to assess each alliance, and how the 'integrated-ness' contributes to alliance endurance. I base the measurable aspects of an IMCS in terms of common doctrine, common command, the sharing of intelligence and the commonality of equipment.

1.8: Common threat, culture and history

The fourth and final lesson examined in this book is the existence of a threat to form an alliance compared to the existence of a *common threat* combined with *shared culture and history* within the alliance. I argue that a common threat, real or perceived, drives the creation of an alliance in the first place. Just because two states share values does not mean they will form an alliance; hence Australia does not have a formal alliance with Portugal, even though the two countries share Western values. However, without a shared culture or history, the common threat will not hold an alliance together once the threat disappears; hence the World War 2 alliance between the Soviets, the United Kingdom and the United States ceased to exist shortly after they defeated the common threats of the war. For an alliance to endure, I argue that as well as the common threat necessary to begin an alliance, there must be shared values and history that hold the alliance together. Without a common threat to begin an alliance, and without the shared culture or history to maintain the alliance, an alliance is unlikely to endure. Without shared values, alliance theory holds.

There are two aspects that underpin the lessons from the common threat, culture and history. Firstly, is the threat that the existing nations face, and how this threat is both defined and interpreted. Should a threat be perceived as important to one state, yet of little importance to another, then there will be varying degrees of commitment to the alliance. Further to this point, if a threat means different things to different nations, then the ability to work out an agreed value of the threat and a viable response to the threat becomes difficult. Secondly, the culture and history that states within the alliance share matter considerably. This metric moves beyond merely whether a state is a democracy or not, but rather concerns the cultural ties and history to determine if there are enough commonalities to enable an alliance to endure. There will never be a perfect fit

30. George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1962, pp. 117–118

regarding common culture and history in explaining alliance strength, however, through analysing the recent history, and the history of the alliance, a degree of commonality is measurable.

There must be a common threat, agreed to by all parties for an alliance to endure. This threat must be not one of many reasons for forming an alliance, rather it must be the main reason. There may always be competing security concerns, but a main threat must exist amongst the nations. Glenn H Snyder describes how 'Alliances generally strengthen the alignments [of the nations] by introducing elements of precision, obligation, and reciprocity'.[31] However, if there is no shared threat, or if the nations intentionally limit their action, then the prospect of obligation and reciprocity is minimal. The lack of a shared threat is what John J Mearsheimer argues when he states: 'alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience, where today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner.'[32] Stephen Wright explains the common thought between neoliberals and neorealists that alliances formed ad hoc to counter a specific threat without any emphasis on mutual values are doomed to failure.[33] Wright's research indicates that causality worked in both ways, so that the security environment changed the NATO alliance, while the military institution within NATO likewise changed the security environment.[34] I argue that rather than being the sole reason an alliance stays together, a common threat is only one of several conditions required.

The conditions at the start of an alliance prove critical to the endurance of the alliance. This is not to say that conditions cannot evolve, or that time does not heal past differences between nations. There are numerous examples of past foes becoming friends, such as Australia and Turkey (now Türkiye) who were bitter enemies during World War 1. However, this healing takes time, as indicated by the fact that formal relations between Australia and Türkiye did not emerge until after more than half a century had passed.[35] Therefore, whether it is cultural ties, historical events such as World War 2 or colonialism, any differences will take time to heal, either by further events, or time itself. Andrew Moravcsik describes the continuing successful integration

31. Glenn H Snyder, 'Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44, no. 1, 1990, p. 109
32. John J Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994–1995, p. 11
33. Stephen Wright, *NATO in the 1990s: Redefining Alliance Theory*, Scholars' Press, Lexington, KY, 2014, p. 28
34. Ibid., p. ii
35. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Türkiye Country Brief', viewed 10 March 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/geo/turkey/pages/turkey-country-brief.aspx

of Europe today as a result of a series of post-World War 2 events and developments, rather than solely the conditions immediately post-WW2.[36] I agree with his argument, and over time differences of opinion can slowly change, which potentially further expands integration. This is a critical factor when I describe in Chapter 5 the conditions in Asia today, and the potential for an existing alliance such as the FPDA to expand.

1.9: Structure of the book

This book is broken down into the three previously mentioned case studies; NATO, SEATO and the FPDA. The chapters start by describing the alliances, the context and the purpose of their creation. They then analyse the alliances by applying the four conditions of *democracy*, *democratic civilian control of the military*, an *integrated military command structure*, and the existence of *common values alongside a common threat* that provide lessons on the endurance or expansion of each alliance. The chapters then examine how each alliance evolved to explain the outcome of the conditions mentioned above. The chapter regarding SEATO, the sole alliance in this book that failed to endure, focuses on the conditions that led to the alliance ending. The middle chapters provide the empirical evidence that can enable Australia to apply lessons to guide the future of the FPDA.

The concluding chapter specifies recommendations based on the conditions existing in the FPDA and the Asia-Pacific today. By examining the conditions required, this book determines that conditions that exist within Asia today are *favourable* for the expansion of the FPDA. Attempting to determine the conditions is somewhat speculative, however, the empirical data in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provides lessons applicable to Australia that enable the recommendations provided in the final chapter. The lessons may not be generalisable to all alliances, in fact I doubt they are; however, regarding Australia and the future of the FPDA, the lessons have merit. The book concludes that the conditions in Asia *are* suitable for the expansion of the FPDA, which will better position Australia to meet its strategic objectives in the evolving Asian environment. Furthermore, the stability in Europe since the Cold War is in part due to the enduring alliance of NATO. As the 21st century is described as the Asian Century, the potential for conflict suggests that an alliance like NATO may be the determining factor that ensures a peaceful Asian Century.[37] Yet an expanded alliance and the potential harmful implications such as adversely affecting relations with China requires considered management. This leads the final chapter to suggest several areas of further study and considerations for the

36. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998, p. 2

37. Australian Government, *Australia in the Asian Century*, 28 October 2012

Australian Government. As the spender of taxpayers' dollars, the government must invest these dollars based on sound knowledge as to what Australia can expect in return for the investment. Likewise, the security and promotion of Australia's national interests are the greatest tasks for the government, so it must educate itself to enable success, both now and into the future.

CHAPTER 2

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

On 4 April 1949, the governments of ten European countries plus Canada and the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). The NAT resulted from years of negotiations and assurances provided by several minor treaties. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, proposed on 5 June 1947 and devised by Secretary of State George C Marshall, the US committed to providing Europe with much needed post-World War 2 funding. The US funding provided financial assistance to businesses, enabling them to increase trade and kick-start the economy, as well as enabling physical reconstruction following the devastation inflicted by the war. From the US side, the Marshall Plan increased the prospect of a successful reconstruction of Europe and decreased the likelihood of another world war. On the European side, the Marshall Plan was not just a welcome source of income; the Marshall Plan demonstrated significant US commitment to Europe. Two years before the Marshall Plan came the Treaty of Dunkirk, signed by the United Kingdom and France on 4 March 1947. The Treaty of Dunkirk aimed to guarantee mutual assistance against any possible German attacks in the aftermath of World War 2.[1]

Forming another treaty in 1948, the Brussels Treaty, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Great Britain, performed as an extension of the Treaty of Dunkirk.[2] The Treaty expanded the nations involved and included the threats from Germany and the Soviet Union. Some experts consider the Brussels Treaty as the factor that 'launched the making of the Atlantic Alliance'.[3] With America now reassured that the Europeans had demonstrated their intent to focus on alliances aimed at providing security and stability from potential threats, President Harry S Truman stated he was 'Sure the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will

1. United Nations, Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the President of the French Republic, 8 September 1947, Dunkirk, France
2. NATO, 'The Brussels Treaty': Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, Belgium, 1948
3. Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance, NATO 1945 to 1950*, Arbor House, New York, NY, 1989, p. 114

be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them protect themselves'.[4] With both the Europeans and the Americans signalling their commitment to progressing their values and security, the foundations for NATO were laid.

The negotiations were not, however, a sure thing nor an easy task; there were several issues that needed resolving and details to work out. Article V, the most commonly referenced article within the treaty, was a critical inclusion for the Europeans. Article V ensured European safety or at least American assistance in the event of a security threat. The lack of specific terms, replaced by more general assistance provisions, came from a requirement by US interlocutors aimed at satisfying the US Congress. For the Europeans, implicit in the security guarantee was the invaluable benefit of deterrence that came with the American guarantee. The Europeans were satisfied with the US commitment to European security issues and therefore compromised on specific details in Article V of the treaty, changing their wording to suit US demands.[5]

2.1: The four lessons

Now that the context of the formation of NATO is established, this chapter assesses how the four conditions apply to NATO: whether the nations within the alliance are a *democracy* or non-democracy; whether the military is *subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance has an *integrated military command structure*; and whether the alliance is based solely on a common threat or whether there is a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. Examining the four conditions is important as the analysis establishes the necessary conditions for the expansion of NATO. After analysing the four conditions and how they apply to NATO, the chapter describes the ability of NATO to expand in three separate, yet related areas: the *number of nations* involved; the *nature of the mission*; and the *area of operations* (AO). This analysis of the conditions and expansion of NATO provides lessons that are translatable to the context and future of the FPDA.

2.2: Democracy

The foundational aspect of the North Atlantic Treaty was that all nations involved were democracies. The preamble to the 1949 treaty states: 'They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded

4. Stanley R Sloan, *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 21

5. Ibid., p. 22

on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.'[6] Founding the alliance on the principles of democracy has served NATO well through its existence for several reasons.

The principles of democracy proved critical during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 and is an example of NATO moving past significant issues between several nations within the alliance. Great Britain, France and Israel (a non-NATO state) attempted to prevent the Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser from nationalising the Suez Canal which the British Government built and primarily controlled for almost a century. When the US failed to back the military actions of Great Britain, France and Israel, a potential challenge to the alliance occurred. However, as expected between democracies, the leaders resolved the issue without lasting damage to the alliance.

As the leaders involved in the Suez Canal crisis desired re-election within their nations, they needed to move on from the issue. The domestic ramifications of the Suez Canal crisis within the UK were significant. The prime minister at the time of the crisis, Sir Anthony Eden, resigned under criticism from both his party and the Opposition over his handling of the crisis.[7] However, Great Britain in a short amount of time managed to improve its relationship with the US, whom it felt had betrayed the UK during the crisis. The replacement prime minister, Harold Macmillan, chose not to dwell on the failure his party had been instrumental in creating. Realising the damage already done to the sitting prime minister, Macmillan wanted to move on from the event and look for positive stories he could sell to the voting public. Therefore, the relationship between the UK and the US, two of the most powerful nations within NATO in the 1950s, quickly strengthened once again, and the 'special relationship' remained strong. The fact that the US was the biggest partner in NATO no doubt influenced the British toward recovering the UK–US relationship; however, I argue the damage the crisis caused UK leaders was likewise a significant factor. For reasons I discuss in the following paragraph, France remained standoffish in its relationship with the US, and ultimately NATO.

The Suez Canal crisis and the lack of support from the US played a part in France leaving NATO. However, there were two historical reasons as to why the French held on to their grievance with the US and failed to act in a manner consistent with a democracy. Firstly, in the 1960s, France transitioned away from a functioning democracy, leading to its inability to demonstrate the democratic traits of compromise and negotiation that are required to contribute to an enduring alliance.[8] Secondly, international politics is based

6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'The North Atlantic Treaty 4 April 1949', Washington DC, 1949
7. Lawrence S Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2004, p. 14
8. Center for Systemic Peace, 'Authority Trends, 1946–2013: France', Vienna, VA, 2014

on power. If the French believed they did not need NATO as they were powerful enough on their own, then they would be more likely to leave NATO and abandon its allies. As Henry Kissinger stated in *Diplomacy*, regarding the late 19th century, 'there was an inherent gap between France's image of itself as the dominant nation in Europe and its capacity to live up to it – a gap that has blighted French policy to this day'.[9] Furthermore, French pride prevented France from overcoming disagreements with the US, as it sought to create an alternative to the US-led NATO. This Euro-centric approach to security exists in France today, with the current French president, Emmanuel Macron, calling for a true European army, capable of protecting Europe from China, Russia and 'even the United States of America'.[10] It is therefore interesting, yet hardly surprising, the French chose to leave NATO rather than repair relations with the US. France aside, the shared values held by democracies led to conditions that enable NATO to endure.

The democratic principles of NATO are crucial to NATO's endurance. However, democratic principles have not always been perfectly adhered to by all the nations within the alliance. For example, the Portuguese regime that signed the treaty fell far short of the democratic standards and requirements detailed within the treaty.[11] Likewise, the government of Türkiye, both at the time it joined the treaty and today, has been imperfect at fulfilling the requirements of the treaty. Experiencing a string of coups, with the latest attempt occurring in 2016, Türkiye is far from a perfectly functioning democracy. Furthermore, land disputes between Türkiye and Greece occurring in the island of Cyprus continue today, although reunification talks are underway.[12] Regardless of the success of the Cyprus talks, the endurance of NATO further backs up the ability of NATO nations to negotiate, compromise and move on from issues, as expected by democratic nations.

Nations wishing to join NATO must adhere to the democratic principles laid out in the 1949 treaty. Following on from the clear intent of the NATO preamble, Article 2 of the treaty states nations will 'contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being'.[13] Furthermore, the 'Membership

9. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY, 1994, p. 119
10. President Emmanuel Macron, 'First World War Armistice Centenary', address, Verdun, France, 6 November 2018
11. Stanley R Sloan, *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama*, Continuum, New York, NY, p. 75
12. Mustafa Akinci and Nicos Anastasiades, 'Joint Statement by the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Mr. Mustafa Akinci and the Greek Cypriot Leader, Mr. Nicos Anastasiades', 26 October 2018
13. NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949

Action Plan' (MAP) released in 1999 details the requirements to join NATO and guides nations to achieve said requirements. The MAP indicates that NATO desires expansion and is willing to assist nations in meeting the strict NATO requirements. An example of the importance NATO places on democracy is in the first chapter of the MAP which states that nations must conform to basic principles such as *democracy*, the *rule of law*, *individual liberty* and *human rights*.[14] Conceptually, the ability of nations to work effectively with the US within NATO required those nations to adhere to the same values as the US. This is not to suggest that non-democratic nations would be incapable of forming an alliance; however, in the context of working with the US, the requirement to share the same democratic values enabled nations to work closely together. This is an important consideration when I discuss the possible expansion of the FPDA. The democratic requirement has served NATO well. Also serving NATO well, and linked to democratic values, is the issue of civilian control over the military.

2.3: Democratically elected civilian control over the military

All NATO states have democratically elected civilian control over their military. This requirement has not always been enforced, as evident by Greece and Türkiye joining the alliance whilst ruled by military leadership. The military control issue regarding Greece and Türkiye has caused some issues within NATO, including the conflict over Cyprus, as previously discussed. However, as NATO further expanded, the democratic civilian control over the armed forces became a critical factor for aspiring NATO nations.

The MAP specifies the requirement for aspiring states to 'establish appropriate *democratic* and *civilian control* of their armed forces' (emphasis added).[15] As Carl von Clausewitz famously stated: 'War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.'[16] In a democracy, the policy must always come from the democratically elected government. The requirement for democratically elected civilian control of the military is crucial for the success and cohesion of NATO, hence the particular requirement detailed in the MAP. This is a lesson applicable to the FPDA should it look to expand the number of nations participating in the alliance.

The requirement for democratic civilian control over the military assured NATO that the success of the alliance would continue past the collapse of the USSR. Nations previously belonging to the Warsaw Pact had mixed forms of military control; however, they

14. NATO , 'Membership Action Plan', 1999, art. I
15. Ibid., art. I, para. 2d
16. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Eds. & Trans.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984, p. 87 (Original work published 1832)

were ultimately subordinate to the control of the Kremlin. The existing states within NATO have the right to grant or refuse entry of aspiring nations. NATO determined control of the state's military must be democratic to ensure the military operated in a manner consistent with NATO values. Weak civilian control of the military in post-communist states exposed weaknesses in the democratic process within those newly independent states.[17] If a situation existed whereby the military operated autonomously from democratically elected civilian control, then the values of NATO and the operating structure within the alliance would likely fail. The military must remain subordinate to democratic civilian control and, as demonstrated by the history of NATO, civilian control enables the alliance to endure and resolve issues in a democratic, rather than militaristic manner. If a military operates autonomously from democratic civilian control, then there is no guarantee the military would constrain itself while its government attempts to resolve issues; this remains a concern with Türkiye today. Therefore, when issues inevitably arise, the potential exists for a military to conduct operations that are not per the principles of NATO, posing a significant dilemma for NATO. Potentially worse still, when issues within the NATO alliance occur, the military of one state could conceivably conduct offensive operations against another NATO state, causing an inevitable split within the alliance. Hence, democratic civilian control of the military is a critical factor for NATO nations. As NATO evolved post-Cold War, the political aspects played an increasing role in NATO's conduct.

