What Can the ADF Learn From Ukraine's Air Defences?
What Can the ADF Learn From Ukraine's Air Defences?Kurt SimmillAustralian Defence ForceWhen Russia invaded Ukraine in Febr
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Rethinking Air Superiority - Towards an Integrated Framework for Modern Airpower
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Existential Choices: Climate Change and You!
Introduction
A Question of Choice and Strategy: Australia’s F-35 Acquisition
Limited by resources and size the F-35 was the best, and largely only, option available to the ADF that guaranteed long term defense interests.
Navigating Challenges in Australia's Defence Strategy: Enhancing Deterrence Through Cultural Intelligence
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The Temptation To Go Beyond Conventional Long-Range Strike
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Swarms of Trouble: The Hidden Threat of Consumer UAVs
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On the Quest to be Reasonably Informed: Recognition of Risk-Based Design in UAS
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The future of air superiority
Abstract
Development of an ADF Integrated Air and Missile Capability to Combat Advanced Air and Missile Threats - 2019 Wrigley Prize Winner
Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.
In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.
The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.
This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.
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