Evolution of Air Bases - Darwin Revisted
David Miller
Australian Defence Force
This time last year, in my first gig as a reservist, I had the pleasure of presenting to the 20th Australian International Aerospace Congress (AIAC20) on the topic of the MQ-4C Triton airworthiness program. Specifically, I spoke about how it had been structured in lieu of any formal recognition of the United States (US) Navy as a competent design organisation for Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) or any formal airworthiness certification of the design basis for the Triton system itself.
Space as a Strategic Geography
Pete Wooding
Australian Defence Force
The 'poor man's air force' is a term for employing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hobbyist drones or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to strategic level military effect, and that effect cannot be understated (Waters, 2018; Nadeau, 2022; Shift, 2023). The ability for terror organisations to coordinate multiple layers of effects, including using COTS drones, to destroy Command and Control (C2) nodes in Israel causes alarm. Couple this with the use of COTS drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strike and battle-damage assessment missions, and the threat posed by what are essentially toys is alarmingly real.
The onset of the war in Ukraine saw one of the most dramatic shifts in combined arms warfare since the introduction of the machine gun. This shift is attributed to the wide scale introduction of drones to the modern battlefield (Kagan et al, 2024). Principally the conflict is demonstrating drones pioneering new capabilities in reconnaissance, close air support and strategic strike with virtually zero risk to the operator.
In terms of National Power in the past, the majority of modern “Grey-Zone” activities centred on clear Diplomatic, Information, non-lethal Military and Economic actions. What is concerning are the blurred lines developing between these instruments, where often State actions do not meet perceived intent creating confusion in the rules-based global order.
Limited by resources and size the F-35 was the best, and largely only, option available to the ADF that guaranteed long term defense interests.
Understanding the complexities of our modern information-based environment is now fundamental to the success in warfighting and navigating the fog of war. Conversely, the use of traditional information paradigms can lead to unwitting co-option of the adversaries’ plan or world view. We must consider that concepts of reality, truth, and what is right inherently does not completely align amongst different actors and groups. With this understanding, we can build resilience and anti-fragility in our decision-making and analysis.
Airbases do not feature significantly in the history of air power unless they are denied.