NATO increasingly utilises political factors rather than the threat of military force to achieve its aims.[18] In a shift from the purely war-fighting aspect of NATO during the Cold War, the alliance evolved to include a greater role for democratic institutions, and the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic means, rather than through intimidation and the threat of the use of military force.[19] This shift required the engagement of the public to ensure the desires of the voting public drove government actions. If proper control of the military by democratically elected civilians did not exist, then the ability to shift toward a more diplomatic mission for NATO would be at risk; an autonomous military may act alone, upsetting the diplomatic resolution NATO is trying to achieve. Of course, should diplomacy fail, the military must have the sufficient capability to conduct any operations directed by the NATO leadership.

The final aspect democratic civilian control of the military aimed to achieve is the value, prestige and professionalism of the military itself. Issues such as esprit de corps, military reforms, professionalisation and meritocracy of the officer and NCO corps, and

17. S Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay and Mark R Rubin (Eds.), *NATO After Fifty Years*, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE, 2001, p. 107
18. NATO, 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)', NAC, Brussels, Belgium, 1991, p. 6
19. S Victor Papacosma et al., *NATO After Fifty Years*, p. 104

the strategic aims of the military are critical for an alliance such as NATO to exist and endure. In former communist countries, these aspects were often not up to the standard of Western militaries. These nations therefore had to change if they wished to become part of the enduring alliance. However, organisational inertia largely influences how any organisation acts. Organisational theory predicts a lack of willingness to change or improve an organisation.[20] By ensuring the military is subordinate to democratic civilian control, the elected officials can intervene and guide the transformation the military needs to enable it to operate as part of an alliance and following Western values and perceptions as to how a military should conduct itself. By civilian leaders guiding the professionalisation of the military, NATO was able to expand the number of nations involved in the alliance.

2.4: Integrated military command structure

The development of NATO into a fully integrated organisation began slowly; however the realities of the Korean War sped up NATO integration. Then Secretary General of NATO Lord Ismay explained:

> the rather leisurely pace of Western rearmament during that period [1949-1951]. Clearly, NATO countries intended to take their time about rebuilding their armed strength; each of them, before deciding on costly and somewhat unpopular measures, had a tendency to 'wait and see what the other fellow was doing'.[21]

Initial NATO strategy placed emphasis on political solidarity that could combine military forces as needed when a conflict arose.[22] The Korean War proved this a disastrous strategy. Although the Western reaction to the Korean crisis was expeditious, the initial fighting lacked coordination and, within two months, the North Koreans forced UN forces to the area around Pusan. The initial failings in Korea forced members of NATO to rethink their strategy, particularly as many believed Korea was a dress rehearsal for Europe, and hence 'the period of cautious optimism and slow methodical progress was over'.[23] During the Korean War, NATO began quickly developing an integrated structure, including military and civilian institutions.

20. Barry R Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, p. 44
21. Lord Ismay, *NATO The First Five Years: 1949–1954*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris, France, 1954, p. 29
22. Seth A Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2017, p. 46
23. Lord Ismay, *NATO The First Five Years: 1949–1954*, p. 31

Spurred on by the Korean War, NATO rapidly integrated. Groups within NATO, such as the military committee, the regional planning group, the finance and economic board, and the military supply and production and supply board, merged so by April 1951 a centralised command and control structure developed into the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).[24] Further integration occurred when the French Assembly refused to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) idea of creating a supranational European Army. The EDC failure meant NATO was the only mechanism to control Germany as it developed post-World War 2. With West Germany permitted to join NATO and re-arm, the guiding principle of NATO became to develop as a fully integrated military command.

The IMCS developed due to the creation of SHAPE. An essential feature regarding the operations of SHAPE was the fact that the headquarters was both international and integrated at all levels. General Andrew J Goodpaster, a Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), described SHAPE as a headquarters that:

> would not function as a committee made up of a number of national delegations, but rather as a single unified organization in which all officers, regardless of nationality, worked for the common mission assigned to Eisenhower [the first SACEUR]: to develop an integrated, effective force for the defence of Western Europe and to conduct that defence, should hostilities occur.[25]

Under the command of General Dwight D Eisenhower, SHAPE played an instrumental role in creating a competent, fully integrated institution. The capacity to resist the common threat of Soviet expansion required unity of command, training, policy, doctrine and where possible, common equipment or interoperability.

NATO integration provided a means to conduct operations aimed at deterrence and, if needed, defending Western Europe. A single powerful command structure incorporated all aspects of the military component of NATO. The single command structure does not suggest national representatives had no say in the employment of their nation's military forces; they did. However, the national representatives acted separately from the international, integrated staff at SHAPE, in a similar manner to 'red-card holders' that operate in a modern-day Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC). Integration involved all aspects of military bureaucracy, such as a shared funding model, common supply and logistics chains, the integration of doctrine, and the joint staff system. For example, the

24. NATO, 'A Short History of NATO', viewed February 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm

25. Andrew J Goodpaster, 'The Development of SHAPE: 1950–1953', in Robert S Jordan (Ed.) *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,* University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1987, p. 2

nomenclature used to designate directorates within the Australian Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), that is, J1 administration, J2 intelligence, J3 operations and so forth, comes from the integrated structure and conventions designed by NATO. Furthermore, the integration provided a common set of standards for military operations, ranging from doctrine to communications and equipment. The integrated military command structure provided a single command structure that controls NATO, regardless of the operation or exercise it undertook. The IMCS resulted in a unified structure and doctrine that held together 20,000 people under 33 sub-commands.[26] A contributing factor in the ability of NATO to form an integrated military command structure was the existence of a common threat, shared culture and history.

2.5: Common threat, culture and history

The expansion of communism was the overarching threat promoting states to join NATO. After an initial period of hopefulness post-World War 2, the Korean War soon put an end to this utopian thought. Rightly or wrongly, Western European nations perceived the Soviets to be involved in the execution of the Korean War and believed the Soviets were using the Korean War partially as an exercise in 'road-testing' what they could achieve in Europe.[27] The reasons to fear expansion by the USSR were logical and based on the actions and words of Russian authorities in the short few years post-WW2.

The hopes that came about by the liberation of European nations from Nazi occupation soon ended with the expansionist policies of the Soviets. While the armies of Great Britain and the United States significantly reduced in size post-WW2, the Soviet army maintained its numbers, overshadowing the power of the West in Europe. Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to President Truman on 12 May 1945 expressing his fears by stating:

> I am profoundly concerned about the European situation … In a short time, our armed power on the Continent will have vanished … I feel deep anxiety … What will be the position in a year or two when British and American Armies have melted and the French have not yet been formed on any major scale … and when Russia may choose to keep 200-300 divisions on active service?[28]

26. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'The NATO Command Structure', Factsheet, February 2018, viewed February 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/1802-factsheet-nato-command-structure_en.pdf
27. Seth A Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950*, p. 46
28. Telegram from Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, in Lord Ismay, *NATO The First Five Years: 1949–1954*, p. 3

Churchill's anxiety was reasonable.

Soviet expansion began during WW2 and showed no sign of ceasing. Throughout WW2, the Soviets annexed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania along with areas in Finland, Poland, Romania, Northeastern Germany and Eastern Czechoslovakia; the annexation continued after the surrender of Nazi Germany. Russia was the only great power to emerge from the ashes of WW2 having conquered and maintained new territory. Furthermore, since the Congress of Vienna, no other major power has placed its forces on foreign soil more than the Russian Empire.[29] Communist influence likewise spread through Asia, further increasing concerns amongst Western nations. British forces faced a communist threat in the form of guerrilla insurgencies in Malaya, and the French confronted communist agitation throughout Indo-China; French forces ultimately lost to the communist-backed Viet Minh in 1964 after the debacle at Diem Bien Phu. The threat of communist expansion posed a real and present danger to the West, and the commonality of circumstances shared by NATO states significantly contributed to the alliance forming and enduring.

The nations forming NATO have similar cultures and shared history. Nations within Europe share a similar culture when compared to other parts of the world and other alliances, in particular SEATO as discussed in Chapter 3. Negotiations between European nations date to before the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century. While many European nations suffered from occupation at various times throughout history and most recently by Nazi Germany, the nations were comfortable with their sovereignty. There was little concern over the potential to relinquish part of the control of their military to a supranational body. The nations realised that to counter the real threat of losing sovereignty to the Russians, they had to decide to lose some of their powers to a supranational body, in this case, NATO; the shared history of the last 300 years influenced their comfort in relinquishing some of their control. The very-near realisation of the EDC European Army highlights the willingness of states to relinquish control. The European Army would have seen nations conceding more significant control than they did to NATO, and had it have not been for the French, the European Army may have formed. Forming NATO was further made possible by the lack of competing ideas regarding the purpose of, and what individual nations hoped to get from, joining the alliance.

Although there will always be minor discrepancies in the reasons nations have for joining an alliance, the aims of the nations joining NATO predominantly aligned. The overwhelming reason, as aforementioned, was the threat posed by the communist expansion of Russia. The acceptance of Greece and Türkiye in NATO was due to the

29. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 24

fear that if they did not receive the support NATO offered, then they would potentially fall to the communists.[30] Regarding Germany, the NATO nations realised that defence against the Soviets required the active and willing participation of a re-armed Germany, under the integrated system of NATO.[31] However, the French disagreed with this, instead opted to form a European Army; an army that the French parliament later voted against. The French signalled many times that they were unhappy with the situation in NATO, unhappy with US actions, and so it is hardly surprising they decided to withdraw from NATO in 1966.[32] Other than the French differences, NATO nations shared a unity of threat, culture and history that provided stability to the alliance, which continues to this day. This stability has allowed NATO to expand, which this chapter will now discuss.

2.6: The stage is set – NATO expansion

This chapter has so far described how the four conditions apply to NATO: whether an alliance is a *democracy* or non-democracy; whether the military is *subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance has an *integrated military command structure*; and whether the alliance is solely based on a common threat, or whether there is a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. The chapter now examines the results of the four conditions and how they have allowed NATO to expand in the ever-changing security environment. Three metrics describe NATO expansion. Firstly, the expansion of the *number of nations* involved in NATO, secondly, the *nature of the missions* NATO conducts and, finally, the *area of operations* (AO) within which NATO operates. The conditions outlined in this chapter enable NATO to expand, keeping it a relevant alliance in the post-Cold War environment.

2.7: Nations involved

Post-Cold War, NATO expanded the number of nations involved in the alliance. Before the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, NATO expanded from the original 12 members to include Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain; since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO continued expanding, with another 13 nations joining the alliance. Two main reasons enabled the expansion of NATO post-Cold War; the fact that all nations are *democracies*, and the *integrated military command structure*.

30. Lord Ismay, *NATO The First Five Years: 1949–1954*, p. 39
31. Ibid., p. 34
32. Lawrence S Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, p. 33

Nations that joined NATO post-Cold War demonstrated the attributes of *democracy*; in particular, the ability to compromise and work together to resolve disputes. The MAP states that nations aspiring to join NATO must commit themselves to 'good faith efforts to build consensus on all issues', and 'participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues'.[33] The ability to complete these required tasks is something that the process of democracy enables. Furthermore, the nations who joined NATO had to demonstrate their democratic ability for the existing NATO nations to allow them to join the alliance. Hence, all the nations must not only be democratic, but demonstrate the sincerity of their democracy. This requirement led to improvements in the ex-USSR nations that joined NATO and have enabled NATO to endure.

The second condition that assisted in the expansion of NATO nations was the *integrated military command structure*. The ex-USSR states had militaries that functioned in a manner very much at odds with the necessary attributes for an alliance to endure. An IMCS requires all nations within the alliance to integrate all parts of their operations fully. As the ex-USSR states had Soviet equipment, doctrine and so forth, there was little hope for these nations to integrate into NATO. The intent or desire to integrate within an alliance is only part of the equation; doctrine, training and equipment that is interoperable is likewise required. The MAP states explicitly that all nations must 'participate, as appropriate, in the military structure', and to 'pursue standardization and/or interoperability'.[34] To this end, the states aspiring to join NATO made significant efforts to reform their military to join NATO. Being able to integrate into the IMCS provided the glue that held these nations together and allowed NATO to expand its mission type. This lesson is valuable for Australia when determining how to invest its aid money if it wants to increase the likelihood that nations within the region can integrate within the FPDA.

2.8: Mission type

NATO formed under the threat of communism posed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat remained until the end of the Cold War, largely explaining the purpose of the alliance during the Cold War. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the common threat subsided, as did alliance theory as an explanation for alliance endurance. Post-Cold War, all countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact had rejected

33. NATO, 'Membership Action Plan', art. I, para. 3

34. Ibid., art. II, paras 2c, 2g

the communist ideology and were no longer adversaries to NATO.[35] NATO stated that the 'threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy'.[36] With the removal of the Soviet threat, NATO looked beyond just Europe, toward the global security environment.

NATO members did not need a single *common threat* for the alliance to remain relevant; hence NATO expanded its mission post-Cold War. At the July 1990 meeting in London, NATO heads of state and government undertook a shift in the alliance, based on the new strategic environment. No longer was the USSR the focus of NATO missions, but rather a broader security agenda contributed to NATO missions, such as NATO contributing to 'global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions'.[37] A general commitment to undertake UN missions is indeed not the common threat that existed to create NATO. Examining the NATO commitment to the UN-backed mission in Kosovo highlights this point. UN resolution 1244 existed to 'provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy'.[38] NATO, an organisation created with the common threat of Soviet Russia, was now undertaking humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, NATO conducted an operation that 'denied the validity of territorial integrity, which had dominated international law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648'.[39] Shared values within NATO, not a shared common threat, enabled NATO to expand.[40] Along with NATO *mission expansion* came *area of operations* (AO) expansion.

2.9: Area of operations

Commensurate with the expansion of mission types, NATO expanded its AO. To fight in Kosovo, NATO had to operate inside that nation, an area outside the original NATO AO. Due to a declaration by President Bill Clinton, NATO did not use ground forces during Operation Allied Force; however, air power conducted the operation for NATO. The use of air power in Kosovo led to NATO fighting for the first time in its 50-year

35. NATO, 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)', Part I
36. Ibid., Part I para. 7
37. NATO, 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)', Part IV, para. 41
38. United Nations Peacekeeping, Security Council Resolution 1224, 10 June 1999
39. Dag Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, p. 13
40. NATO acted in a manner suggesting for a nation to achieve territorial integrity, democratic values and human rights are required. In the case of Kosovo, NATO provided the forces that enabled these values to exist.

history, and fighting in an area outside the European AO.[41] Even prior to NATO fighting in Kosovo, NATO began expanding the AO outside Europe, a trend that continued into the 21st century when NATO took over the fighting in Afghanistan.

All the nations within NATO did not always fully support the NATO missions conducted this century, for example the mission in Afghanistan was contested. However, because the leaders of the nations within NATO were *democratically elected*, they worked toward resolving their differences, and the military contribution by NATO nations focused on achieving mission success. This allows for effective integration within NATO and provides the NATO commanders with the confidence needed to expand their AO and conduct operations away from Europe. The expanding *mission types* and the new AOs are possible because of the common strategic assessment by the NATO nations.

