Australia as a Space Norm Entrepreneur
The unrestrained development of anti-satellite capabilities threatens Australia’s continued access to space.
Ready to explore possibilities for nuclear-engine air power? An informative perspective for air power practitioners on the general characteristics, history, prospects, and risks of nuclear-engines as they potentially disrupt air power and space power.
Space Command should make deliberate decisions on its organisational design by working through each element that will enable the Executive to bypass the constraints of traditional Services. a true representation of Space Command’s successful establishment will be observed when it is considered as part of Australia’s national power and used as such by the Government.
Airbases do not feature significantly in the history of air power unless they are denied.
The ASPC Leader Enrichment Program blog series delivers the thoughts and concepts of the program's junior leaders as they tackle Module 2 - Nationa
Air and space power are critical to the conduct of Australian air operations in ADF joint warfighting.
The ASPC Leader Enrichment Program blog series delivers the thoughts and concepts of the program's junior leaders as they tackle Module 2 - Nationa
Limited by resources and size the F-35 was the best, and largely only, option available to the ADF that guaranteed long term defense interests.
A military force’s ability to ‘know’ their adversary and the environment in which they are operating is regarded as a key determinant in military s
Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.
In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.
The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.
This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.