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When I was younger, I was very black and white in my thinking. Many would argue that I still am! Although I am finding the beauty in shades of grey (don’t say it!). Yet despite trying to grow my empathy and to appreciate the differences of thoughts for the constructive challenges and opportunity for growth – I still fall into the trap of comfort. I don’t always want to deal with people whose views I find offensive, idiotic, or more often than not – both. So despite being aware of the echo chamber phenomena, and its dangers, I wilfully stay with my chamber to learn and hear voices I already agree with, already support, and think very similar to myself. Is that so wrong?

Understanding the complexities of our modern information-based environment is now fundamental to the success in warfighting and navigating the fog of war. Conversely, the use of traditional information paradigms can lead to unwitting co-option of the adversaries’ plan or world view. We must consider that concepts of reality, truth, and what is right inherently does not completely align amongst different actors and groups. With this understanding, we can build resilience and anti-fragility in our decision-making and analysis.

How well do Commanders know Aviator's understanding of National Power? Is there a knowledge gap? Does it matter?

Australia’s Strategic Defence Update 2020 sets Australia’s Defence priorities to our near region, including the South West Pacific and near north.

This article began as a response to Daniel Cook’s recent article on ‘Turning the Tap Off – Stopping the Flow of Pointless Jobs in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)’ (Cook, 2023); as such, it will address some of the points raised in that article within the context a broader trend towards what I term ‘military populism’.

Technology is a key driver for Air Force capability.

Abstract

The 'poor man's air force' is a term for employing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hobbyist drones or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to strategic level military effect, and that effect cannot be understated (Waters, 2018; Nadeau, 2022; Shift, 2023). The ability for terror organisations to coordinate multiple layers of effects, including using COTS drones, to destroy Command and Control (C2) nodes in Israel causes alarm. Couple this with the use of COTS drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike and battle-damage assessment missions, and the threat posed by what are essentially toys is alarmingly real.