Common, effective strategic assessment by the states within NATO allowed for mission and AO expansion. As discussed in the introduction, sound strategic assessment within each nation promotes common thoughts and increases the ease of decision-making within the alliance. This ease of decision-making, especially in the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, reduced potential tension between nations as NATO looked to expand its missions. For example, Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean demonstrates the outcomes of decisions made by NATO. Sea Guardian currently performs three tasks in the Mediterranean Sea: maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism, and support to capacity-building. As stated by NATO 'If decided by Allies, it [NATO] could also perform other tasks [within Sea Guardian] such as upholding freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction tasks and protecting critical infrastructure'.[42] Common strategic assessment led to the creation of Sea Guardian, and common strategic assessment, made possible by the relationship that exists under *democratically elected civilian leaders*, may lead to further expansion of the mission and, with this, the operating area. Conceptually, the expanded AO is not simply a different area in which NATO operates. Rather, it demonstrates that the alliance is willing and able to expand to counter a threat wherever it presents itself. This is a particularly relevant point to the FPDA which I argue should show resolve and willingness to operate, regardless of the location of a current or future threat.

41. NATO, 'Operations and missions: past and present', NATO website, viewed February 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm

42. Ibid.

2.10: Conclusion

In summary, the four conditions analysed in this book support the endurance and expansion of NATO, and therefore provide lessons for the FPDA. The importance NATO places on these conditions is evident not only in the 1949 treaty but also the fact that there is a Membership Action Plan that guides nations wishing to join NATO. Detailed in the 1949 treaty and the MAP are the four conditions in this book. Each nation must be a *democracy*. Democratic skills enable successful negotiations and consensus regarding everyday operations, as well as in potential areas of conflict between nations. The skills present in democracy assisted the UK in progressing past the issue it had with the US during the Suez Canal Crisis. The UK moved on, and the alliance remained. Useful and common strategic assessment as well as the proper and predictable use of the military, consistent with NATO alliance values, contribute to NATO enduring. *Democratically elected civilian leaders* forced ex-Warsaw Pact countries to improve the professionalisation of their militaries, enabling the nations to improve the performance of the military, as well as the ability to provide effective strategic assessment.

The *integrated military command structure* of NATO proved effective at linking all nations within NATO into a single organisation. Integration within NATO involved all aspects of the military bureaucracy, such as a shared funding model, common supply and logistics chains, the integration of doctrine, intelligence products and the joint staff system. The NATO integration enabled officers within the structure to work solely for the mission of NATO. As a result, not only was NATO held together by these structures but the structure made conducting operations as seamless as possible. Finally, the existence of a *common threat* combined with *common culture and history* assisted in the creation of NATO; however, as the common threat ceased at the end of the Cold War, NATO endured. Due to their shared history and culture, the European nations had little concern over the potential to relinquish part of the control of their military to a supranational body. They were comfortable with this proposition, which enabled NATO to form a useful structure. This chapter provides the lesson that because of the four conditions, NATO endured post-Cold War and has since expanded; these lessons can apply to the FPDA.

NATO expanded the *number of nations* involved, the *nature of the missions* conducted, and the *area of operations* within which NATO operates. The expansion is due to the conditions listed in this book, with specific conditions highlighted against the three areas of expansion. The number of nations involved in the alliance increased from the original 12 nations in 1949 to 16 nations by 1990, increasing to 32 in 2024. This expansion of nations is possible due to the *democracy* and *integrated military command structure* required by NATO. Increasing the *types of missions* NATO conducts is a result of the *shared culture and history*, rather than just a shared *common threat*. As the threat of communist expansion and a massive operation in Europe declined, NATO

took on an increasing range of operations. Finally, the area in which NATO operates increased from the European and North American theatre to one that operates around the globe. *Democratically elected civilian control over the military* enabled NATO nations to integrate and provide forces able to operate away from Europe. Furthermore, common and effective strategic assessment allowed the NATO nations to determine missions outside of Europe and expand the AO. AO expansion is likely to continue, with decisions surrounding the future role of Operation Sea Guardian pending. The common strategic assessment provided by *democratically elected civilians control of the military* enables decisions that will expand NATO into the future and show resolve to potential adversaries.

CHAPTER 3

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization formed as a result of meetings held in Manila in 1954 between Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Reversing previous reluctance to form alliances in Southeast Asia, America pushed for the creation of SEATO to counter the threat posed by communist expansion.[1] US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated:

> Any significant expansion of the communist world, [would] indeed, be a danger to the United States since international communism thinks in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States. Therefore, we could honestly say, using the words that President Monroe used in proclaiming his Doctrine, that Communist armed aggression in Southeast Asia would endanger our peace and security and call for counter-action on our part.[2]

The Americans believed that if Asia were sealed off from Western influence, then China would have a free reign to dominate its weaker neighbors, and communism would spread throughout Asia – the domino effect. To make this point clear and highlight that they would only use force against a communist threat, the US added an 'Understanding of the United States of America' statement (Article XI) at the end of the Manila Pact stating the US commitments to Article IV, paragraph 1, 'apply only to Communist aggression'.[3] As the most powerful military in SEATO, the US requirement, therefore, dictated that SEATO would only intervene in matters concerning communism, and not other threats that the alliance nations may face.

SEATO established a headquarters in Bangkok in 1954 and began establishing itself as a formal institution. However, unlike NATO which developed rapidly due to lessons

1. A S B Olver, *SEATO: The Manila Treaty and Western policy in South East Asia*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK, 1956, p. 11
2. John Foster Dulles, *The Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter*, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 1954, p. 2
3. United Nations, South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 8 September 1954, Manila, Philippines, 1954

from the Korean War, SEATO developed at a leisurely pace and lacked clear focus and direction. The Secretary-General of SEATO, His Excellency Mr Pote Sarasin, described that six years after the signing of the Manila Pact much work remained, and stated that 'the work of the Organization and the degree to which member countries co-operate with one another are still not fully understood in many places'.[4] The lack of coordination and understanding by nations within SEATO is a trend that continued until SEATO's official demise on 30 June 1977.

3.1: The four lessons

This chapter now assesses how the four conditions apply to SEATO: whether the nations within the alliance were a *democracy* or non-democracy; whether the militaries were *subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance had an *integrated military command structure*; and whether the alliance was based solely on a common threat, or whether there was a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. Examining the four conditions is important as the analysis establishes that the lack of necessary conditions led to the cessation of SEATO. This is important to the FPDA, as there are similarities between the two alliances. After analysing the four conditions, and how they apply to SEATO, the chapter describes the failure of SEATO to expand in three separate yet related areas: the *number of nations* involved; the *nature of the mission*; and the *area of operations* (AO).

3.2: Democracy

The preamble to the Manila Pact states the desire to 'uphold the principles of *democracy*, *individual liberty* and the *rule of law*, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area' (emphasis added).[5] However, the requirement for democratic rule is absent from the SEATO mentality. Of the seven nations that joined SEATO, the three Asian nations, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, were hardly a model for democracy. The decolonising period post-World War 2 caused great instability in the newly independent states. In the case of Pakistan, there was not the necessary time to establish a functioning democracy in the period between independence and joining SEATO. Pakistan spent from 1958 to 1971 under military rule, and the army commander-in-chief, General Muhammad Ayub Kahn

4. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, *SEATO: 1954–1960*, Public Information Office, Bangkok, TH, (n.d.), p. 3

5. UN, South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 8 September 1954

appointed himself president in 1958.[6] This lack of democracy in Pakistan had a twofold effect on the SEATO alliance.

Pakistani leadership could not compromise and work effectively as part of the SEATO alliance. Instead of having to negotiate, compromise and develop solutions to problems considering various opinions and desires, the upbringing of the leadership of Pakistan enabled no such ability. As a government led by military leaders, compromise was an almost absent trait in the contribution Pakistan made to SEATO. The Pakistani leadership, being senior military officers, were accustomed to having their demands followed rather than compromise, and they remained stubborn in their approach. Experiences that occur early in a person's adult life tend to impact their perception and manner; in the case of the Pakistani leadership, that early experience was one of control, not compromise.[7]

Pakistan became consumed by issues regarding India. Whereas the whole purpose of SEATO was deterring and, if required, defeating the spread of communism in the defined area, Pakistan wanted India considered a threat and SEATO to focus intelligence and planning around the Indian threat. The all-consuming obsession with India put the blinkers on Pakistan, who asserted that their continued presence within SEATO required SEATO's willingness to get involved in the India-Pakistan conflict.[8] Noting that other members of SEATO routinely ignored Pakistani concerns regarding India, the issue of India was now one upon which Pakistan took a firm stance.

The Sino-Indian War in 1962 caused turmoil in the region and highlighted the inability of the Pakistani leadership to exhibit democratic values and compromise. After India's defeat in the Sino-Indian war, the UK and US assisted India in the modernisation of its forces. This assistance aimed to counter the threat of Chinese aggression. Pakistan, however, proved unable to see the UK and US reason and believed their support aimed to assist India in a war against Pakistan. This Pakistani belief resulted in Pakistan requesting assistance from the UK and US to compensate for the assistance given to India; a request that both nations rejected.[9] Instead of appreciating the reality of the situation and looking to the future instead of persisting with the past, Pakistan then sought to develop a plan for SEATO to defend Pakistan in the event of a conflict with

6. Iqra Khalil and Naveed Ahmed, 'Military and Democracy: Conflict Resolution in Reference with Constitutional and Political Development of Pakistan', *South Asian Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1, January–June 2017, p. 130
7. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2017, p. 249 (Original work published 1976)
8. Damien Fenton, *To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–1965*, National University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 2012, p. 208
9. Ibid., p. 212

India.[10] As a plan against India went against the longstanding position of the treaty, the alliance rejected the proposal. Pakistan, having little in the way of democratic necessities, continued to press for India's inclusion as a threat, and for SEATO to gather intelligence products on India. Compromise in the *non-democratic* Pakistan did not exist.

President Charles de Gaulle removed France, one of the wealthiest nations in SEATO, because of an inability to act in a compromising manner. France opposed US unilateral actions in South Vietnam and used SEATO as a mechanism to express this disagreement, with de Gaulle openly criticising the US. The lack of ability to compromise is evident by the French actions at the Ninth SEATO Council Meeting in April 1964, held in Manila. Gaining no support for their argument that communism in Vietnam was not a concern due to the long-held Vietnamese animosity toward the Chinese, France insisted on issuing a reservation at the end of the official SEATO communique, stating its objection.[11] France failed to compromise or move on, which damaged the alliance. Furthermore, France pulled out most of its personnel from SEATO and cancelled participation in all exercises, commencing with the withdrawal from Exercise Sea Horse in 1965. The issue of lacking *democracy* was not just with the SEATO nations; the protocol states were likewise not democratic.

The protocol states of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were not democracies. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 specified that Cambodia, Laos and South (as well as North) Vietnam could not form any agreement obliging military action, or the use of their territory for the use of military forces of foreign powers.[12] For this reason, the nations were unable to join SEATO. However, the US insisted on including them in the designated area which SEATO protected by detailing the nations as protocol states.[13] While SEATO military action never occurred in the protocol states, it did pose an issue for SEATO. Should SEATO have acted, as it could have in either the Laos conflict in the early 1960s or as a response to the increasing issues between North and South Vietnam? If not, then for what exactly was SEATO fighting? Stopping the spread of communism was undoubtedly an ideal of SEATO; however, by supporting the existing governments of the protocol states, SEATO would not exactly be supporting democracy, individual liberty or the rule of law. The likelihood is that a functioning democracy with all the characteristics required for successful alliances would not exist in the protocol states; the South Vietnam Government led by Ngo Dinh Diem is a perfect example of this issue. While democratically elected, Diem committed numerous atrocities and proved

10. Damien Fenton, *To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–1965*, p. 213
11. Ibid., p. 206
12. UN, Geneva Agreements: Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, 20 July 1954, Geneva, Switzerland, 1954
13. UN, Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 8 September 1954

unable to compromise. With US support for the execution and coup to remove Diem from power, the stability of South Vietnam never existed.[14] This demonstrates the fact that while the preamble to SEATO preached democracy, it was never an actual goal of the alliance, and therefore this condition critical for the endurance of an alliance was missing from the very beginning of SEATO. Another condition missing in the SEATO alliance was the strict establishment of democratically elected civilian control over the military.

3.3: Democratically elected civilian control over the military

Of the eight nations making up SEATO, three were in the protected area and consisted of governments with disputable control over the military. Pakistan had a general as its second prime minister, leading to conflict with India. Thailand has suffered numerous coups in its post-WW2 history, leading to instability and, in many cases, the military rather than elected civilians taking power. Recently independent from the US, the Philippines suffered a democratic model not fully understood by the population and political leaders who abused their powers. These issues in the Asian nations of SEATO proved a roadblock to a productive and enduring alliance. They also provide a valuable lesson as to which nations the FPDA should consider if it decides to expand the alliance.

The Philippines experienced differing levels of control over the military during the SEATO years, leading to a non-democratic use of the military. The Filipino president at the time of SEATO's creation, President Ramon Magsaysay, had a deep distrust of civilian bureaucracy and instilled military leaders into civilian government positions. Stating that in order to clean up the deeply entrenched dishonesty and corruption within civilian agencies, Magsaysay decided to install 'only the most ruthless, uncompromising kind of military discipline [that] could redeem them from the mire and restore them to gainful usefulness to our people'.[15] Magsaysay's idea may have been a valid and necessary tactic for the newly independent state in 1954; however, it had long-term ramifications. Following Magsaysay's death in an aircraft accident in 1957, his successor, Carlos Garcia, had a different relationship with the military, and slowly undid Magsaysay's policies regarding the utilisation of military officers in civilian positions. Further changes followed Ferdinand Marcos' election as president in 1965. The result of the varying policies toward the military over the stated decade led to two consequences. Firstly, the instability and differing views between military and civilian leaders led to distrust and

14. James S Corum and Wray R Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS, 2003, p. 263

15. Jose Veloso Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography*, Solidaridad Publishing House, Manila, 1971, p. 315

coup opportunities. Secondly, the military began to function as a tool to keep Marcos in power, rather than secure free democratic elections.

When military leadership focuses on taking over the government in a coup, then the military is not operating as required in a democratic society. Instead of focusing on implementing policies of the democratically elected government, providing frank and forthright advice regarding security issues, the Philippine military acted in ways contrary to democracy. In the period between Magsaysay's death and the inauguration of Garcia, the military planned, then aborted, an attempt to seize power by coup.[16] The fact that the leadership planned a coup was of great concern, as was the fact that the military failed in this endeavor due to a lack of unity within the military. This affair details a military that is not working under the control of democratically elected civilians, as well as a military unable to unite under its leadership, and conduct what may have been a relatively simple operation. The behavior of the military suggests it would be ineffective at contributing toward an alliance operation, causing a lack of cohesion amongst alliance nations. The second effect of the military situation in the Philippines was the use of civilian control by Marcos, which although the people elected him, it was far from a free and open democratic situation.

Ferdinand Marcos turned the Philippine military into an institution focused on keeping him in power. Although wary of the military, Marcos realised establishing a favourable relationship with them would support his long-term ambitions to remain president. For this reason, Marcos began to appoint military officers who favoured his agenda and ideas into positions of power, whilst removing officers who declined to support him.[17] The 1969 election of Marcos was the first election in which a Filipino president was re-elected; however, it was far from democratic, and the Philippine Constabulary described the campaign and election as one that 'brought more killings than in any previous election since 1949'.[18] Rather than the constitution, the military served President Marcos in his second term by violently quelling demonstrations, and harassing opposition parties and groups hostile to the government.[19] While this is civilian control over the military, it is not the democratically elected civilian control over the military required for successful military operations, or for a state to successfully contribute to an alliance and assist the alliance in enduring.

16. Viberto Selochan, 'The Military and the Fragile Democracy of the Philippines', in R J May and Viberto Selochan (Eds.), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, ANU E Press, Canberra, ACT, 2004, p. 63
17. Ibid., p. 64
18. Tillman Durdin, 'Marcos Far Ahead in Philippine Vote', *New York Times*, 12 November 1969, p. 3
19. Viberto Selochan, 'The Military and the Fragile Democracy of the Philippines', in R J May and Viberto Selochan (Eds.), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*, p. 64

3.4: Integrated military command structure

Since its inauguration, SEATO intentionally never had a fully *integrated military command structure*. Article V of the Manila Pact (the equivalent to Article 9 of NATO) states:

> The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.[20]

This article differs from the corresponding NATO article, in that the NATO article further adds 'The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary'.[21] As a result of the SEATO Article V, a small headquarters was established, based in Bangkok, Thailand. The establishment of the secretary-general provided some coordinating function for the headquarters; however, the position had no authority over the military. The SEATO headquarters had representatives from each nation that attended the council meetings held once per year. However, the members attending the meetings held the positions of ambassador to Thailand, the Thai minister of foreign affairs and the commissioners-general for Southeast Asia; as such, the officers' role at SEATO was a secondary duty. The lack of permanent members for the highest council demonstrated the lack of full integration as an organisation. The highest military organisation, the Military Advisers' Group (MAG), likewise lacked permanent dedicated officers for the role.

