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Ready to explore possibilities for nuclear-engine air power? An informative perspective for air power practitioners on the general characteristics, history, prospects, and risks of nuclear-engines as they potentially disrupt air power and space power.

This book examines three alliances to determine the lessons learned that can apply to a possible future expansion of the Five Power Defence Arrange

Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.

In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.

The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.

This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.

The current RAAF organizational structure is top-heavy, unbalanced and too compartmentalized. This results in stove piped training, which inhibits high-end, networked and integrated joint collective training.