In Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat (Higham & Harris, 2016), historians Robin Higham and Stephen Harris assemble a team of experts to investigate examples of failure and defeat in the application of air power. Overall, Why Air Forces Fail is an interesting and important book because it analyses the reasons why air forces have suffered defeat and failure. It draws some important lessons in this regard, and it provides an excellent resource for those studying air power.
There is a blunt but effective thought experiment for anyone in a leadership role: if you see yourself as the village hero, but everyone you lead sees you as the village idiot, you have a problem.
As a platform for addressing current and prospective regional security concerns, this book provides a valuable contribution to exploring ideas and furthering dialogue in an area of vital concern to future regional security
Applying Wylie's Cumulative and Sequential Patterns to Air OperationsPeter Layton
Strategist Joseph Caldwell Wylie argued that strategies were implemented through two general types of operational patterns: (1) cumulative warfare, which involves “a collection of lesser actions” where tactical actions gradually built up to have strategic impact; and (2) sequential warfare, which is “a series of discrete steps” where each lead to the next; an example being the island hopping campaign across the Pacific during World War Two.
The Air Force Strategy (AFSTRAT) was released in September 2020 with the intent of informing how Air Force will posture itself to deliver air and s
In January 2020, I was privileged to fill the role of Senior ADF Officer (SADFO) and Air Base Executive Officer (ABXO) of the RAAF Base Wagga, as the national bushfire emergency unfolded across the NSW southwest slopes.
The 'poor man's air force' is a term for employing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hobbyist drones or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to strategic level military effect, and that effect cannot be understated (Waters, 2018; Nadeau, 2022; Shift, 2023). The ability for terror organisations to coordinate multiple layers of effects, including using COTS drones, to destroy Command and Control (C2) nodes in Israel causes alarm. Couple this with the use of COTS drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike and battle-damage assessment missions, and the threat posed by what are essentially toys is alarmingly real.
What Can the ADF Learn From Ukraine's Air Defences?Kurt SimmillAustralian Defence ForceWhen Russia invaded Ukraine in Febr