The MAG consisted of officers operating in the MAG as a secondary duty rather than in a primary role. The senior US adviser throughout the period 1955 to 1965 was the Hawaii-based Pacific commander-in-chief (CINPAC), while the Singapore-based commander-in-chief, Far East Command, fulfilled the British role. To improve the obvious lack in organisational structure, SEATO established sub-committees, and improved linkages between the MAG and the civilian council. In the mature state, SEATO had a civilian and military structure, although SEATO publications described how a permanent command structure was not required when it stated:

> This has not necessitated the setting up of a permanent command structure … headed up by a Supreme Commander. Rather, the emphasis has been placed on developing plans to meet would be aggressors and improving the ability of the armed forces of the member nations.[22]

20. UN, South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 8 September 1954
21. NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949
22. SEATO, 'The Story of SEATO', Public Information Office, Bangkok, TH, 1972, p. 6

Although SEATO never fully integrated its command structure, it made some progress in forming sub-committees and developing plans for different contingencies.

The military developed groups within SEATO to develop plans to use in the event of an approved contingency. The MAG functioned as the manager of the Military Planning Office (MPO) which had the task of developing and maintaining operational plans to provide SEATO nations with guidance in the event of a communist contingency in the treaty area. Within the MPO were the representatives from the participating nations, led by a colonel and a few staff officers. The staff officers formed the backbone of the MPO and held specialist committees on issues such as communications, intelligence, logistics, mapping and medical matters.[23] Concerns such as classification and intelligence sharing existed, and SEATO never formed an indigenous intelligence capability; instead, it delegated requirements to individual nations, who would then share their intelligence product with the other nations across SEATO. MPO officers oversaw the generation of military plans for exercises and various communism-based contingencies. Unfortunately, regardless of the earnest effort, SEATO never achieved the status of a fully integrated organisation.

SEATO faced problems with the command structure after France and Pakistan all but left the treaty. Although France also removed itself from NATO, the remaining nations could absorb the loss of France, and the cost associated with the relocation of SHAPE to Belgium. Within SEATO, however, France was one of the more powerful nations and its decision to remove all its officers from the command structure and pull out of all exercises and indicate that it would not participate in any operation was a blow to the alliance. Likewise, Pakistan remained in SEATO; however, it also removed its officers from the command structure, and ceased participating in all SEATO exercises let alone any actual operation. Pakistan and France's removal meant a quarter of the nations disconnected entirely from the alliance, leaving it far from being a well-integrated structure. The last issue hindering full integration was the issue of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, and the split this caused the alliance.

France and Great Britain were signatories to the 1954 Geneva Agreement, while the US did not recognise the Agreement. This conflict made operations in the protocol states of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam impossible to integrate within SEATO. Great Britain and France believed that the Geneva Agreement prohibited the intervention in the protocol states unless there was *overt* Chinese aggression. As there was no overt aggression by the Chinese in Vietnam, the governments of Britain and France did not believe the US had legal authority to intervene. Furthermore, as South Vietnam refused to hold elections as specified in the Agreement, it had no legal basis for continued

23. SEATO, 'The Story of SEATO', p. 7

governance, and therefore no right to the protection offered by SEATO. Regardless of the reason for Great Britain and France's lack of willingness to intervene in the protocol states, it again highlights that integration proved impossible within the alliance.

3.5: Common threat, culture and history

The preamble to the Manila Pact and the reason the US pursued the creation of SEATO appear to promote a unity of threat amongst the signatory nations. However, while the communist threat was relevant and important, one must look deeper into the reasons each state signed up to become part of SEATO, and whether there were other more important underlying factors, rather than merely the deterrence of communism.

The US looked to create SEATO to ensure communism stopped spreading in Asia. In 1954, President Dwight D Eisenhower stated:

> The fall of Indo-China … would knock over Burma, then Siam, then the Malay Peninsular and Indonesia. This, in effect, would tumble the row of Island defenses consisting of Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines. To the south, it then threatened Australia and New Zealand.[24]

The threat of communism expanding in this area was something that the US could not tolerate. The US position on communism was that communism only knew force and communists believed co-existence was not possible. Communism was on the march in China, with the backing of the Soviet Union – the main threat to the NATO alliance. The US regarded China as a real aggressor in Indo-China, and as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated to the Overseas Press Club, New York, in 1954: 'Peace is not had by merely wanting it. Peace has to be worked for and planned for.'[25] To achieve this peace, the US saw it as vital to let the communists know that force would meet any aggression in Southeast Asia.

The US created SEATO to share the burden of stopping communism, as well as to promote US interests in the region it considered of great strategic value. US partners such as Japan used the region, known as the 'rice bowl' of Asia, to supply food and vital resources such as tin, rubber and coal. The US wanted to keep that export avenue open, and not in the hands of communist China.[26] Furthermore, the location proved

24. *Time*, 19 April 1954
25. John Foster Dulles, 'The Threat of a Red Asia', address to the Overseas Press Club, New York, 30 March 1954
26. Clayton D McDonald, *Southeast Asia Treaty Organization*, University of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines, 1955, p. 35

strategically important to the US, who already had security alliances with Australia and New Zealand through the ANZUS treaty and bilateral agreements with the Philippines and Thailand.[27]

Australia supported the creation of SEATO for reasons of security and prosperity. A 'forward defence' policy by Australia, aimed at keeping security issues away from Australian shores, led to Australia's involvement in numerous conflicts and alliances within the region. For example, Australia participated alongside the British in the Malayan Emergency; the US did not. Australia joined the fight in Vietnam with the US; the British did not. A second aim of the forward defence policy was the aim of assisting with the development of the Asian nations. Australian External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck stated:

> A major part of its [forward defence] is to give the independent countries of the region the assurance and confidence they want while they are developing their economies, evolving their political institutions, and building co-operative arrangements with one another.[28]

The third reason Australia chose to be part of SEATO is that of ensuring support from its powerful friends. With the UK and US involved in SEATO, it was largely inevitable that Australia, and for that matter New Zealand, would join the alliance. While the US, Australia and New Zealand joined the alliance for reasons that were compatible, this is not the case for all nations.

France joined SEATO with the eventual hope of regaining its status as a significant player in international politics. Although the eight-year war in Indo-China had ended with the defeat of the French, they still hoped to retain some of their cultural political influence in the region. This is evident by the statement of French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France who indicated during the Geneva negotiation in 1954 that 'We shall stay in the Far East; let our allies and our opponents make no mistake about it'.[29] It was this reason, rather than stopping the spread of communism per se that drove the French to join SEATO. The commitment of the French to SEATO, similar to their commitment shown to NATO, all but disappeared during the conflict in Algeria. The French showed more of a self-interest and a lack of willingness to integrate, rather than sharing a common interest with the other nations of SEATO.

27. ANZUS Treaty, 1 September 1951, San Francisco
28. Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, Ministerial Statement, Australian Parliament, Canberra, ACT, 17 August 1967, in NAA, A 4359/221/4/31, p. 143
29. George A Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965, p. 151

The British showed a commitment to the region, in particular the ex-colonies of Singapore and Malaysia, nations not included in SEATO. The British, along with Australia and New Zealand, had committed forces to Singapore and Malaysia, in large part to stop the threat of communist guerrillas during the Malayan Emergency. Through this commitment and forces in the region, the UK demonstrated that it perceived the threat of communism as the main threat.

Of the eight nations in SEATO, only three were Asian nations, and they joined for diverse reasons, somewhat indifferent to the purpose of the treaty. Before looking at the Asian states that joined SEATO, it is essential to examine the fact that most Asian states did not join SEATO. The end of World War 2 aligned with the start of the Cold War and the desires of most colonised nations to become independent. Indonesia, for example, declined to join SEATO as Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo viewed it as a mechanism for colonial powers to maintain their influence and perpetuate Western colonisation.[30] The other main reason nations such as Indonesia did not join SEATO was due to their belief that the result of the Geneva Conference benefited the region, and that SEATO effectively brought the Cold War to the Southeast Asian region; they, therefore, wanted little to do with the treaty.

Indeed, rather than abstain from joining the alliance, the 'non-aligned' states, led by Indonesia, convened in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss common issues shared by newly independent Afro-Asian nations. India felt concerned about the growing hostilities between China and the US, whilst being impressed by the restraint shown by China during the Geneva Conference.[31] Based on Indian desires, China received an invitation and attended the Bandung conference. Solidarity and cooperation between Asian nations was non-existent in the early 1950s and, if anything, the shared history of colonisation reduced their willingness to join SEATO. Of the Asian nations that joined SEATO, there was little in the way of shared culture or history.

Pakistan joined SEATO due to its desire to continue to receive aid from the US, and its concerns over India. The conflict between Pakistan and India exists to this very day, with Associate Professor of History at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, Dr Rabia Umar Ali, stating that the Indian Partition Plan 'lives on in the torturous

30. Ali Sastroamijoyo, *Milestones in My Journey: Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo, Indonesian Patriot and Political Leader*, C L M Penders (Ed.), University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1979, p. 280

31. Richard Mason, 'The Manila conference, 1954 versus the Bandung conference, 1955: the United States, the cold war and the challenge of non-alignment', *Malaysian Journal of History, Politics, and Strategic Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2011, pp. 6–7

memory of historical annals as a sordid tale of misery, agony, and unjust ruling'.[32] In 1954, the hostilities with India, a nation with overwhelming numeric advantages, led Pakistan to realise it needed a dramatic increase in the capability of its armed forces. The military threat posed by India and the need to improve the Pakistani Armed Forces was the single biggest reason Pakistan joined SEATO (and the Central Treaty Organization [CENTO], 1955–1979, for that matter).[33] This is not to suggest that the threat from communism did not exist. China did not recognise the 300 km-long border it shared with Pakistan in the Kashmir region. The Soviets were improving their relations with Afghanistan by providing aid to improve the Afghan security forces and improved road access into Russia. Furthermore, the Soviets showed a preference to India over Pakistan, further increasing the anxiety Pakistan had regarding India.[34] The threat from India came into play a few years later, causing Pakistan to all but abandon SEATO. While Pakistan may have been correct in their perception of a threat from India, it was not a common threat to all SEATO nations, particularly the US.

Due to the lack of support received from SEATO partners, Pakistan pivoted to China. Though China was the main threat for spreading communism in the area, and SEATO had plans in place to stop this spread, Pakistan looked to China to ally. The fact that China had border disputes and fought a war with India led Pakistan to rapprochement with China. Mutual dislike of India led to an alliance between China and Pakistan based on the common threat. Pakistan now had an alliance with China on the one hand and an alliance against China on the other. This situation was untenable, and on 18 September 1964, the US ambassador met with the Pakistani president to discuss the issue.[35] Although Pakistan did not formally pull out of SEATO until 1972, it no longer contributed to the treaty from that point onwards.

3.6: The stage is set – SEATO terminates

This chapter has so far described how the four conditions apply to SEATO: whether an alliance is democratic or non-democratic; whether the military is *subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance has an *integrated military command structure*; and whether the alliance is based solely on a common threat, or whether there is a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. The chapter now

32. Rabia Umar Ali, 'Partition of India 1947: Unknown Boundaries, Uncertain Future and the Birth of Unfriendly Nation States', *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, vol. 65, no. 3, July–September 2017, p. 57
33. Damien Fenton, *To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955–1965*, p. 109
34. Ibid., p. 212
35. Ibid., p. 215

examines the results of the four conditions and how they set the stage for SEATO's demise. The same three metrics used to describe NATO expansion apply to demonstrate how the lack of the four conditions led to SEATO's conclusion. Firstly, the following pages look at the *number of nations* involved in SEATO, secondly, the *nature of the missions* SEATO conducted, and finally, the *area of operations* (AO) within which SEATO operated. The conditions outlined in this chapter prohibited SEATO expansion and led to its demise. By examining SEATO termination, Australia can apply the lessons learned to the FPDA.

3.7: Nations involved

The number of states involved in SEATO remained the same throughout; however, the number of states contributing effectively to the alliance reduced. Of the eight nations involved in SEATO, two nations, France and Pakistan, extricated most of their personnel, stopped participating in exercises, and signalled a lack of intent to participate in any SEATO operations. The reason for the reduction of effective SEATO nations is due to the lack of *democratic traits* in France and Pakistan. As described in this chapter, France and Pakistan held onto issues and were unable to negotiate, compromise or work toward common SEATO goals. The reason SEATO failed to expand the nations involved in the alliance was due to a lack of *common threat, culture and history*.

Southeast Asian nations lacked the desires to join an alliance that had no *shared threat*, with nations that lacked a *shared culture or history*. For starters, the nations that joined SEATO did not necessarily share the same level of concern regarding communism; instead they did not want to be left out of a US-led security framework within the region.[36] Several non-aligned nations in Asia were particularly outspoken in their disapproval of SEATO. India and Indonesia, for example, believed that SEATO was an aggressive instrument dominated by Western powers intent to re-colonise more subtly and that joining SEATO would compromise their status as non-aligned, independent nations.[37]

3.8: Mission type

SEATO formed with the explicit purpose of deterring and, if needed, defending against communism, a role that did not expand during SEATO's existence. SEATO planners

36. Damien Fenton, *To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955–1965*, p. 26
37. Ralph Braibanti, 'The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 4, December 1957, p. 339

created operational plans to guide potential SEATO operations, however, they remained solely to counter communism in the treaty area. The only change to the plans was shifting from conventional conflict to counter-insurgency. In the last few years, due to the removal of French and Pakistani officers, the alliance lacked even a basic *integrated military command structure*, and hence there was no way in which the alliance could generate plans, share intelligence, or conduct a common strategic assessment as to any threat that may warrant an expanded set of missions. As a result, by the time SEATO ceased to exist, there had been no expansion to the type of mission for which the alliance planned. Linked to the lack of expansion in missions is the fact that SEATO failed to expand its area of operations.

3.9: Area of operations

SEATO never expanded its area of operations (AO). The separate plans within SEATO operated within different areas, ranging from the entire treaty area to specific states within the area. Two factors played into SEATO not expanding its AO. Firstly, SEATO lacked an *integrated military command structure* (IMCS) that could enable expansion and, secondly, due to a lack of all states having *democratically elected civilians controlling the military*, the structure that existed within SEATO could not generate and implement direction based on sound strategic assessment.

Due to the intentional lack of establishing a permanent IMCS, SEATO could not expand beyond its fundamental mission and AO.[38] Furthermore, SEATO was unable to establish a disciplined, tightly organised structure that could obey and support the SEATO leadership.[39] Resultingly, SEATO had no mechanism to operationalise the thought of expansion, particularly with the added pressure imposed when France and Pakistan all but left the alliance. Besides, even if SEATO had a robust IMCS, there was little in the way of effective or common strategic assessment to guide the alliance. The combination of a lacklustre IMCS and poor strategic assessment all but killed any idea that SEATO nations would produce a joint assessment of the security environment, or the ability to act on an assessment. The lack of AO expansion crippled the potential of SEATO to counter the communist threat posed by China, yet the alliance was unable to realise this limitation. At a basic operational level, stopping communist China at its source would require operations based out of friendly nations that were outside the AO, such as South Korea, or at the very least conducting strikes against mainland China.[40] The lack of useful and common strategic assessment impeded the ability of SEATO to realise this

38. SEATO, 'The Story of SEATO', p. 6
39. Ronald C Nairn, 'SEATO: A Critique', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 41, no. 1, Spring 1968, p. 18
40. Ibid., p. 6

operational consideration. Hence, before SEATO terminated, there was little chance of it expanding its AO.

