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Tactical Air Intelligence will face a crisis of relevance in conflicts of the future.

ADF Integration Doctrine
3 Series | Operations

ADF Air Power

In 2016, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) came into being, in part to harmonise with the Australian Wo

Underpinning modernisation efforts in the Australian and US Air Forces is the shared recognition that success in the future battle space depends fo

Access to foreign bases has long been a critical enabler of the ADF, and ongoing access will be key to Australia’s future security. In the past, these Forward Operating Bases (FOB) were considered relatively secure, however continual improvements to the range and accuracy of missiles acquired by adversarial militaries have made these bases attractive targets, being the seemingly soft underbelly of western militaries.

In order to continue utilisation of FOBs, and to guarantee the safety of deployed forces, the ADF cannot remain idle to the threat of advanced air and missile attacks. As such Australia must look to develop its Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities in order to remain secure in future operations.

The aim of the essay is to discuss a range of AMD design and operating concepts to inform the development of an ADF Integrated AMD (IAMD) capability.

This essay will be structured into four key areas: western nations’ historical and future reliance on FOBs to project power; the emerging threat of powerful state and non-state actors; Australia’s response to emerging air and missile threats; and, IAMD design and operational concepts in an Australian context.

Criticism is equally applicable to political and military commander alike. The changing nature of military operations commensurate with the increased commitment to UN activities now requires that military commanders be well versed in ethnicity, history, and cultural factors.

The nature of war demands attention to the human factor above any other single factor.