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Defence forces worldwide need to transform their air forces into organisations that can accommodate 5th generation air power technologies in joint

China's current and evolving grey zone activities in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Ladakh region

Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.

In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.

The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.

This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.

The essence and purpose of doctrine. It develops strategic air power doctrine through an understanding of the air environment and the characteristics and structure of air power itself

Air power is distinguished from sea and land power by its flexibility, speed, ubiquity, range and shock effect. These characteristics give air power a unique ability to concentrate force
and manoeuvre rapidly over long distances

In September 2015, Russia sent its military forces to Syria in response to a request by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for help to suppress a civ