3.10: Conclusion

In summary, the four conditions analysed in this book predict the inability of SEATO to endure, let alone expand. Firstly, the SEATO states were not all *democracies*. The mix of democratic and non-democratic states hindered successful negotiations and compromise within the alliance. Pakistan demonstrated the inability of non-democracies to compromise with its persistent demands regarding India; a nation and threat not detailed in the Manila Pact. The lack of trust in some states between government and military leaders, fuelled by the fact that they were not *democratically elected civilian leaders*, led to a lack of focus by individual nations, and an inability to provide common, effective strategic assessment. Furthermore, nations such as the Philippines used the military in a way that was at odds with the values of the alliance.

The lack of an *integrated military command structure* within SEATO proved a hindrance in the ability of SEATO to link all nations within the alliance into a single organisation. There was some commonality and integration within SEATO, yet it was more of a 'paper tiger' than a fully integrated alliance. The structure further weakened when France and Pakistan removed most of their personnel from the alliance, creating a situation where the remaining SEATO states lost interest in the alliance. Finally, the lack of a clear *common threat, culture and history* hampered the ability of SEATO to endure. Most nations within SEATO had different levels of concern regarding the threat posed by communism, yet they wanted to be part of a security organisation involving the powerful US. Like the lack of *common threat*, there was little in the way of *shared culture or history* between the SEATO nations. Only three nations were in Asia, including Pakistan which was outside the AO. Further highlighting this point is the lack of Asian nations willing to join the alliance. Non-aligned countries that did not join SEATO perceived SEATO as a mechanism in which the West could re-colonise the recently decolonised states; the only history shared between the nations in Southeast Asia was one that guided nations away from SEATO.

SEATO ultimately failed to endure, due to the conditions listed in this chapter. The alliance did not have the conditions necessary from the commencement of the alliance. Juxtaposed against NATO, SEATO paints a clear picture as to why the conditions described in this chapter are necessary for an alliance to endure. The failing of SEATO and the endurance of NATO allow us to determine what is necessary for future alliances to endure. The following chapter focuses on the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the environment in Asia today to determine if the conditions exist to allow the FPDA to expand should the Australian Government choose to pursue this option.

CHAPTER 4

THE FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) formed in November 1971 between Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.[1] The objective of the FPDA is to assist Malaysia and Singapore in the event of an armed attack. The same day the FPDA came into effect, a previous arrangement, the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) which consisted of Australian, British and New Zealand troops, ceased. One month later in December 1971, Malaysia and Singapore ended their separate bilateral agreements with Australia, Britain and New Zealand. The FPDA now existed as the only partnership between the nations. Initially intended as an agreement to last until the Malaysian and Singaporean Armed Forces could build up their capabilities, the arrangement remains and marked its 50th anniversary in 2021.[2] There were three reasons for the formation of the FPDA; these three reasons have ceased, yet the alliance endures. The FPDA formed due to the British withdrawing troops from the region, the confrontation with Indonesia, and the instability created by Singapore splitting from the Federation of Malaysia.

Due to geopolitical, domestic and economic reasons, the British Labour Government announced in 1967 that the UK would pull out the majority of its military forces from the Southeast Asian region by the end of 1971.[3] The newly independent Malaysia and Singapore had minimal military capabilities and wished to retain a security arrangement with the former colonial power. In particular, the primary concern for Malaysia and Singapore was the weakness of their air power, and the British withdrawal created a

1. Throughout this book I use the term 'alliance' to describe the FPDA. In this regard, I am using the term to describe an agreement between the nations, and not an explicit requirement for a military commitment in the event of a hostile act. Whilst there is no wording in the FPDA, NATO and SEATO that explicitly commits nations to military action, the intent and subtle differences in the wording exists between the three alliances.
2. Chin Kin Wah, 'Rearranging Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Process of Continuing Adjustments in 1973', *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1974, p. 16
3. Phillip Darby, 'Beyond East of Suez', *International Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 4, October 1970, p. 655

significant gap in the two nations' indivisible air defence.[4] The election of the British Conservative Party in 1970 somewhat reduced the scale of the British pull-out, however, only a modest force remained in Asia post-1971. The defence ministers of the five future FPDA nations met in London in April 1971 to discuss the future security arrangements in the region. The result was the FPDA, an agreement that did not bind the nations to act in the event of an armed attack against Malaysia or Singapore; instead the arrangements committed the nations to consult one another and decide 'what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack'.[5] Although the FPDA was a watered down version of the AMDA, it provided reassurances that the ex-colonies of Malaysia and Singapore would receive protection while they built up their armed forces. The weakness of the Malaysian and Singaporean Armed Forces in the 1960s and 1970s created a sense of vulnerability, particularly after the recent Indonesian attacks known as the 'Confrontation'.

In 1963, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of the Federation of Malaya expanded the nation to include Singapore and the British Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. This expansion created tension with Indonesia, as Indonesian President Achmad Sukarno opposed the idea. Spurred by the Indonesian confrontation with the Dutch which enabled Indonesia to acquire West New Guinea, the Indonesian president believed in confrontation as a suitable tactic to counter foreign behaviour he opposed. In 1963, President Sukarno threatened to 'crush Malaysia', and the following year Indonesian troops conducted offensive operations in both Peninsular and Borneo Malaysia.[6] Singapore likewise suffered attacks by Indonesia, including a series of bomb blasts killing three and injuring dozens. Two Indonesian commandos were found guilty of the attack and sentenced to death.[7] Indonesia posed a genuine threat to the two Asian nations. Although Malaysia and Singapore both experienced a threat from Indonesia, the two FPDA nations had differences, and tension existed leading to the third reason for the creation of the FPDA.

The final reason for the creation of the FPDA was the animosity between Malaysia and Singapore after Malaysia expelled Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965. The mutual suspicion of Malaysia and Singapore required the permanent appointment of a Royal Australian Air Force air vice marshal (2-star) to the position of

4. Damon Bristow, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 27, no. 1, April 2005, p. 4
5. Five Power Defence Arrangements Working Group, Ministerial Communique, London, 16 April 1971, in http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-1127526853, pp. 184–185
6. Damon Bristow, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization', p. 3
7. Ibid.

FPDA commander; an appointment that continues today. The two countries security concerns are similar; however, due to the poor relationship between the nations, they required assistance to enable an adequate defence. The lack of trust between the two created issues such as Malaysia refusing to let Singapore use the Jungle Warfare Training Centre (JWTC), the lack of mutual access to naval ports, the splitting up of Malaysia–Singapore Airlines, and the most serious issue of water supply to Singapore.[8] The FPDA helped to bridge these issues and enabled active support for the two Asian nations.

4.1: The four lessons

This chapter moves on to assess how the four conditions apply to the FPDA: whether the nations within the alliance are democratic or non-democratic; whether the military is *subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance has an *integrated military command structure*; and whether the alliance is based solely on a common threat, or whether there is a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. Examining the four conditions is important as the analysis establishes whether the necessary conditions exist for the expansion of the FPDA in the future. After analysing the four conditions, and how they apply to the FPDA, this chapter describes the possibilities of the FPDA expanding in three aspects: the *number of nations* involved; the *nature of the mission*; and the *area of operations* (AO).

4.2: Democracy

The *democratic* nature of the Five Powers enabled the alliance to endure, albeit with troubles along the way. The nations of Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand are flourishing democracies in all regards; in the latest V-Dem Institute annual democracy report, the nations' global ranking as liberal democracies are 8th, 16th and 9th respectively. The strong democratic nature of the three Commonwealth countries is long-lasting and well known; hence this book will not significantly describe the democratic nature of these three nations. Malaysia and Singapore, however, have a different democratic history and require more in-depth analysis to determine if specific aspects of democracy have played a part in the endurance of the FPDA. This book argues that the aspects of democracy that contribute to negotiations and compromise skills of the leaders have contributed to the longevity of the FPDA, and these aspects of democracy remain present in Malaysia and Singapore today.

8. Ang Cheng Guan, 'Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971', *War & Society*, vol. 30, no. 3, October 2011, p. 216

Malaysia gained independence from the UK in 1953 and formed a federal constitutional elective monarchy, with the government closely modelled on the Westminster system inherited from British rule. The British promoted principles of consultation and representativeness, and facilitated cross-ethnic line cooperative policies within the new nation.[9] Although democracy was not perfect, accountability and responsiveness to the desires of the population existed. The two main Malaysian political parties managed to compromise and cooperate within a complex coalition of various ethnic backgrounds. Hence Malaysian politics and 'public discourse often focused productively on accountability and access, thereby making electoral competitiveness more viable than it had been in 1969'.[10] The improvement in this aspect of Malaysian democracy continues today.

Malaysian political leaders are democratically elected and according to V-Dem have better negotiating and compromise abilities when compared to the United States. This statement is not to suggest that Malaysia is a more liberal democracy than the US, or that the rights and freedoms of Malaysian citizens are better valued and protected than in the US. However, using the 2018 V-Dem report which details various aspects of democracies, and rates countries according to their performance in these aspects, Malaysia has a higher score than the US in the component of democracy that promotes negotiation and compromise. Although the US has a higher overall ranking in the 'Deliberative Component Index (DCI)', this is only due to a much larger score in the 'public engagement' aspect.[11] Regarding the 'Range of Consultation', the 'Reasoned Justification' and the 'Common Good Justification', Malaysia scores higher than the US, indicating a greater 'deliberative process', rather than 'parochial interests, or coercion'.[12] Therefore, Malaysia is stronger than the US in the area of democracy that promotes alliance endurance. Like Malaysia, Singapore is not a model for liberal democracy; however, it demonstrates the skills required for alliance endurance. As I have stated previously, I am not arguing that non-democratic nations are incapable of demonstrating these aspects, rather democratic nations have more experience and, due to re-election desires, have a greater need to demonstrate these traits, which promotes alliance endurance. This is the lesson the FPDA should apply to possible future expansion.

Singapore gained independence from the British Empire in 1963 when it joined the Federation of Malaysia. Less than two years later, the Malaysian parliament voted to expel Singapore from Malaysia, and hence the independent nation of Singapore formed

9. William Case, 'Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressure for Regime Change', pp. 184–185
10. Ibid., p. 193
11. V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for all? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, p. 93
12. Ibid., pp. 91–93

in 1965. Singapore is a parliamentary republic with a Westminster system of unicameral parliamentary government representing constituencies. Although Singapore is known as a 'flawed democracy', and only a 'partially free state' by organisations such as Freedom House, the critical aspects associated with *democracy* are evident in the civilian leadership in Singapore; these aspects have promoted the incredible growth of the nation and allowed the FPDA to endure.[13]

The government of Singapore is not a liberal democracy; however, it is one of the most effective in Asia in terms of economic prosperity, property rights, legal system, honesty, reliability, business conditions and, importantly, lack of corruption.[14] Singaporeans enjoy only a modicum of Western civil liberties; however, they benefit significantly from the ability of the government to improve their education, health and living standards. The development of Singapore would not have been possible without the significant negotiating and compromising skills of the civilian leaders. Consensus building and the willingness to accept criticism and respond to demand by government leaders enabled the development of public housing and industrial development in Singapore.[15] Furthermore, during tough financial times, the Singapore government demonstrated superior negotiating skills when it successfully negotiated with industry leading to a 20 percent cut to wages, a proposal accepted by the workers, rather than legislated by the government. Though not a model for liberal democracy, Singapore is a model for how government leaders can negotiate and compromise for the betterment of all, a trend that continues today. Using the same V-Dem metrics comparing Malaysia with the US, Singapore is well ahead of the US in all aspects, other than in the category of 'Engaged Society'.[16] Engagement and respect for counterarguments demonstrate that Singaporean civilian leaders, in an incorrupt manner, can consult, accept criticism, negotiate and compromise to produce the best result possible – a trait necessary for alliance endurance. The examples in this section align with aspects that I have used to describe the states within the FPDA, and the lessons that can guide the future of the FPDA. It is the DCI aspect of democracy as measured by V-Dem that matters, rather than a nation being democratic per se. As I have stated earlier, I am not suggesting that dictators are unable to display these traits, or that an alliance that does not share these conditions could not endure. I am stating that these democratic traits *assist* in alliance endurance and provide lessons to Australia as to how to possibly expand the FPDA in the future.

13. Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2018: Singapore Profile', viewed February 2019, https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/freehou/2018/en/120996
14. Herbert H Werlin, 'Classical and Liberal Democracy: Singapore and Jamaica', *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 176
15. Ibid., p. 177
16. V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for all? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, pp. 91–93

4.3: Democratically elected civilian control over the military

The fact that all FPDA nations have *democratically elected civilian control over the military* enables the alliance to produce common strategic assessments concerning threats to the alliance. Likewise, the ability of the nations to work together towards a common goal is strengthened by the fact that the militaries of the nations involved are solely concerned with achieving valid military objectives in the national interest, rather than undertaking operations intended to keep a political party in power, as was the case in the Philippines example in Chapter 3. The nations of Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand have democratically elected civilian control over the military, a condition that existed before Australia and New Zealand gained independence in 1901 and 1947 respectively. Malaysia and Singapore, however, have a much different history requiring further analysis to determine if democratically elected civilian control over the military fully existed throughout FPDA's history and whether this contributes to the endurance of the alliance. I argue that although the history of liberal democracy in Malaysia and Singapore is not perfect, the condition of democratically elected civilian control over the military is a significant factor leading to the endurance of the alliance.

Malaysia has a continuous history of *democratically elected civilian control over the military*, commencing before the independence of the nation. The Malaya military fought communist forces in the 1940s and 1950s, a time when Malaya was still under British control. As a result, a foundational aspect of the Malaysian military was the *democratically elected civilian control over the military* as instigated by the former colonial rulers. This aspect remained present after gaining independence and continues as mandated in the Malaysian constitution.[17] The Malaysian Armed Forces are under *democratically elected civilian control*, a fact widely accepted by the government, the citizens, and the military leadership and rank and file.[18] Compared to other Asian nations, such as Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, the role of the military in the national life of Malaysia is apolitical. Furthermore, unlike most other Southeast Asian nations, the Malaysian Armed Forces played virtually no role in the economic life of the nation.[19] The strictly apolitical Malaysian military, having no interference with the national life or economic prosperity of the nation, enables the democratically elected civilian leaders to direct operations in the national interest of Malaysia. The results are evident in the May 1969 race riots.

17. Malaysian Government, *Constitution of Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, 16 September 1963
18. Frederica M Bunge, *Malaysia: A Country Study*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 258
19. Ibid., p. 262

The Malaysian government ordered the military to operate in a domestic security role during the May 1969 race riots. In this activity, the military conducted a domestic policing role to support the Malaysian police as they attempted to regain control and order.[20] In this instance, there was an opportunity for the military to seize political power, yet the military chose to remain loyal to the democratically elected civilian leaders.[21] This control is vastly different to the military coups that occurred in Pakistan during the same period. As a result of the *democratically elected civilian control*, the military performed its duty, with no threat of the military attempting to gain power. Through trusted assemblies such as the National Security Council (NSC), military leadership can provide sound strategic advice to the Malaysian government.

The Malaysian government provided formal mechanisms for the armed forces to interact and provide professional military advice. In 1971, the Malaysian government established the NSC to enable the military, through the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) to provide his strategic assessment to the government.[22] As the military is constitutionally and historically subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders, the NSC provided a mechanism for frank and fearless engagement by the military. The NSC provided the mechanism for sound strategic assessment, an ability that the Malaysian Armed Forces brought to the decision-making process within the FPDA. For example, Malaysia did not request assistance from the FPDA during the second insurgency period which lasted until the late 1980s. Malaysia accurately assessed its military capability, and with minor bilateral help from Australia and New Zealand in the counterinsurgency operations, Malaysia defeated the insurgents while not requesting assistance from the FPDA.[23] During the following years, Malaysia has maintained the successful manner in which it makes strategic assessments. Singapore likewise developed from a minor, militarily weak nation into a capable, professional force, enabled by the democratically elected civilian control of the military.

