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Underpinning modernisation efforts in the Australian and US Air Forces is the shared recognition that success in the future battle space depends fo

The capabilities of existing and proposed future satellite sensors are examined for their ability to provide wide area surveillance of Australia, and recommendations are made regarding future potentials of space-based surveillance.

Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.

In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.

The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.

This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.

The Kestrel Papers series is one of several publications produced by the Air and Space Power Centre (ASPC).

Air and space power are critical to the conduct of Australian air operations in ADF joint warfighting.

If we are to meet our obligations as professional airmen, we must continue to question, examine and restate our fundamental beliefs.