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Wargaming will never 'prove' anything or predict an outcome with certainty. It is merely a means of studying a problem and highlighting or exploring important issues. It will never be a substitute for actual operational experience.

Dragon’s Jaw is the Vietnamese nickname for the Thanh Hóa bridge.

Can the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) correctly prioritise jointness?

5th Generation Air C2 and ISR provides tangible recommendations about improving Air C2 and ISR systems, their integration, collaboration and I

Tactical Air Intelligence will face a crisis of relevance in conflicts of the future.

Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.

In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.

The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.

This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.

Considerable resources have so far been expended on the RAAF air power education program but few, if any, performance measures are in place to assess whether those resources are being effectively and efficiently employed.