Singapore's military developed due to the peacetime innovation led by the *democratically elected civilian leaders*. The Singaporean Armed Forces are under democratically elected civilian control, a fact accepted by the government, the citizens and the military. As is the case with Malaysia described above, when comparing Singapore to other Asian

20. Jessica Ong Hai Liaw and Abdul Hamid Bin Moiden, 'The 13 May 1969 Incident: Public Relations Strategies in Crisis Management', *International Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 11, issue 2, 2017, p. 708

21. Rahmat B Hj Hassan, *Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study Between Pakistan and Malaysia*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2000, p. 58

22. Harold Crouch, 'The Military in Malaysia', in Viberto Selochan (Ed.), *The Military, The State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991, p. 132

23. Cheah Boon Kheng, 'The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948–1990: Contesting the Nation-State and Social Change', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies,* vol. 11, no. 1, June 2009, p. 143

nations such as Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, the role of the military in the national life of Singapore is strictly apolitical. The Singaporean leaders have driven the Singaporean Armed Forces to progress from its creation as a first-generation military in the 1960s, to a second-generation force in the 1980s and 1990s, and then by the year 2000 onwards, a third-generation force.[24] The organisational model described by Barry Posen predicts that a military will remain stagnant in its doctrine, and have little integration to the aims of the government.[25] Yet, innovation can occur when civilian leaders prioritise these efforts. In the case of Singapore, the Ministry of Defence prioritised the efforts to create new structures, acquire new equipment and better integrate the military as a joint service.[26]

Critics may argue that the innovation and development experienced in Singapore is possible regardless of the form of government; this observation has some merit as Singapore is not a typical liberal democracy. However, the Singapore government drove military innovation that solely focused on the security of Singapore, without any non-democratic aims such as protection of the government from opposition parties. This behavior is historically uncommon in autocratic states such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Cambodia in the 1970s. The result of the modernisation drive was a Singaporean military that has a professional officer and NCO corps, modern equipment and training, and a force fully able to integrate with the other nations of the FPDA. In short, the definite civilian control over the military in Singapore enabled the Singaporean military to innovate, develop and acquire equipment that led to the military being one of the most modern in Asia today. The strictly apolitical Singaporean military enables the democratically elected civilian leaders to direct operations in the national interest of Singapore. Furthermore, as there is no doubt as to the military being subordinate to the civilian leaders, there is no fear of a coup or un-democratic use of the military, and the military and the civilian leaders can have a frank and honest relationship, leading to sound strategic assessments. The sound strategic assessments enable Singapore to integrate well within the FPDA and promote alliance endurance.

4.4: Integrated military command structure

The FPDA does not have a fully integrated military command structure. Unlike NATO, the FPDA is an agreement to consult and determine a course of action, either jointly or

24. Michael Raska, *Military Innovation in Small States: Creating a Reverse Asymmetry*, Routledge, 2016, p. 131
25. Barry R Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, p. 40
26. Michael Raska, *Military Innovation in Small States: Creating a Reverse Asymmetry*, p. 153

separately in the event of an armed attack against Malaysia or Singapore.[27] There is no wording in the treaty that commits military action. As a result of this different intent, the impetus did not exist to establish an IMCS. However, there is a similar structure to an IMCS. Not unlike the arrangement in SEATO, the FPDA has combined doctrine, exercise and planning documents, and a permanent staff at RMAF Base Butterworth, Malaysia, commanded by an air vice marshal, along with frequent and increasing dialogue between defence chiefs and ministers. Furthermore, the FPDA evolved from minor exercises to larger-scale exercises, positively effecting the relationship between the states.[28] Unlike SEATO, however, the lack of an IMCS has not hindered the FPDA from enduring, even as the initial reasons for the creation of the FPDA have ceased. This warrants further analysis.

When analysing the reason the lack of an IMCS has not hindered the FPDA, as it did SEATO, one must consider the possibility that the FPDA may well have failed had it faced a situation similar to what SEATO experienced. At no time during the FPDA's existence has it experienced real turmoil. Unlike SEATO, which experienced the removal of two states, Pakistan and France, the FPDA experienced no such predicament. There is little likelihood of this happening as both Malaysia and Singapore enjoy the protection the FPDA provides and the three Commonwealth nations appreciate the access provided by the arrangement. Secondly, as there has been no threat or actual armed attack against Malaysia or Singapore, there has been no real test of the durability and worth of the current structure. Should an issue of significant magnitude occur, there is every possibility that the lack of an IMCS would render the FPDA unable to deal with the situation. Instead of the states working together with the sole interest of the FPDA in mind, the individual nations may primarily focus on their particular interests. However, as the FPDA has conducted over 50 exercises in its history, the shared experience, described in the following section, has enabled the alliance to work without a strict IMCS, regardless of the evolving security environment. In short, the FPDA must examine the worth of an IMCS as it considers the future and its potential to expand and effectively carry out operations during times of war. However, in the case of the FPDA, an IMCS may not prove the best solution.

The FPDA is a unique case of where an IMCS would potentially have doomed the alliance to fail from the start. Unlike NATO and SEATO, the correlation between an IMCS and alliance endurance for the FPDA is indeterminant. At the commencement of the alliance, animosity existed between Malaysia and Singapore, as described in the introduction to this chapter. To bridge the animosity and create a workable solution

27. FPDA Working Group, Ministerial Communique, London, 16 April 1971

28. Derrick V Frazier and J Wesley Hutto, 'The socialization of military power: security cooperation and doctrine development through multinational military exercises', p. 393

that enabled the alliance to succeed, an IMCS never formed. The similarities in culture between Malaysia and Singapore, as discussed in the following paragraphs, mean that regarding an IMCS, the common 'Asian way' culture hindered the possibility of creating an IMCS from the beginning. Malaysia and Singapore share a culture of collectivism that uses face-saving indirect methods, rather than direct, to-the-point orders; a point this author has first-hand experience with after conducting over a dozen deployments to the FPDA area of operations.[29] This in no way questions the professionalism or dedication of their militaries. The 'Asian way' of operating favours a structure similar to an IMCS, however, a command structure with less interference or control over each nation's operations. Furthermore, as the FPDA does not regard an attack on one nation as an attack on all nations, there is less requirement for a fully integrated military command structure.

An example of another alliance operating in Asia without an IMCS is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN operates in the context of the 'Asian way' in which the member states do not interfere with the operations of the other nations. Whilst ASEAN is not a security alliance, it provides a further example of how the context of the region matters, and a structure that works for an alliance like NATO may not work in the Asian region. The current FPDA structure utilises some shared resources, doctrine and temporary commands, whilst requiring each nation to provide their own funding, logistics and intelligence. This structure has enabled the alliance to endure in the Asian context; however, the alliance is yet to face any armed aggression. As trust has improved between Malaysia and Singapore, the FPDA must examine the worth of an IMCS as it considers its next 50 years.

4.5: Common threat, culture and history

A common threat to Malaysia and Singapore led to the establishment of the FPDA. Indonesia caused significant concern for the two Asian nations as Indonesia conducted government-sanctioned and government-led attacks in the past. In 1964 Indonesian troops conducted several armed attacks against targets in both Peninsular and Borneo Malaysia.[30] Likewise, Indonesia attacked Singapore, including a string of bombings that caused dozens of casualties and led to the death penalty imposed on the captured Indonesian commandos.[31] The attacks by Indonesia backed up the threatening language

29. Stella Ting-Toomey and John G Oetzel, *Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001, p. 50
30. Damon Bristow, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization', p. 3
31. Ibid.

from Indonesian President Sukarno, indicating hostilities would prevail for some time. Due to the weakness of Malaysian and Singaporean Armed Forces in the first decades after their independence, the *common Indonesian threat* formed the alliance and held it together during the formative years of the alliance. On top of the threat from Indonesia, there were two other common threats faced by the alliance.

The second common threat holding the alliance together was the removal of the majority of British forces from the Southeast Asian region. The decision by the British Labour Government to remove forces from the region by the end of 1971 created the concern that the weak militaries of Malaysia and Singapore would prove unable to defend against any attack, not just aggression from Indonesia.[32] After the British removed the majority of their permanent forces from the region, the threat from Indonesia did not cease, however, and hence the need for an alliance to replace the gap left by the British departure. Both Malaysia and Singapore have used the ensuing years wisely, with their military capabilities increasing significantly. Singapore in particular focussed on improving their military, and in 2000 Tim Huxley described them as 'exceptional in Southeast Asia'.[33] The third common threat leading to the creation of the FPDA is closer to home for Malaysia and Singapore.

Animosity between Malaysia and Singapore was the third reason for the creation of the FPDA in 1971. After Malaysia expelled Singapore from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, tension and a lack of trust festered between the two nations. The lack of trust required a mechanism to ensure a peaceful existence on the peninsula. Likewise, the common threats described in the previous two paragraphs highlight the common security concerns the two nations faced; their security concerns were *indivisible*, regardless of the tension between the two nations.[34] Without an alliance to bind the two nations together from a security viewpoint, there is every likelihood that the common threat of *each other* would have led to hostile actions in the area. Any hostile action would have led the Commonwealth nations to act to preserve peace within the region. Therefore, the threat between Malaysia and Singapore was a threat faced by all nations within the FPDA. However, the three common threats that led to the creation of the FPDA reduced as the years advanced.

The initial *common threats* to Malaysia and Singapore no longer exist. Firstly, the relations between FPDA states and Indonesia have dramatically improved. This is

32. Phillip Darby, 'Beyond East of Suez', p. 655

33. Tim Huxley in Andrew T H Tan, 'Punching Above Its Weight: Singapore's Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy', *Defence Studies*, vol. 11, issue 4, December 2011, p. 677, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2011.642196

34. Ang Chen Guan, 'Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971', p. 216

evident in the close and productive working relationship developed between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, as part of the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) program.[35] The MSP conducts combined patrols in the Malacca Strait to counter the threat of piracy in this vital waterway. Although there have been minor disagreements between the nations involved in the MSP, this is hardly unusual amongst international groups. The result of the MSP nations working together speak for themselves; in 2005, Lloyd's insurance listed the Malacca Strait as a 'high-risk war zone', however, within a year, as a result of the effectiveness of the MSP, Lloyd's downgraded the risk associated with the Strait.[36] Clearly Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore can work together, and the possibility of open conflict between the nations has rescinded.[37]

The second and third common threats at the beginning of the alliance have been overtaken by time. The British have long since extricated themselves from the area and, in this time, the forces of Malaysia and Singapore have significantly increased their capabilities. The need for British security has diminished, and the nations have extended their security partnerships to include the US. Finally, the threat Malaysia and Singapore posed to each other has likewise decreased. Although their relationship experiences trouble at times, there is no threat of military action between Malaysia and Singapore. As indicated by the MSP, the two nations can successfully work together in military operations. Therefore, all three *common threats* at the start of the FPDA were important, however, they no longer exist. Time has reduced the common threats that formed the alliance; time has also assisted in the *common culture* and *common history* that are now the main factors leading to the alliance's endurance.

The main cultural aspect leading to alliance endurance in the FPDA is the understanding of the 'Asian way'. Malaysia and Singapore can work together despite their disagreements, based on the understanding that they do not interfere with each other's domestic situation or beliefs. Despite a distrust of each other, Malaysia and Singapore used the FPDA to build confidence and communication between their armed forces, especially in the years after their separation.[38] The FPDA provided the mechanism, and the 'Asian way' stopped other distractions from hindering their improving relations. Furthermore, the relations between the Commonwealth nations and the Asian nations developed as the FPDA provided constant interaction, resulting in a shared FPDA

35. Koh Swee Lean Collin, 'The Malacca Strait Patrols: Finding Common Ground', *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, Singapore, no. 91, 20 April 2016
36. Daniel W Drezner, 'Pirates of the Malacca Strait: Lloyd's Curse', *Foreign Policy*, 8 August 2006
37. Andrew T H Tan, 'Punching Above Its Weight: Singapore's Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy', *Defence Studies*, vol. 11, no. 4, December 2011, p. 672
38. Damon Bristow, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization', p. 12

culture. Needless to say, the common culture between the Commonwealth nations has been the bedrock of the close relationship these nations shared throughout history, including in the contemporary context. Finally, the shared history of the past half-century supports FPDA endurance.

The *common history* of the nations within the FPDA supports the endurance of the alliance. The tale of relations between ex-colonial masters and colonised peoples is well documented, and this book does not intend to discuss the topic other than to say that, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is indeed possible to overcome past grievances. The first prime minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, keenly ensured friendly relations with the Commonwealth nations. His desire to maintain good relations with Australia, Britain and New Zealand enabled a positive start to the new shared history created by the FPDA.[39] The relationship between Malaysia and the other nations within the FPDA is today even stronger. From the author's personal experience operating in and from Malaysia and Singapore, there is a sense of a shared history and a common desire to maintain the friendship and alliance in the coming years. The shared history over the last half-century includes non-FPDA combined operations in other areas such as in the Middle East, reciprocal exchanges, education and training opportunities, as well as the permanent basing of Singaporean forces in locations throughout Australia. The recent shared history between the FPDA nations glues the alliance together, enabling the possibility of expanding the alliance. Along with the common culture, the recent common history enables the FPDA to thrive in the contemporary environment. Now the question Australia must ask to ensure it meets its national defence objectives is how can the FPDA expand rather than stagnate?

4.6: The stage is set – FPDA expansion?

This chapter has so far described how the four conditions apply to the FPDA: whether the nations within the alliance are democratic or non-democratic; whether the military is *subordinate to the democratically elected civilian leaders*; whether the alliance has an *integrated military command structure*; and whether the alliance is based solely on a common threat, or whether there is a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. The chapter now examines the results of the four conditions and how they set the stage for the FPDA's expansion, something yet to happen. The book applies the same three metrics used to describe NATO's expansion and SEATO's demise. The three metrics demonstrate how the four conditions led to the FPDA's endurance, and that there is room for carefully considered expansion. Firstly, the following pages detail the *number*

39. Muhammad Ben Muda, 'Malaysia at 50: Malaysia's Foreign Policy and the Commonwealth Revisited', *The Round Table*, vol. 97, no. 394, February 2008, p. 125

of nations involved in the FPDA, secondly, the *nature of the missions* the FPDA conducts, and finally, the *area of operations* (AO) within which the FPDA operates. The conditions outlined in this chapter show that for the same reason the FPDA endures, it is likewise possible to expand.

4.7: Nations involved

The number of nations involved in the FPDA has not changed; for the first few decades of the alliance, this is understandable as most other nations within the area did not share the *common threat*. Initially, the *common threat* of armed attack by Indonesia, the threat that led to the creation of the alliance, was specific only to Malaysia and Singapore. Unlike the Soviet threat that affected all European nations, the threat of Indonesian attack only applied to Malaysia and Singapore. It did not make sense for other Asian nations to potentially damage their relationship with Indonesia, based on a threat that did not apply to them. Furthermore, there was obviously little chance of Indonesia joining the alliance. Over the ensuing years, however, the relationship with Indonesia improved, and the former Indonesian Defense Minister General Benny Murdani declared in 1994 that 'if the FPDA makes its members feel secure, then regional security is enhanced, and Indonesia is happy'.[40] Clearly Indonesia has softened its stance regarding the FPDA. This stance, coupled with the cooperation within the MSP and Indonesia's ranking on the DCI as above all FPDA nations except for Australia, indicates the ability of Indonesia to join the FPDA.[41]

A second hindrance to the expansion of the FPDA in the initial years was the need for *democracy*, and the negotiating skills essential within a democracy; this condition seldom existed within Southeast Asia. The rapid turn-over of governments experienced in the three Asian nations within SEATO and the lack of democratically elected civilians provides a clear example of this issue, as well as the frequent use of the military for reasons not aligned to democratic values. Although many nations in Asia today are far from perfectly functioning democracies, this condition has improved and provides the potential for future expansion.

40. General Benny Murdani (Retd), address at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, ACT, December 1994

41. V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for all? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, p. 92

4.8: Mission type

The FPDA has evolved the exercises it undertakes; however, the actual mission has changed little over the years. In terms of training and the nature of the exercise program, minor changes happened due to the improving capabilities of the Malaysian and Singaporean Armed Forces.[42] Likewise, changes to the organisation have occurred, such as the 2000 change from the Integrated Air Defence System to the Integrated Area Defence System. However, this change was due to the capabilities of Malaysia and Singapore and a greater focus on joint operations, rather than a change in mission type.[43] An expansion in mission type is something in which all FPDA nations would benefit and would likely bring other nations into the alliance. I discuss possible options in Chapter 5. However, an expansion of mission type is yet to happen.

