Technology usually follows a certain progression – first the device gets more features before it reduces in size. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) fill this description perfectly, and we have yet to come up with an adequate defence for them.
Winner of the WOFF-AF Creative Writing Award, this Blog investigates how Air Force can improve its enlisted aviators opportunities without requiring them to commission.
Professional military education is not just box ticking for promotion—a continuum of air and space power education is required to build professional mastery and maintain professional currency.
Insights From Recent Large-Scale Long-Range Drone and Missile AttacksPeter Layton
The ASPC Leader Enrichment Program blog series delivers the thoughts and concepts of the program's junior leaders as they tackle Module 2
The 'poor man's air force' is a term for employing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hobbyist drones or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to strategic level military effect, and that effect cannot be understated (Waters, 2018; Nadeau, 2022; Shift, 2023). The ability for terror organisations to coordinate multiple layers of effects, including using COTS drones, to destroy Command and Control (C2) nodes in Israel causes alarm. Couple this with the use of COTS drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike and battle-damage assessment missions, and the threat posed by what are essentially toys is alarmingly real.
Air Marshal Chipman, former Chief of the Air Force, announced on the eve of the 2023 Avalon Air Show that Australia needs to consider and invest in low-cost mass-produced (LCMP) drones.
The Air Power Development Centre has supported the development of Air Power concepts and strategies since 2004.
Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.
In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.
The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.
This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.
