Lessons for the ADF from Operation Spider's Web
Lessons for the ADF from Operation Spider's WebKeirin Joyce, Joshua Vicino, Michael Spencer, and Matthew ChapmanAustralian Defence Force
The ASEAN-Australia Maritime Security Research Program investigates how ASEAN military forces can address maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN at its centre. While navies have traditionally led maritime security efforts, many contemporary challenges require contributions from multiple domains. As militaries increasingly pursue multi-domain approaches, opportunities for air forces to contribute to maritime security are likely to expand.
Winner of the WOFF-AF Creative Writing Award, this Blog investigates how Air Force can improve its enlisted aviators opportunities without requiring them to commission.
The ASPC Leader Enrichment Program blog series delivers the thoughts and concepts of the program's junior leaders as they tackle Module 2
Understanding the complexities of our modern information-based environment is now fundamental to the success in warfighting and navigating the fog of war. Conversely, the use of traditional information paradigms can lead to unwitting co-option of the adversaries’ plan or world view. We must consider that concepts of reality, truth, and what is right inherently does not completely align amongst different actors and groups. With this understanding, we can build resilience and anti-fragility in our decision-making and analysis.
The Australian Defence Force and Cyberspace
Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.
In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.
The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.
This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.
Rush Hour on the Freeway: Quick Wins and Integrated CapabilityLeith RobertsAustralian Defence ForceFirst, be patient.
Imagining potential futures where we create advantage through collaboration.
Is The RAAF Seeking Combat Effectiveness
Daniel Cook
Australian Defence Force