4.9: Area of operations

Commensurate with not expanding the mission type, the FPDA has not expanded its area of operations (AO). Interestingly, the AO covered by the FPDA excludes Borneo Malaysia. The FPDA does not include East Malaysia as Australia wanted to prevent potential border disputes with the Philippine islands to the north and Indonesia to the south.[44] The exclusion of this area is important as it implies that the FPDA cannot become involved in disputes within the South China Sea, something the FPDA has remained clear of. Rather than innovate and ensure the FPDA remains relevant to government policy, the alliance has remained locked into the same area of operations, with the same nations, conducting the same mission, based on outdated threats.

4.10: Conclusion

In summary, the four conditions analysed in this book support the endurance and expansion of the FPDA. Firstly, all nations within the FPDA are *democracies*. Democratic skills enable successful negotiations and compromise regarding routine operations, as well as potential areas of conflict between nations. Although Malaysia and Singapore are not renowned liberal democracies, they have higher ratings than the US when it comes to the critical component of democracy concerned with alliance endurance:

42. Damon Bristow, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements, Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization', p. 7
43. Carlyle A Thayer, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971–2011)', p. 73
44. Ralf Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture', *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, Singapore, no. 195, 20 April 2010, p. 6

the ability to negotiate, compromise and work for the common good.[45] Regarding the expansion of the FPDA, there are neighboring states to Malaysia and Singapore that share these democratic traits, as well as having their militaries subordinate to a democratically elected government. *Democratically elected civilian control over the military* ensured that the militaries of the FPDA nations acted in line with democratic principles rather than the safeguarding of particular regimes. Furthermore, the restraint shown by the Malaysian Armed Forces during the race riots of 1969 highlights the command the *democratically elected civilian leaders* have over the military. Combined with the formal mechanisms for military input into government decision making, the robust discussion between the military and civilian leaders promotes *sound strategic assessment* by all nations.

The lack of an *integrated military command structure* within the FPDA has not hindered the ability of the alliance to exercise together successfully. This finding was contradictory to my expectations. However, the alliance is yet to face a significant test, and the success of the current structure in an actual war-fighting scenario is unknown; a future IMCS in an expanded FPDA warrants further analysis. Nevertheless, the FPDA structure proves successful in the context of the 'Asian way'. Furthermore, there is a commonality in the operating procedures, exercise plans, interoperability and a continually increasing capability of the Malaysian and Singaporean Armed Forces. Finally, the existence of a *common threat* combined with *common culture and history* assisted in the creation of the FPDA; however, as the common threat declined over the years, the alliance endured. Due to a *common culture*, and understanding of one another, the nations within the alliance can continue successfully working together. Although animosity between Malaysia and Singapore existed and has not entirely ceased today, the two nations share a culture and manage to work together effectively. In doing so, the *common history* of all FPDA nations over the last half-century strengthens the alliance, enabling it to endure without a common threat. With these conditions in place the ability of the FPDA to endure is apparent and from this the ability of the FPDA to expand warrants further examination.

The FPDA has yet to expand the *number of nations* involved, the *nature of the missions* conducted, or the *area of operations* within which the alliance operates. However, there is potential for expansion due to the conditions analysed in this chapter. The *number of nations* involved has not increased since the formation; however, as the security environment in Southeast Asia has changed over the last half-century, the ability exists to increase the nations involved. Indonesia, for example, is a country that warrants consideration; significant military cooperation already exists within the effective

45. V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for all? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018,* p. 93

Malacca Strait Patrols. Increasing the *types of mission* the FPDA conducts is achievable and could start by looking to ensure freedom of navigation through the South China Sea. This new mission would remain defensive in nature, prove beneficial for all nations, and therefore not upset the delicate balance within the region. Furthermore, as all nations within the FPDA have *democratically elected civilian control over the military*, effectively leading UN-backed operations based on sound strategic assessment is an expanded *mission type* the alliance could conduct. Finally, as a common threat no longer drives the FPDA, the area of operations could expand without posing a risk to the existence of the alliance. An area to initially expand may include Borneo Malaysia, which could link to the inclusion of Indonesia as part of the FPDA. Starting with a minor expansion such as including the part of Malaysia not currently covered in the FPDA demonstrates peaceful intent, particularly if the expansion is commensurate with the FPDA undertaking a United Nations-backed operation. The FPDA has the conditions necessary to expand, and the nations involved in the alliance need to seriously consider this option as the FPDA approaches its 60th anniversary in 2031.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The conclusions found in this book are relevant to Australia for three reasons. Firstly, the economic prosperity provided by shipping sustains the Australian way of life; concerningly, shipping is increasingly becoming challenged in the sea lines upon which Australia relies. Secondly, Australia commits aid money and resources to the region so Australia should invest this money in a manner that assists the local communities, as well as pursuing Australian national interests. Finally, the time, money and resources Australia commits to the FPDA provide access to the region; however, the aims of the alliance are no longer relevant and need revising as the FPDA approaches its 55th anniversary. The evolving security climate in the Asian Century means that the Australian Government must make informed decisions as to how best ensure the survival and prosperity of the nation.

Australia's wealth and way of life are supported by trade in and through the Asia-Pacific region, with Australian trade predominantly relying on sea lines of communication through the South China Sea; two-thirds of all Australian trade relies exclusively on sea passage through the South China Sea.[1] The recent and increasing hostility within the South China Sea is a cause of concern for Australia as it poses a threat to Australian trade and security, and therefore the Australian way of life. Furthermore, Australia remains focused on ensuring that freedom of navigation and the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remain enforced.[2] Should a hostile nation choose to deny shipping through the South China Sea or the Strait of Malacca, Australia must be ready to respond. The best way for Australia to respond to a threat in the region is by ensuring that a successful alliance exists to deter any hostile action firstly and, if necessary, defeat said adversary. The only alliance Australia has in the region is the FPDA, an alliance based on a set of no-longer-existing threats. However, a new threat has emerged in the South China Sea. Australia ought to understand the conditions

1. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia's Trade in Goods and Services'
2. Cameron Hill, 'Australia and the South China Sea: debates and dilemmas'

necessary to expand the FPDA, to provide the alliance relevance in the emerging strategic environment; Australia's security and prosperity depends on this.

The second consideration for this book is how to use best the aid money Australia spends in the region, particularly considering the $2 billion package announced by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.[3] Above all, the number one consideration for the government is Australia's national interests. Of course, the money should help develop and assist the countries receiving Australian assistance; however, there are many ways to spend the money. Spending on infrastructure, diplomatic outposts, temporary supplies or agricultural projects are no doubt meaningful and worthy endeavours; however, Australian national interests are possibly better served using the aid money in other ways, while still assisting the recipient nations. This book details the conditions most favourable for an alliance to endure, and therefore expand; Australia should invest aid money that strengthens the conditions examined in this book. This should involve trying to strengthen all the conditions, not merely improve democratic practices. For example, by working with the nations in the regions, Australia can strengthen the doctrine, assist in the procurement of interoperable weapon systems and platforms, and therefore increase the ability of these nations to integrate within the FPDA. By doing so, Australia sets the conditions necessary for the potential expansion of the FPDA and ensures Australia can best work with these nations in times of peace or war.

The third point of relevance for this book is whether the FPDA currently achieves the best *bang for buck* regarding the investment the ADF makes in the alliance. Australia's participation in the FPDA is no doubt strategically important, and it provides Australia access to bases within the region, notably the Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia. However, is the FPDA achieving the maximum strategic advantage by operating per organisational theory, or should the alliance undergo an update to maximise its potential? As defence spending increases throughout Asia, Australia must engage regional concerns in an educated manner to take advantage of the increase in defence spending by our partner nations to offset the increase in defence spending by potential adversaries effectively. For this reason, it is worth discovering whether certain conditions exist to enable an alliance to expand and take advantage of the changing environment; if so, what are these conditions? This book answers that very question. By analysing four conditions that best enable an alliance such as the FPDA to endure and expand, Australia can knowledgeably determine how to expand the FPDA to best suit Australian national interest.

3. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, '$2 billion investment facility to support business engagement with Southeast Asia', ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, 5 March 2024

5.1: Lessons learned

To ensure Australia is best set up for the uncertain future, this book examined the conditions most favourable for an alliance to endure. Combined with answers to the future questions posed below, if Australia wants to expand its sphere of influence and alliance partners in Southeast Asia, it needs to know the conditions necessary to enable alliance expansion. The four conditions analysed in this book provide that answer. This book concludes that the four conditions required for an alliance to endure are: the alliance nations are all *democracies*; the alliance nations' militaries are subordinate to *democratically elected civilian leaders*; the alliance has an *integrated military command structure* if the context of the environment allows; and an alliance based on an initial *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. The analysis of these conditions results in the conclusions and recommendations that the FPDA and Asia meet the conditions required for FPDA expansion.

Regarding the condition of all nations being *democratic*, this book concludes that it is certain aspects of democracy that promote alliance endurance. The example of Singapore highlights the democratic traits required for alliance endurance; the skill of negotiating, compromising and working for solutions that help the common good, rather than *liberal* democratic ideas per se. As described by Gary Goertz, the addition of an adjective, such as *liberal* reduces the range of democracies available to fulfill specific requirements, in this case, the democratic traits necessary for alliance endurance.[4] Due to the desire to secure re-election, democratic leaders generally move on from past failures and issues that arise, and look for a positive future, rather than continue to focus on an issue that the voting public will see as a failure. The ability to compromise and move on from issues increases the ability of an alliance between democratic nations to overcome inevitable differences they may have, demonstrated by the NATO nations during the Suez Crisis, as discussed in Chapter 2. I am not suggesting that being a democracy is the answer, or that non-democratic nations are incapable of displaying the required attributes. Rather, I am stating that it is certain aspects that are more typical within democratic nations that assist in the endurance of an alliance. For the FPDA, this provides a lesson to guide which nations it may consider asking to join the alliance in the future. Related, but distinct from democracies, is the need for *democratically elected civilian control over the military*.

Regarding the condition of all nations having *democratically elected civilian control over the military*, this book concludes this is a unique requirement that supports alliance endurance for two reasons. Firstly, the leader of the government must come to power

4. Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*, Princeton University Press, Woodstock, OX, 2006, pp. 77–80

democratically. If a *democratically elected civilian* leader is not in *control of the military*, the temptation exists for the government to use the military to keep their particular regime in power, as experienced in the Philippines under President Marcos who oversaw elections that 'brought more killings than in any previous election since 1949'.[5] The second requirement for *democratically elected civilian control over the military* is the need for nations to have reasonable and common strategic assessments; something unlikely to occur in an environment such as the Philippines under President Marcos. The conclusion in this book disagrees with Risa Brooks who states that the type of civilian leader does not matter. The use of the military for purposes such as safeguarding regime types and the inability of the nations to make sound strategic assessments when the military is *not* under *democratically elected civilian control* is a trait that will damage rather than enable the endurance of the alliance.

The third lesson this book makes regarding conditions that assist alliance endurance is the benefit, with a local context caveat, for an *integrated military command structure* (IMCS). However, this lesson potentially provides the least value, as the FPDA endures without an IMCS. In the case of NATO, the IMCS proved a single powerful command structure incorporating all aspects of military bureaucracy, such as a shared funding model, universal supply and logistics chains, the integration of doctrine and the joint staff system. The NATO IMCS resulted in a unified structure and doctrine that held together 20,000 people under 33 sub-commands.[6] The context of Europe assisted in the creation of an IMCS, as the European nations were comfortable with their sovereignty and had little concern over relinquishing control over part of their military to a supranational body; this was not the case in Asia. In the case of SEATO, the lack of an IMCS splintered the alliance when crises arose. Without an IMCS to hold the alliance together, along with other factors mentioned in Chapter 3, SEATO terminated. The FPDA shows how an IMCS-like structure can work in the Asian environment, noting that the alliance is untested when it comes to dealing with threats. However, should Australia consider changing the nature of the alliance, it must examine the merits of developing an IMCS. Australia is currently a security provider to the alliance, yet should the mission expand to activities such as maritime security in the South China Sea, then Australia becomes a beneficiary of the alliance. In this case, I assess there is a greater chance that the alliance may be tested. Therefore, the lessons from NATO and SEATO are that in the case of an alliance conducting actual operations, an IMCS is beneficial. In short, an

5. Tillman Durdin, 'Marcos Far Ahead in Philippine Vote, *New York Times*, 12 November 1969, p. 3
6. NATO Factsheet February 2018 – 'The Structure', Factsheet, February 2018, viewed February 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/1802-factsheet-nato-command-structure_en.pdf

IMCS is not required for alliance endurance; however, in a future where the alliance is tested, an IMCS is the strongest structure to promote alliance endurance.

The final condition necessary for an alliance to endure is a *common threat* plus *common culture and history*. In the three alliances examined in this book, an initial common threat drove the creation of the alliance. However, the nations of SEATO did not all agree on the significance or details of the common threat, contributing to a lack of genuine commitment to the alliance by these nations. NATO and the FPDA had specific common threats unique to each alliance; however, over time the common threat reduced. It was, therefore, the shared culture and history that kept the alliances together as the initial threat ceased. Due to the common strategic assessment, NATO states were able to agree upon the development of new threats and missions; something the FPDA has yet to do. In the case of the common culture in the FPDA, the 'Asian way' of operating exists in Malaysia and Singapore and is well understood by the Commonwealth nations. Furthermore, the shared culture and history developed over the more than 50-year life of the alliance support FPDA endurance. NATO and the FPDA prove that alliance theory is incomplete as it does not account for the endurance of these two alliances.

Finally, through analysing the four conditions, this book concludes that the FPDA meets the requirements for endurance, and the conditions in Asia today could support the expansion of the alliance. There is a new common threat to the region with respect to shipping and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. This threat warrants analysing which *nations*, *missions* and *areas of operation* the FPDA should look upon to expand. Initially, the FPDA ought to take minor steps, such as including Indonesia, a country with which Malaysia and Singapore already work closely, extending the AO to include Borneo Malaysia and the South China Sea, and have the FPDA lead minor UN endorsed operations, like INTERFET or RAMSI.[7] The following paragraphs discuss such recommendations.

5.2: Recommendations

This book makes three recommendations based on the conclusions stated above. As the necessary conditions exist in Asia today, FPDA expansion is possible. Firstly, this book recommends the number of nations involved in the FPDA expands, commencing with Indonesia. Secondly, the book recommends the mission types expand to include

7. INTERFET was the Australian-led UN-sanctioned mission to restore security and order in East Timor, post the Indonesian-sanctioned East Timorese vote for independence in 1999. RAMSI was the Australian-led mission aimed at addressing civil unrest and lawlessness, corruption, and the decline in the service delivery and administrative standards of the Government of the Solomon Islands.

maritime security in the South China Sea, as well as UN endorsed operations. Thirdly, the book recommends the FPDA area of operations (AO) expands, commencing with the inclusion of the South China Sea, Borneo Malaysia and any area required to conduct operations in support of UN resolutions. These three recommendations will inevitably have consequences, both positive and negative. The following section discusses these implications. Finally, the empirical evidence in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provides the basis for the recommendations listed in this book; however, implementation of the recommendations requires further study, as I discuss later in this chapter.

5.3: Recommendation 1

The number of nations involved in the FPDA has not changed since the FPDA inception; this book concludes that expansion is possible and recommends that expansion occur. Initially, the *common threat* of armed attack by Indonesia, the threat that led to the creation of the alliance, was specific only to Malaysia and Singapore and therefore it made no sense for other Asian nations to join the FPDA and potentially damage their relationship with Indonesia. Over the ensuing years, however, relationships with Indonesia have improved, and Indonesia has softened its stance regarding the FPDA. Using the same V-Dem metrics analysed in Chapter 4, Indonesia has the democratic components required for alliance endurance, scoring higher than the US in *all* components of the Deliberative Component Index.[8] Furthermore, the combined operations Indonesia conducts with Malaysia and Singapore highlight the ability of these nations to work together. This book recommends Indonesia as the starting point for FPDA expansion, followed by other nations that meet the four conditions examined in this book.

