Air and Space Power Conference 2026: 'Building Fighting Depth' - Panel
The Air and Space Power Conference 2026 addressed the topic of air and space power in national defence.
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Data, Data everywhere, Nor Any Drop to Drink: The Case for the Joint Integrator
The Australian government has made very clear that, to defend the nation, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must be an integrated force. This article contends that such a goal remains an unrealised ambition.
A Question of Choice and Strategy: Australia’s F-35 Acquisition
Limited by resources and size the F-35 was the best, and largely only, option available to the ADF that guaranteed long term defense interests.
Air and Space Power Conference 2026 Transcript: Heterogenous Air Power at War
Air and Space Power Conference 2026 Transcript 'Heterogenous Air Power at War'The Air and Space Power Conference 2026 took place at the National Co
The Temptation To Go Beyond Conventional Long-Range Strike
The Temptation To Go Beyond Conventional Long-Range Strike
Daniel Cook
Australian Defence Force
Lessons for the ADF from Operation Spider's Web
Lessons for the ADF from Operation Spider's WebKeirin Joyce, Joshua Vicino, Michael Spencer, and Matthew ChapmanAustralian Defence Force
Chief of Air Force Symposium 2023 Panel 1 - Boosting Capability Development and Delivery
Panel 1: Boosting Capability Development and Delivery
By
Group Captain Michael Burgess-Orton, Mr Chris Deeble, Air Vice-Marshal Wendy Blyth, Air Vice-Marshal Leon Phillips, Major General Andrew Bottrell
The future of air superiority
Abstract
How well does the workforce understand Air Force’s contribution to national power?
Effective realisation of national power in support of Australia’s national interests requires all Aviators to have a clear understanding of their c
The Weaponisation of Toys and Implications for the Air Force
The 'poor man's air force' is a term for employing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hobbyist drones or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to strategic level military effect, and that effect cannot be understated (Waters, 2018; Nadeau, 2022; Shift, 2023). The ability for terror organisations to coordinate multiple layers of effects, including using COTS drones, to destroy Command and Control (C2) nodes in Israel causes alarm. Couple this with the use of COTS drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike and battle-damage assessment missions, and the threat posed by what are essentially toys is alarmingly real.
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