The one condition not directly measurable against a nation is that of an IMCS; however, contributing aspects within an individual state and a region are measurable. The number of Asian nations now able to operate within an FPDA IMCS or IMCS-like structure has improved steadily over the past decades. Likewise, the number of nations in Asia that operate similar equipment, typically US-made, has increased significantly.[9] Furthermore, an increased number of exercises in the region over the last few decades have improved interoperability between many Asian, Western and FPDA nations. For example, Exercise Cobra Gold is the largest exercise in the Indo-Pacific; it involves all

8. V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for all? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, pp. 92–93

9. Richard A Bitzinger, 'The Asia Pacific Arms Market: Emerging Capabilities, Emerging Concerns', *Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2004, pp. 1-4, https://dkiapcss.edu/Publications/APSSS/Asia-PacificArmsMarket.pdf

the nations of the FPDA and the US, for a total of 29 participating nations.[10] The result of the Cobra Gold exercises which began in 1982 is an improved ability to integrate, enabling successful operations without a permanent IMCS. An IMCS-like structure, similar to the FPDA structure suffices. The FPDA can piggy-back on the improved ability of nations within the region to successfully integrate into the FPDA structure, supporting the recommendation to expand the nations involved in the FPDA.

5.4: Recommendation 2

Within the context of the evolving security situation in Southeast Asia, the objective of the FPDA does not maximise the alliance's potential. This book recommends the FPDA undertakes a shift in the purpose of the alliance, based on the current strategic environment in Asia. No longer should the response to an armed attack against Malaysia or Singapore form the basis of the alliance, but rather the alliance should expand to support a broader security agenda that contributes to stability in the region, including shipping and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Although not excluded from current FPDA activities or exercises, the current FPDA interest in maritime security operates in the context of providing security to Malaysia and Singapore. Maritime security is a mission type that ought to expand, which in turn would likely increase the number of nations wanting to join the alliance. An *expanded mission* protecting the freedom of navigation within the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait is something important to most nations, it is defensive rather than offensive, and can occur in such a manner that it operates per the 'Asian way'. The final recommendation regarding mission type is that, like NATO, the FPDA should expand to include operations designated by a UN resolution.

This book recommends the FPDA expands its mission types to involve operations in support of UN resolutions. When East Timor declared independence from Indonesia in 1999, Australia led a UN peacekeeping force charged with providing stability and security to the new nation.[11] The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) involved 22 nations, including the five that form the FPDA, led by Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove (who later became the Governor General of Australia from 2014 to 2019), with Australia providing the bulk of the forces.[12] The UN operation in East Timor is a perfect

10. United States Embassy and Consulate in Thailand, 'Exercise Cobra Gold 2019 to Kick Off on February 12, 2019', viewed March 2019, https://th.usembassy.gov/exercise-cobra-gold-2019/
11. Australian Government, 'The path to peacekeeping', 17 June 2024, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2024-06-17/path-peacekeeping
12. Australian War Memorial, 'Australians and Peacekeeping', Australian War Memorial website, viewed March 2019, https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/peacekeeping

example of the *type of mission* this book recommends the FPDA expand to undertake in the future. Similarly, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), another Australian-led operation consisting of 15 nations aimed at improving the long-term security and stability of the Solomon Islands is a further example of the kind of mission this book recommends the FPDA expand to include.[13] In short, how NATO expanded its operations to include UN missions is something the FPDA should emulate. Along with *mission expansion*, this book likewise recommends the FPDA expands its *area of operations* (AO).

5.5: Recommendation 3

This book recommends the FPDA expands its AO. The current FPDA AO excludes Borneo Malaysia and the South China Sea that exists between Borneo Malaysia and peninsula Malaysia.[14] The exclusion of Borneo Malaysia is important as it implies that the FPDA cannot become involved in disputes within the South China Sea. Expanding the nations to include Indonesia, along with an *expanded mission* to include maritime security, nestles neatly with the recommendation to *expand the area of operations* to include Borneo and the South China Sea. Furthermore, the FPDA should expand its AO as it undertakes UN endorsed operations. Area expansion has an effect more significant than just operating in a different physical location. By expanding the AO, the expanded FPDA is signalling a significant capability and willingness to integrate its operations in line with the evolving security environment. Therefore, potential adversaries will accurately perceive the FPDA as an alliance prepared to evolve and face new threats head-on; this in itself has a significant deterrent effect which may prevent future issues.

This book recommends the FPDA expand its AO to include areas designated by UN resolutions, rather than maintain the existing hard boundaries. Having undefined boundaries may concern some nations, however, the democratic leaders will negotiate and compromise over any potential misgivings they may have. This compromise would likely have occurred if Indonesia had been part of the FPDA, and the FPDA ran the INTERFET mission in 1999. As this book recommends all nations that join the FPDA meet the four examined conditions, the ability to negotiate, compromise and work together enables the FPDA to *expand* its *mission type* and *AO* without fracturing the alliance. This book therefore recommends the logical place for the FPDA to begin its AO expansion is with Borneo and the South China Sea, and enact a non-restrictive, flexible policy required to enable UN-backed operations in any area.

13. Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 'About RAMSI', RAMSI website, viewed March 2019, https://www.ramsi.org/about/
14. Ralf Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture', p. 6

5.6: Implications

Any change to the global security environment comes with implications, both positive and negative. The recommendations made in the preceding paragraphs arise from an analysis of whether the conditions necessary for alliance expansion exist, and what is possible. However, what is possible does not necessarily translate to what is a good idea. Therefore, it is necessary to study potential implications, thus determining whether any potential negative implications outweigh the expected gains of alliance expansion. This section lists both positive and negative implications, which then leads to further areas of study.

5.7: Positive implications

The FPDA created a mechanism that increased the stability and security of Malaysia and Singapore; the alliance also improved the situation between the two nations, which would otherwise unlikely have occurred. Through a constant working relationship at the military level, Malaysia and Singapore decreased the tension between them and therefore alleviated one of the common threats they shared – each other. Within Asia today, there are disputes between bordering countries that would benefit from a mechanism to promote harmonious relations and reduce tension. The island of Borneo provides an example of an area in which tension is reduceable. For instance, should the alliance expand to include Indonesia and the Philippines, then through the improved relationship driven by the FPDA, tension between the two nations over time would likely reduce.

Furthermore, as the interoperability increases between the nations, the ability of the alliance to contribute to issues within the expanded nations, like anti-terrorist operations in the Philippines, would likewise improve. Recently Australia contributed forces to anti-terrorist activities in the Philippines, with the intent to increase security and stability in the region.[15] An expanded FPDA conducting an activity like Australia undertook in the Philippines is a perfect example of how the alliance can increase stability within the region. The FPDA increased security in Malaysia and Singapore, leading former Indonesian Defense Minister General Benny Murdani to state that the FPDA increases regional security; it is logical to conclude that expanding the alliance further will expand this stabilising effect in the region.

15. Katharine Murphy, 'Australia to help Philippines counter terrorists' "brutal tactics" Payne says', *The Guardian*, 23 October 2017

The second benefit of expanding the FPDA is the positive flow-on effect the previously mentioned increased security will have on the economic prosperity within the region and globally. The creation of the Malacca Strait Patrol program between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand decreased the cost associated with losses to piracy in the Malacca Strait, as well as decreasing the cost of insurance for ships operating in this area. The total economic cost of piracy around the globe is $7–12 billion per year; efforts to reduce this cost has clear benefits to the global and regional economies.[16] President Donald J Trump stated in his 2017 National Security Strategy that 'Stable, prosperous, and friendly states enhance American security and boost U.S. economic opportunities', a statement not just true for the US.[17] Through increasing security and stability, economies have the foundation necessary to enable growth and increasing economic prosperity for all. The positive implications described here are indeed worthy causes; however, there are negative implications that need considering. If the expansion of the FPDA causes increased tension within the region, then the desired outcome of an expanded FPDA may fail to eventuate.

5.8: Negative implications

Although the FPDA has increased the security within the region, there is the possibility of nations viewing the expansion of the FPDA as a threat to their security. Robert Jervis describes the security dilemma as when a nation is perceiving actions another nation (or alliance) takes to increase their security as decreasing the security of their nation.[18] Should the FPDA expand, and therefore increase its capability, a nation such as China may perceive this expansion as a threat to Chinese security, and hence an arms race in Southeast Asia may follow. The inclusion of the US as part of an expanded FPDA would increase the probability of China feeling threatened by the expansion of the FPDA. This book has not analysed the benefits or negative implications surrounding US involvement in the alliance, however, this is an area for further study, detailed in the following paragraphs. For now, consider that Thucydides wrote that countries go to war based on fear, honour and interest. Regarding interest between China and the US, it is a fair assumption that a war between the two nations would cause mutual degradation of their economic stability. This leaves fear and honour. As China continues to expand after its century of humiliation, it regards US dominance in Asia as incompatible with Chinese aims of leadership in the region. Therefore, China faces a dilemma where it is too strong

16. Oceans Beyond Piracy, 'The Economic Cost of Piracy', Oceans Beyond Piracy website, viewed March 2019, https://oneearthfuture.org/sites/default/files/documents/summaries/View%20Summary.pdf
17. President Donald J Trump, 'National Security Strategy of the United States of America', The White House, Washington, DC, December 2017, p. 38
18. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 64–65

and honour-bound not to remain subordinate to US leadership, yet it is not yet strong enough to lead in Asia itself.[19] The US joining another alliance in Asia would exacerbate the dilemma for China, with unknown negative implications. Furthermore, within Asia, potential negative implications extend beyond just China.

The expansion of the FPDA today may disrupt any harmony experienced in Asia. The number of nations wishing to join an expanded FPDA is unknown, yet based on the conditions analysed in this book, not all nations meet the *conditions necessary* for alliance endurance. One positive of this is that the nations wishing to join the alliance may invest in areas necessary to create the required conditions; this happened as European nations endeavored to join NATO. Further to this point, the Australian Government should direct its resources to regional nations to assist in their development. However, there is also the potential for a situation whereby nations that are not permitted to join the FPDA may resent that rejection; rather than work to improve and meet the conditions necessary to join the alliance, they may hedge against the alliance, with China the likely partner. This hedging effect is seen in the questionable worthwhileness of ASEAN today, with Cambodia's reluctance to issue a statement against China's actions in the South China Sea, due to bilateral interference from China as described in Chapter 4.[20] The expansion of the FPDA has the potential to push neutral nations into the arms of China and is a concern worth noting.

5.9: Further areas for study

The positive and negative implications listed above provide areas that require further study, should the FPDA seek to expand the alliance. The three areas used to analyse expansion, the *number of nations* involved, the *nature of the missions* and the *area of operations*, guides the areas requiring further analysis. This book details three main topics that warrant further study, however, this list is far from exhaustive. Firstly, which nations should the FPDA invite to join the alliance; secondly, should the FPDA itself expand, merge with another alliance in the area, or an entirely new alliance form; and thirdly, how will China react to the recommended expansion?

The question of which nations should join an expanded FPDA is the first and the most important area requiring further study. This study should focus on two types of nations; firstly, examining nations within Asia, and secondly, examining non-Asian

19. Hugh White, *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 60

20. Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard, 'ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement', *Reuters*, 25 July 2016

nations. Regarding nations within Asia, the four conditions examined in this book provide a foundation for this study. It is unlikely that all like-minded nations will meet all the criteria; this was the case for NATO as it began its expansion. Through analysing the countries against the four conditions, it will become apparent which nations are potential partners, and which nations are not. As discussed in Recommendation 1, Indonesia is a logical place to start alliance expansion.

Furthermore, like the NATO Membership Action Plan, the FPDA should produce a set of guidelines and assist nations desiring to join the alliance. Regarding non-Asian nations wishing to join the alliance, the four conditions also hold true; however, they require additional study as to why the nations wish to join the alliance, to ensure no perception of Western interference in Asia. A significant consideration is the US; should the US become part of the FPDA? As detailed in the previous paragraphs, certain negative implications will inevitably accompany the inclusion of the US into the FPDA. However, there is also the need to ask whether the FPDA has continued merit without the US, as the US increasingly 'pivots to Asia'; this question requires further analysis.

The second topic for further study is whether the best fit for a future alliance in Southeast Asia is an expansion of the FPDA, an amalgamation of several alliances, or the creation of an entirely new alliance. Within the Southeast Asian region, several alliances exist.[21] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in particular is worth mentioning. Whilst ASEAN itself has no security agreements as such, it has the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which incorporates security concerns with the 11 ASEAN nations as well as several other nations including Australia, China, Russia and the US.[22] While the ADMM-Plus focuses on security concerns and has value, it has no formal mechanism to conduct operations or provide ongoing security measures. This book has not examined all the alliances that exist within Asia today, and further study of these alliances warrants an examination to determine the most effective alliance in the future. A sub-topic in this regard is how an expanded FPDA should operate in relation to the other alliances active within the Southeast Asian region.

The final main question for further study is what are the expected reactions from non-alliance nations such as China? This book provides recommendations such as the FPDA leading UN missions like INTERFET and RAMSI that are unlikely to draw the ire of

21. As a recap, I use the term 'alliance' to describe an agreement between the nations, and not an explicit requirement for a military commitment in the event of a hostile act. Whilst there is no wording in the FPDA, NATO and SEATO that explicitly commits nations to military action, the intent and subtle differences in the wording exist between the three alliances. Furthermore, I use the term 'alliance' when describing agreements such as the ADMM-Plus.

22. ASEAN, 'About the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)', ASEAN website, viewed February 2017, https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html

China; however, other recommendations, such as operations in the South China Sea will surely elicit a response. Whilst defensive in nature, operations in the South China Sea will inevitably create tension with China, and therefore this recommended expansion requires examination to determine China's response. Likewise, there is little doubt that China will flex its economic muscles to damage nations that decide to join an expanded FPDA; mechanisms to counter this response from China will provide reassurance to nations considering joining an expanded FPDA.

5.10: Final words

No one knows what the future looks like, or what the Asian Century means for the security environment in the Southeast Asian region. The only sure conclusion is that nations cannot remain stagnant in their thoughts or actions. The FPDA has served Australia well over its more than 50-year history; however, as the environment changes, so too must the alliance. By expanding based on the recommendations detailed in this chapter, the FPDA is best able to ensure the region remains stable and supports the national interests of the nations involved. It is impossible to conclude that NATO led to one of the most conflict-free periods in European history; however, it is reasonable to conclude that NATO raised the cost of going to war, and therefore reduced the likelihood of war in Europe. The same logic indicates that an expanded FPDA will contribute to raising the cost of conflict within Southeast Asia, and therefore reduce the likelihood of conflict. A worthwhile endeavor indeed.

The conditions examined in this book determine that FPDA expansion is possible. As Australia increases its investment in the region, by utilising this book, the government can direct aid and assistance to projects that will further improve the conditions required for nations to join and integrate within the FPDA successfully. Increased investment in regional engagement has commenced by the Australian Defence Force, with the raising of Joint Task Force 637 to conduct activities with regional neighbors, increase cultural awareness and improve interoperability within the Southwest Pacific.[23] Initiatives such as the raising of JTF 637 are essential first steps in increasing the number of nations able to meet the conditions necessary to join an expanded FPDA. Through a continuation of programs like JTF 637 and following the recommendations detailed in this book, the Australian Government can wisely invest taxpayers' money, fulfilling Australian national interests as efficiently as possible. By doing so, the government is achieving its number one priority: the security of the Australian people.

23. Australian Department of Defence, 'Message from the Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force', DEFGRAM 143/2019, 25 March 2019

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ALLIANCE EXPANSION

This book examines three alliances to determine the lessons learned that can apply to a possible future expansion of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The study concludes there are three conditions necessary for the FPDA to endure: whether states in the alliance are democracies, whether democratically elected civilians control the military, and whether the alliance is based on an initial threat plus a common culture and history. Furthermore, whilst the FPDA does not currently have an integrated military command structure (IMCS), the evidence from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) suggests that if the FPDA were to grow in terms of mission set and member states, then an IMCS would be more important than it has been in the past. Therefore, an IMCS warrants re-examining as the FPDA operates in the evolving security environment of Southeast Asia.

To determine the lessons to apply to the FPDA, I analyse the enduring NATO, the failed SEATO and the conditions present in the FPDA. The book further studies Asia today and determines that favourable conditions exist for FPDA expansion. By learning lessons that contributed to alliance endurance, expansion or failure, Australia can wisely invest its aid and assistance money in the region, to ensure its sphere of influence is maintained and expanded in the evolving security environment. As threats within the Southeast Asian region change, so too must the purpose, size and area in which alliances operate to ensure they facilitate the best possible outcome for the nations involved. This book attempts to provide such guidance, primarily to the Australian Government as it looks to navigate the stormy seas in the Southeast Asian region.

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